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Bringer of food rich in provisions, 
creator of all goodness, 
lord of reverence, sweet of scent, 
the one whose coming makes peace, 
creator of plants for the herds, 
provider of butchery for every god. 
While he is in the underworld, 
sky and earth are in his charge. 
Filler of storerooms, enlarger of granaries, 
the one who gives plenty to the orphan. 
 
 
 
Hymn of the Nile circa 2100 BC 
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SUMMARY OF THESIS 
 
Conventionally, the question of Egyptian water security focused on state-centric 
transboundary hydropolitics within the larger context of the Nile basin. The 
presented research explores ‘water security’ beyond this ‘state-centric 
epistemology’, typically focusing on a singular scale of hydropolitical analysis. 
This dissertation examines the water (hydro) politics of transnational land-water 
investments (LWI) within Egypt and the larger context of the Nile river basin. 
Adopting a multi-site case study methodology, it critically examines the changing 
role of the state and the engagement of non-state actors in the silent 
appropriation of land-water resources through investments in farmlands abroad.  
 
The research methodology contextualizes how land acquisitions take several 
shapes and forms within Egypt (Old-New Lands and New Lands/Mega Projects), 
as well as in other Nile basin countries (e.g. Sudan). They also manifest land-
water-food nexus interdependencies for both; profit and larger strategic 
objectives, through the formation of ‘State-Capital alliances’. Deploying a case 
study of an international Emirati investor in Egypt, it shows how land-water 
investments are rooted in a larger socio-political project as part of the state’s 
vision of horizontal expansion and land reclamation, to address its ecological-
demographic narrative of crisis. The research also draws linkages between 
Egyptian water security and transnational investments in other Nile basin 
countries with a particular focus on the case of Sudan as part of its larger vision 
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of the ‘breadbasket of the Arab World’. However, while these State-Capital 
alliances are rooted in narratives of state modernization, security, and profit, they 
entail various tensions and trade-offs amongst different resources nexi and 
actors, thus masking larger questions of social justice and equity. These tensions 
often reflect the manufacture of abundance and translate into water grabs 
transcending multiple hydropolitical scales.  
 
The thesis argues that the changing role of the “entrepreneurial state” and the 
engagement of non-state actors in transnational land-water investments manifest 
a transition from the hydraulic mission towards water security mercantilism. I 
argue that “water security mercantilism” denotes water grabbing, which overrides 
the conventional understanding of the hydraulic mission (water control by the 
state); towards a broader understanding of the role of non-state actors and 
international investors in accessing water, thus creating their own private 
resources security nexus. Hence, drawing on development studies, hydropolitics, 
and political economy scholarship, this dissertation broadens out the analysis of 
Egyptian water security beyond singular-scale state-centric hydropolitical 
debates; towards a multi-level polycentric analysis of water security, central to 
which are the farmers, the investors, and the state itself. This implies that 
transnational land-water investments not only influence small farmers through 
the reproduction of scarcity on the local level, but also influence the hydraulic 
mission of the state on the national level, and the larger Nile basin transboundary 
hydropolitics.  
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction  
 
 
“Twenty-eight years’ experience in reclaiming desert and growing olives 
…has developed the saying: ‘Knowledge and knowhow encompass science; 
but science does not encompass knowledge and knowhow’,” say the 
farmers. (The Left-behind: Democratic Transitions and the 
Mediterranean Agricultural Communities) 
 
 
1.1. Background, Objectives, and Research Questions  
 
 
1.1.1. Egyptian Water Security and the Nile River 
 
 
The natural connection between land and water for agriculture and food 
has been long acknowledged in Egypt. While Ancient Egyptians did not label 
these linkages as the ‘nexus’, they have attributed great importance to the Nile 
River as the main source of life in their desert lands. Ancient Egyptians referred 
to their territory as kemet, the black or arable land, thus distinguishing the 
cultivable portion of their area from the desert, which they called deshret, or the 
red soil (Tignor 2010). The English name Egypt is derived from the Ancient 
Greek Aígyptos (Αἴγυπτος), which signified the waters whose annual flooding 
ensured the fertility of an earth (Kalin 2006). The story of Egypt and the Nile is 
an eternal one, rooted in history, evolving across times, yet still being shaped by 
modern day politics.  
 
As widely acknowledged, the peculiar mystique of the Egyptian 
environment has historically informed the creation of its own sociological 
category; the hydraulic civilization (Kalin 2006; Wittfogel 1953).  The view that 
Egypt has always been and therefore should again become a society with a 
bureaucratic irrigation grid emerged within Napoleon’s (1798-1801) milieu of 
French engineers as depicted in “La Description De L’ Egypte”. During the times 
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of Mohamed Ali (1805-1840) and Nasser (1952-1970), both labeled as founders of 
modern Egypt – the securitization of the ‘Nile water’ has been often synonymous 
with the larger project of modernity and advancing the hydraulic mission of the 
state. That is; the control and manipulation of water resources so that its 
constituents may meet their domestic, industrial and agricultural needs (Allan 
2005; Allouche 2010). Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a key 
element of the state’s hydraulic mission was to expand agriculture beyond the 
margins of the Nile watershed into desert lands. This included hydraulic 
structures, irrigation canals, large-scale land reclamation schemes, as well as 
Mega projects, amongst other state interventions in the water and agriculture 
sectors.  
 
For the state, the land-water nexus is a key constituent of a larger socio-
political project towards modernity. The Nile water flow represents Egypt’s 
foundation to achieve its hydraulic mission and state modernization as stipulated 
in the Nile’s 1929 Colonial era Treaty. Accordingly, water security has been 
traditionally associated with the annual water share based on instruments of 
international law, as further emphasized in the 1959 treaty granting the 
downstream nation 55.5 billion cubic meters. Hence, Egypt’s water security 
debates focused on state-centric transboundary hydropolitics and contestations 
amongst upstream and downstream Nile countries. These debates further 
intensified over the last decade notably with the signing of the cooperative 
framework agreement (CFA) in 2010, as well as the erection of Ethiopia’s Grand 
Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2010-2011 following the Egyptian revolution. Yet, 
much of these debates rooted in the disciplines of international relations and 
international law addressed water security and Nile hydropolitics from a state-
centric, water-focused and deterministic perspectives, typically situated within a 
singular level of analysis at the transboundary level.  
 
Few studies however addressed Egyptian water security beyond this state-centric 
epistemology. In this respect, the topic of land acquisition and trans-boundary 
water management is unchartered territory whereby the effect that ‘transnational 
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land-water investments’ will have on transboundary water resources has not yet 
been analyzed (Jägerskog 2012). In particular, over the last decade, as the food 
and fuel crisis of 2007/08 and 2010/11 unfolded, coupled with growing concerns 
over water scarcity as well as food security and sovereignty, global-demand for 
large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) witnessed unprecedented levels. Non-state 
actors and transnational investors with different profiles and motivations, 
especially from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as well as Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, targeted investments in different Nile 
basin countries, notably Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia amongst others (Annex 3). 
According to Mehta et al. (2012, p.198) “while control over water resources has 
been traditionally associated with state control and domination by national rulers 
(Wittfogel 1953; Worster 1983), the term water grabbing draws attention to the 
involvement of new capitalist players and actors in water resources management 
and the rise of new political and economic power relations through diverse 
trajectories of neo-liberalism” (Mehta et al. 2012, p.198). This process led the 
formation of “state-capital alliances” (Mehta et al. 2013), towards a larger 
political economic project, for maximum use of land and water resources for 
both; profit as well as larger strategic objectives such as food security and food 
sovereignty. 
 
State-capital alliances reflect the growing role of capital and non-state actors’ 
investments in resources acquisition. They also reflect the changing role of the 
state in land deals (Wolford 2013), and consequently water resources use to 
achieve its hydraulic mission. However, the resource politics associated with 
these investments and their political economy processes amongst different state 
and non-state actors are often hidden or silent. Whether these ‘transnational 
state-capital alliances’ contribute to the hydraulic mission of the state remains an 
unanswered question. Furthermore, from an Egyptian water security perspective, 
the water politics and hydropolitical implications of transnational investments 
for state and non-state actors as well as different water users across local, 
national, and transboundary levels of hydropolitical analysis largely remain 
unclear. 
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The originality of this thesis therefore stems from exploring these 
questions, thus broadening out the analysis of Egyptian water security beyond 
state-centric hydropolitical debates. Drawing on development studies, political 
economy, and hydropolitics scholarship, this research inquiry sheds light on the 
water (hydro) politics associated with transnational state-capital alliances and 
land-water investments (LWI) within Egypt and other Nile basin countries (e.g. 
Sudan). Particular attention in directed towards the changing role of the state, 
and the growing engagement of non-state actors in farmland investments amidst 
a changing hydropolitical landscape in the Nile basin. These emerging political 
economy dynamics of transnational resources acquisitions have received little 
attention in the study of hydropolitics, and will be explored in this dissertation, 
notably from an Egyptian water security perspective, central to which are the 
farmers, the investors, and the state itself.  
 
1.1.2. Objectives, and Research Questions 
 
In light of this background, the objective of this research is to explore the politics 
of ‘transnational state-capital alliances’ and the implications of land-water 
investments by non-state actors vis-à-vis Egyptian water security across 
multiple hydropolitical landscapes, on local, national and transboundary levels.   
 
In this respect, the principal research question investigated throughout this 
dissertation is; to what extent “transnational state-capital alliances” affect 
Egyptian water security across multiple hydropolitical scales and landscapes?   
 
The corresponding Sub-questions are: 
 
(i) What are the origins, discourses, and policies of transnational state-capital 
alliances in Egyptian hydropolitics? [Chapters 3 and 4] 
 
(ii) How are transnational “state-capital alliances” practices affecting Egyptian 
water security on national and local levels? [Chapter 4, 5 and 6] 
 
(iii) To what extent transnational “state-capital alliances” are affecting Nile 
hydropolitics? [Chapter 7] 
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1.2. Water Security, Hydropolitics, and Transnational Investments:    
        Theoretical Debates, and Empirical Gaps 
 
 
1.2.1. Water Security beyond State-Centric Narratives: Non-state actors and  
           Hydropolitics of LSLA 
 
Water security is a highly contested concept reflecting a “battle of ideas” 
(Zeitoun et al. 2013, p.2). The classical understanding of water security in the 
context of the modern Egyptian state has been traditionally attributed to the Nile 
basin hydropolitics, often portrayed as a matter of national security (Bakker & 
Morinville 2013; Abdel Wahab 2011).  In most analysis on Egyptian hydropolitics, 
debates have been typically founded on a state-centric epistemology, and 
upstream-downstream transboundary relations, deeply rooted in the disciplines 
of international relations (IR) and international law.  
 
Critical review of transboundary water resources literature identifies LSLA 
and investments in farmlands abroad by non-state actors as an emerging element 
in the study of hydropolitics (Jägerskog 2012). Hydro-politics here is understood 
as “the systematic investigation of the interaction between states, non-state 
actors and a host of other participants, like individuals within and outside the 
state, regarding the authoritative allocation and/or use of international and 
national water resources”  (Elhance 1997). Indeed, by emphasizing the issue of 
international water allocation and state-centric hydropolitics within the larger 
context of international river basins, few studies have taken into consideration 
the changing role of state and non-state actors in transnational LWI.  
 
Furthermore, previous work in the area of international political economy 
identified the concept of virtual water trade, through the contribution of Tony 
Allan linking water, food, and trade (Allan 1997; Allan 2001; Allan 2003). This 
concept attempted to explain how water scarce economies of the Middle East 
overcame their water deficit via global economic processes and trade in 
agricultural commodities, through “embedded water” (Allan 2001; Hoekstra 
2002; Allan 2002b). However, as the 2007/08 and 2011 global crisis led 
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commodity prices to reach their highest levels since 1845 (Berger & Weber 2011), 
international investors and non-state actors showed an appetite for LSLA and 
investments in farmlands abroad.  Drivers of this crisis included temporary 
export restrictions by food exporters such as Argentina, Russia, India, and 
Vietnam, imposed on rice and other exports to ensure domestic supply, and to 
avoid further food price inflation (Woertz 2013b). A second stimulus was the 
global financial crash in 2008 that caused hedge funds and other large 
institutional investors to look for ‘safe’ places to put their money (Anseeuw et al. 
2012; Cotula 2012; Fairbairn 2014). These emerging dynamics were further 
exacerbated given the growing (water) scarcity and security narratives within 
Egypt, the Nile basin, and MENA/GCC regions at large. Consequently, 
throughout the last decade, these political-economic dynamics led to what was 
labeled as ‘land rush’ (Allan 2013; Zetland & Möller-Gulland 2012), thus stirring 
exaggerated debates about land grabs notably in Africa (see the Politics of 
Evidence - Scoones et al. 2013). However, these debates provided evidence for a 
growing role of international investors in the appropriation of land-water 
resources abroad and reflect the changing role of the state towards land deals 
(Wolford 2013). Yet, little is known about the water (hydro) politics of 
transnational state-capital alliances, as well as the water security implications 
associated with LWI, notably in international river basins with already contested 
hydropolitics such as the Nile.  
 
Hence, an often forgotten dimension in the study of hydropolitics from an 
Egyptian water security perspective is the emerging role of non-state actors and 
investors (e.g. sovereign wealth funds, international private sector, private equity, 
financial intermediaries) in the appropriation of farmlands abroad and their 
associated land-water politics within the wider context of the Nile basin.  
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1.2.2. Non-State Actors and Transnational Investments in Egypt and the Nile 
Basin 
 
Water, land, and food resources are increasingly manifesting different trade-offs 
and interdependencies in the global political economy (Allan 2013). While the 
land-water-food nexus presents a form of non-traditional security on the one 
hand; it is also a venue for capital accumulation and large-scale agricultural 
production on the other. Evidence indicates that available fertile ‘land-water’ 
resources in trans-boundary river basins such as the Nile in Africa have become 
prime destinations for LSLA and transnational investments. Egypt, Ethiopia, and 
Sudan are particularly attractive destinations, due to their available land and 
water resources as shown in table 1.1.  
 
Table.1.1 Size of Land Acquisitions in Different Nile Basin Countries 
Source: (Sandstrom et al. 2016). Presentation at the World Water Week 2016, Stockholm, Sweden. Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet. (based on data from Land Matrix, 2014; Deng, 2011; Bossio, 2012; Lavers 2012a, 2012b; Olanya, 2014; 
Hanna, 2016 (chapter 7); Wondwosen, 2016 (chapter 9). 
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While international and Arab investors are present in Egypt, Egyptian (state and 
non-state), Arab, and other international investors are also present in Nile basin 
countries such as Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda. In this respect, the 
engagement of international investors and non-state actors silently targeting the 
appropriation of land and water resources through farmlands abroad, marks the 
rise of new actors and players, which may influence Egypt’s water security 
debates, as well as larger Nile basin hydropolitics. For the state and the investors, 
profit, as well as other strategic interests, are the main motivations behind these 
investments. Yet, these framings of the land-water nexus by state-capital 
alliances often overlook the largest water users; the farmers, although the nexus 
is the foundation of their livelihoods as further discussed in the following section. 
 
1.2.3. A changing Role of the State: Linking Water Security, Nexus, & Water 
Grabs across multiple scales 
 
Land-water investments entail various interdependencies and tensions between 
different (water-energy-food-land-climate) resources elements, technically 
labelled as “nexus” (from the Latin ‘nectare’ to bind together). For the state, 
despite pre-occupation with traditional (national) security, the (land-water-food) 
nexus presents a form of non-traditional security taking into consideration the 
linkages between different resources elements (Allouche et al. 2014). 
 
In Egypt, during the second half of the twentieth century, the state played the 
larger role in horizontal expansion and land reclamation to achieve the ‘green 
desert dreams’ in order to address its “ecological-demographic narrative of crisis” 
(see Sims 2015). From the state’s standpoint, the Nile waters represent a matter 
of ‘national security’ (Abdel Wahab 2011) to address this narrative of crisis 
founded on the twin challenges of demographic growth/population density in the 
narrow valley and overcrowded delta best known as ‘too many people on too little 
land’ (Mitchell 2002), as well as the unreachable goal of self-sufficiency to feed a 
growing population. In addition, with the liberalization of the economy since the 
late 1970s, the state aimed at achieving the paradoxical policy objective of 
 21 
growing the agricultural sector for both domestic food security as well as 
expansion to export market through high value crops generating foreign 
currency. 
 
Large-scale land reclamation projects ranged from state sponsored schemes 
adopting the Soviet model (1950s-60s), to a US farm type depending on domestic 
private sector (70s-90s) mostly in Old-New Lands. Furthermore, during the last 
two decades, the state launched Mega national projects (mashroua’at kawmeya 
3emlaka) such as South Valley (Toshka), Al Salam Canal, and ‘1.5 million feddan 
project’. These Mega projects mark the state’s approach towards its hydraulic 
mission in the new millennia, an essential element of which is to invest heavily in 
infrastructure to attract international investors and to explore surface Nile water 
as well as groundwater resources.  These evolving approaches towards a larger 
socio-political and economic project of horizontal expansion and greening the 
desert reflect the changing role of the state towards its hydraulic mission.  
 
 As Hillhorst and Zoomers (2011) indicate, the contemporary processes of 
LSLA differ from earlier times where major actors, such as host governments, 
international agribusiness companies, and agro-investors, have changed 
positions. Host governments are now actively promoting foreign investment in 
the water and agriculture sectors through land acquisitions. This policy contrasts 
with the post-independence period, when foreign control of land was opposed, 
and in some cases led to its nationalization, while today, host countries 
emphasize the opportunity for investments, employment and innovation 
(Hilhorst & Zoomers 2011, p.7).  
 
In today’s global economy, host governments often perceive foreign investors as a 
source of capital and high-level technology, implying modernity, connection to 
international markets and integration within the larger global economy. While 
these perceptions are often taken at face value, there is little questioning in Egypt 
or other Nile basin countries about the other side of the coin, or the 
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(environmental, socio-economic, and political) risks associated with FDI and 
transnational investments, especially in areas related to natural resources 
appropriation, notably land and water.  
 
State-capital alliances and the engagement of non-state actors in the 
appropriation of land-water resources reflect the changing role of the state in 
land deals (Wolford 2013) denoting an alternative approach to achieve the 
‘national’ hydraulic mission (notably horizontal expansion and Mega projects). 
These alliances take place in two different political domains; the first is in the 
home country between the government (e.g. Abu Dhabi Food Control Authority) 
and domestic private sector capable of investing in farmlands abroad, to address 
questions of physical water scarcity, as well as food security and sovereignty (e.g. 
Gulf countries). The second domain lies within the host country (typically 
endowed with land and water resources e.g. Nile basin, other locations), whereby 
transnational state-capital alliances take place through the development of large-
scale agricultural investments by foreign investors. However, the two domains 
are not mutually exclusive.  
 
Overall, there is a perceived general pattern that investors do not seek lands that 
do not have water for production in the first place. So, land in itself is 
meaningless for their purpose without water (Mehta et al. 2012). In this respect, 
the engagement of global players and non-state actors in LSLA, to address the so-
called ‘global crisis’ narrative also stirs debates about resources (land/water) 
grabs (Srivastava & Mehta 2014). Despite the growing interdependencies 
between different elements of [a] nexus for different actors, Allouche et al. (2015) 
indicate that the nexus “masks a bigger debate on resource inequality and access, 
contributing to social instability”. While the research recognizes the importance 
of land-water-food interdependencies as a way to ensure water and food security, 
it also critically explores how these interdependencies may result in water grabs 
across multiple hydropolitical landscapes. ‘Water grabs’ as a concept has been 
typically addressed from the lenses of social justice, livelihoods and equity on 
local level, but rarely if ever from a hydro-political standpoint.  
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In this respect, ‘water grabs’ literature is a useful ‘hook’ for drawing out the 
complex power relationships and geopolitics behind international water 
interdependencies (Warner et al. 2013; Sebastian & Warner 2013, p.2). This 
concept will be deployed to examine the water (hydro) politics of land deals not 
only on the local level, but also across national, and transboundary levels of 
hydropolitical analysis. Central to these hydropolitical interactions across these 
different levels are the state, the investors, and the farmers. As such, from an 
Egyptian water security standpoint, it is argued that water grabs not only affect 
small farmers and natural capital on the local level, but also have implications on 
the hydraulic mission at the national level including surface and groundwater, as 
well as Nile hydropolitics on the transboundary level.  
 
1.2.4. A Multi-level Water Security Analysis  
 
To examine the water politics of transnational LWI from an Egyptian water 
security perspective (within Egypt on local, national levels, and in Sudan on the 
transboundary level) a multi-level water security framework is proposed. In this 
respect, Pahl-wostl et al. (2008) draw attention to the importance of adopting a 
global perspective on water governance by recognizing that “local, national, and 
basin-level water issues are interlinked within a global water system” (Pahl-wostl 
et al. 2008, p.421). This is especially true given that most analysis on water 
security focused on different levels (the local, or the national, or the river) 
reflecting a scalar mismatch (Bakker, 2012). This mismatch overlooks the 
interconnection between different actors and multiple levels of hydropolitical 
analysis. As such, this global perspective calls for adopting a ‘multilevel 
polycentric’ (Bakker et al. 2013) approach to do justice to the complexity of 
current water security processes and challenges, and to address the scalar 
mismatch in state-centric water security analysis. A multilevel water security 
approach is particularly relevant to understand how LSLA reflect the growing 
interdependencies and trade-offs between land-water-food resources for the 
state, the investors, and the farmers. This analytical approach towards water 
security is also useful to understand the water politics associated with 
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transnational land-water investments across multiple hydropolitical landscapes 
on the local, national, and transboundary levels.  This also means that this thesis 
will broaden out the analysis of insights on hydropolitics to multiple and 
interconnected scales by deploying a multi-level water security approach to 
understand the interrelation between domestic politics and international 
relations (Menga 2016).   
 
In light of these theoretical debates, the rationale and raison d’être of this 
research is twofold;  (i) to critically examine water security debates beyond 
narrow state-centric water focused deterministic perspectives (Jägerskog 2012) 
in order to put water into its relevant place in the broader political economy. The 
thesis will address this research gap by examining the role of non-state actors, 
and international investors engaged in LSLA and the implications of 
transnational state-capital alliances on Egyptian water (hydro) politics; and (ii) to 
examine the relationship between LWI and their corresponding transnational 
state-capital alliances vis-à-vis Egyptian water security across multiple scales of 
hydropolitical analysis. By doing so, the research aims not only to identify the 
water security implications of land investments and water grabs locally, but also 
on national and transboundary levels. 
 
Therefore, this dissertation attempts to explore changing notions of Egyptian 
water security beyond the rhetoric of state-centric hydropolitics and narratives of 
conflict, cooperation, or hegemony within the larger context of the Nile basin. 
First, as it relates to the concept of water security, the thesis suggests that focus 
should not be just on upstream-downstream state relations; rather it should take 
into consideration the role of non-state actors and financial investors, engaged in 
the appropriation of land-water resources in international river basins through 
land-scale investments. Second, water security is not subject to a singular level of 
analysis. In the context of Egypt, water security was traditionally framed as an 
issue of national security connected to the international level of transboundary 
hydropolitical analysis. However, water security analysis needs to reflect the 
connection between local, national, and international levels, especially as it 
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relates to the implications of land-water investments across multiple 
hydropolitical landscapes of Egyptian water politics.   
 
1.3.  A Multi-Site Case Study Methodology of Egyptian Water Security & 
Transnational Land-Water Investments  
 
 
This section explains the methodology, research design, and research 
methods deployed across the thesis to answer the research questions. 
Methodology is a branch of knowledge that deals with method and its application 
in a particular field of study (Evans et al. 2011, p.127). To answer the research 
question(s), a Multi-Site Case Study Methodology was deployed to overcome the 
limitations of the ‘state-centric epistemology’ associated with hydropolitics 
analysis. A case study is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used” (Yin 1984, p.23).   
 
Multisite Case studies are characterized by their multilevel, multidimensional 
characteristics. This methodology was selected to address the multi-level water 
security implications of transnational land-water investments on local and 
national levels within Egypt, as well as their transboundary aspects in Nile basin, 
notably in Sudan.  The criteria for selecting a multi-site case study is based on its 
potential to elicit common findings from across different settings (Bishop et al. 
2012). Another criteria to select the multi-site case study is its flexibility as a 
method and strategy, whereby it “can become the overarching framework of 
research that consists of several related investigations” (Bishop et al. 2012, 
p.588). This approach is also useful given that hydropolitics are complex, with 
multiple interrelated levels.  As argued earlier, hydropolitics are also multi actor 
including different users such as states, farmers, investors, and citizens, in 
addition to other stakeholders such as technocrats from hydrocracies, policy 
makers, NGOs, as well as researchers.  
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Hence, a Multi-Site Case Study Methodology explores ‘transnational state-capital 
alliances’ and the associated ‘water politics’ on different levels to capture the full 
perspectives from different state, non-state actors, and key players in Egypt and 
in the Nile basin. Accordingly, a number of qualitative research methods have 
been deployed to collect data on these three scales of analysis. The following 
sections outline the deployed research methods, triangulation, reflexivity, and 
challenges for conducting research in Egypt.  
 
1.3.1. Case Study Background, Field Work and Limitations 
 
 
Initially, my research objective was to examine transnational land-water 
investments by foreign investors and non-state actors upstream in the Nile (e.g. 
in Sudan and Ethiopia) and their hydropolitical implications on Egyptian water 
security (downstream). However, due to security and access challenges, extended 
fieldwork in Sudan was not possible. For this reason, and for practicality, the 
research focus has been directed to examine transnational land-water 
investments by non-state actors and investors primarily within Egypt. 
Furthermore, the research also encompassed investments by Egyptian (state and 
non-state actors) as well as other international investors in the Nile basin, with a 
particular focus on Sudan. Therefore, the research design focused on the 
implications of transnational state-capital alliances and their corresponding land-
water investments as an emerging element in the study of Egyptian water security 
across local, national, and transboundary levels of hydropolitical analysis. 
 
The research was conducted primarily in Egypt during the period between 
January 2015 and December 2016. My findings are the result of fieldwork carried 
out adopting a multisite case study approach to understand the emerging role of 
non-state actors and address the multilevel aspects of transnational LWI on local, 
national, and transboundary levels of Egyptian water security analysis. To 
understand the water security implications of transnational investments across 
multiple hydropolitical landscapes, the research employed a combination of 
research methods. These ranged from participant observation (including farmers, 
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investors and policy makers), semi-structured interviews with a range of actors 
within and outside of Egypt, discourse analysis, archival research mostly of 
Arabic material, historical analysis, as well as analysis of national (Egypt) and 
regional (Sudan/Nile basin) data on water resources, demographic, and 
agriculture/irrigation investments. A total number of 72 interviews were held 
throughout the fieldwork process (See Annex 1). Out of these, 56 semi-structured 
interviews were held with investors, experts, policy makers, government officials, 
and NGOs primarily within Egypt, but also in Sudan. In addition a total number 
of 24 unstructured interviews were conducted within Egypt with farmers and 
water users where the selected case study company operates, out of which 16 
interviews were used. 
 
An essential element of the research, and actually the most challenging, was to 
identify an international investor in Egypt for the purpose of the Case Study. In 
this respect, Al Dahra Agricultural Company from Abu Dhabi in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) was identified as a main investor with presence in Egypt across 
four different farmland areas [with plans to expand to Sudan]. Al-Dahra Egypt 
was founded in 2007 and started operations in 2008 “as a result of a 
collaborative effort between the governments of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Egypt” (Interview #19), reflecting a form of ‘transnational state-capital 
alliance’ as discussed earlier. Al-Dahra Egypt specializes in land reclamation and 
infrastructure set up, considered as core competencies of the company. The 
primary purpose of the company’s investments in Egypt was to develop 
agricultural projects for cultivation, production and export of food products and 
animal feed. The company’s strategy is based on acquiring large-scale agricultural 
farmland (or desert reclamation land) in different locations in Egypt, motivated 
by the availability of water resources from both the Nile and  groundwater 
resources (Interview #19). Worth noting that Egypt is a special case since there is 
very little rainwater, and therefore supplementary irrigation is not possible, 
making it a unique place for irrigation and agriculture (Interviews #4 & #19). 
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The selection of the case study (Al Dahra) was not an easy task. Transnational 
LWI are relatively a recent phenomenon. Many of these land deals are not 
announced, and even when announced little information is provided about them. 
Access to Al Dahra Company took place as part of my interviews with an 
irrigation expert who had been employed by the company. From here I was able 
to contact the company, and interview its South African CEO in Egypt and the 
MENA region, as well as the farm managers and staff in the company’s farmlands 
in Egypt.  
 
The case study was designed based on fieldwork in 2 out of the 4 farmlands 
investments within Egypt’s Nile watershed where the company operates.  
Fieldwork was undertaken in Al Salheya located east of Nile Delta reachable 
through a two and half hour ride from Cairo, as well as Al Nubareya located west 
of Nile delta on the road to Alexandria, also reachable via an hour and a half ride 
from Cairo. In both these sites, multiple visits were undertaken to conduct 
interviews with smallholders and water users depending on the same irrigation 
canals as the investors in each location often leading to competition over water 
resources. Worth noting, that the company had two additional sites of farmland 
investments in Toshka and East Oweinat, significantly larger than the selected 
ones, however fieldwork was not also possible there for two reasons. The first is 
related to security, as at the time of the fieldwork (2015 and 2016) the political 
environment in Egypt was still in turmoil following the events of 2011 and 2013, 
thus imposing limitations on researchers’ mobility within the country. This 
challenging environment had also affected most international organizations, or 
foreign affiliated researchers or experts engaged in different projects and 
initiatives in Egypt. The second reason why fieldwork was not undertaken in the 
remote sites is the sheer fact that both farmlands were still at the early stage of 
their development (notably Toshka) and the company was not necessarily willing 
to invite researchers to visit the sites. Reaching there on my own without the 
company was therefore risky and entailed safety issues for me as a researcher 
working on such as a sensitive topic. Furthermore, as it relates to the conceptual 
scope of the research, the presence of the farmers in these location is almost rare, 
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and therefore testing the water grabs implications on other water users would not 
have been applicable in this context. Nevertheless, issues related to land-water 
politics and nexus tensions have been addressed (see chapter 5) through primary 
interviews and secondary data material, which was also a challenging task, yet an 
interesting one.  
 
To capture the views of water users under the category of Old-New Lands, field 
interviews were undertaken in both locations where the company operates. 
Interviews with the farmers depending on Al Kassara canal in Al Salheya, and 
those depending on Al Nasr canal in Nubareya have been conducted separately. 
In Al Nubareya, 10 interviews were conducted while in Al Salheya 14 interviews 
were conducted with a total of 24 unstructured interviews and group discussions 
in total with smallholders and water users in both areas over a span of 3 months 
from January to March 2016. Out of these 16 interviews were used in the actual 
analysis, while the remaining provided useful background insights. Data collected 
from different smallholders and water users in Al Salheya and Al Nubareya 
focused on identifying common patterns and challenges related to the land-
water-food and land-water-energy nexus in both locations under the category of 
Old-New Lands. In addition to fieldwork in both sites, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with NGOs active in these areas and familiar with smallholder 
challenges in land reclamation schemes in Old-New Lands. In addition, a wide 
range of experts, policy elites, donor and specialized UN agencies, government 
representatives, domestic investors, academic researchers, and stakeholders 
engaged in the water-agriculture sectors, as well as land-water investments, in 
Egypt, Sudan, and the Nile basin at large.  
 
In this respect, key limitations associated with collection of primary data for the 
case study is the sheer opaque nature of the topic, whereby most of these deals 
are low profile. Furthermore, accessing water users and different landholders 
around the company’s sites was not an easy task that affected the sample size of 
small farmers in the researched areas, and can be considered as a limitation of 
this study. Nevertheless, the findings addressed common patterns, historical 
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challenges and chronic tensions associated with small holders and land-water 
resources in Old-New Lands, with a particular focus on Al Salheya and Al 
Nubareya East and West of Nile Delta. Furthermore, farmers’ views were 
triangulated with primary interviews data from three different specialized NGOs 
and research centers who have worked extensively with different water users in 
Old-New lands and desert reclamation projects. These views were also supported 
and triangulated with secondary sources and literature depicting challenges with 
small farmers and water users in Egypt’s land reclamation projects. Hence 
different primary and secondary data sources added a perspective to the scarcity 
narratives and confirmed existing patterns and challenges associated with 
smallholders and land-water resources in the studied areas under the category of 
‘Old-New Lands’.  
 
As for the data on Toshka and Oweinat, this mainly relied on primary interviews 
with company executives, policy makers, and technical experts with intensive 
experience in these two locations. Additional secondary data was collected using 
audio-visual material and other official government reports in Arabic. Overall, 
the presented data offers a comprehensive account for the views of multiple 
stakeholders based on alternative data collection strategies as outlined above. 
Primary data on farmers and small investors interviews were triangulated with 
expert views, government statements, as well as official documents and reports to 
capture the divergence of difference discourses amongst different actors.  
 
Insights from the case study and fieldwork on local and national levels within 
Egypt were complemented by an analysis of land-water investments on the 
transboundary level by portraying Sudan as a case study. Data collection for this 
component of the research was based on interviews with key Sudanese policy 
makers and investors, as well as Egyptian investors operating in Sudan. 
Additional insights were gained from conducting semi-structured interviews with 
different actors and stakeholders including NGOs, Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)  
staff, and other Nile basin experts.  Interviews with Egyptian investors in Sudan 
took place in Cairo. Access to additional interviews took place during a short visit 
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to Sudan where I was invited to present at a SIWI-IWMI workshop during 
December 2016. During this visit to Sudan I had the chance to hold a number of 
interviews including Sudanese investors, policy makers, and academics. For 
example, a key interview and site visit to a farmland area was held with the 
largest Sudanese agricultural investor (Dal Corporation).  No farmers’ interviews 
were held in Sudan. Additional data was collected during my participation in 
international conferences such as the World Water Week in Stockholm during 
August 2016 where I presented my research at a high level panel attended by 
Ministers of water resources and irrigation from Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. 
Furthermore, access to a number of experts, academics, and African civil society 
entities working on water issues took place during my participation at the Nile 
Basin Development forums during October 2014 in Nairobi, Kenya and October 
2017 in Kigali, Rwanda.  
 
The combination of these insights from different actors allowed further 
understanding of the politics associated with LWI, primarily from an investor 
perspective. The changing role of the state, the dynamics of state-capital alliances 
and the challenges faced by small farmers were also explored as an essential 
element in the study of Egyptian water security across multiple levels. Most 
analysis in this dissertation ends in 2016, however insights and findings remain 
relevant to contemporary debates on Egyptian water security within the larger 
context of Nile basin hydropolitics. 
 
1.3.2. Research Methods   
 
A wide range of data collection methods was undertaken across multiple sites to 
gain wider perspectives on the politics of land-water investments and state-
capital alliances at different scales of analysis.  To collect data in line with a 
multi-site case study methodology, research methods included both primary and 
secondary sources of data. Primary data and first hand insights were collected 
from various interviews with a range of respondents and stakeholders, within 
Egypt, as well as in Sudan. Given the nature of the topic, most interviews were 
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anonymous. This issue has also limited to a large extent the pool of respondents 
notably within Egypt, as many had perceived the topic as a sensitive issue.  
During the initial stage of the fieldwork, actor mapping was undertaken to 
identify different state and non-state actors, their institutional affiliations as well 
as their ongoing and planned agricultural investments in Egypt and Sudan, as 
well as other Nile basin countries. For this purpose the research process has also 
benefited from the interaction with the Land Matrix (www.landmatrix.com) and 
its committed staff in charge of capturing land deals and corresponding water 
resources in different parts of Africa and the Nile basin including both Egypt and 
Sudan. The interaction with LandMatrix took place via skype interviews and 
access to their primary databases which were triangulated with other primary 
sources mostly from consultants and experts working on the topic, as well as 
secondary sources. The research also relied on state-of-the-art studies 
undertaken by senior consultants addressing land deals in Africa, most notably a 
commissioned study by the Dutch government which was made public and I was 
able to receive a copy of courtesy of an interviewed expert.  
 
To capture perspectives on land-water issues at the national and local levels 
within Egypt, the research adopted a case study approach combined with semi-
structured interviews. Primary data from the different interviews targeted 
different stakeholders involved in water and agriculture sectors such as 
government entities, donor agencies, small and large private sector investors, 
think tanks, as well as civil society organizations. Key informant interviews were 
held with company executives in Egypt who had also provided me with access to 
visit two out of their four farmlands, notably in al Salheya and Al Nubareya 
located east and west of the Nile Delta respectively. Interviews were undertaken 
with the company’s South African CEO in Egypt, as well as Egyptian and South 
African farm managers in both locations. Fieldwork in these sites also entailed 
interviews with company staff, and technicians in each farmland, in addition to 
labour and contractors who have periodically worked in some of the studied 
regions (not necessarily in Al Dahra projects). In addition to interviews with farm 
managers and company staff during my fieldwork at these sites, unstructured 
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random interviews were conducted with different water users operating in the 
same locations as the company including small farmers and domestic investors, 
mostly depending on the same irrigation canals in both sites.  
 
To complement the case study research, additional interviews entailed a range of 
respondents engaged in Egypt’s water and agriculture sectors including financial 
investors, private sector agricultural companies, irrigation and agricultural 
specialists, water policy experts, senior government officials as well as academics, 
think tanks and NGOs in Egypt, Sudan, and internationally. Interviews were also 
held with a number of international experts from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) notably the Water Scarcity Initiative (WSI), the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the NBI. 
 
To capture the views of the state about the relevance of the company’s 
investments in relation to the larger hydraulic mission, primary interviews were 
conducted with a wide range of respondents as shown in Annex 1. Key informant 
interviews, elite interviews, and informal discussions included the present 
Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation in Egypt, as well as previous 
ministers. Previous consulting assignments with donor-funded and development 
projects with the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) with both 
the planning sector and the Nile Water Sector have also provided insight on key 
technical issues related to water resources in Egypt. However, I had kept my 
distance and integrity as an independent researcher during these interactions.  
 
For the analysis of land-water investments on the transboundary level, the 
research portrays Sudan as a case study. Research methods for this element of 
the research included different interviews with some international and domestic 
investors in Sudan, key policy makers, NGOs, and experts on Egyptian-Sudanese 
relations. Key Informants Interviews with both domestic as well as international 
agricultural companies operating in Egypt, and Sudan were targeted. Some of 
these included a long series of interviews with key informant portrayed as 
Egyptian private equity investors (Citadel Capital) investing in both Sudan and 
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South Sudan mostly undertaken in Egypt. Additional interviews were held with 
Nile Basin Initiative officials and secretariat members to understand how land-
water investments in the Nile basin are being addressed, and how they can 
influence transboundary hydropolitics.  
 
These views were triangulated by field observations as well as secondary 
resources mostly comprised of official policy documents (in Arabic), literature, as 
well as official statistics. My personal notes and observations throughout the 
research process benefited greatly from an iterative learning approach, based on 
several interactions and encounters with a wide range of stakeholders and 
different actors within Egypt, and to some extent in Sudan, but also in different 
international venues. Throughout the course of my research, I had also the 
opportunity to participate in a number of meetings as well as seminars, and 
conferences, addressing issues of Nile basin water resources, the nexus, 
sustainability and environmental issues, amongst other issues.  
 
An example of the meetings included the Water-Energy-Food Nexus experts 
meeting in the League of Arab States (LAS) in coordination with GIZ technical 
office in Cairo in April 2015.  In addition, I had the chance to be part of the 
experts roundtables on Green Economy Strategy in Egypt and the Sustainable 
Consumption and Production National Action Plans which included water, 
agriculture, energy, and waste as key sectors during May-June 2016. Other events 
included the UNECE meeting (May 2014) in UN in Geneva to discuss the 
Convention on Water Resources, as well as the Hydro Hegemony (HH7) 
Workshop convened by the University of East Anglia in London also during May 
2014. During these meetings, I had the opportunity to follow the discussions and 
make observations about the discussed topics. Additional observations and 
encounters took place in international venues, where I had the chance to present 
my research to different specialist audiences including; the World Water Forum 
in Stockholm in August 2016, the SIWI-IWMI Workshop on Land Investments in 
Sudan in December 2016, as well as the NBI conferences in Kenya in October 
2014, and in Rwanda in October 2017. These events have positively contributed 
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to the research, both in terms of engaging with the wider epistemic community, 
as well as testing the relevance and validation of the research framework in 
contemporary policy debates. During all these events and interactions, I had the 
chance to develop research notes and key observations, which were crucial in 
complementing my understanding about the politics of water resources from the 
different state and non-state actors perspectives’.  Key moments of change noted 
throughout this process was the acknowledgement by policy makers within most 
Nile basin countries of the importance of the topic, and the rising momentum to 
better understand the role of non-state actors and corporate investments in the 
Nile’s land-water resources. This changing discourse allows shedding further 
light on the topic of transnational investments and water security, whereas this 
thesis attempts to further explore the topic and contribute to this rising debate.  
 
The research methodology also relied on secondary data in in Arabic, English, 
and French languages. Research methods included archival research, review of 
official documents, as well as audiovisual material notably youtube and other 
social media outlets. Data sources included reports, newspaper, published and 
unpublished official reports in Arabic and other languages, hydro resource 
experts and academics reports, non-government organizations and business 
reports, donor technical documents, government documents and press releases. 
Worth noting for this type of academic inquiry research data is usually hard to get 
and entails a high degree of sensitivity due to the political nature of the topic. In 
addition, I relied on the archive of Library of Alexandria where I spent different 
periods of research in Arabic, English, and French languages documents, 
particularly addressing contemporary statistics as well as historical archives, both 
of which were available there.  
 
1.3.3. Ethical Considerations and Reflexivity  
 
Reflexivity can be partly understood as the recognition of the social conditions 
within which the researcher constructs knowledge accounts (Dunne et al. 2005). 
I view my cultural linkages with Egypt, notably through my knowledge of Arabic 
language as an element that has facilitated my research process. The absence of 
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the language barrier and my familiarity with Egypt based on my previous work 
experience and engagement with some donor funded projects addressing socio-
economic and environmental issues in Nile basin (Assessment of Nile Basin 
Discourse in 2011; Evaluation of the Environmental and Social Frameworks of 
the Lake Nasser/Nubia Project with the Nile Water Sector at MWRI funded by 
World Bank 2012-2014; Direct involvement in UNEP project to formulate Egypt’s 
Sustainable Consumption and Production Action Plan notably in the water and 
agriculture sectors 2016)  have assisted me in accessing research material and 
personnel that I can interview. Given my practical and professional background is 
more associated with providing advisory services, research, and consulting 
assignments, this may have influenced my approach during fieldwork, notably in 
accessing interviewees working at the policy/practical levels as opposed to 
farmers. Nevertheless, engagement with policy makers, government entities, 
investors, and other stakeholders in both Egypt and Sudan was not an easy task, 
and entailed several failed attempts to conduct interviews given the political 
nature of the topic as discussed in section 1.3.4 depicting challenges and 
limitations for conducting research in Egypt.   
 
An important part of an academic study is the ethical concerns relevant to the 
research and data collection process. During fieldwork, respondents and 
interviewees participated voluntarily and were informed about the objectives of 
the research and my affiliation as a researcher with the University of Sussex and 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). The views and concerns of all 
involved parties in the research were addressed professionally within the given 
data collection context. Before the interview, I explained the nature of my 
research and its objective and the ethical aspects including confidentiality and 
anonymity. In some cases respondents allowed me to voice record the interview, 
in other occasions it was not possible. All photos taken on site were done under 
the permission of the farmland managers. All interviews were coded based on 
position, location and dates of interview.  This applies to semi-structured 
interviews with investors, policy makers, NGOs, and farmers amongst other 
research participants. This was necessary, as otherwise many participants would 
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have refused to be interviewed. Worth noting however that despite promising 
anonymity several approached potential respondents refused to be interviewed. 
All interview material was treated with confidentiality according to the 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research.  
 
1.3.4. Research Challenges in Egypt and Study Limitations 
 
Since the onset of this PhD research, the study design took into consideration the 
methodological challenges in identifying and quantifying land investments and 
water grabs, and their corresponding implications. It took a long time to identify 
transnational investors in Egypt, and even more time to access them. A key 
limitation in this respect was to capture views of the most powerful player within 
the state, that is the army. This is mostly related to the sensitivities around this 
actor and the security concerns associated with handling data of sensitive nature. 
To address this limitation, the thesis relied on secondary data portraying official 
interviews and statements by representatives of this key player relying on ‘official 
statements’ in newspaper articles and official public reports. Overall, views of this 
key player were represented as part of the state’s narrative towards water security 
within and outside of Egypt. For the interviewed company, it was hard to visit 
remote sites due to security concerns. Interviews with several potential 
respondents were not undertaken given their unwillingness to address the topic. 
Most surprisingly, several non-Egyptian experts and expat workers in 
international organizations refused to be interviewed also due to the nature of the 
topic. For this reason, research extended for two years, with periods of 
bottlenecks and slow progress.  
 
1.4.      Dissertation Thesis & Arguments  
 
The thesis of this dissertation argues that the engagement of non-state actors in 
transnational land-water investments denotes the changing role of the state from 
the ‘hydraulic mission’ towards ‘water security mercantilism’. Transnational 
land-water investments by non-state actors in Egypt and the Nile basin at large 
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are facilitated by ‘state-capital alliances’ and reflect the changing notion of state-
centric hydropolitics. I argue that “water security mercantilism” denotes water 
grabbing, which overrides the traditional role of the state and its hydraulic 
mission, towards a broader understanding of water security based on the role of 
non-state actors and international investors in accessing water, thus creating 
their own private land-water-food security nexus.  From an Egyptian water 
security standpoint, the hydropolitical implications of state-capital alliances and 
transnational land-water investments by non-state actors transcend multiple 
landscapes, beyond singular-scale state-centric hydropolitical views, towards a 
multi-level polycentric analysis of water security. 
 
In relation to the emerging role of non-state actors in transnational land-water 
investments and their implications on Egyptian water security, the thesis puts 
forward three key arguments; 
 
First, LWI taking place in the Nile basin as well as other locations globally reflect 
the changing role of state and non-state actors towards water security and the 
formation of (trans)-national ‘State-Capital Alliances’. In this respect the land-
water-food nexus is framed as a political-economic commodity. This is especially 
manifested in the Gulf-Nile connection. The engagement of non-state actors and 
international investors in the appropriation of land-water resources is facilitated 
by state-capital alliances taking place on two different fronts; (i) the first is 
‘national state-capital alliances’ which occur between home governments 
(typically water scarce e.g. Gulf states) and non-state actors/national investors  
capable of investing in farmlands abroad for profit as well as larger strategic 
objectives of water/food security (supply of strategic crops). (ii) The second front 
consists of ‘transnational state-capital alliances’ between host governments and 
international investors/non-state actors aiming to appropriate land-water 
resources through large-scale investments. Across different Nile basin countries, 
transnational state-capital alliances take several shapes and forms, including; 
Arab investments in Egypt; Egyptian investments in Sudan; Arab investments in 
Sudan; International investments in Egypt and Sudan. As such each of these 
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transnational state-capital alliances are rooted in domestic politics and 
international relations serving larger socio-political and economic objectives for 
both state and non-state actors in home and host countries.  In particular, Arab 
and Gulf investments driven by a regional water scarcity narrative in the Middle 
East and North Africa, target Egypt (with its advanced infrastructure and Mega 
projects) and Sudan as the “breadbasket of the Arab world” (Woertz 2013a). In 
this respect the land-water resources of the Nile nations represents an 
opportunity for “joint” economic development and food security in the Arab 
World. They may also represent multiple forms of water grabs taking place across 
multiple hydropolitical scales (local, national, transboundary). These alliances 
and emerging actors represent a new variable in the Nile basin hydropolitics and 
consequently Egyptian water security.  
 
The second argument discusses how transnational investments are founded on 
the manufacture of abundance. It addresses the land-water-food nexus as both an 
opportunity and [a] risk for different state and non-state actors. The manufacture 
of abundance across the thesis implies that the state is trying to do too much with 
too little. With a limited water budget, increased competition for irrigation 
(either for profit, food security, or for sustaining livelihoods) may lead to creating 
tensions between the different nexus elements (e.g. land, water, energy, food, 
etc..) and different actors including  the investors and other water users. These 
tensions may also entail water grabs and often result a reproduction of scarcity 
narratives notably in areas with inherent water stress situations, thus masking 
larger social justice and equity challenges for small farmers. These tensions also 
reflect the absent role of the state on the ground.  
 
On the one hand, the nexus presents a form of non-traditional security, while on 
the other hand it is a venue for capital accumulation and large-scale agricultural 
production through foreign investments. Land-Water resources 
interdependencies highlight how transnational LWI take several shapes and 
forms within Egypt or other Nile basin countries. Different actors perceive land 
and water resources differently. For the state, LSLA and international 
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investments in Mega schemes are perceived as a key element to address the 
nation’s persistent ecological-demographic narrative of crisis, but also to 
maximize economic return from FDI to modernize the agricultural sector. For the 
investors, land and water resources are essential economic inputs to achieve two 
key objectives; profit, as well as larger strategic objectives often related to food 
security and food sovereignty. For the farmers land and water resources are often 
a synonym of livelihoods and the larger struggle to survive given today’s market 
economy.  
 
However, nexus framings rooted in larger narratives of security and profit, often 
overlook the largest water users; the farmers.  Although the [land-water] nexus is 
the foundation of farmers’ livelihoods, investment processes often result in water 
grabs, thus masking larger questions of social justice and equity. As such, these 
transnational state-capital alliances embracing larger business and strategic goals 
often mask Nexus tensions, thus creating frustrations for both the farmers and 
the investors. These tensions reflect the absent role of the state on the ground 
often manifested in water quality, water quantity, access to electricity, or other 
challenges related to production. Furthermore, where international investments 
are present in locations of existing water stress, this may create tensions between 
investors and different water users. On the local level, nexus opportunities and 
risks shed light on larger questions of social justice notably as it relates to LSLA 
and water grabs. 
 
Consequently, the third argument addresses the hydropolitical implications of 
transnational state-capital alliances across multiple landscapes of water security 
governance.  From an Egyptian water security standpoint, the hydropolitics of 
state-capital alliances and transnational land-water investments transcend 
multiple landscapes, beyond singular-scale state-centric water security views, 
towards a multi-level polycentric analysis of water security. In this respect, water 
grabs not only affect small farmers and natural capital on the local level, but also 
have implications on the national and transboundary levels of hydropolitical 
analysis.   
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On the local level, the different resources (nexus) tensions shed light on water 
grabs by powerful actors endowed with technology and capital. These practices 
often result in the reproduction of scarcity, thus adding another dimension to 
water (hydro) politics on the local level. On the national level transnational 
investments and state-capital alliances reflect the manufacture of abundance 
manifested in water tensions and competition over an already stressed resource, 
further aggravated by Mega projects for horizontal expansion on the one hand, 
and the virtual water grabs of corporate investors (both domestic and 
transnational) on the other. On the transboundary level, investments in upstream 
countries such as Sudan entail risks, opportunities, and uncertainties in relation 
to Nile hydropolitics. As such, transnational land-water investments influence 
Egyptian water politics on the local, national, and international levels, central to 
which are the farmers, the investors, and the state itself.  
 
1.5.     Structure of Dissertation 
 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework. The 
presented framework discusses the changing role of the state and the growing 
role of non-state actors and investors’ engagement in LWI. The chapter highlights 
how transnational state-capital alliances are an emerging element in the study of 
Egyptian water politics with potential implications on water security across 
multiple hydropolitical landscapes, thus necessitating a ‘multi-level polycentric’ 
water security analytical framework. The chapter concludes that transnational 
state-capital alliances and land-water-food nexus interdependencies may mask a 
form of water grabs with hydropolitical implications on local level for farmers, 
national level for the state, and transboundary hydropolitics.  
 
Chapter 3 adopts a historical lens and a discourse analysis approach to trace how 
land reclamation schemes in Egypt yielded mixed results throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century. This chapter highlights the challenges associated 
with state-sponsored land reclamation schemes for different water users 
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including small farmers and graduates. It also sheds light on the creation of a 
parallel water economy through the engagement of private investors in the water 
and agriculture sector–mostly depending on fast depleting groundwater, thus 
deepening the state’s water (in)-security and scarcity narratives. The chapter 
discusses how despite the massive investments by the state and domestic private 
sector in land reclamation and agricultural projects, Egypt’s ecological-
demographic narrative of crisis still prevails with a growing population adding 
further stress to existing land-water resources. The chapter concludes by 
highlighting that this narrative of crisis is rooted in, narrative of physical water 
scarcity, coupled with state bottlenecks and historical challenges to develop 
sustainable land reclamation projects to address this narrative of crisis.  
 
Chapter 4 explains how the state’s approach towards land reclamation and 
horizontal expansion evolved towards the end of the twentieth century, into the 
new millennia. The chapter highlights the Mega projects in the desert lands 
including the second generation (South Valley project) launched in 1996-97 as 
well as the most recent version of the 1.5 million feddan launched in 2015, which 
I label as hydraulic mission 3.0. Deploying the concept of the entrepreneurial 
state the chapter explains how the state’s hydraulic mission has evolved by 
establishing ‘transnational state-capital alliances’. This concept allows to 
understand how the state’s infrastructure investments in the desert lands aimed 
to de-risk LWI to attract international investors to contribute to Egypt’s hydraulic 
mission and land-reclamation schemes.  
 
Chapter 5, moves to map the different types of non-state actors engaged in 
transnational state-capital alliances and their affiliations, with a particular focus 
on GCC actors engaged in transnational LWI in Egypt and Sudan. While the first 
part of the chapter presents the institutional arrangements between different 
state and non-state actors, the second part of the chapter introduces Al Dahra 
Agricultural Company as a major investor in Egypt, and explains its motivations 
based on the larger mandate of Abu Dhabi Food Control Authority. The chapter 
also outlines the company’s different investments in Egypt across four different 
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farmlands, highlighting the similarities and differences in each site. The politics 
associated with farmlands in New Lands are also analyzed, reflecting how little 
progress has been achieved over the last decade especially in light of Egypt’s 2011 
events and larger domestic debates associated with land deals within Egypt.  
 
Chapter 6 portrays the case study of Al Dahra’s investments in two different sites 
in Old-New Lands, notably in Al Nubareya and Al Salheya. Based on fieldwork, 
the chapter provides in depth empirical analysis about politics of existing 
investments for the farmers, the investors, and the state by focusing on nexus 
tensions and actors’ interactions on local level. The case study shows that land 
acquisitions and water grabs take several shapes and forms. Surface water as well 
as underground aquifers, play complementary roles in most investments. The 
chapter argues that water security for private investors may come at the expense 
of small farmers, who are as important given their contribution to food 
production locally, and most importantly sustaining their livelihoods. A key 
message is that the corporate investors may be reproducing scarcity on the local 
scale, which affects both the farmers and small investors who already suffer from 
physical water scarcity and political scarcity. 
 
Chapter 7 extends the analysis of transnational investments and Egyptian water 
security beyond local and national scales. This chapter discusses state-capital 
alliances and Nile transboundary hydropolitics, notably in Sudan. It highlights 
how over the last decade, Sudan has been an attractive destination for 
transnational LWI in search of fulfilling its own ‘hydraulic mission’ as the 
‘breadbasket of the Arab world’.  To examine state-capital alliances and Nile 
hydropolitics, the chapter situates transnational investments within the larger 
context of Sudanese-Egyptian relations. Particular emphasis is directed to 
examine transnational investments by the Egyptian state, as well as Egyptian and 
international (GCC) non-state actors in Sudan. Accordingly, the chapter 
highlights the water politics of transnational LWI, and their associated risks, 
challenges, as well as the unachieved potential in Sudan, all of which represent 
new and emerging elements influencing Egypt’s water security. 
 44 
 
Chapter 8 presents a synthesis of the research findings and concludes the thesis. 
It presents a broadened view of Egyptian water security and transnational 
investments across multiple scales. Findings are presented across three different 
categories. The first category examines the political economy aspects of state-
capital alliances and the diverse modalities of LWI within Egypt as well as other 
Nile basin countries. It highlights how state-capital alliances frame the nexus as a 
political-economic commodity. The second category of findings discusses how 
state-capital alliances are founded on the manufacture of abundance, often 
resulting in nexus tensions for both farmers and investors. It also shows how 
these tensions reflect the absent role of the state thus raising questions of social 
justice and equity amongst different actors. The third category presents a 
multilevel Water Security Analysis of LWI and Water Grabs across multiple 
hydropolitical landscapes. The chapter concludes by questioning whether these 
findings mark the shift from the age of the hydraulic mission towards a new 
approach of  ‘water security mercantilism’? 
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Chapter 2  
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
A Multi-level Water Security Analysis of Transnational State 
Capital Alliances & the Hydropolitics of Land Investments  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a conceptual framework that argues for a multi-level water 
security analysis drawing on hydropolitics, development studies and political 
economy scholarship. While water security is already a contested concept, the 
appropriation of land and water resources by non-state actors through 
transnational investments in farmlands abroad adds a new dimension to the 
debate. As discussed earlier, critical review of literature identifies LSLA and as an 
understudied area of hydropolitics (Jägerskog et al. 2012). Furthermore, little is 
known about the hydropolitical implications and water security dimensions of 
transnational land-water investments, central to which are the state, the farmers, 
and the investors. In this research, I examine the changing role of the state and 
the increased engagement of non-state actors in transnational investments as an 
emerging element in the study of hydropolitics. This research scope is 
particularly relevant to state-centric debates addressing Egyptian water security, 
within the larger context of Nile basin hydropolitics.  
 
I argue that the engagement of non-state actors in transnational investments is 
facilitated by state-capital alliances and denotes a transition from the hydraulic 
mission towards water security mercantilism. Transnational land-water 
investments reflect a changing role of the state and the rise of state-capital 
alliances towards the appropriation of land-water resources.  To advance its 
hydraulic mission in the 21st century, the changing role of the state towards 
frontier making reflects variations between a “developmental/predatory” mode 
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and an “entrepreneurial” role. By establishing Mega projects and de-risking land 
reclamation and horizontal expansion in remote desert areas, the hydraulic 
mission of the entrepreneurial state depends on infrastructure investments to 
attract international investors endowed with technology and capital to develop 
large-scale agricultural schemes. This process is facilitated by state-capital 
alliances, which take place in both home (e.g. GCC) and host countries (e.g. Nile 
basin).  It is also founded on land-water-food nexus interdependencies often 
framed in larger narratives of regional cooperation and economic integration.  
 
A nexus approach allows understanding the opportunities and tensions 
associated with different actor-resources interactions and the multiple nexi (e.g. 
land-water-food; water-food-energy; food-trade; etc.). Thus the’ land-water-food’ 
nexus is about understanding the linkages between different actors and 
resources, given competing interests over land and more importantly water 
resources. These resources linkages also draw attention to potential conflicts 
between users, sectors, and nation-states (Bakker & Morinville 2013). As such, 
transnational state-capital alliances and their corresponding security and profit 
‘nexus’ framings often entail trade-offs and tensions, and may result in different 
forms of water grabs, which transcend multiple levels of water security analysis. 
In this respect, the concepts of nexus and water grabs are deployed as analytical 
lenses to understand the water security dimensions associated with transnational 
state-capital alliances and land-investments across multiple hydropolitical 
landscapes.  
 
In light of these debates bridging water grabs and nexus literature to understand 
the water politics of transnational investments, the conceptual framework adopts 
a multi-level polycentric analysis of water security (Pahl-Wostl 2009). This 
analytical approach towards water security is based on a framework recognizing 
the presence of different actors (polycentric) that interact across different scales 
(multi-level) (Bakker et al. 2013). This also means that a multi-level water 
security framework aims to understand the interrelation between local dynamics, 
domestic politics and international relations related to transnational land-water 
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investments, thus broadening out the analysis and insights on hydropolitics to 
multiple and interconnected scales (Menga 2016).  
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section presents a critique of 
state-centric hydropolitics literature and identifies the engagement of non-state 
actors in LSLA as a gap in the literature. The second section discusses the 
evolution of the hydraulic mission of the “state” and conceptualizes the changing 
role of the entrepreneurial state. It also identifies the rise of transnational state-
capital alliances given the engagement of non-state actors in the appropriation of 
land-water resources. Section three bridges the debates on water grabs and the 
nexus opportunities and tensions associated with transnational state-capital 
alliances and land-water investments across different levels. Section 4 identifies 
the governance dimensions of water security and  develops a multi-level 
framework to analyze the implications of land-water investments across multiple 
hydropolitical scales. Section five concludes the chapter. 
 
2.1. Critique of State-centric Transboundary Hydropolitics 
 
Historically, the relevance of transboundary waters in today’s global 
political economy can be traced back to the 1977 United Nations Water 
Conference in Mar del Plata in Argentina, which gave rise to one of the first  
‘Register of International Rivers’ (United Nations 1978; Turton 2008). This event 
initiated a process by which the existing structure, function and core assumptions 
underpinning the way we manage water resources have been systematically 
examined and critiqued over time (Turton et al. 2007; Turton 2008). Literature 
also refers to the fact that most studies addressing international watercourses 
received more attention during the post cold war era over the last three decades 
(1990-2018). Two ground-breaking studies took place in the 1970’s by 
LeMarquand (1977)1 through his book “International Rivers: The Politics of 
Cooperation” and John Waterbury (1979) through his book “Hydropolitics of the 
Nile Valley”. Schmeier (Schmeier 2010) further indicates that more 
                                                             
1 It should be noted however that before publishing his book, LeMarquand, D. published in (1976) an article with the title 
of ‘Politics of International River Basin Cooperation and Management’ 
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comprehensive studies started to emerge since the early 1990s referring to 
scholars such as  (Gleick 1993; Lowi 1993; Biswas 1993; ; Dinar & Wolf 1994; 
Dinar 2002; Kliot 1994). 
 
Traditionally pivoted around state-centric hydro-political debates, notions and 
narratives of conflict (Gleick 1993; Homer-Dixon 1995; 1996; Dinar 2002) and 
cooperation (Waterbury 1997; Wolf 1998; 1999) have dominated international 
relations (IR) and trans-boundary water resources management (TWM) 
literature. Hydropolitics literature explored the two terms in an exhaustive 
manner whereby Julien (2012) refers to these two discourses within the 
rationalist paradigm of IR2 as the “water security discourse” and the “water 
rationality discourse” (Julien 2012, p.46).   
 
The debates have clearly shifted from this dichotomous understanding. Hydro-
politics and water security literature addressing TWM also covered a multitude of 
issues such as water nationalism (Allouche 2005), hegemony (Zeitoun & Warner 
2006), counter-hegemony (Cascão 2008), power asymmetry (Cascão 2009), and 
unilateral vs. cooperative action (Earle et al. 2010, p.2). The London Water 
Group has shown how conflict and cooperation can coexist in any given 
international river basin (Mirumachi & Allan 2007) and focused their analysis on 
how power, hegemony and power asymmetries can influence transboundary 
water politics (Zeitoun & Warner 2006). The co-existence of conflict and 
cooperation amongst upstream and downstream riparian countries in a river 
basin remains an appealing framework to explain and understand hydro-political 
relations and behavior (coercive, cooperative, veiled consent, etc…) towards 
trans-boundary water resources (Mirumachi 2015). Warner (2012) refers to the 
exiting discourse on hydropolitics as “the three compelling stories”, that is “water 
war, water peace and water hegemony”. Others have taken a broader analysis. 
Selby (2003) for instance has taken a historical materialist view by looking at 
                                                             
2 Realism and Liberalism are cited as two main rationalists paradigms in IR  (Katzestein et al, 1998 in Julien 2012).   
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water conflicts through the lens of a political economic problem rooted in 
patterns of capitalist development. 
 
Complementing views are found in the studies of international political economy 
based on the concepts of virtual water and virtual water trade developed by Tony 
Allan in 1992, linking water, food, and trade (Allan 2003). These concepts 
succeeded in explaining transboundary water relations of the 1970s and 1980s 
(Earle et al. 2010, p.24) by analyzing the invisible process of trade and its role in 
regional security in the Middle East. The concept is founded on the premise that 
“communities and nations that live in river basins (watersheds) operate in “open” 
economic systems (problemsheds) where resource shortages can be 
compensated” (Allan 2001). Through virtual water trade, weaker riparians can 
promote their different preferred principles- sovereignty, integrity, and 
reasonable and equitable use – because the problem of water security is being 
invisibly addressed (Allan & Mirumachi 2010, p.19). 
 
Nevertheless, the global food and energy crises of 2007/08 and 2010/11, along 
with climate change uncertainties have brought back scarcity narratives in global 
earth system and water debates (Allouche 2011). This persisting idea of linking 
water scarcity to conflict and war has been well explained by Katz (2011), what he 
has termed the Hydro-Political Hyperbole. Media images and declarations by 
journalists, politicians, and think tanks reinforce these popular geopolitical 
discourses and imaginaries (Hanna & Allouche, forthcoming).  
 
In this respect, the science of politics that characterizes IR related hydropolitical 
theories might be too rigid to understand the various historical trajectories, 
diversity and pathways of water-related inter and intra state relations around the 
world. Many of these concepts of the trans-boundary water resources and 
hydropolitics literature as well as their corresponding water security discourses 
and narratives remain state-centric, focusing on inter-state relations at the 
international level, whereby nation-states are the central unit of analysis. 
Furthermore, John Agnew’s (1994) criticism of what Smith (1979, p.191) calls 
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'methodological nationalism' shows how the idea of the territorial state as the 
container of (modern) society has been reproduced in the main currents of 
international relations (Agnew 1994). This tradition reflects a more entrenched 
worldview and a ‘state-centric epistemology’, which hardly leaves any chance for 
the ‘domestic’ to surface as a scale, as expression of power and conflicting 
interests (Brenner 1999; Zain 2007). In this respect, reference to local and 
regional settings, or to 'global' processes, “was largely closed off by the 
'nationalizing' of social science and its subservience to the territorial state” 
(Agnew 1989, p.69). 
 
Subsequently, beyond the upstream-downstream contestations of historical 
water shares and state-centric conflict, cooperation, and hegemony narratives, 
and drawing on the evidence that non-state actors are playing an increasing role 
in controlling natural resources in trans-boundary river basins as discussed in 
chapter 1, the topic of land acquisition and hydropolitics is unchartered territory 
(Jägerskog et al. 2012). In this respect, the effect that LSLA - by both foreign 
governments and by national and international companies- will have on trans-
boundary river basins has not yet been analyzed.  
 
As such, there is a need to look beyond these state-centric hydropolitical 
and water security narratives to put water into its relevant place in the broader 
political economy perspective and the evolving research agenda on trans-
boundary water management (TWM) (Jägerskog et al. 2012). This is especially 
the case given the increasing interdependencies between land-water-food-
energy-climate which are multiple in their nature. Furthermore, the implications 
of LSLA or “land and water grabs” by both foreign governments and by national 
and international companies, as well as their policy implications on trans-
boundary water resources in complex river basins remain unclear.  For instance, 
some unanswered questions raised by other researchers included; Will the host 
countries where the investments are being made become less powerful than some 
of their riparian neighbors, or will this instead lead to an increase of their 
bargaining power? (Zeitoun & Jagerskog 2009); will the small farmers be 
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squeezed between a strong riparian protecting its own interest and a strong 
foreign government (e.g. India, China, GCC) seeking to safeguard its food 
security? These debates are increasingly gaining relevance given the rising 
security and scarcity narratives in light of the contemporary hydropolitical 
context in international river basins such as the Nile. In particular, these debates 
are notably relevant to Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan for instance where the 
influence of non-state actors is growing via massive land acquisition deals as 
discussed in chapter 1. In the context of this research, I question the implications 
of LSLA and transnational investments on Egyptian water security, by examining 
their water (hydro) political interactions1 within Egypt on the local and national 
levels, but also across the borders in Sudan on the transboundary level. 
 
But where would we situate the “state” beyond state-centric hydropolitical 
theories? And how do we conceptualize the state-society interaction within the 
larger hydropolitical debates in light of the growing scarcity and security 
narratives on local, national, and international levels?  To address these 
questions, the following sections discuss the changing role of the state and the 
engagement of non-state actors in the appropriation of land and water resources, 
within the larger debates on water security, the hydraulic mission, and large-scale 
land-water investments.   
 
2.2. A changing Role of the State in Land-Water Investments 
 
2.2.1. Modernity, and the hydraulic mission: From a developmental to a 
predatory state 
 
The impact of modernization theory on water resources management has been 
well documented (Allouche 2010). Different scholars have attributed the larger 
question of state modernization throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries to the idea of the “hydraulic mission”, defined as mastering nature and 
controlling the flow of water (Allan 2002b; Allouche 2010). Modern water 
sciences, hydrology, and landscape engineering technologies have been therefore 
portrayed as crucial ingredients of state power and control, thus facilitating large-
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scale structural interventions to regulate water flows and the modification of 
waterscapes over large parcels of geographical land (Benedikter 2014). Scott’s 
(1998) conceptualization of high modernism reflects how the state’s management 
capacity contributed to national hydraulic projects and structures such as dams, 
as well as large-scale irrigation schemes, often portrayed as a sign of might, 
development and modernity.  
 
In this respect, Molle et al. (2009), indicate that water resources development by 
the state was an emergent and, at times, intentional, political strategy for 
controlling space, water and people and an important part of everyday forms of 
state formation (see Worster 1985; Wehr 2004; Swyngedouw 2007). In Egypt, 
similar to other countries, hydraulic bureaucracies are, first and foremost, the 
creation of nation states and reflect a number of their concerns and objectives. As 
indicated by Molle et al. (2009), “If, as stressed by Wittfogel, centralized despotic 
states have emerged from the need of large‐ scale investments in water control, 
these needs have also been sometimes concomitantly used by states to strengthen 
their legitimacy”. Bakker (2003, p.40) further indicates that throughout much of 
the twentieth century, water management and investment in the water sector 
were mechanisms of ‘social legitimization’ of the state whereby “water was 
understood to be a strategic resource for societies undergoing modernization 
(and hence industrialization and urbanization), and a factor of production” 
(Ibid).  
 
Mitchell (1991) indicates that the state has been always hard to define. In his 
views, “a definition of the state always depends on distinguishing it from society, 
and the line between the two is always difficult to draw in practice” (Mitchell 
1991, p.77). In order to understand the changing role of the state in relation to 
land-water investments and the larger debates about water security, I refer to the 
larger body of literature on the developmental state. Peter Evans (1995; 1989) 
distinguished three forms of state (Farah 2009); the first is the predatory state 
controlled by a political elite prioritizing the fulfillment of its own interest even at 
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the expense of society, with the help of an inefficient state bureaucracy. The 
second is the intermediate state, built on a certain administrative capacity, yet 
with fragmented structures penetrated by different interest groups. The third is 
the developmental state, with a well-developed bureaucracy, relatively 
autonomous from interest groups, however maintaining close ties with large 
private corporations, usually embedded in selected social networks, particularly 
industrial ones. Yet, a state can demonstrate aspects of both, a developmental 
state and a predatory one, as the two types are not mutually exclusive (Farah 
2009; emphasis added). 
 
However, Chang (2010) indicates that different forms of developmental states 
exist. Chang (2010, p.82) criticized the narrow, fundamentalist definition of a 
developmental state, that is “one that derives political legitimacy from its record 
in economic development; which it tries to achieve mainly by means of selective 
industrial policy”. He argues that while the developmental state literature has 
been widely applied to the East Asian ‘miracle’ economies such as Japan and 
South Korea during the 1950s-80s, other experiences need to be taken into 
consideration. According to Chang, we should look at other experiences, “if only 
because they shake us out of our usual assumptions regarding what is possible; 
for reality is often ‘stranger than fiction’” (2010, p.82). As such, further attention 
is needed to explore different models of the developmental state, one that can 
address the wider picture of developmental success and failure around the world 
(Regeni & Auktor 2017). Accordingly, there is a need to broaden the definition of 
the developmental state “to include any state that deliberately intervenes to 
promote development” (Chang 2010, p.84). In this respect, Farah (2009) 
indicates that the history of modern Egypt reveals different periods of state 
intervention in the economy. State intervention ranged from total control during 
the reign of Mohamed Ali to relative autonomy under Nasser, whereby she 
characterizes the Egyptian state during both those periods as a “developmental 
state” (Farah 2009). However, this developmental state is far from the experience 
of East Asia (where the state invited the creation of a separate capitalist class to 
carry out the work of development under its guidance). Under Mohamed Ali and 
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Nasser the state did not target economic growth but aimed at a complete 
restructuring of the Egyptian economy and society (by eliminating previous 
dominant elites and changing dominant power relations).  Interestingly enough, 
it is also during these periods that a central element of state intervention for 
modernization was the advancement of Egypt’s hydraulic mission. The main 
point of this discussion is that developmental success or failure can take many 
forms as has happened at different times in history (Regeni & Auktor 2017). 
 
As such I argue that the role of the developmental/predatory state has 
evolved into an entrepreneurial role marking the state’s new approach towards 
frontier making, land reclamation and horizontal expansion in the 21st century as 
discussed in the following section.  
 
2.2.2. The Hydraulic Mission of the Entrepreneurial State & Transnational 
State-Capital Alliances 
 
As indicated by Regeni & Auktor (2017), a growing number of scholars argue that 
changing global conditions have renewed the call to revise the debates on the 
changing role of the state in social and economic transformation in the 21st 
century (see Evans 2014; Evans & Heller 2015; Altenburg & Lütkenhorst 2015). 
These debates also denote the rise of non-state actors engagement in the 
appropriation of natural resources. A good example relevant to the current 
research is sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). SWFs are becoming key investors in 
the market and are being used by some emerging powers to secure commodities 
abroad, not just driven by profit seeking motives but also by public goals which 
may have negative environmental and social consequences (Clapp & Helleiner 
2012, p.493). 
 
In a special issue about the rush for global land deals, Windy Wolford at al. 
(2013) put forward four key arguments in relation to the role of the state in land 
deals; (i) states are not simply passive victims in these deals, nor coerced into 
accessing foreign capital by selling off pieces of their national territory to more 
powerful economic or political players; “Instead, many states are active, 
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calculating partners in land deals, negotiating the costs and benefits of the 
contemporary moment in order to maximize returns on what are considered 
marginal lands or marginal communities”; (ii) states do not divide neatly into 
those acquiring land and those being acquired, rather a range of actor within the 
states (e.g. government agencies, elites, etc) may “draw on different kinds of 
authority to provide assistance or obstacles to would-be buyer”; (iii) governments 
around the world have had very different responses to land deals ranging from 
embracing large-scale land deals to resisting them; and (iv) land deals can lead to 
the articulation of different kinds of power within the state. 
 
Contributing to these debates about the changing role of the state in land deals, I 
argue that the engagement of non-state actors and international investors marks 
a new approach towards the hydraulic mission and larger water security 
objectives. Building on the idea of state modernization and the hydraulic mission 
drawing on the literature of the developmental state, this section explores the 
changing role of the developmental/predatory state, and the rise of the 
“entrepreneurial state” and transnational “state-capital alliances” towards water 
security and land-water investments. 
 
In her book “The Entrepreneurial State” Mazuccato essentially questions the role 
of the State in the economy” (Mazzucato 2013b; Mazzucato 2015). This concept 
aims to change how we talk about the state as ‘the most effective way to defend its 
existence, and size, in a proactive way’. Mazzucato makes the distinction between 
the developmental state and the entrepreneurial state. She refers to the 
developmental state literature, which “understood the state’s role in ‘developing’ 
countries, both in terms of Keynesian demand management and in leading the 
industrial process”. On the other hand, she explains the importance of the 
entrepreneurial state in terms of its “centrality in the innovation process and in 
the struggle for global competition”.  
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Combining Schumpeter3 and Keynes4, Mazzucato argues for the centrality of 
government intervention in innovation systems and debates the idea that “the 
state is cast as inertial –necessary for the ‘basics’, but too large and heavy to be 
the dynamic engine” (Mazzucato 2015). She observes that “in most parts of the 
world we are witnessing a massive withdrawal of the State, one that has been 
justified in terms of debt reduction and – perhaps more systematically – in terms 
of rendering the economy more ‘dynamic’, ‘competitive’ and ‘innovative’”. In this 
respect, the role of government is being limited to simply “facilitating” and “de-
risking” the private sector; fixing market failures, rather than having a direct role 
in creating and shaping markets, determining the direction of change, with the 
adequate budgets and governmental structures to do so (Mazzucato 2015, pp.3–
4); 
Thus, to dismantle that false image, a proper defense of the State 
should argue that it not only ‘crowds in’ private investment (by 
increasing GDP through the multiplier effect) – a correct but limited 
point made by Keynesians – it does something more. It is necessary to 
build a theory of the State’s role in shaping and creating markets – 
more in line with the work of Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]) who 
emphasized how the capitalist ‘market’ has from the start been heavily 
shaped by State actions.  
According to Mazzucato (2011a) a state is entrepreneurial when it is able and 
willing to invest in areas of extreme uncertainty, courageously envisioning the 
direction of change across public agencies and departments. She indicates further 
“an entrepreneurial state does not yet know what the details of the innovation 
are, but it knows a general area that is ripe for development, or where pushing 
the boundaries of knowledge are desirable” (2011a, pp.70–71).  
 
Most importantly, an entrepreneurial state must “think big” (Mazzucato 2013b; 
Mazzucato 2011b). In this respect, most of the radical, revolutionary innovations 
that have fuelled the dynamics of capitalism – from railroads to the internet, to 
modern-day nanotechnology and pharmaceuticals – trace the most courageous, 
                                                             
3 Schumpeterian economists emphasized the importance of economic systems in stimulating innovation 
4 A British economist widely considered as one of the most influential during the 20th century and the founder of modern 
macroeconomics theory. His ideas fundamentally changed the theory and practice of macroeconomics and the economic 
policies of governments as he built on and refined earlier work on the causes of business cycles 
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early and capital-intensive ‘entrepreneurial’ investments back to the ‘visible hand’ 
of the State (Mazzucato 2013a; Mazzucato 2015). It was such mission-oriented 
investments that coordinated public and private initiatives, built new networks, 
and drove the entire techno-economic process, which resulted in the creation of 
new markets (Ibid). To illustrate the concept, she provides the example of green 
transformations and their corresponding investments in solar and wind energy, 
indicating that these investments are not just about start-ups and venture capital, 
rather “it is about the willingness and ability of economic agents to take on risk 
and uncertainty: what is genuinely unknown” (Mazzucato et al. 2015).   
 
In the case of Egypt, in pursuit of a modern vision of horizontal expansion, and 
land reclamation, the state adopted a new entrepreneurial model to achieve its 
desert dreams. This new approach was mostly confined to government 
investments aiming at developing the necessary infrastructure for new Mega 
projects in remote desert lands as part of frontier making. In this respect, the 
entrepreneurial state has made tremendous investments in infrastructure to de-
risk land-water investments, primarily to attract foreign and domestic investors. 
Infrastructure investments included a sophisticated network of irrigation canals, 
the largest pumping station in the world (Mubarak station in Toshka), access to 
electricity, (air)-ports, investment climate and tax breaks, amongst other 
measures to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) in the agriculture sector – 
as well as other sectors of the economy. This shifting role of the state along the 
dynamics of the global economy marks the rise of the ‘hydraulic mission of the 
entrepreneurial state’ through high-risk infrastructure investments in the desert 
with the main objective of attracting technology and capital primarily from 
international investors to develop large-scale agricultural lands as part of 
horizontal expansion plans.  
 
This process led the formation of transnational “state-capital alliances” (Mehta et 
al. 2013), towards a larger political economic project, for maximum use of land 
and water resources. Land-water investments in farmlands abroad can be 
therefore viewed as an outcome of the 20th century processes of economic 
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globalization and the corresponding restructuring of state function (Falkner 
2003). They also reflect the changing role of the state towards its hydraulic 
mission and horizontal expansion plans, by engaging international investors and 
non-state actors in land-water investments.  
 
2.3. Non-state Actors & Transnational Land-Water Investments:  
        Bridging Nexus and Water Grabs Debates 
 
While there is a degree of repackaging involved from the ‘old’ concepts of 
integrated water resources management (IWRM) (limited to the water domain/ 
community level) and sustainable development (as a too broad concept to narrow 
down to specific issues), the nexus offers the opportunity to focus on sectors of 
energy, land, food, and water (Srivastava & Mehta 2014). In this respect, Allan et 
al. (2015, p.304) indicate that the Water-Energy-Food linkages can be 
conceptualized as a “grand nexus” that embraces two sub-nexi; the water-food-
trade sub-nexus, and the energy-climate change sub-nexus.  Therefore, nexus 
debates reflect the growing recognition about these inter-linkages, which were 
typically forgotten “because of bureaucratic silos and the vested organizational 
and institutional interests” (Srivastava & Mehta 2014).  
 
In light of the changing role of the “entrepreneurial state” towards transnational 
land-water investments, evidence shows increasing interdependencies between 
‘financial capital’ on the one hand, and ‘land-water-energy-food’ resources on the 
other. In this respect, the “nexus” is framed for powerful global players to think 
about water and growth prospects “interlinking water security, economic 
development and GDP growth, building investment and regulatory models for 
the flow of innovative water funds” (World Economic Forum 2009). However, 
nexus linkages can be also framed as a Global Risk (World Economic Forum, 
2011b), thus representing resources tensions (e.g. energy access; water quality 
and quantity; export and regulatory fees, etc.). While these framings adopted the 
nexus as a ‘resource governance’ lens, the Bonn Conference in 2011 stressed the 
importance of prioritizing a ‘human security’ lens (Allouche et al. 2015). 
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Furthermore, narratives of scarcity and uncertainty have driven the language of 
nexus to be increasingly framed in the language of (non-traditional) security 
(Allouche et al. 2015). Given market volatility, land appears to be a more stable 
source of investment and a platform for energy, food and water security during 
the era of climate change (Srivastava & Mehta 2014). These interdependencies 
reflect how [the] nexus also indicates a convergence of actors, which is 
particularly visible in land acquisitions in Africa (Ibid). In this respect, “the nexus 
has become a strong policy metaphor to address the ‘world in crises’ and has also 
brought in new players such as global corporations, who are now taking a keen 
interest in addressing land, water, climate change and energy risks” (Ibid).  
 
Thus, the ‘nexus’ allows drawing linkages between different actors and resources. 
Accordingly, different actors including new and old civil societies, the private 
sector, IFIs, International Organizations and academics “all understand and 
frame sustainability and security differently” (Allouche et al. 2014, p.12). This is 
especially true given that powerful hydrocracies tend to view water and 
ecosystems as static systems, which in turn shapes an illusory view of food, water 
and energy security as static too (Allouche et al. 2014). Consequently, both the 
state and the investors have internalized this environmental security narrative in 
a particular way, which is leading to capital intensification. Furthermore, 
Keulertz & Woertz (2015) indicate that the contemporary multipolar order 
represents a new phase of ‘inverse globalization’ by which new actors in the 
global political order, such as the GCC countries, BRICS, and China, start to 
become investors instead of being the beneficiaries of investment (Allan 2013; 
Sojamo & Larson 2012). Accordingly, increasing economic connectedness also 
externalizes resource extraction to other regions and exposes countries to 
volatility in the global market (Hoff 2011).  
 
While it is recognized that multiple nexi exist, the conceptual framework 
highlights the strong connection between ‘land-water-food’ nexus as an emerging 
element of political economy and resource politics. In this research, [land-water-
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food] resources are particularly addressed given the larger environmental and 
hydropolitical context in arid areas such as the Middle East and North Africa. 
These resources linkages are reinforced by (water scarcity) risks perceived by the 
state and investors, thus leading them to pay particular attention to the 
uncertainties associated with water security, population growth, and food 
security/ sovereignty. The land-water-food nexus is also of particular relevance to 
questions of water security, financial power, and larger political objectives such 
as the hydraulic mission. This link is used across this dissertation to highlight the 
importance of studying the growing land-water-food interdependencies for the 
state [host countries notably in Nile basin (e.g. Egypt-Sudan-others)], the 
investors (seeking profit as well as other strategic objectives based on land-water 
access for food production), as well as the farmers whereby this nexus represents 
their livelihood. 
 
However, it is important to note that while land-water-food interdependencies 
for the state and investors are of particular relevance to questions of security, 
they also entail environmental, social, and political risks for different actors. 
Accordingly, land acquisitions and appropriation of water resources through 
farmlands abroad denote different forms of nexus tensions. In this respect, 
literature indicates that the silent appropriation of water resources through land 
deals and LSLA represents a form of water grabs.  In this context, water grabs are 
understood as the capturing of control not just of the water itself, but also of the 
power to decide how this will be used—by whom, when, for how long and for 
what purposes—in order to control the benefits of use (Mehta et al. 2013). 
 
Consequently, investments addressing one aspect of insecurity can exacerbate 
other insecurities (Jobbins et al. 2015), not only in terms of resources grab (e.g. 
water withdrawal requires more energy), but also in terms of actors’ interests. 
The politics of transnational land-water investments often reflect the 
manufacture of scarcity, or rather the [manufacture of abundance], and draws 
linkages between international political economy and geopolitics. As such, while 
transnational investments and state-capital alliances manifest the convergence of 
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state and non-state actors to address larger (water-food) security and scarcity 
narratives and risks, ‘the land-water-food’ nexus shows (hydro)-political and 
socio-economic trade-offs, and hence draws attention to water grabs. Therefore 
the market-technical framing of the nexus by the World Economic Forum, 
located in international business imperatives and global economy “mask a bigger 
debate on resource inequality and access, contributing to social instability” 
(Allouche et al. 2014). Thus, the nexus literature and its multiple framings hide 
contested issues of resources politics and sustainability pathways.  
 
Water grabs as a concept has been typically used to question the social 
dimensions of land deals, but rarely if ever from a hydro-political standpoint. I 
extend the use of the concept to examine water (hydro) politics of transnational 
investments across multiple landscapes. In this respect, I argue that the 
engagement of non-state actors through the formation of transnational state-
capital alliances results in hydropolitical implications across multiple levels; on a 
local level for farmers, on the national level with the states, and on the 
transboundary level of Nile river basin hydropolitics. This also implies the 
presence of a myriad of interactions amongst different actors across the different 
scales. For example while investments by large corporate actors are often framed 
by state-capital alliances as an important element of the hydraulic mission, sector 
modernization, and economic opportunity, they can increase water tensions on 
the local level with negative impacts on the livelihoods of small farmers. Yet, they 
can also represent a form of virtual water grabs on the national level if 
investments lead to export of high water consuming crops such as alfalfa. 
Transnational investments can also represent a form of water grabs on the 
transboundary level potentially leading to increased hydropolitical tensions 
between upstream and downstream countries within the larger context of a river 
basin.  
 
To address the scalar mismatch about the hydropolitical dimensions of 
transnational investments, the conceptual framework recognizes the governance 
dimensions of water security. Hence, deploying the analytical lenses of nexus 
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water grabs, the research explores the resources politics and hydropolitical 
implications of transnational state-capital alliances and land-water investments 
on the local, national and transboundary scales of hydropolitical analysis. To 
unpack the water politics associated with these investments across different 
landscapes, the following section proposes a ‘multi-level water security’ 
framework, adopting a ‘global perspective’ to link different scales and actors.  
 
2.4.  The Governance Dimensions of Water Security  
 
A common definition of water security is “an acceptable level of water-related 
risks to humans and ecosystems, coupled with the availability of water of 
sufficient quantity and quality to support livelihoods, national security, human 
health and ecosystem services” (Bakker 2012; Cook & Bakker 2012). Water 
security perspectives emphasize the inherent uncertainty in the management of 
complex socio-ecological systems. However, water governance literature 
indicates a scalar mismatch in analyzing water security (Norman et al. 2012; 
Bakker & Morinville 2013; Bakker 2012). For example Egypt has indicated that 
water security is a matter of national security; while Australia indicated that 
water security is an issue of water availability on a watershed basis (Cook & 
Bakker 2012; Bakker & Morinville 2013). Furthermore, in the Middle East and 
North Africa region, discussions are generally focused on regional-based sharing 
of scarce resources in the face of increasing demand and geopolitical tensions 
(Bakker & Morinville 2013, p.7). These views however are based on state-centric 
positions, sometimes linking the national to international, yet often overlooking 
the local. They also overlook the role of non-state actors/market players, since by 
definition they focus on nation-state as the central unit of analysis.  
 
According to Pahl-wostl et al. (2008), there are four different schools to 
understand water resources governance as part of global resources governance; 
The first emphasizes local level issues typically associated with anthropologists, 
arguing the need to understand local rights, needs, and stakeholders. The second 
school of thought emphasizes the importance of water as a national resource for 
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the benefit of the national economy and society (e.g. domestic interests come 
first). The third school of thought towards water governance adopts a basin 
level/watershed approach, combining efficiency and hydrological systems (e.g. 
equitable management of transboundary and international waters). The fourth 
and relatively new school takes a ‘global perspective’ on water governance by 
recognizing that “local, national, and basin-level water issues are interlinked 
within a global water system” (Pahl-wostl et al. 2008, p.421).  
Given the nature of transnational land-water investments and their 
corresponding state-capital alliances, the conceptual framework adopts the 
fourth proposed approach for a ‘global perspective’ linking different levels of 
water resources governance. The existence of a multitude of actors and interests 
in the water security debates underscores the need for robust frameworks to 
ensure social and environmental externalities are accounted for or ‘internalized’ 
whereby resources are shared equitably and natural capital maintained (Hoff 
2011). Therefore, a global perspective reflects the necessity of a multi-level water 
security analytical framework to address the emerging role of non-state actors, in 
relation to international land-water investments and their hydropolitical 
implications transcending multiple landscapes. This approach is especially 
relevant to issues of scalar mismatch often stressed within water security 
literature (Bakker 2012; Cook & Bakker 2012; Bakker & Morinville 2013).  
 
A multi-level water security framework recognizes the nature of transnational 
state-capital alliances denoting the presence of different actors (polycentric; e.g. 
state, farmers, investors) that interact across different local, national, and 
transboundary scales (multi-level). This is especially true in the case of the 
hydropolitics of transnational land-water investments vis-à-vis Egyptian water 
security on local and national levels, as well as the larger question of Nile basin 
transboundary hydropolitics. 
 
According to Bakker et al. (2013, p.7) multi-level governance is viewed as an 
alternative to singular scale perspectives and particularly state-centric analyses, 
thus assuming a priori the importance of addressing scalar interdependencies 
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and cross-scale policy externalities (Bakker & Morinville 2013). Multilevel water 
security approach often entails a process of rescaling along one or more of three 
axes: ‘up’ from nation states, ‘down’ to local levels of government (e.g. the 
delegation of responsibility to municipalities), and ‘out’ from geopolitical units 
(e.g. the nation-state, the province, the state, the parish) to new scales (e.g. 
watersheds) (Bulkeley 2005; Reed & Bruyneel 2010; Bakker & Morinville 2013). 
Bakker et al. (2013, p.5) draw further attention to these scalar interdependencies 
by linking polycentrism and a multilevel water governance approach whereby;   
 
Polycentrism implies the involvement of multiple actors at multiple scales; 
hence, an innovative aspect of a water security approach is the emphasis on 
multi-level governance...with increased emphasis on watershed-based and 
integrated management of environmental issues, awareness of the multi-
level causes and impacts of water-related threats (particularly, although 
not uniquely, with regard to the water–energy–food nexus), and concern 
over the implications of climate change for water resources—the study and 
mitigation of which is necessarily multi-scalar. This provides a distinct 
contrast to the watershed-focused emphasis of IWRM. 
 
 
However, as indicated by Bakker et al. (2013) while rescaling processes and 
multi-level governance approaches offer important avenues to pursue water 
security analysis (at multiple levels), several limitations remain. These are 
summarized in three main critiques (Bakker & Morinville 2013); the first is the 
importance to acknowledge the utility and limitations of any particular scale of 
governance. The second is the tendency of multi-level governance to adopt a 
watershed-focused approach, which may be insufficient to address complex water 
security challenges and trade-offs occurring at spatial and temporal scales. For 
example the issue of virtual water trade or trade-offs between water-energy-food 
(nexus) are not necessarily addressed through a watershed approach. The third 
criticism is related to the notion of polycentric governance, whereby even if local 
issues are taken into consideration, the power of decision-making often remains 
at the national level within the state; a phenomenon referred to by Ribot (2004) 
as the “Charade” whereby even if a multilevel governance approach aims at 
improving efficiency, access and sustainability, it may not necessarily address the 
concerns and power relations associated with local population and small farmers 
(Bakker & Morinville 2013).  
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Nevertheless, despite these limitations, a multi-level governance approach can be 
useful to address the emerging hydro-politics of transnational LWI between 
different (state and non-state) actors interacting across different scales. Hence, 
deploying the concepts of the nexus and water grabs within a multi-level water 
security framework reveals three key issues (Bakker & Morinville 2013); (i) water 
security is not only subject to state-centric analysis (neither the sole nor the 
primary unit of analysis), rather it is the outcome of different types of 
interactions between state, non-state actors (e.g. market), and society (e.g. 
farmers) within the same level or across multiple levels of hydropolitical analysis; 
(ii) the existence of  ‘land-water-food’ linkages and water grabs across different 
hydropolitical levels, thus expanding the classical perception of water (security) 
from a singular element of the political economy to multi-scalar polycentric 
approach; (iii) water security emphasizes the centrality of social justice in 
negotiating conflicts generated by tensions of [a] particular nexus manifested in a 
variety of modalities (both legal and illegal) and scales (from local to 
supranational). 
 
2.5. From the hydraulic mission to water security mercantilism 
 
As discussed in this chapter, the changing role of the state and the engagement of 
non-state actors in LWI mark a new episode in the hydraulic mission of the 
entrepreneurial state to advance the larger ‘modernization’ project. It also led to 
the establishment of transnational state-capital alliances towards water security 
to serve national horizontal expansion plans and land reclamation schemes. 
These alliances associated with transnational investments show how the nexus is 
viewed and framed differently by different actors. These alliances also show the 
growing interdependence and tensions between the different elements of [land-
water-food] production on the one hand, and financial profit on the other.  
 
In other words, transnational state-capital alliances mark the transition from the 
state-led hydraulic mission to water security mercantilism. This term was 
originally introduced by (McMichael 2013) to explain how land grabs represent a 
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form of security mercantilism in international relations, whereby; “land grabbing 
overrides the multilateral trading system substituting direct access to productive 
land for food and fuel supplies rather than relying on market access, whereby 
evolving governance mechanisms simultaneously deepen the privatization of 
states and land-use” (2013, p.48).  
 
Inspired by this definition, I argue that “water security mercantilism” denotes 
water grabbing, which overrides the traditional role of the state and its hydraulic 
mission, towards a new understanding of water security based on the role of 
private/non-state actors in accessing water resources, thus creating their own 
private [land-water-food] security and profit nexus. While for the state, 
investments represent opportunities for sector modernization based on the 
introduction of industrial agricultural production modes; transnational LWI 
primarily serve private interest and profit. They also re-shape our understanding 
of water security, primarily to serve financial goals, instead of larger public goals, 
through a particular understanding of land-water-food interdependencies 
depending on industrial agricultural production modes. As such, instead of 
advancing the hydraulic mission of the entrepreneurial state, transnational LWI 
by non-state actors mostly address their primary goal of financial profit. Hence, 
these political economy dynamics founded on state-capital alliances left the 
hydraulic mission of the state unachieved, and shifted land-water resources use 
towards private interests and larger strategic objectives of transnational 
investors. Consequently, through water security mercantilism, private actors 
override the existing hydraulic mission of the state, and existing water 
governance mechanisms (Conca 2006). These processes represent an emerging 
element in hydropolitical debates, beyond singular-scale state-centric views, 
towards a multi-level view of water security. Given land-water nexus politics 
associated with transnational investments, the understanding of Egyptian water 
security can be claimed to witness profound changes with implications on the 
state’s hydraulic mission, food security, as well as agricultural and virtual water 
trade within and outside the Nile basin.  
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Chapter 3 
 
State Modernization, Horizontal Expansion, and 
Egypt’s ‘Ecological-Demographic Narrative of Crisis’  
 
Chapter Overview and Key Message  
 
This background chapter discusses the evolution of Egypt’s hydraulic mission from a 
historical perspective, with a particular focus on horizontal expansion and land 
reclamation schemes during the post-colonial era of Nasser (1952) onwards. It shows 
how water security and controlling the flow of water have been consistently an essential 
element of the national discourses on state modernization, and greening the desert. It 
sheds light on Egypt’s unresolved ecological-demographic narrative of crisis known as 
‘too many people on too little land’, despite the many land-reclamation projects 
undertaken during the second half of the twentieth century (1952-1980s). The chapter 
argues that this persistent narrative of crisis is a product of both physical and political 
water scarcity. This narrative of crisis deepened further given the shifting role of the 
‘developmental’ state to a ‘predatory’ one with increased private sector participation in 
the water and agriculture sector as further discussed in chapter 4. 
 
Introduction 
 
Egypt’s hydraulic mission towards modernization has evolved over time, 
driven over the last half a century by what David Sims labels as an “ecological-
demographic narrative of crisis” (Sims 2015). In the post-colonial era since 1952 
the new national imaginaire perceived land reclamation schemes as inseparable 
from the Nile Valley and Delta. The post colonial hydraulic mission of the 
Egyptian state has been driven by a twin legitimating discourse of too many 
people in too little land in the Nile Valley and Delta, and of remaking citizens in 
the tabula rasa of the desert (Sowers 2011). The desert was proposed to be 
carved out as a terra nullius, an undeveloped space to be developed, it became a 
tool of frontier making, where new citizens would build modern farms in the 
blank landscape of the desert (Sowers 2011). For the state, a key determinant of 
Egyptian water security is its framed vision to achieve its ‘desert development 
dreams’ (see Sims, 2015), which also represents a main element of national 
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security for social, economic, and political reasons mostly driven by security and 
scarcity narratives. 
Perhaps the classical understanding of water security in the context of 
Egyptian hydropolitics has been traditionally attributed to the Nile basin 
historical water allocation treaties of 1929 and 1959. These treaties have granted 
Egypt 55.5 billion cubic meters upon which the state has depended for its 
different economic activities throughout the twentieth century, including the 
agricultural, municipal, and industrial sectors. Egypt’s total renewable water 
resources are equivalent to 60 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually, out of which 
55.5 bcm (92.5%) flows from the Nile Transboundary River extending over 11 
countries in Africa. The source of 16% of Egypt’s Nile waters flows from the White 
Nile countries of the Great Lakes (Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, 
Congo (DRC), and South Sudan). The remaining 84% of the Nile water flows 
from the Blue Nile countries in East Africa mainly comprised of Ethiopia, and 
Sudan.   
 
Nevertheless, water -security- for the Egyptian state and the Egyptian people 
means more than this narrow view of fixed water share and its multiple uses. In 
fact the notion of “water security” has evolved over time for the Egyptian state, 
thus denoting multiple framings, interrelated across different historical periods, 
geographical scales, as well as socio-economic and political economy phases. 
Indeed, by emphasizing the issue of international water shares within the context 
of the Nile transboundary river basin, few studies have taken into consideration 
the multiple framings of “national” water security in Egypt’s context, and 
therefore the linkages between transboundary, domestic and local scales of water 
politics (Menga 2016). 
 
In other words, water security in Egypt is deeply rooted in the state’s quest 
for modernization and its corresponding hydraulic mission founded on the idea 
of mastering nature and controlling the flow of water. This quest has been mainly 
driven over the last 70 years by an ecological demographic narrative of crisis 
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(Sims 2015), given Egypt’s unique geography, demography, and the state failures 
associated with these factors. This narrative of crisis has been mostly propelled 
by two key drivers; the first is the sheer fact that 96% of Egypt’s population only 
lives on 7% of its total land area, often labeled as ‘too many people on too little 
land’ (Mitchell 2002). The second is the state’s economic growth and food 
production (security)5 objectives aiming at expanding the country’s agricultural 
economy and crop production for both domestic and export markets. As such, 
amidst consistent patterns of demographic growth in the ‘Old Lands’ of the Nile 
valley and delta, coupled with a diminishing per capita water share, ‘water 
security’ and its corresponding discourse of horizontal expansion, land 
reclamation and greening the desert have been consistently viewed as key 
elements of national security to address its narrative of crisis and corresponding 
scarcity discourses.  
 
The key message of the chapter highlights that despite massive investments 
in land reclamation schemes during the period between 1952-1970’s, Egypt’s 
ecological demographic narrative of crisis still prevails, which I argue is a 
combination of physical and political (water) scarcity. The chapter poses that 
between the state’s national discourse on modernization and horizontal 
expansion on the one hand, and the challenges faced on the ground by land 
reclamation schemes on the other, different actors have framed the land-water-
food ‘nexus’ differently. The chapter provides a critique of land reclamation 
projects, indicating that from the state’s perspective the narrative of crisis 
necessitated a new approach towards frontier making, as will be further 
discussed in chapter 4. 
 
The chapter is divided into 5 sections. The first section provides a historical 
background for the role of water in state modernization in Egypt especially in the 
postcolonial era (post 1952). Section 3.2 highlights the importance of water in 
frontier making and horizontal expansion, and discusses the state’s vision of 
                                                             
5 Food Security (al amn al gheza2i) is often the synonym of food production, self-sufficiency and food sovereignty 
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‘greening the desert’ and the corresponding policies of land reclamation. Section 
3.3 discusses the ‘feddan game’ and implementation in land reclamation 
schemes, as well as the challenges of early settlers and smallholders. Section 3.4 
discusses shades of physical and political water scarcity in Egypt, emphasizing 
the persistence of the country’s scarcity and security narratives, and the shift 
from development to allocation policies. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter by 
highlighting that despite state investments in large-scale projects to establish new 
communities in the desert, Egypt’s ecological-demographic narrative of crisis still 
prevails.  
 
3.1. State Modernity and the Hydraulic Mission under Mohamed Ali and 
Nasser 
 
In Egypt, the use of the Nile River waters dates back to early dynasties and 
kingdoms of Egyptian civilization. As perhaps the most famous irrigated 
agricultural society in world history, the Egyptian civilization has conceived the 
Nile’s water as an essential element of its geography reflecting cultural, social, 
and economic importance, linking state modernization to the river. Both 
Hecataeus and Herodotus referred to Egypt as ‘a gift of the river’ in their ancient 
writings (Griffiths 1966, p.57). Since ancient times, the river has been connecting 
the people of Egypt through ‘Habi’ god of Nile as featured on the temples’ walls 
from Abu Simbel to downstream Rosetta, depicting it as a religious symbol. It is 
estimated that early agricultural activities were established since 3000 B.C. and 
perhaps before then even. Controlling the Nile’s water perhaps dates back to the 
12th Dynasty with the intervention of Amenemhet III, known to the classical 
world as King Moeris. Amenemhet III attempted to connect Bahr Yusef branch of 
the Nile river with the Fayum, thus restoring the connection between the Nile 
river and Lake Moeris which formed naturally during the late Pleistocene epoch 
when melting African glacial sheets caused the Nile’s water level to be about 18 
meters higher than today (Bell 1975). Yet, “the necessary technology for large-
scale perennial irrigation was unavailable until the nineteenth century A.D. when 
the traditional, basin or paleotechnic system...began to come to an end”(Kalin 
2006). From here we can trace the early steps of mastering nature and 
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controlling the flow of water to serve the hydraulic mission for state 
modernization. A ‘hydraulic mission’ that has evolved across the last 200 years 
reflecting the political and economic importance of water resources domestically 
for the modern state building and nation making project in Egypt (see Hanna and 
Allouche, forthcoming).  
 
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the founders of modern 
Egypt such as Mohamed Ali and Nasser have relied on the Nile water to advance 
the hydraulic mission of the state, as an essential element of modernity. State 
modernity and its hydraulic mission were founded on the vision to expand the 
irrigation network and canals across Egypt’s landscape led by the Department of 
public works established in 1836 (now known as Ministry of Water Resources 
and Irrigation MWRI). During Mohamed Ali’s reign, Egypt was transformed into 
a society with new forms of communal association suited to systematically 
recasting the environment for the efficient operation of a perennially irrigated 
commercial agriculture. Where perennial irrigation was introduced, two, even 
three, crops could be grown per year, instead of the single crop that had been 
traditional for millennia. According to Tignor (2010) Mohamed Ali’s ‘hydraulic 
mission’ expanded further to develop several large-scale irrigation projects, and 
established a system of state monopolies for almost all agricultural commodities 
traded domestically and internationally. His strategy was to buy agricultural 
outputs like wheat, barley, cotton, and sugar at low prices and selling these 
commodities at high prices either to local Egyptian consumers or, in the case of 
cotton, to foreign textile owners to swell the state coffers. The result was a large 
increase in government revenues, which, then, supported the enlarged army, the 
educational missions, the hydraulic improvements, and much else (Tignor 2010). 
Perhaps an early form of water security mercantilism! 
 
The second half of the nineteenth century was a period when local 
communities led by colonial engineers transformed millions of hectares of the 
northwest Indian sub-continent from single season cropping to double season 
cropping with irrigation systems (Allan 1999). Engineers with this Indian 
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experience arrived in Egypt in the last two decades of the nineteenth century 
(Willcocks & Craig 1913) with the objective to control the Nile waters available to 
Egypt and later those of the Sudan. The hydraulic mission (Swyngedouw 1999) 
inspired engineers and the governments, which employed them from the late 
nineteenth century during what sociologists have termed industrial modernity 
(Beck 1992; 1995).  
 
On the international front, to secure Egypt’s Nile water, Mohamed Ali issued 
his orders to send a campaign to Sudan under the leadership of Ismail Pacha in 
1820-1821. The historical accounts about the importance of the Blue Nile waters 
to Egypt were also sought with the increased British influence in Egypt and 
Sudan in 1882 and 1897 respectively, to ensure that no one would tamper with 
the Nile (Shapland 1997b). The securitization process of the Nile water resources 
can be claimed to have started by the 1891 protocol “with the colonial powers of 
Britain and Italy, negotiated the demarcation of the respective spheres of 
influence in Eastern Africa laying the foundation for securing unhindered access 
to the Nile waters (Haftendorn 2000; Shapland 1997b; Turton 2000). In later 
historical periods, several events have led to the first Nile treaty of 1929 to secure 
the flow of water to Egypt. These include the 1902 Addis Ababa agreement 
between Ethiopia and Britain on behalf of Egypt marking the “principle of non-
interference with the flow of Blue Nile” to seek prior consent before initiating any 
works that might affect the flow of the Blue Nile or Sobat (Shapland 1997b, p.70). 
This agreement was confirmed later on by the tripartite agreement of 1906 
amongst the colonial powers Britain, France and Italy confirming their interests 
in Ethiopia (Ibid). Based on this latter agreement, an exchange of notes took 
place in 1925 whereby Italy recognized the “prior hydraulic rights” of Egypt and 
Sudan and agreed not to construct any works likely to modify the flow of the 
Ethiopian tributaries of the Nile. Through the 1929 agreement, Egypt received 48 
billion m3 of the flow and full access to the spring flood, while the Sudan only 
claimed 4 billion m3 (Haftendorn 2000, p.58). Sudan eventually gained its 
independence in 1956 and signed the 1959 Nile Treaty between Colonel Abboud 
and Nasser, which granted Egypt and Sudan full rights for the utilization of the 
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Nile waters with annual shares of 55.5 and 18.5 billion cubic meters (bcm), 
respectively. With British assistance during the colonial period and by its own 
efforts afterwards, Egypt was able to establish relative water independence 
comparatively early by way of ‘resource capture’ (Zeitoun & Warner 2006, 
p.449). This development contrasts with the subsequent ‘hydraulic missions’ of 
upstream riparian states, which were traditionally impeded by their relatively 
weaker financial positions (Cascão 2009; Parkes 2013). 
 
Nasser attempted to advance further Egypt’s hydraulic mission based on the 
1959 agreement. Under his rule, state modernization marked key nationalist 
milestones including agrarian reform, expanding irrigation networks, Aswan 
High Dam6 for irrigation and hydropower, as well as the launch of large-scale 
state-sponsored agricultural projects and land reclamation7 schemes. Between 
1964 and 1975, Egypt’s post-colonial ‘hydraulic mission’ extended, often 
described as the "Early High Dam Period" (Turton 2000). It spans the time from 
the first closure of the Nile to the first filling of Lake Nasser reservoir's capacity to 
carry 164 billion cubic meters of water. The construction of the High Dam has 
brought significant increases in the nation’s welfare due to the reliable supply of 
adequate water for irrigation, as well as municipal and industrial use (Smith 
1986; Postel 1996). These national projects manifest the importance of water to 
Egypt’s horizontal expansion plans and frontier making processes.  
 
The following section traces the evolution of Egypt’s hydraulic mission in 
particular as it relates to the state’s land reclamation schemes and horizontal 
expansion plans in post-colonial times.  
 
 
                                                             
6 Egypt’s High Dam – 3,803 m. in width and 111 m in height. Construction began in 1960 – opening date 1970.  
7 For the Non-Egyptian reader there is a need to clarify the meaning of reclamation as it is used in Egypt. Reclamation is, 
in fact, an incorrect English term for most of this land, unless one goes back to pre-historic times. Only lands lost through 
poor drainage, salinity and other water management related practices are truly reclaimed. Almost all such areas are 
located in or near the Old Valley. Most were reclaimed before 1982 (Zalla et al., 2000). 
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3.2. The Role of the State in Horizontal Expansion and Land Reclamation 
Schemes: A historical overview 
 
Before and after the 1952 Nasser era, agriculture has always been central 
to Egypt’s economy and its politics, and the state has been at the center of it 
(Saad 2002). Land reform was the first act in a radical reshaping of post 
revolution Egypt. Nasser confiscated a large number of private enterprises, and 
redistributed nationalized and sequestrated land among landless farmers. 
Perhaps the land reform discourse started in 1950 by the minister of Social 
Affairs Ahmed Hussein8, who suggested a plan labeled the ‘Five Feddan9 Scheme’ 
aiming at distributing reclaimed desert land to landless peasants (Johnson 
2004), as well as reforming the Egyptian countryside including a minimum 
agricultural wage and limited land distribution (Adriansen 2009). This program 
was an extension to early efforts since 1948 when the government announced a 
plan to distribute reclaimed desert land to small-scale farmers, who were to be 
given small plots of land and ‘hygienic houses’ (Mitchell 2002, p.40).  
 
Following 1952, land redistribution was an important goal, but land 
reclamation was also on the agenda. The hydraulic mission was driven by 
Nasser’s postcolonial modernization vision and the agenda of the developmental 
state, fueled by nationalism, associated socialist policies, and state-led large-scale 
projects. Accordingly, a key element of Egypt’s national hydraulic mission is 
symbolized in large-scale land reclamation projects to conquer the desert and 
establish new communities away from the overpopulated Nile valley and its delta. 
For the developmental state, this national objective of greening the desert has 
been consistently part of modernization, manifested in different generational 
projects founded on the premise of water security.  
 
Land reclamation in Egypt was traditionally a state function. The history of 
reclamation in post colonial Egypt has been characterized by the development of 
                                                             
8 Ahmed Hussein’s work gained eventually international recognition especially as it relates to the ‘Rural Social Centres’ 
9 Measurement Unit – 1 feddan equivalent to 0.42 hectares 
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large state farms with thousands of workers especially in the 1960s, inspired and 
partly financed by the Soviet Union (Springborg 1979a; Adriansen 2009). The 
government launched a large-scale land reclamation program that was a 
continuation of an initiative of the colonial-era rural social improvement program  
(Mitchell 2002) in the face of endemic disease and hunger after more than a 
century of intensified production of raw materials and food commodities for 
export to Europe (Dixon 2013). State-sponsored projects had two key objectives; 
to settle large numbers of people in the desert lands10, as well as gaining political 
capital by establishing large-scale developmental projects.  
 
 
Map 3.1: Old Lands and Land Reclamation in Egypt (1960-1986) 
 
Egypt's agricultural potential. Irrigation schemes: (1) Tahrir, (2) Maryut, (3) Nubariya desert, (4) northern delta, (5) south 
of Lake Manzala, (6) western Sinai, (7) Faiyum depression, (8) El-Minya, (9) Kena, (10) Radesia Wadi Abbady, (11) Kom 
Ombo (Source: Beaumont et al. 1988) 
 
                                                             
10 Desert Lands across the thesis refer to both Old-New Lands on the fringes on the Nile Delta, as well as New-New Lands 
in the Oasis 
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For example, the Tahrir Province (Modireyet Al Tahrir) land reclamation 
scheme located in the desert West of Nile Delta dates back to 1952. It was 
originally supported by Magdi Hassanein -a free army officer- based on a 
discovery of clay strata suggesting that the Romans had farmed in the area  
(Springborg 1979a). The project was officially launched in 1954 to create a 
collective farm model. Ever since, there have been several debates whether this 
land reclamation scheme as well as other ones should be state-owned or should 
be distributed to individual holders. A few years later, specifically in 1958 Sayed 
Marei, the minister of Agrarian Reform under Nasser, announced that 400 
peasants would receive small parcels of the land. By 1961 he announced that all of 
Tahrir would be converted from collective (i.e. state) to private holdings 
(Springborg 1979a; Springborg 1979b). These plans however were largely 
opposed by other free officers based on the foundation that future water planned 
to be allocated from the Aswan High Dam can only support farming on one fifth 
of the total area of 40,000 feddan he had proposed. Water has been, and still is a 
key factor of debate for the state’s modernization plans.  
 
During the period between 1961-1967 the scheme witnessed interesting 
developments adopting a Soviet Model. As Springborg indicates, “the sheer 
quantity of reclaimed land began to mount up very quickly after 1960/61, in 
which year 28,300 feddan had been reclaimed, compared to 89,300 feddans in 
1961 /62, 122,300 feddan in 1962/63 and 159,400 feddans in 1963/64” 
(Springborg 1979a, p.58). During 1964, Kruschev visited the scheme and 
announced that Soviet Union would assist in the reclamation of 10,000 
additional feddan to create a “state farm model”. During this period, once more 
debates intensified about whether land reclamation schemes should remain 
under state control or should be distributed to individual farmers. Two points of 
view opposed each other; the first arguing for a socialist model of state-sponsored 
land development and avoiding land fragmentation, while the second advocated 
for a move from state bureaucracy, to avoid costly and inefficient schemes by 
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applying agrarian reform co-operative model and distributing 5 feddan to small 
holders and landless peasants. 
The importance of land reclamation to Egypt was best described by Mohamed 
Hassanein Heikal (one of Egypt’s prominent journalists and political scientists), 
as follows (Springborg 1979a, p.59 based on Al Ahram Newspaper issue of 
January 8th 1965);   
 
The answer to the country's immediate agricultural difficulties lies in the one 
and one half million feddan that will be cultivated after the High Dam is 
built. In order to make best use of this land, there must be enough capital, 
technical knowledge, social planning, and direct contact with the 
international market. Because of this, the new land should not be divided up 
and distributed in patches of five or ten feddan. It should be used for modern 
cultivation on a large scale so as to achieve the highest level of production 
possible, while exporting the produce should be the most important goal. 
This necessitates that the land remain public property. Socialism will be 
achieved since the land will belong to the people and since it will offer great 
chances for employment because the workers on the new land will take part 
in the councils of direction. 
 
Nevertheless, under austerity measures for a nation under war, in 1971 Sadat 
announced that Egypt’s 300,000 feddan under the General Organization for the 
Utilization and Development of Reclaimed Land, would be divided amongst 11 
companies; a proposal that never saw the light due to political reasons 
(Springborg 1979a). By the end of Sadat’s presidency in 1981 the debate was still 
ongoing whether reclamation plans to be distributed to different individuals and 
agro-businesses, public and private, foreign and domestic. This view was based 
on arguments favoring efficiency and on the rationalization of production and 
marketing, in conjunction with the attractiveness of foreign capital and expertise 
(Springborg 1979a).  The state however remained in control of much of land 
reclamation schemes.  
 
In addition to Modireyet Al Tahrir, and as shown in table 3.1, other state-
sponsored schemes included Al Nubareya, Al Salheya, and the Mubarak Project 
for Developing and Serving the Land Allocated to Youth Graduates initiated in 
1987. Other donor funded development projects included the World Bank New 
Land Development Project (1980-1991) targeting to reclaim 24,000 feddan west 
of the delta (Barnes 2012), and the West Delta Irrigation Improvement Project in 
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2005. Most of these land reclamation projects, reverted to a “top-down” 
bureaucratic approach where applicants would be assigned land parcels 
randomly with the loss of any community dynamics (Sims 2015, p.95). 
 
 Table 3.1. Land Reclamation Projects in Egypt 1950s-2000s 
 
Source: (Barnes 2010, p.221) based on data from (Springborg 1979a; Meyer 1998; Zalla et al. 2000)  
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3.3. Land-Water Resources in Egypt and the Feddan Game  
 
3.3.1. Classification of Land-Water Resources in Egypt  
 
As a result of the different land reclamation schemes throughout most of 
the second half of the twentieth century, Egypt’s land resources can be classified 
into two broad categories and three types of ‘Lands’ according to the ‘Ministry of 
Water Resources and Irrigation’ (MWRI), these include (Karajeh et al. 2011); the 
classical category of ‘Old Lands’ located within the Nile Valley where farming 
took place for thousands of years; and the second category of ‘New Lands’ which 
includes the two other types of ‘Old-New Lands’ typically including lands at the 
margins of the Nile delta mostly developed under the different projects discussed 
in the previous section; and ‘New-New Lands’ mostly desert lands scattered 
across Egypt’s deserts.  
 
The ‘Old Lands’ represent the largest irrigated area in Egypt and are found in the 
Nile Valley and Delta. These include lands, which have been intensively cultivated 
generations ago, mostly using water from the Nile. ‘Old Lands’ are characterized 
by alluvial soils spreading over 5.36 million feddan (2.25 million ha), typically 
irrigated by traditional surface irrigation systems, which, compared to modern 
and improved irrigation systems, have a very low field water application 
efficiency of around 50% (Karajeh et al. 2011). Most of this land suffers from four 
important problems; continued encroachment by non-agricultural uses at a rate 
of 20,000 feddan/year (8400 ha/year), land fragmentation, salinity and 
degradation of soil fertility, and on farm-water management (Karajeh et al. 2011).  
 
Beyond the ‘Old Lands’, situated within the natural boundaries of the Nile 
watershed within Egypt, new desert ‘frontiers’ included two broad categories; 
Old-New Lands and New-New lands (also referred to across this thesis as New 
Lands). These land reclamation schemes cover 2.5 million feddan (1.05 million 
ha) and were reclaimed relatively recently particularly since the construction of 
the Aswan High Dam. The Nile is the main source of irrigation water, but in some 
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desert areas, underground water is also used. In 2000, the USAID Agricultural 
Policy Reform Program (APRP) issued a report (Impact Assessment Report No. 
12) to “examine the types, quality and completeness of data as it pertains to New 
Lands” (Zalla et al. 2000). The report indicated that until 1982 land reclamation 
and development in Egypt was concentrated on waterlogged and saline soils 
located mainly in the Nile Delta. Further development efforts have concentrated 
on desert lands [Old-New Lands] on the edge of the already existing cultivated 
[Old Lands], utilizing a combination of Nile water delivered through irrigation 
canals and development of underground water. Therefore, 1982 provides a logical 
dividing point between a first and second phase of reclamation activities (Zalla et 
al. 2000). 
 
The ‘Old-New Lands’ are located mainly on the east and west sides of the Delta 
and are scattered over various areas of the country. This is the most 
heterogeneous class of Land reclamation outside of the old lands, but relatively 
close to the Nile valley and the delta. This generation of lands may or may not be 
located within a Nile valley governorate. Most have been reclaimed by various 
users as shown in table 3.2 during the last three decades and much, but not all, of 
the area is now above marginality, i.e., many have achieved the maximum 
potential they can expect from reclamation activities alone. This phase of Old-
New Lands has a cropping pattern that is different from that of Old Lands in that 
they include more high value crops (fruits and vegetables) and less traditional 
field crops (cereals and cotton). Examples of such lands include the West of 
Noubaria Agricultural Intensification project covering about 900,000 feddans; 
North and South Tahrir region and El-Khatatba south-west of the delta; and El-
Salheya east of the delta.  
 
The ‘New Lands’ include the most recent areas in remote desert locations. They 
both depend on a mix of Nile and underground water resources as a main source 
of irrigation.  This phase of ‘New-New Lands’ is located far away from the Nile 
delta in remote desert areas. These are lands in the process of reclamation since 
the late 1990s and 2000s, and distributed to big companies that are capable of 
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managing production of high value crops, mainly fruits and vegetables for the 
export market. They depend on high cost, high levels of technology in 
reclamation, cultivation and marketing. Examples of these lands include the 
Mega projects in Toshka, East of Oweinat in western desert, and the area around 
the El-Salam canal in Sinai, as well as the recently launched 1.5 million feddan 
(see Chapter 4). These lands depend on highly corporate engagement based on 
capital-technology endowments for mechanized agriculture and farming 
activities. Water in Toshka mainly depends on the lake Nasser reserve channeled 
through al Sheikh Zayed Canal, characterized by high water quality, while in 
Oweinat water resources mainly depend on underground reserves from the trans-
boundary Great Nubian Sand Aquifer, shared between Egypt, Sudan, Libya and 
Tchad.  
 
As shown in table 3.2, various types of agricultural producers operate on these 
lands: big investors, small investors, beneficiaries, graduates and squatters. 
Irrigation water varies between surface and underground water resources. Worth 
noting however, mostly small and large investors operated their farms utilizing 
more efficient and more expensive systems of irrigation like drip irrigation or 
sprinkler irrigation. Other beneficiaries however used other traditional methods 
or irrigation flooding their lands, either from surface water or underground wells. 
 
Many of the land reclamation projects involved the relocation and resettlement of 
farmers, farm families and agricultural workers from the old land to these newly 
reclaimed areas. Therefore, the state made tremendous investments to provide 
agriculture and social infrastructure, much of which remained incomplete or 
needed maintenance according to a USAID report issued in 2000 evaluating the 
Agricultural Programs in New Lands (Zalla et al. 2000). As such, despite the 
different land reclamation projects led by the state, slow progress was achieved 
under the smallholder land distribution schemes during the mid to late seventies. 
Also, worth noting, many of the young graduates who had been allocated land 
parcels have left them and were replaced by the private sector as they could not 
afford the cost of farming in the desert (Interview #1). 
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Table 3.2. Mapping of Different Actors in Land Reclamation Schemes in Egypt 
 
Source: (Zalla et al. 2000) 
 
3.3.2. Irrigation Technology and Smallholders Challenges  
 
Despite the announced results of land reclamation during 1952-1997, different 
types of beneficiaries and actors engaged in land reclamation projects, and faced 
a number of challenges, which goes hand in hand with the little progress achieved 
on the ground. This is especially true for the small farmers who benefited from 
Graduates are encouraged by government to settle and invest in new lands and are given 
major support through the Mubarak Young Graduates Project of MALR for that purpose. The 
support includes preparation of secondary and tertiary canals, resettlement support and long-
term financing to purchase their land over a thirty-year period. 
Beneficiaries are individuals that the government wishes to aid in a special way by 
subsidizing their acquisition of agricultural land, invariably in newly reclaimed areas. This 
group includes landless laborers, persons displaced from state farms that have been 
dismantled, veterans and other similar groups. Both graduates and beneficiaries receive 
settlement and operational support from the Graduates Project. They hold approximately 30% 
of the total area of new lands reclaimed since 1987. 
Small investors are individuals who purchase plots of land in the newly reclaimed areas, 
usually about 20 feddan, directly from the government. In some areas those with less than 
seven feddan also receive support from the Graduates Project, but this does not appear to be 
uniformly true. 
Large investors are major stakeholders in policy decisions relating to production, cropping 
and marketing, due to their ownership of large areas of new lands. There is no official dividing 
line between large and small investors, but many observers use 20-30 feddan. There is also a 
group with more than 200 feddan that can be characterized as competitive entrepreneurs who 
are able to mitigate risk and bear interim losses on their own. They usually provide for 
themselves more of the basic irrigation infrastructure, such as wells, secondary and tertiary 
canals and roads, pumping facilities and system maintenance, unlike most graduates, 
beneficiaries and small investors. They frequently provide their own marketing and processing 
infrastructure as well. The term infrastructure is used differently than for graduates and 
beneficiaries, for whom it may also include housing, electricity, financing, schools and other 
social amenities. 
Squatters are a group that is not discussed much, but which appears to be quite substantial 
in numbers and area cultivated. They simply occupy land that appears suitable and dig wells or 
pump lift water from nearby canals; eventually their property rights are recognized and they 
can get title to the land for a relatively modest payment if the government owns it. Estimates 
of the size of this group vary widely, but squatters could occupy as much as 15% of lands 
reclaimed since 1982. 
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these land reform programs. As described by Mouna Mourshed in her award 
winning MIT paper published in 1995; 
 
To the casual observer, the Egyptian experience with irrigation technology 
adoption is a story about the failure of the public sector and the success of 
the private sector. The government installed a technology that was 
inappropriate to farmer crop preferences and provided farmers with little 
technical assistance in equipment use. In short, although reclamation 
officials intended to promote the use of water saving technology in the 
desert, they did not ground their policy in an understanding of the daily 
practices and realities of desert farming. In contrast private farmers adopted 
irrigation technology because they obtained intensive assistance from 
exporters and large investor farm employees who possessed the knowledge 
required to produce high-yields and superior quality crops. Furthermore, 
unlike public-sector farmers, private farmers were able to select the 
technology suitable to their cropping practices rather than having the 
equipment pre-installed on their plots (Mourshed 1995). 
 
This has been confirmed by (Interview #2) indicating that over the last 
decades smallholders who started to use drip irrigation have been called 
“investors” even though they only owned 5 feddan or more. Worth noting 
however that many public sector farmers did not want to install drip irrigation 
system as they were just looking for the cheapest way to irrigate (Interviews # 1, 4 
& 17). As a result of the difficulties faced by smallholders including farmers, 
youth and other beneficiaries from the state-sponsored programs, irrigation 
practices in these lands shifted from the state-installed water saving irrigation 
equipment to flooding methods, known as ‘ray bel ghamr’. Other reasons for this 
shift are the sheer fact that small farmers who came from the Delta were mainly 
used to flood irrigation in the Old Lands and were not willing to take the risk nor 
the time to experiment with new technology that may affect his yield (Interviews 
# 21; # 3). These practices and agricultural traditions were transferred to the 
reclamation schemes (Old-New lands) especially those depending on surface 
irrigation. As such there has been a lot of resistance from many small farmers to 
adopt water saving practices, partly due to cost and economic implications, but 
also due to inherently cultural elements and the way agriculture has been 
happening in Egypt for thousands of years. Since water is free, farmers do not 
think they need to save water (Interviews # 1,2,4, &9).  
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Furthermore, this problem also occurred in the ‘New Lands’ of the western desert 
Oasis, whereby non-renewable underground water is often the only source of 
irrigation. Yet, small farmers used it to flood their fields, despite both the sandy 
soils of the desert and the relatively higher temperatures in the desert ultimately 
leading to higher levels of evaporation. A prime example in this respect based on 
my observations from my personal engagement in a project in the New Valley 
governorate was the situation of families in Abu Minqar village in Farafra Oasis 
who were allocated land plots for reclamation in western desert in New Lands 
(400 km southwest of Cairo). In this location, small farmers who inhabited a 
village of 1,300 inhabitants mostly depended on flooding their fields from 
underground water from artisan wells Be’er wahed (Arabic meaning for Well#1) 
for alfa-alfa cultivation. This example and other ones too reflect the farmers’ use 
of non-renewable water resources and the lack of regulations on behalf of the 
government to address this issue. During a later visit to the village a couple of 
years later, the water from the artisan well was no longer free flowing, and the 
farmers had to bear the extra cost of diesel fuel to pump water out of the well into 
their fields reflecting one of the tensions about the water-energy-food nexus in 
desert locations for stallholders. To address these challenges, a donor funded 
small grants program had set up 20 feddan of drip irrigation pilot field, 
implemented as a demonstration pilot for the rest of the farmers to replicate the 
model (Field notes). Collectively the farmers needed to set up an NGO for the 
collective use and development of their resources and grants support, which was 
a whole different challenge on its own that goes beyond the scope of this research. 
Worth noting however, aside from irrigation technology, and WEF nexus 
challenges, other difficulties facing the farmers were related to high cost of inputs, 
a policy failure-ignoring farmers’ socio-economic needs and day-to-day 
challenges on the ground, and the sheer absence of basic social services such as 
hospitals, schools, and basic infrastructure (Field notes).  
 
In other locations where farming depended on surface water for irrigation, 
graduates who have been allocated a piece of land as government beneficiaries, 
assumed infrastructure to be the government responsibility. Nevertheless, water 
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does not reach the farms, and the young farmers do not know what to do in light 
of the absence of alternatives.  Small farmers cannot extract water from deep 
wells – their pumps are small and can only extract water at 350 meter of depth. 
On the other hand, private investors and large-scale farms are not heavily 
regulated, whereby government interference is minimal compared to small 
farmers (Interviews #1; #2; #13). For example private investors expand the 
canals in their lands (as will be shown in chapter 6), whereas small farmers are 
not allowed to do so (Interview #1).  
 
As such, what Mourshed refers to in terms of the success of the private sector 
compared to the public sector water and irrigation activities reflects the signs of 
the decline of the developmental state (of Nasser) and the rise of the predatory 
state during market liberalization. According to (Interview # 16), this neglect of 
the farmers on the one hand and the growing participation of the private sector 
(see chapter 4) on the other led to “the creation of two parallel water economies 
in Egypt”. The first is the government’s surface water irrigation network mostly 
covering the ‘Old Lands’, and early reclamation schemes in ‘Old-New Lands’ 
depending on both surface and/or underground water. The second is the private 
water economy in Old-New lands and New Lands which mainly depend on 
underground water representing a small share of 9.03% of Egypt’s annual water 
resources consumption estimated to be 6.9 billion cubic meters of its total annual 
water uses.  
 
3.3.3. The Feddan Game and the Implementation Gap 
 
With all the state efforts to advance its horizontal expansion plans, it 
should be noted that land reclamation does not necessarily mean that this land is 
productive. In this respect, David Sims draws attention to the idea of the “feddan 
game”. That is while the state announced positive results in land reclamation, the 
line is unclear between what is ‘reclaimed’ land, and what is ‘productive’ land, 
whereby “even critical observers and foreign academics fall in this trap” (Sims 
2015, p.104).  
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The ‘Feddan Game’ reflects the clear disconnect between the state’s 
“macro” objectives and national strategies, and the micro practices, or in other 
words what is actually happening on the ground. There are two main issues to 
observe; the first is the inconsistency in the figures of reclaimed lands issued 
from different government agencies (Ministry of Agriculture, GARPAD, MWRI, 
donors). The second issue is the challenges faced by users who are not from the 
private sector and do not have the financial means to adopt or maintain 
precision irrigation.  
 
In terms of the inconsistency in the figures, MWRI data indicated that by 
1997 only 1.6 million feddan were reclaimed out of which only 815,000 feddan 
were under production, while on the other hand, GARPAD statistics indicate that 
between 1950 and 1997, 2.6 million feddan were reclaimed, thus portraying a 
“rosy picture” (Sims, 2015: 105). Statements from different policy makers, who 
also announced different results of land reclamation schemes during Egypt’s 
post-colonial era, further confirm this discrepancy in figures. For instance, Sayed 
Marei (Nasser’s Agriculture Minister) announced in 1970 that a total of 868,700 
feddan were reclaimed between 1952-1969, while Youssef Wali (Mubarak’s 
longest agriculture minister) announced in 1985 that a total of 905,100 feddan 
were reclaimed during the period between 1952-1985. As such for the period 
between 1952-1997 little accuracy is understood in terms of both; the actual 
amount of reclaimed land, and the actual productive land out of the reclaimed 
lands. Worth noting here that 1997 is a dividing line in land reclamation schemes 
given whereby a new horizontal plan was issued during 1996-1997 as will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 4.  
 
Despite the massive investments by the state and a wide portfolio of donor-
funded projects for the modernization of the water and agriculture sectors, there 
has been inefficient management of state-owned large reclamation schemes and 
constant neglect of small farmers. Furthermore, these investments did not 
address Egypt’s two key challenges, which are the foundation of its ecological-
demographic narrative of crisis, that is; (i) demographic redistribution away from 
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the overcrowded Nile valley and its Delta, and (ii) food security (amn gheza2y) 
often used in the policy discourse interchangeably with self-sufficiency (iktifa’ 
zaty). These issues are further highlighted in the following sections as core issues 
related to Egypt’s physical water scarcity, as well as political scarcity. 
 
3.4. Shades of Scarcity and Egypt’s Narrative of Crisis 
 
So where do we go from here given this historical background? As 
indicated earlier, despite the massive investments in desert land reclamation, and 
despite different attempts to improve agricultural productivity during the last few 
decades, Egypt’s narrative of crisis still prevails. In this section, I attempt to 
address the origins of the discourses, and policies associated with Egypt’s (water) 
scarcity and security narratives.  
 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
between 1980 and 2007 several factors of progress have been achieved in Egypt’s 
agricultural sector. These include “implementing various economic reforms, such 
as in trade liberalization and prices; and technological development and 
improving productive relations, particularly, those prevailing between the owners 
and the renters of the agricultural lands” (Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 2011).  
 
However, it is widely argued that population growth offsets most of these 
gains. In particular, two key concerns are central to Egypt’s water scarcity and 
security risks on the national level, often argued to represent the foundation of its 
“narrative of crisis” based on; (i) demographic re-distribution outside of the 
overcrowded Nile Valley and its Delta, and (ii) ensuring food security for a 
growing population. These concerns are often attributed to the country’s unique 
geography combined with its rates of population growth and resulting 
demographic pressure in the Nile Valley and its Delta, which have shaped much 
of Egypt’s ecological-demographic narrative of crisis and the corresponding 
physical water scarcity narratives. In particular, I address two forms of scarcities 
in Egyptian water politics, mutually reinforcing each other, often leading to a 
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vicious circle and narrative of crisis, those are; physical water scarcity, and 
political scarcity. 
 
3.4.1. The Land-Water-Demography Nexus and Political Scarcity  
 
 
          3.4.1.1. The Malthusian View: Physical Water Scarcity and Demography  
 
In terms of physical water scarcity, from the state’s standpoint, Egypt’s 
ecological-demographic narrative of crisis is primarily founded on Malthusian-
style assumptions about the "limits to growth" (Meadows, 1972; Bakker, 2003). 
In terms of the relationship between demographic growth and water resources, in 
1952 Egypt’s total population was 21 million inhabitants. Today, in 2018 Egypt’s 
total population is 104 million, out of which 94 million live in Egypt according to 
CAPMAS 2017 census. As shown in Figure 3.1, per capita share of both land and 
water resources in Egypt has significantly declined between 1897 to present days. 
In 1897 water resources per capita represented around 5000 cubic meters 
annually, with an average agricultural land holding of 0.9 acres. In 1952, this 
share decreased to more than half reaching 2000 cubic meter per capita 
annually, with an average land holding of 0.4 acres, whereby the country 
exported wheat and other crops. Today, per capita water share in Egypt is 600 
cubic meters annually and an average of 0.2 acres. By 2025, per capita share of 
both land and renewable water resources is forecasted to further decline reaching 
less than 0.1 acres and 500-300 cubic meters per capita respectively as shown in 
figure 3.1 below. As the international benchmark for water poverty globally is 
1,000 cubic meters per person per year, Egypt may have reached this limit since 
1998. Egypt is therefore in the phase of physical water scarcity due to its annual 
population growth rate of 2.7%. By dividing the amount of available renewable 
water resources (which is fixed 55.5 bcm) by the growing population, water 
poverty rates are expected to get worse –with some estimates pointing at the 
figure of 250 cubic meter by 2030. 
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Figure 3.1. Per Capita Share of Water Resources and Agricultural Land  
 
Source: (Khalifa 2015) 
 
The classical description of Egypt’s demographic distribution is 85.2% of the 
population lives on 5.36 % of the total land area of 1 million square km as shown 
in table 3.3. Another portion of the population (12.4%) is mostly around the 
Mediterranean such as Alexandria and other coastal cities representing 6.7% of 
the country’s total area. As such, for the remaining lands in Egypt representing 
90% of the country size in only inhabited by 2.4 % of the total population. This is 
the foundation of Egypt’s ecological-demographic narrative of crisis. 
 
Table 3.3. Demographic Distribution in Agro-ecological Zones in Egypt 
Agro-Ecological 
Zones 
      Area Km2 Area % Population % 
Northern Coast 56200 6.73% 12.4% 
Nile Valley & Delta 53100 5.36% 85.2% 
Western Desert 681,000 64.84% 0.2% 
Eastern Desert & 
Sinai 
281,100 25.06% 2.2% 
Source: (Al Hakim 2015) based on MWRI data 2004 
 
 
Furthermore, according to CAPMAS (2017) the average population density in the 
total inhabited area reached 1,612 persons per square km. These densities are 
even much higher in several areas in the Nile valley and Delta, reaching 49,952 in 
Cairo, 14,154 in Aswan, and ranging between 4,907 and 2000 inhabitants per 
square km in the Nile Delta as shown in Table 3.4. These figures mark some of 
 90 
the highest densities in the world often surpassing China and India or even the 
population of a single Gulf country (Interview #4).  
 
Table 3.4: Population Density in Egypt’s Nile Valley and Delta Governorates 
Governorate Population 
Density 
Pop/km2 
Governorate Population 
Density 
Pop/km2 
Governorate Population 
Density 
Pop/km2 
Cairo 49,952.1 Alexandria 2,947.8 Sharqia 1,408.4 
Aswan 14,154.6 Gharbia 2,521.2 Kafr El Sheikh 947.3 
Giza 6,586.1 Damietta 2,053.4 Behera 849.8 
Luxor 5,232.9 Beni Suef 2,179.1 New Valley 215.3 
Kalyoubia 4,907 Qena 1,820.1   
Suhag 3,009.2 Fayoum  1,784.8 National Average: 1,162 
inhabitant/km2 
Asyout 2,806.3 Dakahlia 1,732.4   
El Menia 2,230.7 Menoufia  1,673.6   
Source: CAPMAS, 2017. Based on National census data for 2014 by the Egyptian Survey Authority 
 
 
 
While these different figures represent the foundation of Egypt’s ecological-
demographic narrative of crisis, the state’s water security and scarcity narratives 
are expected to deepen in light of the growing patterns of demographic growth, 
coupled with decreasing per capita water shares on the one hand, and higher 
water consumption and competition between different sectors on the other.  
These observations lead to the first conclusion. Despite several land reclamation 
schemes throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the large-scale state 
sponsored projects did not influence the demographic distribution of the 
population. Egypt’s growing population denotes decreasing land and water 
shares per capita. This observation is further confirmed by the high population 
densities as shown in table 3.3, which still preside over a small fraction of the 
total land area within the country whereby 97.5% of the population lives on 7% of 
the land, or 85% lives on 5.3% of the land.  
3.4.1.2. Smallholder Challenges  
 
As discussed earlier, the state had deployed tremendous amounts of 
investments in land reclamation schemes post 1952 and throughout most of the 
second half of the twentieth century. Yet, Egypt’s narrative of crisis remains 
 91 
unresolved. While physical water scarcity in indeed a risk for the Egyptian 
economy and society, driven by consistent patterns of demographic growth, there 
are also other hindering factors, which negatively influence Egypt’s security and 
scarcity narratives. Though it is important to understand the quantitative 
dimensions of physical water scarcity as part of the wider official (national) 
narratives, it is important to draw attention to other forms of scarcity beyond 
those founded on the classical Malthusian assumptions. These are often related 
to questions of state’s policies and the neglect of small farmers – those who are 
the largest water users, and those who supply the nation with its food needs 
(Interview #3) whether in the old lands or the newly reclaimed lands.  
 
There is a wide consensus that land reclamation schemes, started as an 
alternative route to fight youth unemployment and divert the traditional mindset 
of expecting a government job upon graduation. They also served the larger 
government vision of greening the desert, which was a big slogan back in the 
1980s. Despite the state’s national narrative of crisis, Timothy Mitchell contested 
the notion of “too many people on too little land”. For Mitchell (2002), it is 
important to link the issue of agricultural lands to questions of inequality and 
distribution, thus criticising USAID for bringing in technical solutions that do not 
address the real issues relevant to small peasants. Mitchell amongst others also 
criticized how USAID has been pushing for mechanization, privatization and neo 
liberal practices (see chapter 4). Others such as (Bush & Ayeb 2012; Bush 2011)  
indicate that Law No 96/199211 issued to liberalize agricultural land has had 
negative impacts in old lands and raises questions of injustice for small farmers 
as it omitted the two main advantages granted to small farmers by Nasser’s 
agrarian reform under law 157/1952; fixed rental value (seven times the tax), and 
the inability to evict tenants from their rented lands. Furthermore, Mitchell 
(1995) and Bush (2002; 2007) have contested this dominant discourse of state-
led development, and view these land reclamation schemes as a way to avoid the 
reform and redistribution of the old Nile Valley and Delta lands. They argue that 
                                                             
11 Law 96/ 1992, was issued to liberalize agricultural land, by determining a 5 year transitional period (ending in 1997) 
after which tenants had to return the arable land to its original owners (Saber 2006) 
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these policies should be understood as part of the wider political maneuvering of 
both the Egyptian Government and its influential international partners such as 
USAID. In this respect, a critical issue often overlooked is the country’s increased 
reliance on animal production, and hence expanding cultivation of animal feed at 
the expense of plant production, which in turn has led to increased imports of 
wheat from the US (Mitchell 1995; Adriansen 2009). A view often interpreted by 
the state as a result of rising incomes and changing patterns of consumption in 
the society as indicated by former Minister of water resources and irrigation 
Hossam Moghazi during a recent workshop conducted by the FAO water scarcity 
initiative (Interview #30; field notes). 
 
According to  Tutwiler et al. (2013), problems of water availability and 
distribution have been reported in the Egyptian scientific research literature for 
decades. Many commentators see the problem as one of poor distribution more 
than a lack of supply (Ibid). For experts, Egyptian farmers still overwhelmingly 
practice flood irrigation, which results in evaporative loss and over-irrigation, 
causing soil damage and rises in groundwater tables (Interviews # 2; #4;; #7; 
#13). For example, in 2005, only 6% of Egypt’s cultivated area was equipped with 
modern pressurized irrigation systems (Tutwiler et al. 2013). In this respect, 
where farmers dominantly use flooding irrigation techniques, water-use 
efficiency at the field level is often said to be low (Ghazouani et al. 2014; El-Agha 
et al. 2011; Tutwiler et al. 2013). Furthermore, inadequate agricultural drainage 
coupled with the Nile Delta’s particularly flat slope contribute to salinization of 
soil and water resources (Tutwiler et al. 2013). Problems of head and tail at the 
level of an irrigation canal have been also widely documented (Ghazouani et al. 
2014; Rap et al. 2015). These farmer challenges at the local level result in major 
production problems, inefficiencies and dislocations at the national level.   
 
However, smallholders do not always view these scarcity narratives by experts 
and policy makers the same way. While a common scarcity narrative blames 
small farmers for the inefficient use of water resources, alternative views argue 
otherwise. Foe example, Molle et al. (2010)  indicate that this view is often both 
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incorrect and unfair as farmers operating under conditions of water scarcity are 
unlikely to waste water. Overall, Egyptian farmers put up with a lot of challenges, 
however they always find a way to access water whereby “the constrained 
environment in which farmers operate and make choices is frequently not well 
understood and documented” (Molle et al. 2010). To keep up with water stress, 
“farmers adapt by relying on three main strategies; digging illegal wells to 
withdraw water, using illegal pumps especially during night time, and 
illegal/informal access to drainage and sewage water, all of which are against 
Egyptian law” (Interview # 2). For example, a case study by IWMI (Ghazouani et 
al. 2014) highlights that farmers in West Nile Delta use several methods to adapt 
to water scarcity including – but not limited to: changing cropping patterns, 
crafting collective irrigation rules, reusing agricultural drainage water, practicing 
deficit and night irrigation, and over-irrigating whenever water is available (Ibid).  
These practices reflect the actual scarcity challenges faced by smallholders and 
their adaptation approaches to support their livelihoods in water stress 
situations.  
 
In light of these criticisms concerning questions of inequality and distribution, 
Mehta (2003, p.2), indicates “shades of scarcity are found in theories of 
modernization which promote un-linear paths from ‘underdevelopment’ to 
‘development’. According to Xenos (1989, p.36) “these models continue to be 
evoked by those taking refuge in the hope of an abundant future to assuage their 
sense of the injustices of present-day scarcity” (in Mehta 2003). In the context of 
Egypt’s horizontal expansion and land reclamation schemes, scarcity has 
different meanings for different actors. For instance, a main paradox occurs 
whereby despite horizontal expansion having been a developmental priority, 
there is an ongoing loss of the fertile lands of the Nile delta and valley due to 
illegal construction” (Interview # 1). Consequently, with the urbanization of the 
countryside, “another main problem facing Egypt’s water and agriculture sector 
is the fact that the primary canals are losing space (zemam)” (Interview # 4). This 
transformation in agricultural land use is due to several socio-economic 
challenges and lack of profitability from agricultural activities for small farmers 
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(Interview # 20). As a result, between 1984 and 2010, an average of 37 thousand 
feddan have been lost annually due to illegal construction on agricultural land 
with a total lost agricultural land equivalent to 1 million feddan. During the 
period of the Egyptian revolution in 2011 an estimated 70,000 feddan were lost 
for illegal construction (Interview # 4). Paradoxically, despite the loss of 
agricultural land, Egypt’s water needs are increasing and not the opposite. This is 
mainly attributed to two reasons; (i) expansion in cultivation of high water 
consuming crops such as sugar cane and rice, (ii) inefficiency of water use 
especially in the old lands (Interviews #13; #36).  
 
In terms of the expansion in cultivation of high water consuming crops, a 
common challenge is the famous case of rice cultivations mostly spread over 3 
regions. In January 2018, the MWRI in coordination with ministry of agriculture 
announced that the total areas of rice cultivations in Egypt will be decreased to 
reach 734,000 feddan only in 9 governorates instead of 1.076 million feddan 
decided during the previous year, thus this decision decreased rice cultivations by 
300,000 feddan (AL Ahram 2018). This figure is consistent with what was 
originally decided during the High Dam early studies not to exceed 700,000 
feddan. In addition to official figures of total rice cultivations, it is estimated that 
an additional 800,000 feddan of illegal rice cultivations take place on an annual 
basis.  It is worth noting however that rice cultivations are good for climate 
change adaptation and mitigating soil salinity and seawater intrusion in 
agricultural lands near coastal zones (Meetings Notes #2; #5). the question of 
rice water consumption is a contentious issue which reflects the shades of scarcity 
between the state’s policy to save water, and the farmers livelihoods. Attempts to 
address the issue of rice cultivation were also subject to a recent World Bank 
funded project to support system of rice intensification (SRI), albeit on a limited 
pilot scale (field notes; Interview #10). 
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3.4.2. The Land-Water-Food Nexus: Self-Sufficiency vs. Virtual Water Trade   
 
The second issue relevant to Egypt’s hydraulic mission and horizontal expansion 
schemes throughout the second half of the twentieth century relates to the larger 
question of food security and the myth of self-sufficiency. In terms of Egypt’s 
water resources budget, table 3.4 below shows the quantity of water resources by 
source between 2010/2011 and 2014/2015. Official government data shows an 
average growth in demand for water of 3.5% annually, from 73.8 bcm in 2010 to 
76.4 bcm in 2015 (CAPMAS 2017). In this respect, the country’s annual share 
from the Nile’s water (55.5 bcm) represents 72.64% of its total annual demand for 
different water uses. The difference between total water use and available Nile 
water is an amount equivalent to 20.9 billion cubic meters. This amount 
represents Egypt’s water budget deficit mainly covered from other sources as 
shown in table 3.5. These include; underground water resources (6.9 billion cubic 
meters – 9.03% of its total annual water uses), recycling and reuse of agricultural 
drainage water supplied 11.7 billion cubic meter equivalent to 15.3% of total water 
use, in addition to wastewater recycling (1.3 bcm, 1.7%), rainfall (0.9 bcm 1.8%), 
and desalination (0.1 bcm, 0.13%).  
 
Table 3.5. Egypt Quantity of Water Resources by Source (2010-2015) 
 
                     Source: CAPMAS, 2017 
 
In terms of the competing uses between different sectors, the agriculture sector is 
the main water user in Egypt’s water economy. As shown in table 3.6 agriculture 
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consumes 62.5 bcm of water annually equivalent to 81.6% of Egypt’s total water 
resources in 2014/2015 (CAPMAS 2017). Drinking water requirements are 
equivalent to 10.35 billion cubic meters representing 13.55% of the total use, 
while industry consumes 1.2 billion cubic meters equivalent to 1.57%, and finally, 
an amount of 2.5 bcm is lost to evaporation equivalent to 3.27% of Egypt’s total 
water use (Ibid). These figures are expected to further increase given the new 
urban and industrial cities currently under development, as well as the newly 
established ‘1.5 million feddan’ Mega project (see chapter 4).  
Table 3.6. Water Uses by Sector 2010-2015 
 
            Source: (CAPMAS 2017) 
 
Agriculture is the largest water-consuming sector in Egypt. Farmers are the 
largest users of agricultural water. Egypt has 8 million feddan of irrigated 
agricultural land, out of which (5.5-6 million feddan) 75 % represent the “old 
lands” in the Nile Valley and Delta and (2-2.5 million feddan), and the remaining 
25% are newly reclaimed desert lands. In addition, about 229,000 ha are rain fed 
cultivation along the Mediterranean coast (Eid et al. 2007). The intersection 
between land-water-food nexus is portrayed in Egypt’s official policy discourse as 
a matter of national priority “to feed a growing population” (Interviews #5 & #7; 
Meeting Notes #1, #2, #5). In terms of self-sufficiency, often discursively 
synonym to ‘national food security’, any production gains achieved at the farm 
level have been largely offset by population growth (Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 
2011). There is consensus amongst domestic and international experts that 
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despite higher water productivity and use efficiency; demographic growth offsets 
these results (Interviews #5 & #7).   
 
As such, along horizontal expansion plans to farm the desert throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, Egypt’s reliance on food imports has been 
growing and not the opposite. Professor Tony Allan addressed this issue during 
the 1990s, referring to the concept of ‘virtual water’ (the water embedded in 
agricultural production). He explored the concept by observing Egypt’s on-going 
water management including both agricultural and political practices, while 
having access to national data about food imports (Cascão 2017). In this respect, 
‘Virtual water’ explains how Egypt in practice accesses food supply with less 
water, whereby physical water scarcity and failing to provide ‘real’ irrigation 
water was made possible by an ever greater reliance on embedded water in food 
imports (Allan 2001; Warner 2013; Wichelns 2001). As such, for the past 4 
decades, Egypt’s water security has been achieved through virtual water imports, 
through an invisible and silent process allowing the perception and illusion that 
Egypt is water self-sufficient (Allan 2001).  
 
Table 3.7. Cereal Imports in selected countries 1960-2005 (000 metric tons) 
 
            Source: (Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 2011) based on FAOSTAT data 
 
Virtual water trade includes three key elements; food crops, fodder crops, 
and livestock. Food crops include wheat and maize. In the 1990s and 2000s, 
virtual water imports increased, including soybeans (a fodder crop) and maize as 
main imported crops, followed by wheat. Main suppliers included the US, 
Argentina, Brazil, Australia, France and Russia. Fodder crops include soybean 
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and other types of animal feed. Main livestock imports include beef, cattle and 
sheep from Australia and Brazil (and to smaller extent Sudan). As shown in figure 
3.2 and table 3.7, during the period of 1961 to 2005, Egypt was the largest food 
importer in the region. Since the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, Egypt 
depended on low-cost imports -mostly of wheat from the US (Cascão 2017). 
Despite growing its agricultural land base to 8.4 million feddan, estimates 
indicate that as of 2010, Egypt imported between 40% and 50% of its food needs. 
Egypt is also the largest wheat consumer in the world as shown in table 3.8. 
 
 
 
Table 3.8. Egypt Wheat and Rice Imports (2008-2011) 
 
(Source: Timmerman 2013) 
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Figure 3.2. Egypt Virtual Water Imports in crops and livestock 1998-2004  
Source: (Zeitoun et al. 2010) 
 
 
 
 
So what does this amount translate into, equivalent to water resources? Experts 
in the field of water resources indicate that in terms of figures, different studies 
estimate Egypt’s reliance on an average of 20 to 30 billion cubic meters of virtual 
water during the periods of 1990s and early 2000s. Tony Allan indicated the 
figure of 33 billion cubic meters in 2011 (Cascão 2017), and most recently the 
Egyptian Minister estimated a figure of 34 billion cubic meter of water in 2017 
 100 
(Interview #7; Research Notes). The Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation 
further confirmed these figures in different international venues and official 
meetings, indicating that Egypt’s water needs are equivalent to 114 billion cubic 
meter annually. This figure includes 80 billion cubic meter used internally (59 
bcm from Nile + 14 billion recycling + 3.5 billion underground + 0.6 bcm 
rainwater), in addition to the 34 bcm from virtual water trade (Interview #7; 
Field Notes based on unpublished MWRI data). In other words according to the 
state’s view, Egypt can afford 59 bcm of its budget, while it has a deficit of 55 bcm 
which it compensates from water recycling (20 bcm), and the largest portion 
from virtual water trade (34 bcm). Worth noting however, some of these figures 
do not necessarily match with the official data presented earlier in this section. 
While it is important to highlight this discrepancy, different sources indicate the 
same conclusion. In other words, what saved Egypt over the last few decades was 
not an increase in its production based on horizontal expansion rather it was its 
reliance on virtual water trade. But this is a conclusion that Tony Allan had 
reached a while ago.  
 
What I would like to highlight here is that Egypt’s land reclamation schemes 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century did not solve issues of self-
sufficiency and food security, which constitutes a key element of its narrative of 
crisis. Massive quantities of American aid in the form of wheat and large-scale 
(commercial) cereal imports from across the world are the flip side of failed 
agricultural policies that ended up subsidizing urban consumption rather than 
strengthening rural livelihoods (Verhoeven 2015a). Furthermore horizontal 
expansion did not address Egypt’s demographic problematic, consequently 
leading to higher food consumption. The political correlate of this exclusionary 
growth model was mounting social unrest and violent protests in the countryside 
that pre-dated the 2011 Egyptian Revolution (Verhoeven 2015a; Bush 2011). 
These issues were particularly manifested as a political challenge notably 
following the 2011 events in Egypt. 
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It is estimated that “agriculture production has to increase by 70% by 2050 in 
order to keep pace with population growth and changing diets” (El-Ramady et al. 
2013). (Interview # 4) estimated that “Egypt needs an additional 10 million 
feddan to cover its food gap which necessitates an additional 60 billion cubic 
meters on top of its existing water share from the Nile”. Furthermore, while 
Egypt addressed its food needs through virtual water trade, there is a rising 
conscience about the risks associated with virtual water import. According to 
MWRI, Egypt’s food gap reached 3.5 billion USD per year (Interview #7), 
whereby the purchase of large amounts of food imports can drain vital fiscal 
reserves, a problem further deepened by the burden imposed on food subsidies 
(James 2013). Secondly, high dependence on virtual water import implies that a 
country’s economy is subject to price fluctuations in global food market (Ibid). As 
such, while virtual water may have represented a solution during the last three or 
four decades for Egypt’s food gap, it entails a great amount of (social, political, 
economic) risks, given the need to feed its growing population.  
Conclusion 2: the amount of water allocated to agriculture exceeds the country’s 
total annual share of renewable water resources. In figures, this means that 
agriculture demand alone represents 62.35 billion cubic meters annually as per 
2014/2015 figures, whereas Egypt’s renewable water resources are only 55.5 
billion cubic meters. Furthermore, water allocation to agriculture is expected to 
compete with Egypt’s urban expansion and the establishment of new urban 
communities. Overall, land reclamation schemes did not improve Egypt’s food 
security situation, largely dependent on virtual water trade and food imports.
Conclusion  
 
Deploying a historical lens and a discourse analysis method, this 
background chapter situated the importance of water security as a key 
element of state modernization in Egypt especially during the postcolonial era. 
The chapter discussed the role of the developmental state during Mohamed 
Ali and Nasser - as founders of modern Egypt (Farah 2009), especially as it 
relates to the idea of the hydraulic mission –defined as mastering nature and 
controlling the flow of water. Particular reference was made to large-scale 
land reclamation schemes as a socio-political project of the developmental 
state throughout the second half of the twentieth century post 1952. In this 
respect, state-sponsored schemes in ‘Old-New Lands’ reflect how horizontal 
expansion represented the larger vision to achieve the ‘desert development 
dreams’ (see Sims 2015), driven by a persistent “ecological demographic 
narrative of crisis” with its two challenges of demographic redistribution and 
growing the agricultural economy for both domestic and export markets.   
 
Yet, despite massive investments by the state in the agriculture sector 
and land reclamation schemes, by the end of the 20th century, Egypt’s 
ecological demographic narrative of crisis still prevailed. The chapter 
identified the state’s scarcity and security narratives, which I argue are a 
combination of physical and political (water) scarcity, given Egypt’s unique 
geography, demography, and the state failures associated with these chronic 
challenges. From the state’s perspective this narrative of crisis necessitated a 
new approach towards frontier making, as further discussed in chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
Chapter 4  
 
The Hydraulic Mission of the Entrepreneurial 
State & the Manufacture of Abundance 
 
Chapter Overview and Key Message 
 
Building on the historical background of state-sponsored land reclamation 
schemes presented in chapter 3, this chapter argues that by the late 1990s a new 
approach towards horizontal expansion was adopted by the “entrepreneurial state”. 
This entrepreneurial role was manifested in establishing desert Mega projects with a 
primary investment focus on infrastructure development. The role of the state was 
limited to de-risk land-water investments to attract international investors endowed 
with technology and capital to establish large-scale state-of-the-art farmlands in 
Mega projects. This changing role of the state towards water security and the 
engagement of international investors in the appropriation of land-water resources 
mark the formation of transnational state-capital alliances. However, it is argued that 
these alliances relied on the Manufacture of Abundance reflecting increasing 
interdependencies and tensions between land-water-food production nexus and 
capital accumulation. Furthermore, the land-water-food interdependencies driving 
transnational state-capital alliances mark a new approach towards water security -as 
discussed in chapter 5, and draw attention to equity and social justice dimensions of 
water security, as further discussed in chapter 6. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, throughout most of the second half of the 
twentieth century, state-sponsored schemes yielded mixed results (Sims 2015; 
Interviews # 1 & 9). This was clearly manifested in the challenges faced by 
small holders and young graduates in land reclamation schemes (Interviews # 
1 & 9), as well as the implementation gap associated with the ‘feddan game’. 
As such, despite the massive investments by the state, the nation’s ecological-
demographic narrative of crisis has not been resolved amidst rising (water) 
security and scarcity risks. Furthermore, under the economic liberalization 
program during the late 1970s-onwards the agriculture sector witnessed a 
greater participation by the domestic private sector thus shifting the role of 
the developmental state to a predatory one (Farah 2009; Evans 1997). Private 
sector participation in the ‘water and agriculture’ sector also resulted in 
creating a parallel water economy mostly dependent on underground water 
resources to export high value crops to European markets.   
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However, with insufficient levels of (domestic) private investments in 
the agriculture sector, and with the persistent policy objective to pursue 
horizontal expansion to ‘green the desert’, by the end of the twentieth century 
the state changed its approach towards its hydraulic mission. In 1996, the 
state announced the launch of new Mega projects (mashru’at kawmeya 
3emlaka) including Toshka, Sharq Al-Owainat, and El Salam Canal marking 
the birth of a new generation of large-scale land reclamation schemes in ‘New-
New Lands’. These National Mega projects adopted a more innovative 
approach towards frontier making and reflect an extension of the state’s 
modernization attempt beyond the earlier generations of state-sponsored 
schemes.  
 
According to an interview in 2012 with former minister of water resources and 
irrigation, also honorary president of World Water Council, Dr. Mahmoud 
Abou Zeid (currently President of the Arab Water Council) "from the 
beginning Toshka was designed to develop a new community, not only as an 
agricultural project… the fact remains that we cannot sustain ourselves in a 
narrow valley, with all the social and economic problems of overcrowding. We 
have to go to the desert and we have to build. Or the country will collapse" 
(The National 2012). This statement clearly reflects the foundation of Egypt’s 
ecological-demographic narrative of crisis at the national level and reflects the 
state’s logic and larger vision towards its desert development plans in the new 
millennia through National Mega projects.  
 
The chapter argues that the new generation of horizontal expansion schemes 
and Mega projects in ‘New-New Lands’ represents an evolution of the 
hydraulic mission by the “entrepreneurial state” (Mazzucato 2015; Mazzucato 
2013a). Under the new entrepreneurial model, the role of the state is mostly 
confined to de-risking land-water investments in the desert by developing the 
necessary infrastructure for new Mega projects in New-New Lands. State 
entrepreneurship is manifested in infrastructure investments such as 
irrigation canals, largest pumping station in the world, access to electricity, 
roads, and airports with the objective of attracting foreign and domestic 
investors to develop large-scale fully mechanized agricultural projects. The 
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evolution of the ‘entrepreneurial’ state’s twenty first century hydraulic mission 
aimed to attract domestic and foreign investors capable of developing capital 
and technology intensive large-scale agricultural production projects in the 
new Mega schemes, but also in the existing Old-New Lands.  
 
This process reflects the changing role of the state to achieve its horizontal 
expansion plans, and the engagement of new players and non-state actors in 
the appropriation of land-water resources. Transnational investments in 
farmlands abroad highlight the growing interdependencies between ‘land-
water-food’ resources as essential inputs for a successful large-scale 
agricultural operation, for both host countries as well as investors. While in 
most countries corporate engagement and foreign direct investment FDI in 
land and water resources are often a source of revenue for the government, in 
Egypt it is also perceived as a crucial element for the state to address its 
ecological-demographic narrative of crisis, and to achieve its hydraulic 
mission. In this respect, the land-water-food nexus can be perceived as a 
political commodity to achieve larger strategic objectives, and to advance the 
state’s 21st century hydraulic mission. On the other hand, for the corporate 
actors, land acquisitions are a silent approach to appropriate or “grab” water 
resources for food production; either to achieve maximum profit, or other 
strategic objectives such as food security (especially relevant to water scarce 
countries in Gulf and MENA regions). Nevertheless, despite the presence of 
land-water resources, infrastructure, and business facilitations as key 
stimulating factors for the investors to take the risk by investing in the desert, 
evidence indicates that tensions may exist with other element of the water-
energy-food nexus or food-trade nexus. These will be explored in this chapter 
and the following one.  
 
These political economy dynamics have resulted in two issues; (i) the 
formation of transnational state-capital alliances to advance the hydraulic 
mission of the entrepreneurial on the one hand, and address the land-water-
food security nexus; and (ii) the manufacture of abundance by the 
entrepreneurial state, given the existing water scarcity narratives in Egypt as 
discussed in chapter 3. While transnational state-capital alliances may indeed 
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establish large-scale agricultural projects in the desert, they do not necessarily 
address the nation’s narrative of crisis. Capital-intensive highly mechanized 
projects are not labor intensive by nature [e.g. 50 feddan may only require 1 
technician (not farmer), while 1 feddan in old lands may require a family of 10 
farmers (Interviews # 2,3 & 21]. As such, while foreign investments may green 
the desert, they are far from achieving horizontal expansion or demographic 
redistribution given their sheer nature. Furthermore, empirical evidence 
indicates that large-scale foreign investments in the agriculture sector may 
represent a form of “virtual water grabs” on the national level. This is 
primarily due to the sheer fact that some corporate farms target the 
cultivation of alfalfa to send back home, or grapes for winemaking in Europe. 
Exporting citrus to Europe is also a common practice to many investors 
similar to many domestic investors engaged in trade with the northern 
continent. As such, driven by profit or strategic objectives, transnational 
investments did not resolve Egypt’s ecological-demographic narrative of 
crisis, with its two cornerstones of demographic redistribution and closing the 
food imports gap.  
 
The chapter is divided into six Sections. The first section identifies the 
national determinants of the entrepreneurial state by tracing the changing 
role of the developmental/predatory state in the water and agriculture sectors. 
Section two discusses the role of the entrepreneurial state in de-risking land-
water nexus as the foundation ‘National Mega Projects’ for frontier making 
through corporate desert farming.  Section three presents the different 
criticisms associated with Mega projects and identifies Mega projects as the 
manufacture of abundance. Section four discusses the formation of 
transnational state-capital alliances and the engagement of non-state actors in 
Mega projects as a key element of the hydraulic mission of the entrepreneurial 
state. This section also provides examples of Arab investors engaged in land-
water investments in Egypt. Section five highlights the rise of the third 
generation of Mega projects in Egypt and presents the ‘1.5 million feddan’ 
project. This section also presents a few examples of different planned 
international investments in this project. Section six concludes the chapter.  
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4.1. National Determinants of the Entrepreneurial State  
 
As indicated by Bush (2007), the Egyptian government and IFIs blame 
the Nasser era for the underperforming agricultural sector. State intervention, 
the controls placed on farmers in relation to pricing, cropping and marketing, 
are seen to have restricted agricultural production and frustrated market 
efficiency (Bush 2007, p.1604). These issues were also highlighted during a 
USAID congressional presentation (USAID 1992) indicating that due to state 
intervention, agricultural sector growth during the early to mid 80s was very 
poor with the value of production growing at less than 1 per cent per year 
(Bush 2007). Consequently, in light of the challenges associated with state-
sponsored schemes, several proposals emerged calling for the 
“modernization” of the agriculture sector. Accordingly, the sale of state land to 
private investors for reclamation only started in the mid 1980s. This 
orientation was in line with Public Law no 143 adopted in 1981, which 
removed the public sector’s legal monopoly on reclamation, thus opening it 
for domestic private sector.  
 
By 1987 Egypt’s economic transformation towards the liberalization of 
the agricultural sector was supported by the Minister of Agriculture Yusuf 
Wali as well as USAID advisors and funding. The key strategy for this 
liberalization process was primarily to remove the state from production, 
support export-led growth of the agricultural sector, and promote a US farm-
type model adopting a capital-intensive mode of agriculture production. As 
such, an essential element of the liberalization of the agriculture sector was to 
allow commercial companies farming in desert lands to compensate for the 
loss of agricultural land in the Delta, and to provide opportunities to generate 
new jobs, increase production, and widen the development base (Interviews # 
4; 5; & 6). In this respect, for commercial farming, the economics of water 
resources were measured through two key parameters; “how many jobs each 
cubic meter of water created, and how much USD each cubic meter of 
exported water yielded” (Interview # 4).  
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Yet, despite the investments and considerable financial resources 
devoted by the government, domestic private sector, and foreign aid agencies 
for agricultural expansion, the share of agricultural land per capita continued 
to fall (Verhoeven 2015a; Karajeh et al. 2011).  Furthermore, Egypt was 
classified as the 3rd highest recipient of aid for water-related projects – 
between 1990-2004 receiving an average of USD 168 million a year in water 
aid – constituting 7% of the annual average development assistance over this 
period (Interview # 51). Verhoeven (2015a, p.368) best described the situation 
of the agriculture sector as follows;  
Despite endless development assistance missions to repair agricultural 
productivity, despite the decreed switch from cotton to cereal 
production, and despite the billions spent on land reclamation by 
Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, the import bill keeps mounting, rural 
poverty is deepening, and environmental problems refuse to disappear. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, total factor productivity in agriculture 
was probably lower than it was in 1900, and agriculture’s contribution to 
growth was minimal (Hansen 1991). Today no country in the world 
imports more wheat and, indirectly, more water than Egypt (Allan 2011). 
 
According to Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur (2011) the rate of agricultural 
development during the period between 2002-2012 has decreased by almost 
50% as shown in table 4.1, reflecting lower levels of investment in the sector. 
In this respect, there are two aspects to observe in relation to investments in 
the ‘agriculture and irrigation’ sector; the first is the share (% GDP) of the 
sector in total national investments, and the second is the private sector share 
from the total investments.  
 
In terms of the share of the ‘agriculture and irrigation’ sector in the national 
economy (GDP), evidence suggests that during the period between 1970-2002 
agricultural investments reached an average of 9% of total national 
investments. During the fifth five year plan (2002/03–2006/07) national 
targets aimed to increase the share of investments allocated to agriculture, 
nevertheless, actual investments levels did not exceed 8% as shown in table 
4.1 below. In fact, the ratio of total investments in the sector declined during 
the sixth five-year plan (2006/07-2011/12) reaching 4.8% (Elamin & Tanyeri-
Abur 2011). This level of investment is less than half what it used to be 
throughout the past half-century.  
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Table 4.1. Share of agriculture and irrigation sector of total investment in socio-economic plans and 
the private sector proportion 
 
Source: (Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 2011) (based on data from Institute of National Planning, 1994. The role of State in 
Agriculture Sector Within the Economic Reform era, December 1994; National Economic Plan for year 2007/08-
2011/12) 
* Data not Available for the Years 1992 / 93 – 2001 / 02.  
** Included Holding Companies and Business Sector.  
 
Figure 4.1. Share of agriculture and irrigation sector of total investment in socio-economic plans and 
the private sector proportion 
 
Source: (Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 2011)  
 
 
In terms of the private sector share from total investments in irrigation and 
agriculture sector, figures reveal an upward trend reflecting the shrinking role 
of the “developmental state”. As shown in table 4.1 the private sector share in 
total agricultural investments increased from 4% in 1971-76 to 53.7% during 
1987-92, reaching 78.6% of total investments between 2006/07 and 2011/12, 
clearly reflecting the state’s diminishing investment allocations to the sector 
(Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 2011). This growing private sector involvement in 
agriculture comes in line with structural adjustments in the Egyptian economy 
during the 1990s. This increased engagement in the sector was also coupled 
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with a shrinking share of the state throughout different Five Year Plans during 
1988-1993 (Fourth Five Year Plan), 1993-1997 (Fifth Five Year Plan), and 
1997-2017 (Twenty Year Strategy) as shown in figure 4.1. Worth noting 
however, despite this growing private sector investments, by 2005 total 
agricultural exports only reached 3.9% of the value of Egypt’s total exports 
(Borras et al. 2013) . 
 
According to the African Development Bank (ADB) significant progress has 
been achieved during twenty years (circa 1987-2007) in liberalizing the 
agricultural sector, including the removal of a range of quotas, price controls 
and input subsidies, and the privatization of various agricultural production 
projects and new state-owned lands (African Development Bank 2009a). 
However, this strategy of agricultural modernization, with increased private 
sector involvement in the sector resulted in two issues. The first is the 
preoccupation with capital-intensive export agriculture. In this respect, the 
growing private sector participation in agriculture and the liberalization of 
land rental markets are believed to have stimulated productivity increases, 
through the establishment of private farmlands depending on underground 
water to export high value crops to European markets. The second issue is the 
neglect of small farmers that followed from the contemporary drive to 
promote investment in the new lands rather than resolve issues of land and 
market access and rural development in the old lands (Borras et al. 2013; 
Bush 2007; Mitchell 2002). 
 
The creation of a parallel water market by the private sector in ‘Old-
New Lands’ diverted attention from the land-water challenges associated with 
the Nile River and the farmers in the ‘Old Lands’ and early reclamation 
schemes. The Nile waters serve millions of small farmers, “those who truly 
feed Egypt and provide fresh food supply to the local market” (Interview # 3). 
Yet, they are also those who have been truly neglected despite representing 
the majority of water users (Interview # 1). Farmers in Old Lands have 
depended on Nile water and have taken it for granted over 7000 years. The 
same practices were transferred to the early reclamation schemes in Old-New 
lands as discussed in chapter 3. Flood irrigation has been the traditional 
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method for farming and livelihood. From the investors’ and government 
perspectives, these practices are perceived as inefficient and deepen Egypt’s 
water crisis. From a policy maker perspective, in addition to traditional flood 
irrigation methods by small farmers, there are other challenges associated 
with the Old Lands the Nile basin’s narrow valley and its overcrowded delta 
such as agricultural land fragmentation, water quality, water quantity, and 
overall weak water use efficiency (Interviews #1, 2, and 4). Worth noting 
however, the soil and type of crops in the Old Lands may not necessarily allow 
for the use of modern irrigation techniques (Interviews # 13 & 32).  For this 
reason, the state had launched the Irrigation Improvement Program (IIP) 
supported by the World Bank to increase water use efficiency in Egypt’s old 
lands. Yet, the IIP came at a time when the government started to move away 
from its former development strategy, based on centralized ownership and 
planning, towards a decentralized, market-based and outward-oriented 
economy (African Development Bank 2009a).  
 
Hence, while small (public sector) farmers faced several difficulties 
associated with land reclamation schemes, private sector engagement in 
agriculture grew steadily during the 1980s and 1990s as shown in figure 4.1. 
As one of the largest fruit exporters in MENA region, most exports depend on 
underground water resources in private desert farms. The dependence of 
exports on underground water is not only due to issues of surface water 
scarcity, rather “it is more relevant to the question of water quality and the 
agricultural product standards and requirements imposed by importing 
European countries” (Interview # 16). For this reason, most exporters and 
commercially oriented agricultural companies rely on underground water 
adopting an economic logic and financial equation (e.g. how much foreign 
currency can be generated from each cubic meter of water; and how many jobs 
can be created) (Interview #4).  
 
As indicated by some of interviewed investors and practitioners, private 
agricultural investments in desert lands can be categorized historically as two 
generations (Interview # 16; 22); The 1st generation in West of Nile Delta 
notably Wadi El Natroun and Cairo-Alex Road (e.g. west delta) where land 
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and underground water resources have been exhausted. The 2nd generation 
mainly investing in the Oasis carrying on the lessons learned from the 1st 
generation related to over abstraction and withdrawal of water resources from 
underground wells. Worth noting that as a result of the salinization of 
underground water from the 1st generation of lands, the main crops now are 
pomegranate and olive trees, which match the salinity level of water and the 
soil. The salinization of water was mainly caused by the concentration of salts 
in the wells as a result of over withdrawal. The easiest solution to overcome 
this issue has been to dig a new well to avoid the salinity of the exhausted well. 
This is a practice undertaken by many small and large investors under the 
radar of the MWRI, hence creating an informal water market.  Worth noting, 
the private sector is the main consumer of underground water in Egypt and 
functions in isolation from the government (Interview # 16; Interview # 2; 
Interview # 1). As a result, “we are not sure how much water each user 
consumes to irrigate their lands”. This applies to different types of users 
making the size of the water economy unknown. “We can’t manage what we 
can’t measure” (Interview # 16)! 
 
The market dynamics stimulating private sector growth reflect the clear 
disconnect between the financial profit of the water and agriculture economy 
on the one hand, and the state’s horizontal expansion vision on the other. 
Domestic private sector investments mark the shifting role of the state 
(hydraulic mission) from a developmental one (during Mohamed Ali and 
Nasser), to a predatory mode, mixing public interests with private sector 
profit. On the one hand, large-scale state-sponsored schemes relied on 
technical top-down solutions based on GDP measures and expert agencies, 
often manifesting signs of political scarcity. Typical top-down approaches 
from public agencies usually overlooked the real problems associated with the 
largest water users (e.g. farmers) leading to a vicious circle of physical water 
scarcity and narratives of crisis. On the other hand, the creation of a parallel 
water economy by the private sector based on financial, technical and 
managerial solutions, led to the neglect of the actual challenges faced by 
different types of settlers and small investors in Egypt’s land reclamation 
projects (Mitchell 2002). As such, despite a growing participation of the 
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private sector in the agriculture sector, Egypt’s ecological-demographic 
narrative of crisis remained unresolved. Both issues of demographic re-
distribution and closing the food gap had not been addressed by domestic 
private sector investments.  These factors combined, fuelled by an alarming 
narrative of crisis, led to an alternative mode of frontier making and 
horizontal expansion, what I label; the hydraulic mission of the 
entrepreneurial state.   
 
4.2. The Entrepreneurial State and the Land-Water-Food Nexus: Frontier 
Making by De-risking Land-Water Investments  
 
From the state’s standpoint, despite the liberalization of the agricultural 
sector during the late 1980s and early 1990s, investments were still 
considered below the sufficient levels that would fulfill sector growth 
requirements (Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 2011). This view is also shared by 
technical agencies such as the FAO, indicating that ‘additional investments are 
needed’ in order to enhance the agricultural sector and to allow its dormant 
development capacities to grow (Interview # 6; Meeting Notes #2). This policy 
orientation was consistently part of the state’s development discourse to 
tackle the strategic objectives of realizing food security to address the needs of 
a growing population, and to improve the sector’s contribution to GDP 
(Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 2011).  
 
To address the nation’s persistent narrative of crisis, in 1996 the 
Egyptian cabinet of ministers discussed a new ‘national investment map’ that 
called for “expanding the utilized percentage of Egypt’s land area fivefold 
(from 4% to 20%) by 2017. This national strategy aimed to reclaim an amount 
of 2 million feddan notably in 3 areas; Toshka, East Oweinat, and El Salam 
Canal with the initial intention to allow 6 million people to live there by 2017 
while generating 450,000 new employment opportunities. In January 1997, 
the Southern Egypt Development Project” or “South Valley Project” was 
launched, whereby the “Toshka” scheme started with the objective of 
reclaiming 540,000 feddan for agriculture depending on water resources from 
Lake Nasser, supplemented by underground water from the Great Nubian 
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Sand Aquifer – shared with Sudan, Libya, and Tchad. Toshka was therefore 
conceived to create a new valley for Egypt, situated in the western desert, 
about 900 km south of Cairo, and 100 km from the southern borders with 
Sudan.  
 
Map 4.1. The system of canals in Toshka project 
 
Source: (Moneim et al. 2014) 
 
Accordingly, horizontal expansion witnessed an innovative approach by 
the “entrepreneurial state” to achieve its 21st century hydraulic mission. An 
essential element of this strategy depended on investing in infrastructure to 
attract international investors, foreign capital, and advanced irrigation 
technology for large-scale farming. The idea of the entrepreneurial state may 
appear as a contradiction in terms. For neoliberals like Friedman (2009), 
grand visions and innovations typically came from “pioneers, hackers, 
inventors, and entrepreneurs,” not from the lumbering actions of the 
bureaucratic state (see Isaacson 2014; Swedberg 2015). This idea has been 
increasingly called into question. Mazzucato (2011a; 2013a) in her book ‘The 
Entrepreneurial State’ argues that the state plays a pivotal role in shaping the 
modern economy, by supporting the private sector in a myriad of ways (from 
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publicly funded research activities, small business start-up grants, and tax 
credits, amongst other measures). The modern state does not only nudge the 
economy, it actually pushes it forward through bold and innovative measures 
(Mazzucato 2015). This idea of the State’s role in shaping and creating 
markets is more in line with the work of Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]) who 
emphasized how the capitalist ‘market’ has from the start been heavily shaped 
by State actions.  
 
To advance horizontal expansion, the state has acted as a force for 
change, not only ‘de-risking’ the economic landscape for risk-averse private 
actors, but also leading the way, with an ambitious project (Mazzucato 2015). 
Investing in establishing sustainable communities outside of the Nile valley 
has been usually considered a risky task for small holders, agricultural 
cooperatives, and private investors. In this respect, state entrepreneurship 
was manifested in a risk-oriented approach to expand land reclamation in 
uninhabited remote desert locations, by investing in infrastructure and 
exploring alternative approaches to develop Mega projects in ‘New Lands’. As 
shown in Annex 2, the state invested in establishing irrigation canals, largest 
pumps in the world, digging wells, roads, electricity, land planning and the 
creation of urban nucleus for these desert communities. By doing so, the state 
shifted from being the actual developer, operator, and manager of large-scale 
agricultural schemes to being merely an infrastructure developer and an 
investment promoter. This strategy depended on de-risking desert 
investments through advanced infrastructure and a business climate to attract 
both local and international investors to mega projects, by; hence its 
entrepreneurial role. 
 
This state-led vision was estimated to cost 86 billion USD over 20 years, 
with the government expected to finance 20-25% of the infrastructure costs, 
while local and foreign private capital would finance the rest (Sims, 2015:49). 
The new ‘Mega projects’ were similar in concept to older land reclamation 
models and large-scale state sponsored schemes, however they were different 
in three main aspects; (i) the mega scale of infrastructure (i.e. largest pump in 
the world), (ii) the investment philosophy behind the mega projects which 
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depends on LSLA and private sector capital/technology intensive agricultural 
projects, and (iii) attracting foreign investors with experience in similar 
projects elsewhere.  
 
The Land-Water-Food Nexus in Mega Projects  
 
The hydraulic mission of the ‘entrepreneurial state’ can be therefore seen as 
part of “frontier making or the expansion of socio-ecological spaces for capital 
accumulation” (Dixon, 2013).  Frontiers, as many scholars have noted, are 
artifacts of technology and imagination. As Gavin Bridge argues, “frontiers are 
imagined (and constructed) as sites of ‘bountiful emptiness’. They are ‘fecund’ 
spaces, ‘empty but full’ ” (Bridge 2001, p.2154; in Li 2014). That is, they are 
empty of people, histories and claims, but full of potential for new and 
improved use (Li 2014). Specifically in the case of Egypt, for the 
entrepreneurial state, land reclamation has been a venue for frontier 
making, whereby “land identified as a resource available for global 
investment is classified as ‘underutilized’ or frontier land, or sometimes as 
marginal, idle or waste land” (Li 2014, p.592). 
 
Mega projects depended on the key inputs of land (abundant), water 
(security), and infrastructure (development) to encourage food production in 
remote desert areas with the participation of the private sector and 
international investors. As such, ‘land-water-food’ interdependencies 
represent the foundation of this new expansion and have been a central 
condition of heightened capital accumulation in Egypt’s agriculture sector 
(Dixon 2013). This approach can be also viewed as an extension of the 1990s 
economic liberalization program and the growing corporate engagement in 
the ‘water and agriculture’ sector. Given the connectedness of today’s global 
economy the entrepreneurial state depended on both; state investments and 
private capital to develop its 21st century Mega projects as a key avenue for 
“frontier making” within the borders of what is presently modern day Egypt. 
In this respect, ‘national frontier making’ is connected to frontiers regionally, 
thus leading to the formation of transnational state-capital alliances especially 
as it relates to key strategic issues such as land, water and food resources. 
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Therefore, transnational state-capital alliances are argued to reflect the 
changing role of state and non-state actors towards water security.  
 
Mega projects and the 21st century entrepreneurial approach towards 
horizontal expansion reflect the changing role of the state towards land-water 
resources use for a larger political-economic project. In this respect, water 
control, state power, and achieving the hydraulic mission towards 
modernization are manifested in the formation of ‘transnational state-capital 
alliances’. As such, while post 1952, the state was the main sponsor of large-
scale desert development schemes, today, land reclamation and water use are 
not confined to state actors, small farmers, young graduates, or domestic 
investors. Rather, new international investors have been also encouraged to 
participate as key players in large-scale agricultural projects. Different state 
and non-state actors included financial investors, transnational corporations, 
and specialized agricultural private sector. Also worth noting that the 
participation of different investors in large-scale agricultural projects, not only 
in Egypt, but also across the Nile basin countries as well as other destinations 
globally was further motivated by the food crisis of 2007/08 and 2010/11.  
 
As such, the process of the “expansion of socio-ecological spaces for capital 
accumulation” (Ibid) depended on de-risking land reclamation projects and 
establishing transnational state-capital alliances manifested in foreign 
investments in state-of-the-art large-scale agricultural projects. On the one 
hand, the state took the risk to invest in the desert by injecting immense 
resources from the state-budget typically for financing national projects' 
infrastructure (e.g. Toshka). On the other hand, the state depends on private 
investors to inject the necessary capital and know-how to develop large-scale 
agricultural projects using water saving modern irrigation techniques - 
typically center pivot technology (Interviews # 5 & 6).  
 
In terms of water resources, the estimated water needs for the project 
were estimated to be 5 billion cubic meters, roughly 10% of Egypt’s annual 
Nile water share. As indicated by Collins (2006) to manage excess water from 
Lake Nasser, between 1966 and 1978 the state excavated a 14 miles overflow 
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canal on western shore of the lake to link it with Toshka depression. The canal 
was not used for 18 years until 1996 given the dry years of the Nile flooding 
(Warner 2013).  To use this excess water during the 1996 flood period, the 
Toshka project involved excavating the Sheikh Zayed Canal of 44 miles to 
carry about 380 billion cubic feet of water on a yearly basis from Lake Nasser 
to the Toshka depression south west of Aswan, and then branches into 4 sub-
canals with a total length of 160 miles. The canal was designed to receive the 
excess water from Lake Nasser and pump it into Sheikh Zayed station using 
the giant Mubarak pumping station housing 24 pumps– developed by a 
European-Egyptian-Japanese consortium (Wahby, 2004; Warner, 2013), 
which then was the largest pumping station in the world- elevating the water 
about 175 feet. Water is conveyed through a long intake channel of 3 Miles 
from Lake Nasser to the Suction basin of the pumping station. These plans 
have come under serious criticisms both internally and externally as discussed 
in the following section. 
 
The Ministry of Investment represented in the  ‘Promotion & External Offices 
Sector’ of the ‘General Authority For Investment & Free Zones’ (GAFI) in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture have the mandate to promote 
investment opportunities in Mega projects and to attract international 
investors. In each Mega project, the state specifies the cost and availability of 
infrastructure categories under different projects as shown in Annex 2, 
including; source of water supply, cost of irrigation infrastructure, electricity, 
roads, cost of land. The promotion pamphlet estimated a 15% return on 
investment for different crops including citrus, grapes, vegetables, amongst 
others! 
 
The responsibility for preparing the land for agricultural uses and urban 
development was mandated to a newly created government entity; the 
‘Southern Regional Development Authority’. It planned to distribute large 
segments of the arable land to private development companies, who in turn 
divided up the estates into large holdings for big agro-businesses and smaller 
holdings for individual families. While some of these lands are allocated to 
small farmers and domestic agricultural investors, it is private capital that 
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plays a larger role in developing land and water resources through large-scale 
commercial agricultural projects (Interviews # 4,5, & 6).  
 
4.3. Mega Projects Criticism & the Manufacture of Abundance  
 
Similar to earlier reclamation schemes, Mega projects were introduced 
and marketed as the hope for future generations to escape the overcrowded 
Nile delta and the narrow valley of the River Nile. Accordingly, over the last 
two decades, the state has changed, not its vision, but the means by which to 
achieve it. To overcome the challenges associated with the early reclamation 
schemes, the state sought to explore an alternative pathway of frontier making 
to advance its hydraulic mission by establishing Mega projects in uninhabited 
remote desert locations. From the state’s standpoint, Mega projects represent 
a potential solution to the ecological-demographic crisis narrative; firstly, as a 
venue for ‘frontier making’ to address the population density and 
demographic re-distribution issue in Egypt, and second; as a national symbol 
of Egyptian modernity and economic development, that will ensure the 
growth of agricultural sector for both domestic and export markets, in 
addition to ‘food security’ as a key element of national security. Other 
motivations behind this new generation of horizontal expansion projects was 
to overcome the traditional challenges of the ‘Old Lands’ (e.g. land 
fragmentation), as well as the reclamation challenges in ‘Old-New Lands’ 
(Interviews # 4 & 6). Others however argue that political objectives have also 
motivated these national mega projects. Warner (2013) for instance argues 
that “water, science, and technology do play a key role in legitimizing overall 
state control in a ‘state with a major legitimacy deficit’ (Dorman 2007) … the 
Toshka project serves state hegemonic goals in a two-chessboard game, at the 
domestic and international scale” (Warner 2013, p.103).  
 
In this respect, the notion of the manufacture of abundance reflects how 
the state is advancing new initiatives for land reclamation, depending on a 
seriously constrained water budget. This approach deepens the deficit of the 
water budget and would ultimately reproduce scarcity in areas of water stress 
mostly associated with small water users, or alternatively tap into non-
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renewable ground water, which then can raise uncertainty about the 
sustainability of non-renewable ground water aquifers.   
 
During the last two decades, Toshka attracted a fair amount of criticism 
both on domestic and international levels. Perhaps the expertise of Dr. 
Roushdy Said12 -named as the founder of Egyptian Geology, with advanced 
degrees in Sciences from Zurich in 1951 and then Harvard - represent an 
insightful constructive criticism. In 1997 during one of his lectures at the 
American University in Cairo, Dr. Said described Toshka as “a mega project 
that consumes 10% of Egypt’s total annual share with a modest economic 
return” (Al Masry Al Youm 2007b). According to him, “Toshka should be 
converted into an industrial project where by the economic return of each 
cubic meter of water will be much higher from industry compared to 
agriculture” (Ibid). When asked about the chronic demographic crisis in Egypt 
within the Nile valley and its delta he stated “population density is indeed an 
impediment for development within the Nile boundaries. There needs to be a 
national plan to re-distribute the population into the desert, however this 
should not be attached to greening the desert. Perhaps a more realistic 
approach is to encourage industrial activity in desert lands where labor is 
intensive” (Al Masry Al Youm 2007a). From his views, farming in the desert 
land does not have a positive economic return on the national economy as it is 
does not create many job opportunities given that it is not labor intensive 
since it depends on mechanization and technology. On the other hand, 
establishing industrial complexes can attract more labor and therefore 
increase the desert population and contribute to establishing more socio-
economically viable community concentrations in the desert.   
 
He explained further that ‘desert development’ and the ‘protection of 
old agricultural lands’ of the Nile valley are two complementary objectives. By 
creating spaces for populations to move into the desert and engage in 
economic activities and income generating opportunities –especially in the 
industrial sector, this leads to less pressure on the agricultural land and water 
                                                             
12 Rushdi Said (May 12, 1920 – February 8, 2013) was an Egyptian scientist, educated at Cairo, Zurich, and Harvard 
Universities. A professor of geology, he was the chairman of the board of the Egyptian Mining and Geological 
Research Organization (1968–1977). (Source: Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rushdi_Said) 
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resources from the river. And he was indeed right, as discussed in chapter 3, a 
key risk for Egypt’s best quality land-water resources is illegal construction on 
agricultural land to absorb the population densities, as well as convert the use 
to a more economically rewarding activity, construction in this case. These 
issues as identified in chapter 3 represent signs of political scarcity as it relates 
to the management of Egypt’s land-water resources and more importantly 
addressing the socil-economic needs of the largest water users, that is small 
farmers. As such, Dr. Roushdy Said called for supporting farmers and those 
engaged in agriculture sector to be provided with state of the art research that 
can support their production and improve the economic return of their crops. 
This view was further emphasized by several experts during the interviews 
emphasizing that “it does not make sense to invest in the desert and 
horizontal expansion, while at the same time the country is losing some of its 
best and most fertile agricultural land in the old valley (Interviews # 1 & 4).  
“The priority should be given to resolving the problems of the small farmers in 
the Old lands, especially as it relates to water resources in order to ensure the 
sustainability of their agricultural activities, thus avoid the conversion of the 
fertile land to constructed property” (Interviews # 1,2,3, &9). These views 
were also publically shared by other Egyptian academics such as Dr. Nader 
Nour El Din (a professor of Agriculture at Cairo University) as well as Dr. 
Mohamed Emara (a famous writer and journalist), questioning the socio-
economic benefits of land reclamation and farming in the desert (field notes).  
 
Globally renowned and influential international Nile experts have also 
voiced criticism to Mega projects since their inception.  John Waterbury, for 
example, doubted the project’s sustainability even for the short run, claiming 
‘the Toshka canal spillway will probably never be used again’ (Waterbury 
1997, pp.297–298). Stockholm Water Prize laureate Tony Allan called the 
project ‘preposterous, a national fantasy. . .[for Egypt] is going to have less 
water, not more’ (Gladman 1997 in Warner 2013). Hence, the pumping and 
distribution technologies are falsely predicated on water abundance, which 
will need to be pumped away from somewhere else – or perhaps was never 
really intended to be used (Warner 2013; Barnes 2012). 
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It can be also argued that Mega projects have deepened issues of political 
scarcity in relation to socio-environmental dimensions of land-water 
resources. Egypt’s reform strategy was to more fully integrate the agricultural 
sector into international trade and to do so by promoting capital-intensive 
export agriculture. This led to the neglect of Egypt’s small farmers, those 
farming less than 5 feddan and who account for 90 per cent of the country’s 
landholders. Medium to larger holders, cultivating between 5 and 20 feddan, 
account for 20 per cent of landowners after the land reforms of 1961, were also 
marginalized in the agrarian strategy after the early 1990s (Bush 2011). 
 
As such, the hydraulic mission of the entrepreneurial state and Mega projects 
depended on the manufacture of abundance. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
country’s water resources budget has been under constraints during the last 
three decades. While attracting international investors and non-state actors 
endowed with capital and technology seemed to be a modern approach to 
green the desert using economies of scale, the question of water budget given 
the existing scarcity and security narratives remains unanswered. Worth 
noting however, that up until 2009, progress of these investments was 
insignificant. As discussed in the next section, Saudi KADCO the first 
international investor in Tohska had only cultivated 1% of the total land 
allocated for the company (100,000 feddan). These thousand feddan were 
mainly cultivated by high quality grapes (from California), targeting European 
export markets, a deal that was met with massive criticism domestically “as a 
way of wasting water resources” (Al Masry Al Youm 2009).  
 
But this is not necessarily the view of project proponents. In an informal 
discussion with a senior policy maker, he indicated that Toshka was only 
planned to consume 10% of Egypt’s annual share of the Nile, using a small 
fraction of the state budget, which compared to the foreseen benefits could 
have positive impacts on the utilization of Egypt’s water resources (Interview 
#6; field notes). From the state’s standpoint, corporate engagement allows for 
the use of water saving technologies, greater food production, with potential 
future growth for both domestic and international markets. The participation 
of transnational investors is therefore viewed by the state as a way to avoid the 
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traditional challenges associated with inefficient practices in Old Lands, and 
the typical medium size investments of the domestic private sector depending 
on surface and underground water resources in Old-New lands and New 
Lands. Furthermore, for the state, corporate engagement in large-scale 
agricultural projects is a means by which economies of scale due to capital, 
technology, and the sheer size of land-water investments. In this sense, 
transnational investors endowed with capital and technologies are perceived 
as a new player, which can advance the process of “industrial modernity” 
(Beck, 1992) in the agriculture sector. This vision adopted by the state has 
been further revived more recently in 2015 the state launched ‘1.5 million 
feddan’, what I label as hydraulic mission 3.0 as discussed in section 4.5. 
Accordingly, over the last two decades, LSLA have taken different shapes and 
forms, adopting a corporate approach towards water security for maximum 
financial return and food security. This new version of the Mega projects 
reflects the increasing role of capital in the acquisition of land and water 
resources, thus shaping multiple nexi, for both the state and the investors. 
 
4.4. State-Capital Alliances in Mega Projects   
 
In terms of patterns of growth of international agricultural investments 
in Egypt, based on General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI) 
unpublished data sets for ‘non-petroleum greenfield FDI’ between 1972–
2009, the agriculture sector received very little FDI (4%) (Hanafy 2015). 
Nevertheless, despite the relatively small share in total FDI inflows, 
international investments in the agriculture sector have been increasingly 
growing. As shown in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 total foreign agricultural 
investments in Egypt were estimated to be 576.8 million USD in 2000, and 
have increased four (4) folds reaching 2,075.2 million USD in 2005. The total 
international investments during this period (2000-2005) totaled 6,372.7 
million USD. Worth noting however that the value of these agricultural 
investments doubled between 2006-2008 reaching 13,624.7 million USD, 
whereby in 2006 investments reached 5,302 million USD, in 2007 4,641 
million USD and in 2008 3,680.5 million USD. These figures are significantly 
higher than investments in other Nile basin countries such as Sudan as shown 
in table 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2.International Investments in agriculture & irrigation Egypt 2000-2008 (US million) 
 
Source: Author, based on FAO data in (Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 2011) 
 
Table 4.2. International Investments in agriculture&irrigation sector Egypt&Sudan 2000-2008 (US 
million) 
 
Source: Egyptian General Authority for Investments (GAFI) Data in (Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 2011) 
 
In terms of the share of land reclamation activities in international 
agricultural investments in Egypt, in 2002 it reached 278 million USD, 
representing around 41% of the total FDI flow to the sector (Elamin & 
Tanyeri-Abur 2011). During the period of 2000-2008 total investments in 
land reclamation reached 1.6 billion USD representing around 38.34%. of 
total FDI flow to the sector. Worth noting, the ratio of reclamation projects in 
total FDI reached about 68% in 2007, and then increased up to 84% in 2008, 
when the value of FDI in these projects reached around three billion dollars 
(Ibid: 41-42). These figures are quite consistent with the global land rush 
phenomena, and also represent a boost to the hydraulic mission of the 
entrepreneurial state.  
 
The main Arab investors in Mega projects include a number of Gulf 
companies such as the wealthiest non-royals Saudi family business and the 
largest WAQF ‘Al Rajhi International Investment Company’. As shown in 
table 4.3 other investors included the Emirati companies Jenaan and Al Dahra 
supported by Abu Dhabi Food Control Authority as discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. Many of these investors are also engaged in Sudan as well as other 
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destinations with the Nile basin, or outside of it such as California, Ukraine, 
and Portugal, amongst other locations. Worth noting that some of these 
investors may engage in more than one agricultural scheme in Mega projects 
and other location in Old-New lands as shown in Chapter 6 through the case 
study of Al Dahra Agricultural Company. 
 
Table 4.3: Land Size and Arab Agricultural Investments in Toshka 
Company Land Size Reclaimed Land  Land under production  
Kingdom Agricultural 
Development Company 
(KADCO) (Branch no. 1) 
25 10 2 
Al Rajhi International 100 30 1.360 
South Valley Development 
(Branch No. 2) 
120 7 2.3 
Savola 50 20 - 
Al Dahra 100 10  
Ministry of Housing 10  New Toshka City 
Source: author calculations (Land size in thousands of feddans) 
 
Kingdom Holding: Lessons from a Divestment story?  
Kingdom Holding is the investment platform for Saudi Prince Al 
Waleed Bin Talal labeled by Forbes magazine as the richest man in the Arab 
World. In 1998, Kingdom Holding established Kingdom Agricultural 
Development Company (KADCO) with a capital of 30 million Egyptian 
Pounds to invest in land reclamation of 100,000 feddan in Toshka. Up to 
January 2011, reclamation started for 10,000 feddan of the total 100 
thousands, with only 2,000 feddan cultivated. Agricultural produce included 
Alfa alfa as fodder for cattle and dairy production, as well as Table Grape 
exploitation – for exports, and palm dates.  
 
The agricultural investments of Kingdom Holdings’ Farm in Toshka 
depended on Nile water withdrawal to cultivate orphan crops such Alfa alfa as 
a fodder for cattle and dairy production. In addition, table grape exploitation 
was also a priority targeting exports markets in Europe. According to 
(Interview Phd Researcher University of Carlton CY), investors use the water 
to cultivate high value horticulture for exports, questioning the impact on 
raising farmers’ income, and definitely not a contributor to food security;  “no 
one benefits locally, and the economic opportunities are typically low wage 
jobs” (Interview Phd Researcher University of Carlton CY). “Companies are 
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not interested to support the economy but to achieve the maximum profits” … 
Water is not the problem– the question rather is “is this a sustainable 
practice?”  Key issues pertaining to the sustainable use of water resources 
range between basic issues such as the leakage from the canal into the desert 
due to quality of irrigation network, concrete lining of the canal causing a lot 
of seepage. On the other hand, most investors use center pivot irrigation 
systems leading to the highest water productivity in Egypt.  
  
Following the January 2011 revolution, large-scale land deals were 
massively investigated in Egypt in search for corruption incidences with 
KADCO being the most famous case. Since 2011, Egyptian media perceived 
the Toshka land deal with the Saudi company during the Mubarak era was 
‘illegal’ (Warner 2013). In the sequence of events, Egypt’s public prosecutor’s 
office froze the land and KADCO. As part of the political implications of the 
January 25th revolution, the Egyptian government concluded a new 
agreement to approach Toshka in a ‘‘more serious way’’. The government of 
Dr. Essam Sharaf forced KADCO to forego 90,000 feddans of its original land 
allocation in Toshka worth 4.5 million EGP (at the time of purchase 13 years 
earlier), with an estimated land price of 50 L.E. per feddan. As a result the 
company was to give up 75,000 feddans, retain 10,000 and be entitled to use 
15,000 in the following five years whereby the original payment of 4.5 million 
would be considered as a down payment, conditional of reclaiming the 
allocated land within 3 years of the agreement. The forgone land was to be 
distributed to young Egyptians. 
 
Since then, the company raised its issued capital reaching 55 million 
USD divided into 55,000 stocks each for $1000 USD. The holding company 
had also borrowed an amount of 34 billion USD from its shareholders during 
the last years as reported by Al Mal newspaper (Al Mal News, 2017). The 
company had also investment in irrigation infrastructure and water pumping 
stations, and its associated energy costs, amongst others. Yet, in April 2017 
the company decided to sell its investments to a government owned company 
after claims of loss reaching 89 million USD. The company was sold for 1.25 
million EGP, equivalent to 70,000 USD (after the devaluation of the EGP in 
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November 2016) including the 10,000 reclaimed land for which full cost was 
already paid, in addition to the 15,000 feddans for which 4.5 million were 
deposited. Worth noting, that a few months earlier, another Saudi investor “Al 
Rajhi” was offered to buy the land at a price of 17 million USD, but the offer 
was withdrawn for non obvious reasons.  
 
4.5. Hydraulic Mission 3.0 and Egypt 2030 Strategy: The 1.5 Million 
Feddan Mega Project 
 
Following the political events of 2011 and the January 25th uprising in 
Egypt notably under the slogan of “Bread, freedom, and social justice” (3eesh, 
7oreya, 3adala egtema3eya), Egypt’s political economy witnessed interesting 
developments. In addition to investigating land deals with foreign/Arab 
investors such as Kingdom Holding as discussed earlier, the Egyptian state as 
the largest importer of wheat globally struggled with securing enough supplies 
to feed its growing population, amidst shrinking foreign currency reserves. As 
Bloomberg commented on Egypt’s outsized influence on the global wheat 
market it indicated, “in a world awash with wheat, the biggest importing 
nation is struggling to buy the grain,” whereby “Egypt’s government was 
among those overthrown in 2011 in the so-called Arab Spring as high food 
prices fired up unrest (Bloomberg 2016). Dependence on wheat imports and 
other essential commodities during both 2011 and 2013 uprisings have 
severely affected the central bank foreign reserves from 36 billion in 2010 to 
nearly 15 billion post-2011 onto 2014 (Interview #4). 
 
Furthermore, following the change in leadership in Egypt since 2014, a 
number of Mega projects have been launched mostly state-sponsored to 
achieve Egypt’s 2030 Sustainable Development vision. Amongst these is the 
1.5 million feddan project targeting to attract both foreign and domestic 
investments to reclaim the desert and modernize Egypt’s agricultural sector to 
enhance the nation’s food security, notably from strategic crops such as wheat. 
This was perhaps manifested in the launch of the first ten thousand feddan to 
cultivate wheat in Farfra Oasis in the New Valley governorate by the army, 
marking the first milestone in this mega project. Worth noting here, Gulf 
nations such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have voiced their support to 
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Egypt’s Mega project, thus projecting their political support to Egypt’s new 
regime, to help the nation overcome the turbulence it witnessed since the 2011 
events of the Arab Spring.  
 
As such, despite the limited success achieved in the mega projects 
launched in 1997, a new “National Mega Project” was launched on December 
30th 2015 to reclaim and cultivate 1.5 million feddan, what I label ‘hydraulic 
mission 3.0’. Once more boosted by the ecological-demographic imaginaire, 
the new ‘national’ Mega project represents the latest version of state 
entrepreneurship. The project is the first phase of “National Reclamation 
Program of 4 million feddan” which aims at expanding agriculture land, and 
establishing modern communities dependent on agriculture” (Official 
Sources). In an official press statement issued on December 14th 2015, Prime 
Minster Sherif Ismail declared, "This project will expand Egypt's prospective 
agricultural land 20 percent, from 8 million to 9.5 million feddan," (AL Ahram 
2015). The main project philosophy is to establish a new countryside in Egypt 
with “model villages that avoid the problems of the past and explores the 
opportunities of the present” (Official statement) (Al Masry Al Youm 2016).  
 
According to ‘Egypt’s 2030 Sustainable Development Strategy’ issued by the 
Ministry of Planning in 2015, the 1.5 million feddan national project addresses 
the key strategic priority to develop the agriculture sector, in line with policy 
directives for Land and Water resources use (Ministry of Planning, 2015). The 
project is marketed as an integrated unit including land reclamation, 
Infrastructure, groundwater wells and Housing utilities as basic requirements 
to attract youth, small farmers, local investors, and international corporate 
investments. The new national project does encompass land reclamation 
schemes in 7 different areas, including the incomplete Toshka project 
originally planned to reclaim 540,000 feddan, out of which only 20,000 
feddan have been developed since 1997 to date (Source). The required funding 
by the entrepreneurial state to start financing the first phase of infrastructure 
for the project is 20 Billion EGP (2.5 Billion USD) including four key 
components; (i) reclamation of desert lands, (ii) establishing the “New Rural 
Egypt” company (sherqet al reef al masry) to manage the project, (iii) 
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establish new underground water wells for land reclamation, (iv) land 
development in south of Egypt (Official Statements; Al Masry Al Youm, 2016). 
The new national project represents the latest version of state modernization 
strategy and agricultural development to address Egypt’s ecological-
demographic narrative of crisis, and its classical challenges of population 
growth, redistribution, and horizontal expansion (Interviews; Official 
Statements).  
 
In terms of the needed water resources, the Mega Project mainly relies on 
underground water resources.  The planned mega project aims to apply water 
accounting and advanced water technologies depending on solar energy 
(Minister statement; Interview #30). Out of the total project size, 172,000 
feddan or 11.5 % of the total targeted land area depend on surface irrigation 
from the Nile, while the remaining 1.328 million feddan representing 88.5% of 
the total size of the project, depend on underground water resources (Khalifa 
2015). According to the MWRI, the project entails digging over five thousand 
water wells for a total cost of LE6 billion ($766 million), with 600 wells to be 
drilled in different areas of Egypt's Western Desert, including Wadi Moghra in 
Al-Qattara depression, the Toshka region, and Farafra Oasis. The main policy 
for the sustainable use of underground water resources in this project is that 
“wells are run alternately aiming at aquifer’s recovery” (Official Statements). 
Water use in the project is primarily the responsibility of MWRI in charge of 
designing the proposed wells according to specific technical criteria taking 
into consideration; number of wells in each area, well spacing, well depth, 
maximum allowable discharge, pump setting depth, and the source of energy. 
The property of the wells shall be transferred to users while the MWRI retains 
the right to monitor and evaluate the aquifer and withdrawal rates from the 
wells to ensure the sustainability of aquifers (Official Statements).  
 
The government has also set some guidelines to mitigate any unexpected 
“risks” related to the unsustainable use of water resources in the new national 
project. First amongst these is to amend the existing legislations of 
groundwater exploitation in order to avoid aquifer deterioration –both 
quantitative and qualitative. Other guidelines include determining the type of 
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crops according to the daily allowable rate of withdrawal, prohibiting the use 
of pesticides and fertilizers, application of modern irrigation systems, and 
prohibition of high crop water consumption (i.e: banana - rice- alfalfa...) 
(Khalifa, 2015; official sources). Other approaches relevant to the 1.5 million 
feddan are to cultivate strategic crops or their alternatives to decrease the 
country’s dependence on food imports. For example given that the country 
cannot expand sugar cane cultivations in the Old Lands due to water 
limitations, the new mega project will target the cultivation of sugar beet as a 
substitute and will also process it to increase sugar production and decrease 
the country’s imports of this state subsidized strategic commodity which costs 
the state budget million of USD.  
 
Figure 4.3. Percentage of Equipped Areas in 1.5 Million Feddan Project 
 
                   Source: Khalifa, 2015 
 
The new national mega project targets lands with existing infrastructure, 
developed under earlier schemes but never materialized. Figure 4.3 shows the 
percentage of equipped areas under the ‘1.5 million feddan’ project. Some 
areas are already 100% equipped and ready for cultivation (from earlier 
investments by the entrepreneurial state), while other lands still require much 
work to prepare the infrastructure primarily related to digging wells, roads, 
electricity, and housing. A key problem in this respect is the fact that all center 
pivot irrigation equipment is imported from abroad costing the 
entrepreneurial state a large amount of foreign currency to import them 
(Interview# 7; official statements). Other project implementation challenges 
communicated in different technical meetings included; shortage in number 
of available drillers (Rigs), lack of trained labor, long periods for sites 
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preparation, transfer of equipment, and poor roads status in different remote 
desert areas (Khalifa 2015). 
 
Transnational Investments in the ‘1.5 million feddan’ project 
 
Promoting investments in the 1.5 million project by the entrepreneurial state 
had started even before its official launch. In April 2014, during a meeting 
hosted by the Arab Authority for Agriculture Investment and Development 
(AAAID) in Tunisia, the minister of agriculture Ayman Abu Hadid made an 
announcement that “Egypt plans to lease 25,000 hectares (59,500 feddan) of 
agricultural land to Arab investors as part of a plan to attract foreign 
investment in sustainably developing the country’s agriculture sector” 
(Farmlandgrab 2014a). 
 
Furthermore, during the ‘Egypt Economic Development Conference’ (EEDC) 
held in Sharm El Sheikh during March 2015, the Ministry of Agriculture 
announced signing different agreements to develop more than 282,000 
feddan of agricultural land, in addition to an Egyptian Emirati feasibility 
study to reclaim 84,000 feddan of land in Kom Ombo (Khalifa 2015). In 
addition, ten Arab and international firms announced investments to develop 
197,000 feddan of desert lands, while 16 firms will invest in projects across 
84,600 feddan. This was further confirmed by Fahd Al Hammadi, a member 
of Egyptian-Saudi Business council who announced that 9 Saudi companies 
would be reclaiming 300,000 feddan in the newly launched project, with total 
investments of 20 billion EGP. These Saudi companies included Al Marai, 
Savola, Capital Community, DDF, Al Rajhi, Egyptian Saudi Farming 
Company, Nadek, AlKhozeim, and Al Gazae’. During this same conference, a 
Japanese financed initiative of USD 49 million was announced to improve 
irrigation systems in Upper Egypt by building new regulators for the Dairut 
canal, which channels 17% of irrigation water from the Nile. In addition, in 
September 2015, India’s Embee International announced that it is in the 
process of acquiring 33,000 acres of land for farming in Egypt, with an 
estimated investment of Rs50 billion (Dh276.35 million) to grow pulses and 
vegetables (Gulf News 2015). The company, which has been into textile 
business in Egypt for the last 28 years, confirmed through its Director Sanjay 
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Khushalani that “Embee International is participating in the One Million 
Feddan land reclamation project. We have booked around 33,000 acres. The 
land is being given on lease for 50 years” (Ibid). The investment is one of the 
largest by any Indian company in Egypt and the first foray by an Indian firm 
in the country’s agriculture sector. 
 
However, very little is known about the progress of the new Mega project from 
the investors’ side. Yet, by May 5th 2016 the state announced the cultivation of 
the first pilot area of 10,000 feddan of wheat and barley in Farafra was 
announced. While this may not be indicative of any success of the project, it is 
important to realize that it is too early to evaluate the outcomes of this slowly 
developing national project. Yet, two issues in particular are subject to critical 
thinking; the first is how land distribution differed from earlier mechanisms 
of misallocation? And second, how is this national project utilizing the 
lessons learned from earlier land reclamation and desert farming schemes, 
notably those launched in 1997? 
 
4.6. Conclusion  
 
The chapter discussed how the hydraulic mission of the state in Egypt shifted 
from a developmental/predatory role to an entrepreneurial role. This role is 
founded on the manufacture of abundance implying that the state is trying to 
do too much with too little given its limited water budget, and the inherent 
water stress in Egypt, aggravated by the ecological-demographic narrative of 
crisis. The chapter started by discussing how with the liberalization of the 
economy during the late 1970s and early 1980s, domestic private sector 
investments marked the shifting role of the state from a developmental role 
(as understood during Mohamed Ali and Nasser), to a predatory one, mixing 
public and national interests with private sector profit (Evans 1989). This shift 
reflected the gradual withdrawal of the state from land reclamation, and the 
growing engagement of the domestic private sector in agriculture mostly for 
export of high value crops depending on underground water. However the 
market dynamics stimulating private sector growth reflected the clear 
disconnect between financial profit in the water and agriculture economy on 
the one hand, and the state’s horizontal expansion vision on the other. They 
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also created an unsustainable parallel water economy depending on 
underground water resources to meet the specifications of export markets. 
These factors combined, fuelled by an alarming narrative of crisis, led the 
state to realize the need for an alternative mode of frontier making and 
horizontal expansion, what I label; the hydraulic mission of the 
entrepreneurial state.   
 
Hence, to achieve its hydraulic mission, and quest for modernization at the 
dawn of the 21st century, the entrepreneurial state launched several national’ 
Mega projects (Mashrou’at Kawmeya 3emlaka) marking an evolving 
approach towards horizontal expansion and water security. This 
entrepreneurial approach towards horizontal expansion and greening the 
desert focused primarily on de-risking LSLA to promote FDI in Mega projects. 
The entrepreneurial state took the risk of investing in infrastructure in remote 
desert schemes -through roads, access to electricity, largest pump in the 
world, irrigation canals, as well as business facilitations and exemptions- to 
attract investors endowed with technology and capital, capable of developing 
large-scale state-of-the-art farmlands. As such, the changing role of the state 
shifted from being the actual developer, operator, and manager of large-scale 
state-sponsored projects to being an investor in infrastructure for Mega desert 
development schemes. South Valley Development Project including both 
Toshka and Oweinat, in addition to Al Salam Canal project, as well as the 
recently launched ‘1.5 million-feddan project’ are all examples of Mega 
projects in remote desert locations sponsored by the entrepreneurial state. By 
doing so, the state attempted to overcome three key issues; the traditional 
challenges associated with the Old Lands, the mixed results of earlier desert 
land reclamation schemes in ‘Old-New’ Lands, and the limitations associated 
with the domestic private sector in agriculture.  
 
As such, the changing role of the state aimed at promoting a greater 
participation of the international agricultural investors, and led to the 
establishment of transnational state-capital alliances. These alliances reflect 
how both the state and the investors frame the land-water-food nexus as a 
political-economic commodity. For the investors, ‘land and water’ are merely 
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production inputs for a profitable commercial production operation. For the 
state, non-state actors’ engagement in land-water investments has become 
synonym to sector modernization over the last 20 years, with economic 
benefits such as FDI inflow in the agriculture sector, foreign currency from 
land leasing, food production, employment, and, ultimately fulfilling its 
hydraulic mission of establishing sustainable communities in the desert. The 
role of capital and non-state actors in land-water investments can be therefore 
considered as a new emerging element of the state’s hydraulic mission and 
water politics on the national level.  
 
Yet, whether transnational state-capital alliances and large-scale land-water 
investments have achieved these national goals and visions is still 
questionable. It is argued that these projects are largely founded on the 
manufacture of abundance given the state’s inherent scarcity narratives and 
stressed water resources budget. In fact while these investments contribute to 
the modernization of the agricultural sector, they have not necessarily 
addressed the state’s ecological-demographic narrative of crisis, given their 
dependence on little labor requirements, and have not developed any sense of 
community dynamics. Furthermore, these investments may imply a form of 
virtual water grabs since some investors notably from GCC target the 
cultivation of high water consuming crops such as alfa alfa to send back home, 
or serve other export markets. This manufacture of abundance reproduces 
physical and political scarcity given the inherent challenges associated with 
the state’s water budget at the national level. 
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CHAPTER 5   
 
Transnational State-Capital Alliances and the Gulf-Nile 
Connection: Al Dahra Agricultural Company 
 
Chapter Overview and Key Message  
Despite the numerous controversies associated with Mega projects and limited 
success of early international investors (e.g. KADCO) as discussed in chapter 4, Arab 
investments still target Egypt in search of land and water resources for food 
production. Given the regional narrative of water crisis in MENA, land deals denote 
the growing role of international investors/non-state actors in farmlands abroad in 
search of water and food security. The chapter discusses different investment 
modalities, range of actors, and institutional arrangements reflecting the changing 
role of state and non-state actors in home (e.g. Saudi Arabia and UAE) and host 
countries (e.g. Egypt and Sudan). To illustrate state-capital alliances the chapter 
introduces the case study of Al Dahra Agricultural Company -an Emirati investor, 
through its diverse land-water investment modalities in Egypt.  While this chapter 
sheds light on the politics of the company’s LSLA in ‘New-New Lands’ and Mega 
projects (Toshka and Oweinat), chapter 6 will portray a case study of its investments 
in Old-New Lands.  
 
Introduction  
 
Transnational state-capital alliances are often shaped by scarcity and 
security narratives in both home countries (supporting non-state-actors’ 
investments in farmlands abroad), as well as host countries (aiming to utilize 
natural resources through the most financially rewarding deal). Given their 
land-water resources endowments, Egypt amongst other Nile basin countries, 
have been popular destinations for transnational land-water investments over 
the last decade. Despite being a downstream country, Egypt in particular is an 
attractive destination for different investors compared to other African 
economies due to its advanced infrastructure, experienced labor, and 
investment climate (Interviews#4 & #29). This is especially reflected in the 
growing interest of Arab investments in Egypt’s national mega projects as 
discussed in chapter 4. Sudan is also an attractive destination for agricultural 
investments, historically labeled as the “breadbasket of the Arab world”, 
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notably within the framework of Arab Joint Food Security Strategy as will be 
discussed in further detail in chapter 7. 
 
With growing populations and physical water scarcity challenges, water 
and food security are critical concerns in the MENA region, notably for Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. As indicated by Tony Allan (2002a) 
Arab countries are the most food-trade dependent globally. This dependence 
on food imports, coupled with water scarcity concerns, further aggravated by 
the food price spikes over the last decade “have been perceived as a strategic 
vulnerability by Arab governments ever since” (Keulertz & Woertz 2015). As 
the food and fuel crisis of 2007/08 and 2011 unfolded, several Arab nations 
realized the risks of relying on global markets for food imports (Mulligan et al. 
2017). As the largest net importers of grains in the world (Sadler & Magnan 
2011), this realization led GCC countries to shift their strategy towards 
acquisition of farmlands abroad as a way to achieve food and water security. It 
should be noted however that if world commodity prices remain stable, it is 
much cheaper to continue to import food than investing in regional 
agriculture (Keulertz & Woertz 2015). Yet, given the unclear trends of global 
food trade and in light of growing uncertainties associated with population 
growth, water scarcity, and food sovereignty, a multitude of state and non-
state actors have engaged in the appropriation of land and water resources to 
undertake agricultural investments abroad. LSLA are particularly a popular 
strategy by state and non-state actors, notably from Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), Arab countries, but also other global corporate players. These global 
drivers also came at a time when Saudi Arabia for instance phased out 
domestic wheat production as its underground water resources dwindled 
(Hillhorst 2015b). 
 
In Egypt, while early land deals in Toshka such as the famous Saudi 
Kingdom Agricultural Development Company (KADCO) in 1998 remained for 
a long period controversial, both domestically and regionally, the global food 
and fuel crisis provided a boost to transnational investments. As discussed in 
chapter 4, most desert reclamation projects during the last twenty years in 
Egypt relied on domestic and foreign investors and corporate modes of 
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farming, exceeding 75% of all reclaimed land on average (Sims 2015, p.111). 
This percentage is increasing, especially at a time when desert land allocations 
for smallholders dwindle, and when the extra budgetary allocations necessary 
to support smallholder farms shrink (Ibid). As a result, the government has 
become ever more beholden to private capital (especially foreign i.e. Gulf Arab 
capital) to provide the sectorial investments it needs (Sims 2015; Interviews 
#34; #46). This orientation is further justified by the state on the premise that 
the level of domestic investments in the agriculture sector is insufficient. 
Foreign investments are therefore perceived as a key element of agriculture 
sector modernization, and also an alternative strategy for horizontal 
expansion by the entrepreneurial state, relying on both; foreign capital and 
technology.  As such, this changing role of the state towards land deals paved 
the way for corporate engagement in land-water resources acquisitions and 
marks the foundation of transnational state-capital alliances.  
 
Alliances between state and non-state actors take place on two levels; 
within home countries (domestic state-capital alliances), and between host 
countries and non-state actors/international investors (transnational state-
capital alliances). Domestic state-capital alliances take place between home 
governments (e.g. Abu Dhabi Food Control Authority (ADCFA)) typically 
water scarce with food security and food sovereignty concerns, and their 
domestic private sector capable of investing in farmlands abroad. In this 
respect, these alliances take different institutional arrangements with the 
main objective of supplying their home governments with strategic crops such 
as alfalfa or wheat for domestic markets. Transnational state-capital alliances 
on the other hand take place between host governments endowed with land-
water resources (e.g. Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, others), and non-state actors as 
well as international investors typically from water scarce GCC countries but 
also other international financial investors from within and outside the Nile 
basin (e.g. Egyptian private equity funds; Korean international private sector; 
GCC SWF; etc..).  
 
The objective of this chapter is to highlight the Gulf-Nile connection by 
identifying different state and non-state actors engaged in transnational state-
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capital alliances through investments within Egypt, but also in other Nile 
basin countries such as Sudan.  To showcase these variations the chapter 
discusses GCC investments in the Nile countries with a particular focus on 
Saudi and Emirati investments. The chapter introduces the case study Al 
Dahra Agricultural Company as an Emirati non-state actor investing in Egypt 
with plans to expand to Sudan. Al Dahra case study shows that LSLA take 
several shapes and forms in Mega desert schemes (New-New Lands) as 
discussed in this chapter, as well as other existing land reclamation projects in 
Old-New Lands (see chapter 6). 
 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first part discusses 
how state-capital alliances take place on two levels; ‘domestically’ within 
investors’ ‘home countries’, but also ‘transnational’ between the ‘host country’ 
and international investors. It also analyzes how land-water-food 
interdependencies shaped state-capital alliances and the growing engagement 
of non-state actors in transnational investments, notably between the Gulf 
water scarce region and Nile basin countries. The second part explores the 
institutional arrangements between home government and non-state actors 
with a particular focus on Saudi and Emirati investors in both Egypt and 
Sudan. The third section introduces Al Dahra Agricultural Company, an 
Emirati investor engaged in land-water investments in Egypt. Al Dahra’s land-
water investments modalities across different farmlands in Egypt show how 
LSLA take several shapes and forms. While this chapter identifies the 
company’s land deals in Toshka and East Oweinat (New Lands), chapter 6 will 
focus on the company’s investments in two other sites, notably in Al Salheya 
and Al Nubarya (Old-New Lands).  Section four concludes the chapter.  
 
5.1. The State-Capital Alliance: Gulf-Nile Connection 
 
International investors involved in large-scale agricultural schemes 
have different profiles and motivations. Investors include sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs), state-owned companies, financial institutions (FIs), or the 
private sector. On the one hand, corporate and institutional investors engage 
in transnational land-water investments in search for a business opportunity 
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and a profitable agricultural operation. For instance private equity funds and 
private sector investments can have a business plan to serve local or export 
markets to render the investment more profitable. Other investments have 
wider strategic mandates associated with food security and sovereignty 
objectives related to commodity markets. In this case, home governments 
encourage agricultural investments in farmlands aboard, often by subsidizing 
companies or securing medium term contracts such as the case between Al 
Dahra and the Abu Dhabi Food Control Authority (ADFCA) as discussed in 
detail in this chapter. Quite often however, investors can have both objectives; 
that is to ensure a profitable agricultural investment operation, while also 
contributing to strategic objectives of their home governments.  
 
In this respect, different investors are interested in the Nile Basin’s land and 
water resources, not only from the water-scarce Arab and Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), but also from other Asian as well as BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China). While investors from GCC are primarily concerned 
with food security, private-sector companies from China and Brazil are 
exploring opportunities in infrastructure development and biofuels as part of 
the increased BRIC ties with African countries. 
 
“Agricultural practices are very old. This is especially true for countries and 
societies endowed with land and water resources such as Egypt and Sudan”. 
This is how my interview started with one of the prominent private equity 
fund managers based in Cairo with a diverse investments portfolio in Africa. 
He continued “however, financial investments in large-scale agricultural 
projects received more attention over the last decade. During the period 
between 2007-2015, mergers and acquisitions in the field of agriculture 
roughly represented a value of 50 billion USD globally. This figure is expected 
to increase in the future, perhaps ten folds and could reach 500 billion USD” 
(Interview #23). These figures come in line with FAO estimates indicating that 
an average net investment of $83 billion a year will be necessary to raise 
agricultural production by 60% and feed the global population of more than 9 
billion expected by 2050 (FAO 2014). 
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From an investor’s standpoint, “we are in a time where private 
investments in agriculture are expected to grow. The private sector is doing 
now what the governments used to do (and were never supposed to do); that 
is the engagement in the agri-food systems. This is originally the 
responsibility of the private sector and not the government” (Interview #23). 
Overall, factors related to demand, market size, and control of market prices 
are the main drivers behind private sector and financial investments in 
agricultural food commodities. The logic of land deals for agriculture from an 
investment perspective is typically evaluated based on the assumption that 
demand is much larger than the company’s ability to produce and supply 
(Interview #26). In African markets, investors often think that by producing 
large-scale maize for example, they can control the market price almost 
creating a monopoly, especially in economies where there is no competition 
and no commodity exchange trading. In addition to market opportunities, 
there are also off-take agreements (crops are sold before cultivation) with 
entities such as WFP, UN and human agencies as well as international NGOs.  
 
On the one hand, host governments perceive international investments as an 
essential contributor towards the development of the agriculture sector.  This 
is largely justified by the perception that foreign investments adopting state-
of-the-art technology stimulate agricultural modernization and FDI economic 
gains (Interview #4). On the other hand, non-state actors adopting capital and 
technology intensive approaches in agriculture perceive resources rich 
countries such as Egypt and Sudan, as opportunities to secure land and water 
as key inputs for food production. In this respect, the Nile basin’s land-water-
food nexus represents opportunity for transnational investments, where 
capital, technology, and politics play a big role.  
 
For example, the “Gulf Nile Economic Cooperation” discourse 
represents one of the venues for the state-capital alliances to take place under 
the umbrella of regional collaboration and Gulf Capital-Nile Resources 
exchange. The Gulf/Nile space is a manifestation of how transnational 
investments in land-water resources materialize in policy and commercial 
circles, facilitated by a number of actors such as the Arab Water Council. On 
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May 28th 2016, the “Gulf Nile Economic Cooperation” Conference took place 
in Cairo’s International Conference Center. The event –labeled as ‘Gulf/Nile 
1’- was organized by a private company “Comesa13” to facilitate trade and 
investment opportunities between Nile countries and Gulf Cooperation 
Council. The conference was chaired by the president of the Arab Water 
Council (Dr. Mahmoud Abou Zeid), and included key regional figures such as 
Al Sadek Al Mahdi from Sudan, as well as key Gulf investors from Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait amongst others. As I attended the conference 
proceedings, it was noticeable that they key message was that Nile countries 
are eager to facilitate Gulf investments, notably in the agriculture sector “to 
achieve the potential of land-water resources in the Nile countries, and 
contribute to developing the agro-industry value chain in African nations” 
(Meeting Notes #8). 
 
Transnational state-capital alliances are founded on commitments from the 
government side. These include; a concession agreement, the security of land 
and surroundings, as well as a water license (typically not specifying the 
amount of water to be withdrawn). Investors on the other hand promise the 
state that their investments will create jobs, and provide food in the domestic 
market. However, as investors perceive themselves taking up risks by 
engaging in a financially demanding investment, they request guarantees and 
incentives from the government including; tax exemptions, CAPEX  (land is 
almost for free (1$/feddan)), a water license, and guarantees by host 
governments to investors to minimize political and investments risks. 
Nevertheless, problems between the private investors and the host 
government can possibly happen as “contracts are not treaties”, and are 
subject to “weak commitments and high chances for conflicts”; “in this case it 
is unclear who is responsible to solve the problem between the private 
investors and the state?” (Interview #23). This remains a major factor of risk 
and uncertainty of transnational investments. The situation is even more 
complicated when investments are not executed due to issues related to 
community grievance, political instability, and other externalities outside of 
the control of the state or the investors.   
                                                             
13 Similar name but different entity than COMESA the regional trade platform in east Africa 
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Others however contest these investor-centric perspectives by 
questioning whether investments and political stability are a two-way 
relationship. In this respect, it is still unclear whether land-water investments 
promote political (in)-stability in host countries, or whether political 
instability can result in kicking out the investors and investments. These 
political and contextual risks to foreign investments and LSLA remain largely 
unclear (Interviews #28b & #29). In this respect, tensions can exist between a 
profitable and efficient agricultural investment on the one hand, and sharing 
the wealth generated from natural resources. While investments and 
transnational state-capital alliances are framed as a way of creating win-win 
situations, they may often lead to tensions with local communities and small 
farmers due to increased competition over land and water resources. A critical 
issue that represents grave social and environmental risks, often overlooked 
by ‘transnational state-capital alliances’.  
 
5.2. Land-Water-Food Nexus in the Nile Basin: Investors’     
        Perspective 
 
According to (Keulertz & Woertz 2015) the role of the state is crucial in 
preparing water scarce MENA region for nexus challenges and spur-related 
investment especially in the water and agriculture sectors. Investments in the 
agricultural sectors of core nexus economies such as Egypt and Sudan could 
substantially increase regional food security, which requires increased 
investment in the energy and water sectors to provide growing populations 
with increased access to water, food (Keulertz & Woertz 2015). However, the 
changing role of the state towards land-water investments and the 
establishment of state-capital alliances may reflect a “partial” understanding 
of these issues. 
 
Many investors adopt the strategy of establishing an integrated farm through 
vertical value chains to add value, but also avoid high costs of logistics and its 
associated challenges especially in Africa (see chapter 7 Citadel Capital in 
South Sudan). For example, in the case of sugar cane, if an investor plants it 
without processing it in a mill, it will be very expensive to transport and 
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export. On the other hand, having a sugar mill alone without having the crop 
will lead to high cost of inputs (sugar cane for processing). For this reason, 
vertically integrated value chains are an important element in some large-
scale agricultural projects, however depending on the type of cultivated crop.  
 
In terms of the process of resources acquisitions, large-scale agricultural 
investments can vary in type. There are broadly two categories of investments; 
(i) Green Field Investments, where investors start from scratch, or (ii) 
Acquisitions, which can take place through either Growth Capital Funds 
(providing funding and equity to businesses that have the potential to grow), 
or Turn Around Funds.  In terms of financial investments in large-scale 
agricultural corporate investments, these depend on the strategy of the private 
equity fund/FIs whether it is targeting a greenfield investment, or whether it 
is acquiring an existing farm. In this respect, the financing mechanism can be 
pure equity (which translates in fully financing the project by the fund), or 
financing could depend on leverage, that is a portion of the finance is arranged 
through debt by borrowing from banks or financial institutions, while the 
other portion is arranged from equity.  
 
However, from an investor’s perspective, not all land-water investment 
destinations are the same. For instance, investments in Egypt can depend on 
surface water from the Nile, or underground water resources in the desert, 
however no investments can be developed in Egypt based on rainwater. On 
the other hand, farmland investments in North Sudan may depend on 
irrigation water from the Nile River, as well as other surface, or underground 
water resources, supplemented in some locations by rain fed irrigation. In 
South Sudan LSLA and agricultural investments can depend on rainwater 
with supplementary irrigation. Accordingly, the appropriation of water 
resources also takes place in a variety of ways, depending on surface or 
underground water resources, or both.  
 
There are 2 types of agricultural investments; rain-fed and irrigated 
agriculture. For a Greenfield investment, it is critical to understand the 
difference between both types, as well as the advantages and disadvantages 
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associated with each. Rain-fed agriculture investments are much cheaper as 
they are not capital intensive, and a low cost of labor. However, rain-fed 
agriculture has 2 major disadvantages: a) risks of water variations and 
droughts which will automatically result in a loss of cash flow, b) crop yields 
are much lower than irrigated agriculture. For example, crop productivity 
(depending on the crop) can be 1.5 tons/feddan in rain-fed but can be double 
that in irrigated projects. On the other hand, irrigated agriculture is much 
more expensive mainly to the cost of pumps which can reach 50 million USD 
per pump. Advantages of irrigated agriculture include: 1- higher yields; 2- 
investments are less vulnerable to climate variations and rain water volumes; 
3- Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) support irrigated agriculture 
because it is capital intensive with major infrastructure undertakings 
(Interviews #18 & #22).  
 
In terms of water resources use, investors typically receive a ‘Water License’, 
which does not indicate a specific amount of water withdrawal. Paradoxically, 
the water license can be withdrawn if investments are not taking place on the 
ground. Water is used in all stages of large-scale agricultural production for 
the different purposes including land development (reclamation), irrigation 
and farming (yield improvement vs. rain fed), and harvesting. As such, for the 
investor “You value water based on what it does and not what it is” 
(Interview #23). The closer the land is to the source of water, the cheaper it is 
to make the Land-Water connection for irrigation, which also has the 
advantage of using smaller and cheaper water pumps. The further the land 
plots from the main source of water, the higher the cost of irrigation, which 
eventually translates to a higher cost of production. Similarly, for 
underground water, digging wells in remote desert areas can reach up to 600 
meters, implying a high investment cost, only affordable by financially capable 
corporate investors (Interview # 2). To calculate the cost of water use, 
investors examine four main aspects; (i) cost of extraction (pumps) x price of 
goods and added value of water to produce (compared to rainfed for instance), 
(ii) the availability of water license, (iii) water use efficiency and water quality 
(e.g. how much is wasted water), and (iv) opportunity cost of water (how was 
water used and whether other uses can yield higher profits) (Interview #23).   
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According to corporate investors, private equity firms and non-state 
actors are interested in LSLA due to “the hidden value of land and water 
resources today, which are seemingly reflected in very high profitability 
figures and return on investment in the agriculture and food sectors” 
(Interview #23). For investors, Africa is considered as the final frontier in 
private equity development and financial investments. Over the last decades, 
financial investors and private equity funds in the international market were 
fully developed in the west, with a large degree of advancement in Asia due to 
China’s role, while Africa is still behind as the industry is still underdeveloped. 
However, the barriers for the development of financial investments in Africa 
are several, including; the need for economic and political (structural) reforms 
in order to establish partnerships. For instance, there are only a few relatively 
established markets in the region such as Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, and 
South Africa, as well as Egypt (notably before 2011). This implies that other 
economies still have the potential to be developed from a private finance 
standpoint, but still lack the basic pre-conditions to attract international 
financial investors. For this reason, international monetary institutions 
requested structural reforms in order to ensure adequate assessment of 
political risk in several African countries with potential to attract investments. 
This orientation also comes in line with the World Bank Group orientation to 
“create new markets” in fragile country states (FCS) by de-risking governance, 
social, and environmental risks.  
 
In particular, for the investors, these reforms can positively influence 
the agriculture sector given its increasing importance to the continent itself, as 
well as the global market. As such, transnational land-water investments in 
Africa are growing in importance due to the sheer fact that 60 % of remaining 
arable land in the world in Africa. A second factor is the continent’s reliance 
on food imports and aid despite its natural resources. However, a key 
weakness in the development of the agriculture sector in Africa is logistics, 
preventing the flow of natural resources to competitive international markets. 
Logistics represent a barrier for investments due to a number of interrelated 
issues such as cost, market accessibility, and lack of developed infrastructure. 
For example, Maize has an international price of 300$/ton in the 
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international market, whereas in Juba traders sells it at 1000$/ton with 700$ 
markup. Why is Maize so expensive in South Sudan and Juba in particular?  
This is due to the high cost of logistics, absence of ports and roads as well as 
high transportation costs, high cost of petroleum products and fuel, and 
finally customs challenges (Interview #25).  All these factors combined add a 
markup to the original cost of the product, reflected in the market price. 
Applying this example to other economies in Africa explains why food prices 
are often very expensive, leading several countries to depend on food and 
nutrition aid. By supporting food production locally African economies can 
avoid logistical costs associated with food imports. This in turn can result in 
providing food at affordable prices to the local population. Therefore from an 
investor’s standpoint, large-scale agricultural investments can help Africa 
surpass its reliance on external food aid and can address many of these issues 
related to agriculture and food production in the continent. 
 
Reflecting on these “investor” perspectives, one can critically think 
about the paradox between an investor’s contribution to address issues of food 
production locally, and the sheer mandate of generating maximum profit and 
foreign currency. Investors typically aim to achieve the highest rates of return 
by exporting agricultural products to international markets with a stronger 
purchasing power. This thought led me to ask the financial investors about 
how they determine the ratio or percentage of production for local markets as 
opposed to exports? The answer I got was largely vague, but clearly indicates 
that these decisions are based on the basic economic issue of “opportunity 
cost”. For example, a crop such as alfa-alfa, highly demanded in the Gulf, will 
probably be 100 % exported. On the other hand maize or wheat could be 
supplied locally and partially exported” It really depends on the type of crop, 
type of business, and market dynamics” (Interview #23)! In all cases, once 
investors secure land and water, they can decide the destination of their food 
production for the highest financial (and sometimes political) return. A form 
of water security mercantilism! 
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5.3. GCC Non-State Actors’ Investments in the Nile Basin  
 
State-Capital Alliances established in home countries are primarily 
founded on supporting investments in farmlands abroad. The land-water 
nexus is the primary commodity pursued by this alliance in order to secure 
food as well as profit. Arab investors in particular have shown an appetite for 
investment in natural resources adopting diverse modalities in Africa and 
elsewhere globally. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have the most institutionalized 
approach through the Qatar National Food Security Program (QNFSP) and 
the King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment Abroad 
(KAISAIA). Kuwait adopts a top-down approach with the involvement of the 
ministries of finance and agriculture led by portfolio investors such as the 
Kuwait Investment Authority tasked with direct investments despite their 
limited experience in the sector (Woertz 2013b, p.91). In addition existing 
development funds such as the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development (AFESD), as well as the Arab Association for Agricultural 
Development (AAAD) support some investments. Also worth noting that 
Saudi Arabia is the largest shareholder of the AAAD14 contributing over 22% 
of organizational capital. The research identified several Arab investments in 
Egypt and Sudan, covering different categories of land-water investments 
including (Hanna 2016): 
 
▪ Investments by corporate actors from Arab water scarce countries (Saudi 
Arabia, Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait) in Egypt and Sudan. 
▪ Investments by Egyptian private equity funds and private agricultural 
companies in Sudan and South Sudan (e.g. Citadel Capital) 
▪ Investments by global investors and international private sector 
agricultural companies in Egypt, Sudan, and other Nile basin countries 
(Japan and India in Egypt; South Korea and China in Sudan).   
 
 
The following section provides examples of institutional arrangements and 
domestic state-capital alliances between non-state actors from GCC and their 
home governments notably in Saudi Arabia and UAE, targeting investments 
in farmlands abroad in both Egypt and Sudan.  
                                                             
14 AAAD is comprised of 20 Arab and African member states seeking food security for their populations. 
Contributions include Kuwait with 19.5%, and the United Emirates, Sudan and Iraq each with a 15% share. Egypt 
contributes only 3%.  
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5.3.1. The King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment Abroad 
(KAISAIA) and Investments in Egypt and Sudan 
 
Several political economy drivers abroad motivate Saudi investments in 
farmlands abroad. The establishment of modern large-scale dairy production 
in the Kingdom dates back to the 1970s15. However, the water-intensive 
nature of the operations had been questioned over its long-term 
sustainability. As such, aside from the food price shocks in the international 
commodity market, the kingdom issued a decision to stop wheat cultivation in 
the desert effective 2016. This decision was largely based on the depletion of 
the underground water resources reserve on which Saudi Arabia depended for 
the non-economic production of wheat in the desert over the last 30 years or 
so (Interview #4, Interview #28). To address this issue, local dairy firms have 
been moving towards full (100%) reliance on imported feed, with some 
companies investing directly in establishing their own feed production 
facilities abroad as part of a wider government initiative to encourage the 
acquisition of foreign farmland (Oxford Business Group 2013).  
 
In 2008, Saudi Arabia launched the King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi 
Agricultural Investment Abroad (KAISAIA) to provide government credit and 
diplomatic support for Saudi companies investing in foreign agricultural 
projects. Providing insurance for KAISAIA overseas farm projects was also 
planned in coordination with the Agricultural Development Fund, the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB) and the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment 
& Development. According to Abdullah Al-Awain, director general of the fund 
“the fund seeks to serve the initiative by safeguarding the investments, 
minimizing the risks that these investments may face and maintain the rights 
of the fund itself, while maximizing projected revenues” (Farmlandgrab 2013). 
In 2012, a report by the Land Matrix project indicated that Saudi Arabia 
purchased about 5.5 million acres, the largest being 675,000 acres in the 
Philippines by Eastern Renewable Fuels Corporation for agriculture 
(Farmlandgrab 2014a). Other examples of international agricultural 
                                                             
15 When the McGuckian family of Ireland helped to establish an indoor dairy farm in Al Kharj. The facility went on to 
become the main farm of Almarai, the largest dairy company in the Middle East; the firm is also the world’s biggest 
integrated dairy group, with total revenues of SR11.22bn ($2.99bn) in 2013. 
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investments involving the direct acquisition of land and water resources 
included the United Farmers Holding Company (UFHC) deal to gain control 
of 2700 ha of prime wheat land in Poland and 33,000 ha in Ukraine, either 
through direct ownership or long-term lease (Oxford Business Group 2013). 
UFHC is a Saudi consortium made up of several key Saudi companies in 
agriculture sector including Saudi Agricultural and Livestock Investment 
Company, Saudi Grains and Fodder Holding, the Almarai Company, entering 
the Irish market by offering $77m for Irish-based agribusiness Continental 
Farmers Group (CFG). 
 
Saudi Investors targeted Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, amongst other countries 
in Africa and elsewhere. For example, in Ethiopia, Melis Zenawi the late prime 
minister welcomed Saudi investments by stating "we want to develop our land 
to feed ourselves, rather than admire the beauty of fallow fields while we 
starve" (Pearce 2012). In Egypt, despite the interruptions associated the 
political events in Egypt during 2011, a revival of land deals took place during 
the 2015 Economic Development Conference. It is estimated than more than 
nine deals took place during this event with a total amount of 20 billion EGP 
targeting 300,000 feddan for land reclamation.  Involved Saudi investors 
included Al Rajhi, Al Marai, Savola, Egyptian Saudi Farming Company, 
Capital Community, DDF, Nadec, Al Khozeim, Al Gaze3. Only few signs show 
the materialization of these land deals. For instance, in 2016, the Egyptian 
Holding Company for Land Reclamation was contracted by the Saudi Savola 
Company16 to reclaim 20,000 feddan (out of its 50,000 feddans in Moghara, 
Northern Western Desert) at an investment cost of 1.3 billion EGP (Al-Borsa 
News 2015).  
 
“In most deals, Saudi investors have generous access to water and the right to 
export at least 50 percent of the harvest back to Saudi Arabia” (Interview # 4). 
This was further confirmed by (Interview # 18) indicating that Saudi investors 
seek the maximum financial return and as such “treat the land as a cow”. For 
this reason, a 2012 report from one of Africa's biggest banks, Standard Bank 
                                                             
16 Savola’s existing investments in Egypt amount up to 8 billion EGP in the agri-food sector including sugar 
processing, vegetable oils and gee, and pasta.  
 
 
150 
based in South Africa, suggested it had mistaken during its initial assessment 
and that Saudi investments may be bad value for the continent by stating; 
"For African countries courted by Saudi agribusiness firms, a clear 
appreciation of the value of the asset on which they rest is necessary…Under-
selling of agricultural assets (both land and, perhaps more critically, water) 
remains a profound threat” (Standard Bank 2012). 
 
Al Rajhi  
 
Al Rajhi17 International Investment (RAII) is an interesting example of a 
Saudi Investor engaged in Egypt and Sudan. RAII lines of business include 
investments, agricultural infrastructure development, farm management 
services, production, and trading undertaken by 3 subsidiaries; Al Rajhi 
Agricultural Management Services Company (responsible for the production, 
maintenance and operations on the farms, and expand infrastructure for 
irrigation in new farms); Saudi Grain & Fodders Holding LLC established in 
2008 (branches out to 5 different subsidiary companies); Al Rajhi Agricultural 
Infrastructure Co. established in 2015 specialized in engineering, procurement 
and construction services for agricultural projects development for RAII as 
well as third parties.  
 
Since 2008, Al Rajhi played a leading role as part of KAISAIA. In 2009, Al 
Rajhi Group brought together major Saudi agribusiness companies including 
Al Marai, Aljouf Agricultural Development Company to form Jannat, a joint 
venture company to acquire farmland overseas. Based in Riyadh, Jannat 
Agricultural Investment Company (limited liability) includes six Saudi 
companies with a capital of 63 million riyals to undertake large investments in 
agricultural farming overseas. In 2009, Jenat acquired 10,000 hectares in 
Egypt to cultivate wheat, barley, and alfaalfa for a deal estimated at 70 million 
USD. Jannat currently owns 77.73% of the capital of the agricultural 
investment company in Egypt, and produces wheat, alfalfa, corn and pulp on a 
land area of 4,000 hectares East Port area. In 2013, the Board of Directors 
                                                             
17 Owned by a Saudi family business and the largest WAQF Al Rajhi family is considered to be the wealthiest non-
royals in Saudi Arabia.  
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agreed to enter into a partnership with Marina Agricultural Development 
Company (Egyptian company) to establish a production and marketing of feed 
silage in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia Company (Jazan 2015).  
 
Al Rajhi’s agricultural investment portfolio also includes projects in Sudan, 
Egypt, Ukraine and Poland amongst others. Its operations are presently at 
Kafa’a and Al Ghaba (Sudan) and Toshka (Egypt). In Egypt, the Saudi 
company acquired 100,000 feddan (62,500 feddan) in Toshka in 2007 out of 
which 20,000 feddan located on branch 1. By 2009 Al Rajhi started with the 
reclamation of 10,000 feddan, out of which only 400 feddan were cultivated 
during the initial phase to produce wheat and alfa alfa for export to Saudi 
Arabia (Grain 2010). The second phase was planned for the remaining 52,000 
feddan and was scheduled to start in 2010 but was delayed as a result of the 
January 2011 revolution. A recent study by a Dutch consultant commissioned 
by the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands in 2015 estimated that 
the size Al Rajhi’s farm in Egypt is 42,000 ha with a production size of 6,300 
ha (Hillhorst 2015a). The production on the farms in Sudan and Egypt consist 
mainly of Alfalfa, Wheat (grain and seed), Corn, Barley, Date and banana 
seedlings.  
 
In Sudan, Al-Rajhi’s Al Kafa2a project established near Barbar city in the state 
of the Nile River in the Northern region. Al Kafa2a project is planned on 
12,000 feddan (5,000 hectares) relying on a main canal 5 km from the Nile to 
the external periphery of the project, which branch out to smaller canals 
totaling 35 km. Currently, 75 axis of the 100 planned are already cultivated 
including wheat, corn, alfalfa using modern technology and agricultural 
mechanization (Vimeo 2014). Plans for expansion include additional two 
areas of 50,000 and 30,000 feddan to the eastern and southern parts of the 
project respectively. In its reports, the company identifies its initial challenges 
to be the choice of the irrigation system taking into consideration the soil and 
temperature characteristics.  
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5.3.2. Abu Dhabi Food Control Authority (ADFCA) and UAE Investments in 
Egypt and Sudan 
 
ADFCA supports and subsidizes its own private sector companies to invest 
abroad as part of the UAE’s food security strategy to satisfy the country’s 
needs of basic agricultural commodities, notably animal feed. The reason why 
ADFCA is interested in cultivating fodder abroad is to replace the locally 
produced ‘Rhodes grass’ which was halted by the government since 2010 as it 
consumed 3 of every 5 liters produced in agriculture in UAE. In 2009, ADFCA 
signed contracts with two key Emirati investors Jenaan Investments and Al 
Dahra Agricultural Company to supply large quantities of animal feed 
(Interview #18). Both companies undertook investments in Egypt and Sudan, 
as well as other countries globally “to supply ADFCA a variety of fodder items 
that have been scarce in the market, but having best nutrients that ensure 
productivity and quality of the livestock” (ADFCA 2015).  
 
In January 2015, ADFCA renewed the supply contract for different Emirati 
companies investing in farmlands abroad. This renewal indicates UAE’s 
ongoing strategy “to continue ensuring adequate supply of high quality fodder 
to the agricultural sector for five years until 2020” (ADFCA, 2016). According 
to HE Dr. Mugheer Al Khaili, ADFCA Board Member and Managing Director; 
“the decision of the signing of contracts comes in line with directives and 
decisions of Abu Dhabi Executive Council pertaining to fodder support to 
livestock farms as well as a complimentary to the strategic objectives set in the 
area of food security in fodder supplies, by recognizing it as a strategic 
commodity and by systematically managing the stock in the emirate” (ADFCA, 
2016).  
 
Jenaan Investment 
 
Jenaan Investment - a private company established in Abu Dhabi in 2005- is 
an example of an Emirati investor engaged in Egypt and Sudan to invest in 
farmlands abroad. In 2007, the company acquired 160,000 feddan18 of land in 
                                                             
18 A feddan is the equivalent of 0.42 hectare 
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Egypt to grow 60,000 tons of corn, barley, silage and alfalfa grass. To start, 
the company invested USD 25 million to acquire 6000 feddan in Toshka and 
establish an animal feed plant for fodder export to the UAE. In 2009 the 
company also signed a deal to invest US$ 251.8 million (Dh925 million) to 
grow wheat on an additional 100,000 feddan (42,000 hectares) in East 
Oweinat. Project implementation was planned over five years, expected to be 
complete by 2015, whereby production was "strictly for Egyptian 
consumption". The plan was to start out by cultivating 8,400ha and expand 
operations by the same amount each year. After five years, the land was 
expected to yield 350,000 tons of wheat annually. However, inevitable delays 
and disruptions occurred on the ground due to the political situation in Egypt 
in 2011. 
 
According to Jenaan, by 2012, the company was growing 60,000 tons of corn, 
barley, silage and alfalfa grass in Egypt. Half of that was sent to the Abu Dhabi 
Food Control Authority and half was sold to private Egyptian companies (The 
National 2012). Prior to 2013, Jenaan was producing forage to feed livestock 
in Abu Dhabi but was losing money, partly due to an export tax of 300 
Egyptian pounds ($43.56) a ton on the crops it exported back home 
(Interview #18). In 2013 Jenaan changed its policy partly because of its 
financial loss and partly due to advice from the government of Abu Dhabi to 
contribute to Egypt’s food security in support to its political transition during 
2013-2014. Jenaan started cultivating 10,000 feddan of wheat in Egypt and is 
looking to plant 30,000 feddan more next year. Worth noting that Egypt is 
among the world's biggest importers of wheat consuming 14 million tons a 
year. 
 
In Sudan, Jenaan investment signed a deal with the government in 2010 to 
establish a joint venture (60% Jenaan, 40% Sudan) under the name of 
“Amtaar” considered as the country’s largest scale agricultural investment. 
The deal entailed 30-year renewable lease for 230,000 feddan (100,000 
hectares) in Sudan. In April 2012, the first phase started with 12,000 feddan 
(5,000 hectares) expanded into 12,000 four months later. Using a floppy 
irrigation system to irrigate using the Nile’s water, this operation is expected 
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to generate between 50,000 and 70,000 tons of feed on a yearly basis. 
According to Khalil Al-Shamry, General Manager of Jenaan Investment “our 
vision has been to help achieve food security for the UAE and the Gulf 
countries … we started with 137,000 acres and now we have finished 
infrastructure for 30,000 acres. As this is only our pilot project, we believe 
that within the next ten years we will be able to cultivate a minimum of one 
million hectares, but first we wanted to check Sudan’s conditions, and our 
technology” (The Worldflio 2015). In 2016, Jennan Investments signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Sudanese Finance Ministry to 
establish the biggest date palm farm in the world, with a total of 221 million 
trees to be planted over a 13-year period (ADFCA 2016). Other plans for 
expansion included an investment of 500 million USD to buy farmland in 
Tanzania, and another one in Ethiopia of 163 million USD, in addition to the 
Far East, the US where it produces about 150,000 tons of grass from farmers, 
and Spain with 300,000 tons of feed. 
 
Al Dahra Agriculture 
 
Another example of an international Emirati investor in Egypt is the Abu 
Dhabi based Al Dahra Agricultural Company, one of the main suppliers of 
animal feed in the UAE. Al Dahra Agriculture is affiliated to Al Ain Holding 
(Formerly Al Ain International Group) founded in 1996. The Economic giant 
is named after Al Ain city (Arabic: The Water Spring), the birthplace of the 
late Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the founder of the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and the Ruler’s Representative in the Western Region of Abu 
Dhabi. Al Ain Holding19 has a group of leading companies headquartered in 
Abu Dhabi that includes its subsidiaries; Al Ain Properties, Al Ain Capital, Al 
Ain Hospitality Investments and Al Ain Educational Investments, as well as its 
affiliate; Al Dahra Holding -established in 1995- mainly working in agriculture. 
With a diversified local and international investment portfolio, Al-Dahra 
Holding specializes in the agriculture industry with a global portfolio and 
                                                             
19 Khadim Abdulla Aldarei is the Managing Director of Al Ain Holding, and the Vice Chairman of Al Dahra Holding. He is 
also the chairman of Al Dahra Agriculture Company in Egypt. 
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presence across four continents and trading activity in more than 25 
countries.  
 
Al-Dahra Agriculture is a subsidiary of Al-Dahra Holding. According to their 
website, Al Dahra Agricultural Company is “a prominent leader in 
agribusiness; specializing in the cultivation, production and trading of animal 
feed and essential human food commodities such as rice, flour, fruits and 
vegetables” (Al Dahra Agriculture 2018). Al Dahra’s strategic orientation is 
based on strategic needs in the UAE market, often guided by ADFCA driven by 
a larger goal to ensure the sustainability of key commodities supply by 
investing in creating a full-fledged portfolio of essential commodities available 
for import into the UAE from own foreign agricultural investments (Al Dahra 
Agriculture 2018). An essential element of the company’s mandate is to supply 
the UAE and ADFCA with animal feed and forage “that have been scarce in 
the market, yet having best nutrients that ensure productivity and quality of 
the livestock” (Al Dahra Agriculture 2018).  
 
Accordingly, over the last decade, Al Dahra has positioned itself in the global 
market as a leader in the forage and roughage cultivation, and processing 
industry, offering a spectrum of forage products. Al Dahra cultivates in 
farmlands across Europe, US, South Asia and North Africa. On an annual 
basis, the company’s owned and leased farmlands globally produce more than 
2 million metric tons of forage with an annual forage cultivation capacity of 
390,000 metric tons as follows; Al Dahra ACX Global (USA): 60,000MT; Al 
Dahra Fagavi (Spain): 160,000MT; Al Dahra Egypt: 120,000MT; Al Dahra 
Pakistan: 50,000MT.  
 
Al Dahra adopts an active foreign investment strategy, establishing various 
acquisitions and joint ventures with specialized feed and food producers 
worldwide driven by profit as well as strategic orientations. According to the 
company, investments cover various geographies which “contribute to the 
host countries long-term food security and farming sustainability…by 
dedicating a share of Al Dahra’s agricultural production for local consumption 
and upgrading the local infrastructure which is essential for the country’s 
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agricultural sector development, while also contributing to the country’s 
economic development through the generation of new employment 
opportunities” (Ibid). 
 
The group owns and operates a large asset base including a land bank of 200 
thousand acres, 8 forage pressing and production plants, 4 rice milling plants 
and 2 flour milling plants in India and Pakistan” (Al Dahra Agriculture 2018). 
Egypt is one of the locations where Al Dahra is advancing its food (and water) 
security strategies. Al Dahra also acquired land in Sudan, however initial 
reports indicate that this operation has been delayed (Hillhorst 2015a). In 
Egypt, the company’s landholdings are estimated to be 119,560 feddan 
producing around 120,000 metric tons of alfa alfa (cultivation, production, 
and processing capacity) which represents 31% of the company’s annual 
forage cultivation capacity globally, and 10% of its annual production and 
processing capacity. Also, it engages in commercial production for export of 
high value crops in the international market as presented in the following 
section. Al Dahra’s strategy is based on acquiring large-scale agricultural 
farmland (or desert reclamation land) in different locations in Egypt, 
motivated by the availability of water resources from both the Nile and 
underground water resources (Interview #19). Worth noting that Egypt is a 
special case since there is no rainwater, and therefore supplementary 
irrigation is not possible, making it a unique place for irrigation and 
agriculture, as well as the politics associated with them (Interviews #19; #4).  
5.4. Al Dahra Large-scale Land Acquisitions (LSLA) in Egypt  
 
5.4.1. Al Dahra Egypt: Diverse Modalities of Land-Water Investments 
 
Al-Dahra Egypt was founded in 2007 and started operations in 2008 as a 
result of a collaborative effort between the governments of the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Egypt (Interview #19). Al-Dahra Egypt specializes in land 
reclamation and infrastructure set up, considered as core competencies of the 
company. The primary purpose of the company’s investments is to develop 
agricultural projects for cultivation, production and export of food products 
and animal feed. The total work force of Al-Dahra Egypt is around 500 
employees on fixed contracts, excluding seasonal labour and those working in 
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the Toshka and Oweinat project, which is considered a separate operation on 
its own (Interview #19) as discussed in the next section. In Egypt, the 
company invested heavily in building on-farm production infrastructure 
comprising wells, drip and pivot irrigation systems, pumping stations, 
filtration units, processing plants, sorting and packing units, including owning 
and operating a forage processing and baling facility. In addition, it has 
developed advanced logistics capabilities for domestic and overseas 
distribution and has invested in the latest agricultural equipment and logistics 
machinery (Interview #19).  
 
The company’s investments in Egypt comprise two main categories; Old-New 
Lands (east and west of Nile delta), and New Lands in remote desert areas 
allocated for Mega projects as shown on Map 5.1. In total Al-Dahra Egypt 
operates four large agricultural projects with a total size of 119,560 Feddan of 
land as shown in Table 5.1. These farmlands in Egypt represent approximately 
10% of its global land bank investments, out of which only 20,000 are 
cultivated (Interview #19). The farms are situated in (i) Salyeha (East of Delta 
(Site #1: 3,200 Feddan)), (ii) Nubareya (West of Delta (Site #2: 360 feddans)), 
(iii) Sharq Al Oweinat (16,000 Feddans), and (iv) Toshka (100,000 feddan). 
In light of this diversity of land and water resources acquisitions, each of these 
has its own characteristics, including the land size, the source of water, and 
the scale of agricultural production as shown in table 5.2. Al Dahra’s land 
acquisitions in Egypt started in 2008 in Al Nubareya and Al Salheya situated 
West and East of Delta (as will be discussed in detail in the case study 
presented in Chapter 6), and then moved to acquiring 15,000 feddans in 
Sharq Al-Owainat to the extreme South West of the country. In addition to 
these 3 farmlands, Al Dahra acquired a fourth site in Toshka to reclaim 
100,000 feddans of farmland situated 60 km from the border with Sudan, 
through a 25 years land lease deal, for which Al Dahra pays an annual leasing 
fee. Production however only started on one fifth of this total land cultivating 
nearly 20,000 feddan starting 2015.  
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Map 5.1. Al Dahra’s land and water acquisitions across Egypt cover different sites including;  
Al Nubareya in Western Nile Delta, Toshka, and Sharq Al-Owainat in South Western Desert. 
 
                                 Source: Google Maps 
 
 
Map 5.1 (b) Al Dahra Farmlands in Toshka and Oweinat 
 
Source: Google Maps 
 
One of the interviewed farm managers witnessed the cultivation of Al-Dahra’s 
first season in May 2008. He explained with enthusiasm “our aim in Al Dahra 
is to manage our farms according to international standards, we have quickly 
gained a strong reputation in the Egyptian and international markets despite 
the fact that we only started our operations in 2008”. For private investors, 
the investment decision about crops choice is purely based on economic 
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considerations (Interview #19), prioritizing the highest economic return from 
the high value crops. For the company, an agricultural operation should 
mainly translate into financial return in foreign currency, function of demand 
and prices in the European export markets (Interview#18). The local market 
is of secondary importance, and mainly serves to sell the rejects (Grade B and 
C) of the export market. As proudly explained by the farm manager “Al Dahra 
received an award from the Netherlands in 2015, as Egypt’s top exporter of 
high quality oranges to the European market. Al Dahra’s agricultural produce 
is Global Gap certified, and we are currently working to be TESCO certified”. 
In terms of the operational relationship between Al Dahra and ADFCA, 
(Interview #18) explains that Al Dahra Egypt sells its agricultural produce to 
Al Dahra Abu Dhabi, who in turn sells it to ADFCA. This transaction is subject 
to taxation from Egypt’s side, whereas the financial transaction ends up in the 
company’s account in Egypt. The company is subject to supervision by the 
Egyptian Import Export Authority (hay2at al saderat wal waredat), and each 
fiscal year has to be settled separately.  
 
In each different geographic contexts of its four farmland, Al Dahra had to 
manage, adapt, resolve, and secure the necessary resources to ensure return 
on its agricultural investments. For example, in Al Nubareya farmland, Al 
Dahra acquires water from underground aquifers in the western desert, as 
well as the Nile through its complex irrigation network stretching downstream 
across the West of Delta agricultural area. In Toshka, Nile water is directly 
provided from Lake Nasser, supplemented by underground water from the 
great Nubian sand aquifer. In Sharq Al- Owainat, access to water for irrigation 
primarily depends on the great Nubian Sand aquifer, “by digging wells, 
literally in the middle of the desert close to the Southern border with Sudan” 
(Interview #19).  
 
In terms of land size, Al Nubareya and Al Salheya (Old-New Lands) are 
relatively much older, and much smaller in size compared to Toshka and 
Oweinat (New Lands) which are recently established land reclamation 
schemes remotely located south west of Egypt near Lake Nasser and closer to 
the borders with Sudan (Interview #18). While farms in Old-New Lands are 
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limited in size, the location of Al Salheya and Al Nubareya provide several 
comparative advantages compared to remote desert lands. This includes 
easier access to electricity, better services, ease of transportation, and access 
to export ports from the Mediterranean or Red sea. These advantages contrast 
with remote sites in New Lands where distance to export ports implies 
additional time and cost.  
 
In terms of water resources, a major distinction between Egypt and other Nile 
basin countries, or elsewhere globally is that agriculture depends 100% on 
irrigation with no supplementary rainwater. It is crucial to understand this 
factor, given that securing water is a key element for a successful agricultural 
operation, and is therefore a major investment cost for farmland irrigation to 
achieve the corporate objective of maximizing agricultural productivity, and 
hence profit (Interview #19). For Al Dahra, a mix of Nile and underground 
water was adopted to develop large-scale land reclamation projects. In each of 
Al Dahra’s agricultural sites across the country both elements (land and 
water) share some similarities, but often-different characteristics. Al Salheya 
farmland eastern of Nile Delta depends on Nile water from Al Ismailia Canal. 
Irrigation in Al Nubareya farmland west of Nile delta depends on a mix of 
water sources, originally from underground water, supplemented by Nile 
water, which only started to flow to Al Dahra’s farms in 2014, conveyed 
through Al Nasr Canal, one of two major branch canals from Al Nubareya 
Canal. Al Dahra’s large-scale schemes in Toshka depend on the Nile water 
from Lake Nasser channeled through al Sheikh Zayed Canal, mainly 
characterized by high water quality. While Al Dahra’s investments in Sharq Al 
Oweinat 60 km from the border with Sudan solely depend on underground 
reserves from the trans-boundary Great Nubian Sand Aquifer, shared between 
Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Tchad. 
 
However According to the company’s management, “despite the land-water 
resources potential, do not make profit due to the high level of transaction 
costs associated with this operation from cultivation to export” (Interview 
#18). As such, between the Nile surface water and its complex irrigation 
network on the one hand, and underground water resources in Egypt’s desert 
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on the other, investors face several paradoxes pertaining to issues such as –
but not limited to- water quality and quantity, access to electricity, and 
logistics amongst other factors. In this respect, different modalities of 
agricultural investments in both Old-New Lands and New Lands enrich our 
perspective about the company’s practices and challenges, especially as it 
relates to its diverse land and water acquisitions across the country and the 
Nile’s watershed. 
 
Table 5.1: SUMMARY AL DAHRA LAND-WATER INVESTMENTS in Egypt  
 Al Nubareya 
(West of Delta) 
Al Salheya 
(East of Delta) 
Toshka Sharq Al 
Owainat 
Land Size 360 Feddans 3,200 Feddans 
40 years lease 
100,000 Feddans / 
Only 20,000 
cultivated 
500 million USD 
16,000  
Feddans 
Crops  Citrus – Oranges, 
grapes, mango, and 
other fruits for export 
markets 
1,475 Feddan Citrus (Orange Naval 
130 feddan & Orange Valencia 1175 
feddan) + 1,725 feddan cultivated 
out of which 1,200 feddan of wheat 
and the remaining 525 divided 
amongst sweet corn for silage, 
potatoes, and winter weed. 
Wheat /alfa alfa Wheat/alfa 
alfa 
Source of 
Water 
Underground Water –  
Nile water only started 
in 2014 
Al Nubareya/Al Nasr 
Canal –Al Khereegen 
Secondary Canal – 
Branch Canal 4  
Nile Water 
 
Al Ismailia Canal Primary – 
Tarouty Secondary Canal – Al 
Kassara Tertiary Canal + 17 
unused wells 
Nile Water – 
Directly from Lake 
Nasser via Al 
Sheikh Zayed Canal  
Supplemented by 
Underground water  
Undergroun
d Water – 
Great 
Nubian Sand 
Aquifer 
Water Pump 30 horsepower pump  
 
28 pumps -  
Station 1: 11 pumps – Station 2: 9 
pumps – Station 3: 8 pumps 
100 horsepower pump  / 2008  
Grundfos German Technology 
  
Source of 
Electricity 
Grid  Grid Grid – inconsistent 
– Plans to expand 
to solar 
Grid 
Inconsistent  
Irrigation 
System 
Double Drip Centre Pivot, Double Drip, 
Sprinkler/ Upgraded in 2012 2015 
Centre Pivot Centre Pivot 
Types of 
Crops 
Fruits/Citrus Fruits/Citrus, Alfa Alfa, Wheat,  Alfa Alfa, Wheat Alfa Alfa, 
Wheat 
Destination European Market Depends on the product 
:Europe/UAE/Egypt/ 
Egypt, UAE, other Egypt, UAE, 
other  
Labor 12 (fixed) +outsource 
labor via external 
contractor for cultivation 
season / average 2 per 
feddan of citrus 
82 – 130   
(Source: Author) 
 
 
5.4.2. Challenges of Land Deals in New Lands  
 
Al Dahra’s largest investments under the category of New Lands are located in 
Toshka, and East Oweinat, Both farmlands -150 km from each other- are 
remotely located in the western desert where there are no land holdings for 
small farmers. In East Oweinat, the 15,000-feddan farmland was directly 
leased from the Ministry of Agriculture who had failed to develop the land on 
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its own (Interview #18). In this farmland, the company produces about 
50,000 tons of forage and silage per annum, in addition to owning and 
operating a forage processing and baling facility. In addition, the company 
cultivates wheat solely depending on underground water, with a target 
production of 100,000 tons per year (Interview #19).  
 
Map 5.2: Satellite view of Sharq Al Oweinat farmlands in South Western Desert 
 
Source: Google Maps 
 
 
However, “Al Dahra’s operations in Sharq Al-Owainat are at a critical 
intersection due to several challenges including access to water and electricity, 
infrastructure, and labor problems” (Interview #19). For the company, a key 
problem in Oweinat and similar desert schemes is the absence of 
supplementary irrigation – unlike other parts of the world. For the company’s 
managers, the critical issue of water resources in such remote areas is a main 
concern, as “the natural environment and mother nature do not provide water 
for agriculture in these desert locations”. For the company, it is a significant 
investment to dig wells, with all the equipment and machinery needed to 
cover the massive land areas.  Adding to this are issues of electricity, and the 
site’s remote location, which impose limitations on production, significantly 
increasing the cost of production and transportation resulting in major 
financial implications for the company. 
 
On the other hand, Al Dahra’s Toshka farmland targeted to cultivate 100,000 
feddan with an investment of $500 million (Dh1.83bn). The agreement signed 
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in July 2008 marked Al Dahra’s latest and fourth land deal with the 
government represented by the Egyptian General Authority for Agricultural 
Development (GAAD) in coordination with the General Authority For 
Investment (GAFI). The agreement was signed in the presence of Amin 
Othman Abaza20, and Ahmed al Zaabi, the UAE ambassador to Egypt, and was 
announced amid a string of deals by UAE companies to acquire farmlands 
abroad, as the Emirati Government looked to secure the country's supply of 
imported food (The National 2011). Al Dahra’s project in Toshka was to be 
cultivated in four stages of almost 25,000 feddan each, by pumping water 
from the Aswan High Dam reservoir (Lake Nasser), to be delivered via a 50-
kilometre canal. Additional underground water resources in Toshka include 
the Great Nubian Sand Aquifer.  
 
However, the operation had not started until 2013 despite the contract being 
signed in 2008. This delay was primarily due to a ruling by an administrative 
court that had cancelled the contract following the 2011 revolution as part of 
major legal procedures undertaken by the Egyptian public prosecutors and 
judges who opened dozens of investigations into land deals that took place 
under the former president Mubarak. In this respect, the state council 
(magles al dawla), an administrative court that provides legal expertise to 
Egyptian government ministries and rules on disputes between the public and 
the government, announced on February 21st 2011 that the government had 
broken the law in 2008 when it transferred the Toshka land to Al Dahra 
without holding an open bidding process. The decision immediately set off a 
number of investigations into whether other land contracts awarded through 
similar processes under a "direct order" had also violated the law – similar to 
Saudi KADCO discussed in chapter 4. Following this legal procedure, Osama 
Abdul Lotif, the chief executive in Egypt, said the company would challenge 
the state council's ruling against Al Dahra's deal, arguing the contract "was 
signed with a full [Egyptian] ministerial commitment".  
 
In early April 2011 a cabinet-level committee reversed the ruling by the 
administrative court that had cancelled the contract. The reversal of the 
                                                             
20 Last Minister of Agriculture during Mubarak 
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original ruling came under the condition that the company provides an 
expedited plan for developing the land, according to Hussein Ghunima, the 
head of ministerial affairs at the ministry of agriculture. Al Dahra had to 
submit a detailed plan for what crops it will grow and how it will develop the 
land, otherwise it would risk cancellation of the deal. From the government’s 
point of view “the state is eager to demonstrate that foreign investors are still 
welcomed in a new Egypt”, stated Mr. Hussein Ghunima, a senior official and 
the head of ministerial affairs at the Ministry of Agriculture (The National 
2011). "We must encourage any person coming to [Egypt] to continue. We 
need to develop our country… We need to invest more and more. We've got 
the resources, we have got the land, we have got the water, and we have the 
sun. All of these provide a good way to develop our country" (Ibid). For Mr. 
Ghunima, the decision to uphold Al Dahra's contract was not connected to the 
question of whether the "direct order" process was legal, and other factors 
were included. According to him, “Al Dahra has been given a second chance to 
make significant progress in the Toshka project…this gives them a good 
opportunity to put them on the right way. There is water, and they have got 
financial resources, so they can continue with the good work". Worth noting 
however, little is known about the details of water consumption by these 
projects, nor the guidelines for water planning and management in these 
large-scale irrigation schemes! 
 
In the summer of 2013, following the June 30th events in Egypt, Minister 
Ayman Fareed Abou Hadeed visited Al Dahra Farms with the Ambassador of 
the UAE in Egypt Mohamed Ben Nokhera. The visit included al Dahra Farms 
in Toshka, as an essential initiative of the Arab Agricultural investments in 
Egypt in support of the June 30th revolution. The Egyptian minister stressed 
the fact that the efforts of attracting Gulf Agricultural investments come as 
part of the government’s plan to develop new agricultural areas totaling 
340,000 feddan in 5 main areas including; south east of Qattara depression, 
Old Farafra, East of Siwa Oasis, Toshka, and Sinai. Specifically in Toshka land 
the plan included cultivating between 75,000-100,000 feddan of sugar beet, 
oil seeds, as well as essential crops for the “dual & triple agricultural cycles” 
ةيثلاثلا وأ ةيئانثلا ةيعارزلا ةرودلل , including wheat, corn, alfalfa, and other secondary 
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crops. The project also entailed developing agro-processing industries, 
however no evidence is present about any progress on this front (field notes).  
 
In 2014, Al Dahra CEO Mr. Darei indicated that the investment had initially 
run into logistical difficulties but that Egypt's new regime was keen on paving 
the way for more foreign direct investment in the sector stating "the 
government was not used to such large-scale foreign investments in 
agriculture but now with the new regime there is a big initiative of support 
and they are moving in the right direction," (Farmlandgrab 2014e). Only in 
October 2015, did Khadim al-Darei, the vice Chariman of Al Dahra inform 
Reuters on the sidelines of an agricultural conference in Abu Dhabi that 
"Work on the Toshka project is complete and we are set for cultivation by 
October 2015, we have plans to get around 300,000 tons of wheat from there" 
(Farmlandgrab 2014e). He expected the first harvest from Toshka in May-
June 2016 and that all of the company's wheat production would be sold in 
Egypt. To date, Al Dahra only succeeded in cultivating 20,000 feddans in 
Toshka out of its 100,000 feddans land acquisition due to the politics of new 
lands and deals which resulted in several delays in developing the Toshka 
farmland (Interview #18).  
 
Overall, in both large-scale farmlands remotely located in the desert, 
competition to access water is not with other users. Rather, the main 
challenge relies with “Mother Nature”. The location of the farms, and the 
harsh environment of the desert, distance from markets, and challenges 
associated with access to labor and energy resources are the key obstacles for 
a financially viable operation.  Worth noting however, in September 2017, A 
new 20MW solar plant in the Toshka area in Aswan governorate has started 
operations, with $25 million in investment, according to Complete Energy 
Solutions company, the project’s developer. For Al Dahra it is expected to to 
save 10 million liters of gasoline and reduce CO2 emissions by 25,000 tons 
(ArabFinance 2017). But whether this new development will result in a 
sustainable operation for Al Dahra’s 1.5 billion project in the desert is to be 
seen.  
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Even if the company ends up with a profitable operation, the fact that it plants 
alfa alfa and export it back to the UAE is a form of virtual water grab. Planting 
wheat and selling it to the Egyptian government may be positively 
contributing to the country’s food security and its heavy reliance on imports to 
feed its growing population. However, under all scenarios, the company’s 
large-scale investments in desert farmlands raise larger questions about 
Egypt’s ecological-demographic narrative of crisis! These land-schemes have 
not addressed the question of population redistribution and do not contribute 
to establishing sustainable agricultural communities in the desert due to the 
sheer nature of their operations. An investment of this size is highly 
mechanized, is not labor intensive, and above all, does not create any 
community dynamics through which population can flourish in Egypt’s desert 
lands. 
 
5.5. CONCLUSION  
 
‘State-capital alliances’ are shaped by scarcity and security narratives, in both 
home countries (e.g. GCC), and host countries (e.g. Nile basin). Over the last 
decade, the food and fuel crisis renewed interests in investments in farmlands 
abroad. To ensure their food sovereignty, water scarce GCC countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE established domestic state-capital alliances through 
different institutional arrangements (ADFCA; KAISAIA) to support private 
sector investments in farmlands abroad. This approach aimed to find an 
alternative option to achieve land-water-food ‘security’ nexus, by bi-passing 
the global (virtual water) trade market to meet their needs of certain strategic 
crops (wheat; fodder; rice, etc.). Transnational investments by non-state 
actors from GCC countries targeted different destinations globally, notably in 
Nile basin countries such as Egypt and Sudan.  
 
State-capital alliances also manifest how both the state and the investors 
understand ‘land-water-food’ interdependencies, often framed as a ‘political-
economic commodity’. In this respect, the Gulf-Nile connection manifests an 
essential element to achieve a joint Arab food security strategy. Home 
governments (e.g. KAISAIA; ADFCA) support non-state actors and investors 
engaged in farmland investments in the Nile basin to achieve food security. 
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Host countries such as Egypt perceive transnational investments as a sign of 
modernization of their agricultural sector and an important element of its 
hydraulic mission and Mega schemes. For Sudan, transnational investments 
are an attempt to achieve the larger vision of the “breadbasket of the Arab 
World”. While non-state actors (financial investors and international private 
sector companies) are often driven by larger strategic concerns related to 
water security and food sovereignty in home countries, many of these 
investments are also motivated by profit. 
 
The chapter highlighted in particular the example of Al Dahra Agricultural 
Company. The case study shows how LSLA take several shapes and forms. The 
company’s investments in Egypt span across four different sites, spanning two 
generations of land reclamation schemes broadly classified as Old-New Lands 
and New Lands. Each farmland has different characteristics in terms of land 
size, source of water, types of crops, and size of operation. The chapter focused 
on the politics of land deals in ‘New Lands’ notably in Toshka and Oweinat, 
showing how the 2011 political events in Egypt resulted in political risks and 
legal battles that delayed implementation of these investments. Now that the 
investments are operational, little is known about actual water use and the 
sheer amount of virtual water grabs associated with them. Even if production 
of alfalfa was halted and replaced by wheat for local market, non-state actors 
sell their produce to the state, which in turn sells it to the people; those who 
truly own and deserve to benefit from the Nile’s land-water for their 
livelihoods. Accordingly, the understanding of the land-water-food nexus by 
both state and non-state actors manifests an evolving approach towards water 
security based on state-capital framings either for corporate profit, or larger 
strategic and political-economic objectives. This framing reflects the changing 
role of both state and non-state actors, and often overlooks the interests and –
social, environmental, and hydropolitical- risks for smallholders, who are in 
fact the largest water users. While investments in New Lands remotely located 
in the desert are of large-size and do not entail competition over land-water 
resources with other users, chapter 6 presents the case study of Al Dahra’s 
farmlands, notably in Al Salheya and Al Nubareya and explores the water 
politics associated with transnational investments in Egypt’s ‘Old-New Lands’.   
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Chapter 6  
 
The Reproduction of Scarcity & Local Scale 
Hydropolitics in Old-New Lands: 
 
Al Dahra Case Study in Al Salheya and Al Nubareya  
 
 
Introduction  
 
Al Dahra case study demonstrates the Gulf-Nile connection. Al Dahra is 
an example of a transnational ‘state-capital alliance’ founded on a win-win 
situation at the national level. This type of alliances is also situated within the 
wider Arab Food Security Strategy and regional economic cooperation 
discourse in MENA region. However, while non-state actors’ investments 
endowed with technology and capital may be perceived as a positive 
contributor to the hydraulic mission of the entrepreneurial state and its Mega 
projects, it is also important to examine the water politics and hydropolitical 
implications associated with these ‘state-capital’ alliances on the local level for 
different actors in light of the inherent water scarcity and security narratives.  
 
Al Dahra case study also shows that LSLA take several shapes and forms 
depending on both the Nile and underground water. As discussed in chapter 
5, despite targeting LSLA in New Lands and Mega projects, the case of Al 
Dahra Agricultural Company shows that investments in Egypt also exist in 
other land categories. The ‘Old-New Lands’ located east and west of the Nile 
Delta are known for high development potential due to climatic conditions, 
central location between Africa and Asia, Europe and the Middle East; 
advanced transportation facilities (roads, sea ports, airports, etc.), fertile land, 
and water resources (African Development Bank 2009b). Irrigation and 
agriculture are crucial for the economies of these two regions depending on 
water resources from the Nile and underground aquifers. The cropping 
pattern of this generation of land reclamation is different from the traditional 
Nile valley/Delta  ‘Old Lands’. It includes more high value crops (fruits and 
vegetables) and less traditional field crops (cereals and cotton).  
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Old-New Lands differ from Mega projects in New-New Lands in two 
key aspects; the first is the proximity to export ports and domestic market 
hence having direct implications on transportation cost and ease of access to 
energy and markets -viewed as a comparative advantage of Old-New Lands 
(Interview #18). The second aspect is the existence of farmers and 
smallholders in Old-New lands who already suffer from water stress with 
ample of inherent water quality and quantity challenges, unlike in remote 
desert farmlands in Toshka and Oweinat. In this respect, the resource politics 
of transnational investments in Old-New lands entail different land-water-
energy-food interdependencies for different actors, as well as tensions 
amongst them. 
 
Accordingly, this chapter examines the hydropolitical implications of state-
capital alliances and their corresponding nexus interdependencies, tensions, 
and water grabbing practices in Old-New Lands. Adopting a case study 
methodology, the chapter examines water politics associated with two of Al 
Dahra’s farmlands in Al Salheya (east Nile delta) and Al Nubareya (west Nile 
delta) depending on Al Isamilia and Al Nubareya Irrigation Canals 
respectively (map 6.1), as well as ground water resources. 
 
The key message of this chapter is that state-capital alliances taking place on 
the national level are often framed as a win-win situation for both the state 
and the investors, and tend to overlook the livelihoods of the largest and most 
vulnerable water users; smallholders and farmers. They also entail several 
land-water-energy-food nexus tensions not only for local water users but also 
for the investors themselves. These nexus tensions denote the absent role of 
the state at the local level, which influences different water users. These 
dynamics also have hydropolitical implications; often resulting in water 
grabbing practices on the local level. 
 
The resource (hydro) politics of transnational state-capital alliances are also of 
particular importance in light of an inherent water stress situation in Old-New 
lands and the wider state approach of the manufacture of abundance. The case 
study of Al Dahra in Al Salheya shows the fierce competition over a scarce 
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resource whereby technology and capital often result in water grabs, and 
hence raise the question of equity and livelihoods vs. profit and modernity. Al 
Dahra’s farmland in Al Nubareya shows that investors and other water users 
face a paradox between unavailable surface water from the Nile and exhausted 
underground water resources. As such, the hydropolitics amongst non-state 
actors and existing water users in both sites shed light on questions of water 
grabs and equity due to the inherent physical and political water scarcity.  
 
Map 6.1. Al Ismailia and Al Nubaria Canals located East and West Nile Delta 
 
  Source: (African Development Bank 2016) based on Comprehensive Study and Project Preparation for the 
Rehabilitation of the Nubaria and Ismailia Canals 
 
 
A key finding is that transnational investments manifest a paradox of the 
entrepreneurial state and the manufacture of abundance ultimately leading to 
the reproduction of scarcity. This reproduction of scarcity shows how each 
actor adapts to scarcity to achieve water security; for company security 
translates to higher profits while for smallholders security is often 
synonymous with livelihood security under constrained socio-economic 
challenges. For one actor it is fewer financial gains despite a challenging 
business operation with only 40% of the water available, while for another it is 
a loss of livelihood and a downward spiral of rural poverty. A paradoxical 
perspective reflecting what “securing” water translates into on the ground. As 
for the state, while these investments may be endowed with capital and 
technology, they may not be necessarily address its ecological-demographic 
narrative of crisis, or its hydraulic mission. In fact they often represent a form 
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of virtual water grabs.  
 
The chapter is divided into five main sections. It starts by discussing the 
inherent land-water resources challenges in Old-New Lands for different 
water users. Particular focus is directed to inherent water user challenges and 
irrigation infrastructure east of Nile Delta, notably in Al Salheya. Section 6.2 
presents the case study of Al Dahra farmland in Al Salheya depending mainly 
on Nile water for irrigation from Al Kassara Canal, a branch canal depending 
on Al Ismailiya main irrigation canal. This section questions the role of 
technology and capital in water grabs and highlights how water shortages 
affect corporate investors and smallholders. It highlights how water politics 
are influenced by the role of technology, financial, and political capital 
associated with international investors, thus favouring their access to water, at 
the expense of other users. Section 6.3 presents the case study of Al Dahra 
farmland in Al Nubareya highlighting the paradox between underground 
water quality and unavailable surface water, forcing the company to depend 
on a mix of ground and surface water resources to irrigate their high-value 
crop farmland.  Section 6.4 discusses the common nexus challenges for 
different water users in Old-New lands, notably smallholders and investors 
reflecting the absent role of the state on the local level. It also discusses how 
power asymmetry, financial and political capital facilitate the process of water 
grabs in an inherent context of physical scarcity and smallholders challenges. 
Section 6.5 concludes the chapter by highlighting how transnational 
investments in Old-New lands contribute to the reproduction of scarcity.  
 
6.1. Land Reclamation & Inherent Water User Challenges in Old-New 
Lands  
 
6.1.1. Desert Development in Al Salheya (East of Nile Delta): 
          A Historical Overview 
 
In the Eastern Nile Delta region, early attempts at desert development date 
back to 1973, following the war, in an attempt to rebuild the area around the 
Suez Canal zone. In the eyes of the state, Al Salheya located east of the Nile 
Delta had the basic endowments to expand life beyond the narrow Nile valley 
and its overcrowded delta. Old Salheya is one of Al Sharqia’s main cities, 
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historically named after the thirteenth century Ayubid King al-Saleh 
Negmeddin, who built it in 1246 as a precaution against invasion by the 
Crusaders. As one of the early reclamation projects in Old-New lands, Al 
Salheya agricultural scheme depended on Al-Ismailia canal, one of the 
downstream branches of the Nile River as shown on Map 6.1. The multi-
purpose Canal is one of the most important irrigation and drinking water 
resources in Egypt established between 1858 and 1863, to supply drinking 
water to the villages on the Suez Canal zones and to the workers during 
digging the Suez Canal Navigation Route (Geriesh et al. 2008; Goher et al. 
2014). The 128 km long canal supplies water for irrigation, and drinking water 
for large cities serving about 12 million inhabitants (El-Haddad 2005; Stahl & 
Ramadan 2008). Its inlet starts from the Nile at Cairo branching to the East 
Nile Delta region towards Al Ismailia governorate passing across 4 different 
governorates including Cairo21, Kalioubeya, Sharkeya -where Al Salheya is 
located (Ibid). Today, 4,869,573 inhabitants live in the area irrigated the 
Ismailia Canal which serves 725,000 feddan of irrigated agricultural land, 
which is about 9% of Egypt‘s cultivated area, whereby 518,468 feddan are 
managed under surface irrigation and 206,211 feddan under modern 
irrigation, with an average loss of 1,339 million m3/year (African 
Development Bank 2016). 
 
Al Salheya el Gedida or New Salheya is a newly planned city established 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s during president Sadat’s rule as part of 
the first generation of the new Egyptian cities. Although the new city was 
originally planned during the Nasser era, its development had been postponed 
due to the 1967 and 1973 wars. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, given the 
limitations of the state-sponsored farms approach, “para-statal high-tech 
commercial farming” was adopted in Old-New Lands at a time of transitioning 
between Nasser’s socialist system and Sadat’s open door policy of economic 
liberalism during the 1970s. For example, in 1979, Osman Ahmed Osman 
                                                             
21 Including those living in the northern part of Great Cairo, Shubra El-Kheima, El Amira, Mattaria, Musturod, Abu-Zaabal, 
Inchas, Belbeis, Abbasa, Abu-Hammad, Zagazig and El-Tal El-Kabeer, before entering the Suez Canal area. The first source 
is the upstream portion of the Ismailia Canal (from Cairo to Abu Zaabal, western side) including the largest industrial 
zones in the region (Shupra El-Kheima, Musturod, Abu Zaabal industrial zones), which include the activities of petroleum, 
petro gas, iron and steel, Abu Zaabal Fertilizers Company, Alum (Aluminum Sulfate) Company, detergent industries and 
electric power station (Goher et al. 2014; Geriesh et al. 2008) . 
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formed a joint venture company called the “Middle East Company for Land 
Reclamation” which turned out to become “Al Salheya Agricultural Project”. 
With the majority of shares owned by Osman’s Arab Contractors Company, 
and minority shares taken by the American firms Pepsico, Arizona Farmers, 
and Gifford Hill (Sims, 2015: 95). The first phase of the project aimed to 
cultivate 23,000 feddan mainly applying center pivot irrigation (Meyer 1998) 
depending on water from Al Ismailia Canal. This deal marks the rise of early 
signs of corporate engagement in land reclamation ambitiously targeting the 
reclamation of 150,000 feddan. It also reflects how the state’s hydraulic 
mission shifted from a developmental role to a predatory one.  
 
In a confidential report by the World Bank, issued on May 20th 1983 under the 
title of “Selected Issues in Agriculture, Irrigation, and Land Reclamation”, the 
feasibility study for ‘Al Salheya’ project was highlighted as an example of 
reclamation experience in ‘Old-New Lands’. The study proposed “the transfer 
of responsibility for technical and commercial management of the irrigation 
system to the private sector even though it was envisaged that small farmers 
might be involved in the actual growing of crops. Public sector inputs would 
be restricted to the provision of infrastructure, roads, electricity and main 
irrigation supplies” (World Bank 1983, p.31). Furthermore, the report had 
recognized that the experience gained from land reclamation in other 
locations suggested that “yields from small farms are now considerably higher 
than those obtained by the public sector companies and the transfer of the 
existing large public sector farms on the Old-New lands to settlement as in the 
West Beheira project is to be encouraged.” (Ibid: 38). The report also 
encouraged the government to rethink its desert development policy in Old-
New Lands based on three key factors (World Bank 1983);   
(i) The limited supply of additional water and the need to use it sparingly 
on the generally light desert soils after lifting it some 50 meters; 
(ii) The extremely limited effect that agricultural land settlement can have 
on Egypt's population problem; 
(iii) The technical and managerial problems of obtaining high yields on 
newly reclaimed desert lands in West Nubariya and Salheya, where even 
the small farms yields are well below those obtained by small farmers on 
the Old Lands. 
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The report concluded its observations on Al Salheya project stating that “the 
level of technical and managerial supervision and control needed to obtain 
high productivity on these soils will necessitate commercial private farming, 
oriented towards those high value export crops in which Egypt has a 
comparative advantage such as fruits, vegetables, groundnuts, onions and 
potatoes” (World Bank 1983, pp.38–39). The report went on by highlighting 
that the ministry of agriculture and land reclamation (MALR) “is already 
moving in this direction in proposing to include sale of land to middle class 
land owners on 10 feddan lots in addition to landless farmers and college 
graduates” (ibid: 39). By 1988, five animal and dairy production farms had to 
be closed in Al Salheya, and 14 greenhouses were left with no operations as a 
result of the lack of spare parts and chronic electrical failures. Following these 
initial failures, 23 chicken breeding farms, a fodder factory and a fish farm 
were also out of production. By 1990, almost all aspects of the project had 
come to a standstill, the foreign companies had long bailed out, and the losses 
of both Arab Contractors and the government were colossal (Sims 2015, p.96). 
Given the financial pressure on the state-owned project, Salheya was placed 
for auction to the private sector in 1991. Only 2 offers were received, however 
their price was far short than the asking price. Major challenges included the 
project’s excess labor force of 2,500 employees, which pushed away potential 
investors (Meyer 1998). To overcome this challenge, two options were put 
forward to reduce labor force; (i) compensate laid off workers with cash, or (ii) 
giving workers part of the land. None of these two options were deemed 
feasible as the first was too expensive and the second was rejected by most 
employees who feared that this large-scale project with sophisticated 
technology would not be manageable if the land would be split into tiny 
private farms (Meyer 1998). Finally, in 1992 under a staggering debt of more 
than 250 million L.E., the project was no longer placed under the supervision 
of the MALR. Instead, it was restructured into a joint venture agricultural 
company owned by 4 main creditors; 3 public banks, and the Arab 
Contractors Company under the name of Al Salheya Investment and 
Development Company (Meyer 1998). By 2001, Al Salheya Agricultural 
Project was slowly being rehabilitated, but in 2013 it appeared that less than 
half of the 120 central pivots (each irrigating 150 feddans) were being 
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operated (Sims 2015, p.96). On the ground, Al Salyeha largely remains a mix 
of different users whereby agricultural lands in the area vary in size and 
landholder. New Salheya is today a nucleus for the reclamation of 118,000 
feddan situated between “Old Salheya” and Ismailia governorate. Small 
farmers largely dominate with small landholdings average 1 feddan in size, but 
also middle-class private agricultural investors with land holdings between 20 
and 500 feddans (Sims 2015). While these are the dominant average size of 
landholdings, Al Dahra case study shows a different modality for land 
acquisition and agricultural development using its technological, financial, 
and political capital. 
 
6.1.2. Inherent Land-Water Nexus Tensions for Water Users in Al Salheya  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, land reclamation projects such as Al Salheya and Al 
Nubareya involved the relocation and resettlement of farmers, farm families 
and agricultural workers from the ‘old land’ to newly reclaimed areas (Zalla et 
al. 2000). Many of the graduates, small farmers, and beneficiaries came to 
these lands seeking a new opportunity following the dream of starting a new 
life away from fragmented land parcels and overcrowded villages in the Old 
valley. Nevertheless, starting their own communities was not easy due to the 
challenges they often encountered in the desert (Field Notes; Interview #1). 
While tremendous investments were made to provide agriculture and social 
infrastructure, much of which is still incomplete (Zalla et al. 2000; Interview 
#36). A common trait is the lack of access to basic services such as health care 
facilities, schools, or even bakeries. Access to both electricity and water is not 
granted, in both households and agricultural fields (Interviews #54; 56; 57). 
These factors combined have also contributed to abandoning these lands and 
communities by different smallholders, hence resulting in greater involvement 
of domestic private investors (mostathmereen) who had the financial means 
to develop these lands (Interview #1). 
 
As one of the early reclamation projects, Al Salheya agricultural scheme did 
not depend on underground water for its development, unlike other projects 
in the Western desert. As part of the main system that is fed from Aswan and 
as a feeder canal, the Ismailia canal operates essentially under a system of 
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upstream control (FAO 2005). Based on MWRI data it receives a seasonally 
varied supply of 3.5 billion cubic meter of water annually (MWRI 2005). 
These allocations are determined centrally by “technocrats” in accordance 
with the expected cropping pattern, whereby officials making such decision 
are typically based in the Irrigation Sector of the Ministry of Water Resources 
and Irrigation (MWRI) (Barnes 2012; Interview #10).  
 
The Irrigation Advisory Services Unit -under the irrigation department of the 
MWRI- has the mandate to provide support to farmers for managing and 
operating the irrigation system. Law 213/1994 enables farmer participation in 
water management on improved irrigation systems at mesqa level and 
provides a legal basis for the establishment of water user associations and 
water boards on new lands (African Development Bank 2016). In the 
traditional irrigation setting (Figure 6.1), for farmers, small agriculture 
producers, and investors in Al Salheya, water flows from Al Ismailia main 
canal into primary, secondary, and tertiary irrigation canals. Control of 
discharges22 in the feeder canals occur at the main head regulators and at 
cross regulators located at the boundaries between irrigation directorates 
(FAO 2005). Branch canal head regulators are equipped with lifting gates, 
whereby the regulation of flow, in practice is largely determined by 
accumulated experience. In the absence of explicit measurement of discharge, 
District Engineers, and to some extent the gate operators who have day-to-day 
control of the regulator gates, exercise a certain amount of flexibility and 
discretion in allocating water supplies (Wolters et al. 2016; FAO 2005). In 
effect, the District Engineers responsible for arranging water deliveries to 
individual branch canals try to distribute the water allocated to them 
(Ghazouani et al. 2014). The gate operator (or bahhar) is responsible for 
opening and closing the gates of the secondary canals, and adjusting the water 
level according to the schedule provided by the district engineer (Ibid). 
Sometimes, gate openings and rotation schedules may be adjusted in response 
to representations and complaints from farmers, or to observed conditions, in 
                                                             
22 Discharge control depends on rating curves either for the gates or for the downstream channel; these ratings are 
confirmed by periodic current metering. The operation method emphasizes regulation to achieve specified levels 
downstream of the regulators (as a proxy for discharge), rather than to maintain particular upstream water levels, 
which may vary considerably depending both on the season and on which branch canals are being fed from the 
upstream reach at any particular time under the rotation schedule. 
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order to achieve the greatest possible degree of user satisfaction (Wolters et al. 
2016; FAO 2005). On the branch canals, low-level tertiary canals called 
mesqas (open earthen tertiary canals) are run by farmers and provide water to 
the fields through quaternary channels called marwas. Farmers withdraw 
water from the mesqas that provide water to individual pumps feeding 
quaternary field ditches known as marwas (ditches). The area served by a 
mesqa is in the range of 50 to 200 feddans, while the marwa typically serves 
around 10 to 20 feddans (FAO 2005). Downstream of branch canal offtakes, 
there is usually only limited hydraulic regulation. Except where they are 
needed for internal rotation or to control steps in water level, gates on cross 
regulators and sub-branch canal offtakes are often not functional or have been 
removed (Wolters et al. 2016). Water levels depend primarily on abstraction 
of water by farmers (Ibid). As indicated by Wolters et al. (2016) given that the 
irrigation system is supply-oriented at the upstream side, and demand-
oriented at the downstream side this system creates management issues. 
Different water users including the interviewed company have confirmed 
these issues, indicating that this system opens the door for corruption and 
favouritism, depending on each irrigation context (Interviews # 16; 19; 
Meeting Notes #2).  The drainage system in the Ismailia canal command area 
is comprised of open and tile drains. There are 89 agricultural drains, which 
directly flow into the river Nile, most of them collect volumes of wastewater 
either municipal or industrial (MWRI & HCWW 2011; FAO 2005). Drainage 
water collected from the fields by subsurface drains flows into secondary open 
drains (Ibid). In addition, unofficial direct pumping from the drain by farmers 
uses large volume of drainage water, however is difficult to measure but 
estimated to be about 2 700 million m³ in 2010 (Karajeh et al. 2011). 
Unofficial reuse is practiced along Bahr Baqar, Bahr Hadus, Gharbia, Edko 
and Umoum drains (FAO 2005).  
 
With the presence of the rotational irrigation system, farmers accuse the 
MWRI for being unable to deliver water to their lands through the network of 
existing irrigation canals (Field Notes; Interviews # 54-61). Despite several 
government programs prioritizing irrigation improvement and water use 
efficiency (under the donor funded Irrigation Improvement Program IIP), 
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farmers still face the same problem of water shortages (Interviews #9; 13; 36), 
best described by smallholders as “our land is thirsty, and no one is helping 
us” (Interviews #54; 56; 57). Ironically, this has been confirmed by both; the 
farmers and by the large company Al Dahra, as it is pretty common in Al 
Salheya farmland that the irrigation rotation (monawba) can reach up to 15-
20 days without water reaching the canals (as opposed to 4 days) which 
negatively affects the crops. For the farmers, the land-water-food nexus is the 
source of their livelihood. For the investors it is an equation that ensures a 
profitable agricultural operation for maximum financial return (Field Notes). 
Furthermore, in Old-New Lands, irrigation techniques commonly employed– 
such as drip and sprinkler irrigation- are the ones more suitable for the scarce 
water resources and the sandy and calcareous sandy soils typical of the 
reclaimed desert lands (Zalla et al. 2000). However, for most smallholders, 
very few used drip or sprinkler irrigation. For them large water quantities are 
needed for their flood irrigation practices. The further you are as a water user 
along the canal, the more you need water especially during the summer, but 
given that water does not flow in the canal, smallholders and farmers have to 
illegally draw water from the wells they had to dig (Interview #1). 
Alternatively, with no other options, they resort to water in the agricultural 
drains containing a high level of toxins and heavily polluted (Interviews # 1; 2; 
36; Field Notes).  
 
Figure 6.1 Irrigation System from the Nile 
 
Source: (Rap et al. 2015) 
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As such, throughout the last 20 years MWRI designed a program consisting of 
three stages to develop both Al Ismailia and Al Nubareya canals, both 
requiring rehabilitation. This infrastructure improvement plan included the 
rehabilitation of hydraulic structures to increase capacity and improve 
regulation in the long term. In November 2006, the Government of Egypt 
(GoE) requested funding from the African Water Facility (AWF) for the 
financing of the proposed “Comprehensive Study for the Rehabilitation of the 
Ismailia and Nubaria Canals”. An appraisal mission was conducted to Egypt 
between 17th April and 2nd May 2007 to undertake the study appraisal and 
visited both the Nubaria and Ismailia canal areas. The report further 
described the situation in both areas stating (African Development Bank 
2009b, p.vi);  
 
“In this context of water scarcity, efficiency in water allocation and 
distribution is of great importance and this implies that the 
hydraulic control structures which include dams, barrages, 
regulators, weirs and navigation locks have to be in a good 
operational condition to achieve the desired efficiency. Given the 
age (over 100 years for some), the state of deterioration and the 
large number of these structures (over 200), and in order to ensure 
an efficient planning of future interventions, the GoE has identified 
the need for a Master Plan which will set the priorities and facilitate 
the mobilization of resources for capital investments”.  
 
 
The conclusions of the appraisal mission clearly stated that both these canals 
are experiencing serious problems such as decaying and poorly functioning 
infrastructure, seepage and water logging adversely affecting valuable 
agricultural land, insufficient water conveyance capacity, unauthorized 
abstractions, environmental degradation from pollution.  
Consequently, the MWRI contracted the French company Artelia between 
2010-2013 to undertake the pre-feasibility and feasibility studies for both Al 
Nubareya and Al Ismailia canals including semi detailed design and tender 
documents. Given that the implementation of all the desired physical and 
hydraulic improvements would require major capital investment, the aim of 
the study was to select and prioritize among interventions. The expected 
benefits of canal improvements included the enhancement service provision 
in terms of distribution uniformity; quantity; quality; equity; and timeliness of 
water delivery to the water users / beneficiaries, including: agriculture 
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(irrigation and drainage), domestic (water supply and sanitation), industrial, 
as well as for navigation. 
 
Yet, despite these investments by the state to advance its hydraulic mission, Al 
Dahra and other water users have voiced serious concerns regarding both, 
including the decreasing levels and quality of ground water in Old-New Lands, 
notably in Al Salheya and Al Nubareya. The investors regard the issue of water 
scarcity, or rather the inconsistent availability of Nile water, as a major risk 
factor negatively affecting the operation of several agricultural farms in the 
area during the past 5 years of operation (Interview # 17). These factors also 
negatively influence different water users and smallholders often resulting in 
illegal abstraction of water and competition over the main input for 
agriculture as shown in the following sections.  
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6.2. Water Grabs? Technology, Capital, and Corporate Water Security in 
Al Dahra Farmland – Al Salheya (East Nile Delta) 
 
6.2.1. Al Dahra Farmland in Al Salheya  
 
Al-Dahra’s project in Salheya east of the Nile Delta consists of a farm size with 
a total area -also known as 7eyaza23- of 3,200 Feddan. The land deal between 
GARPAD and the company stipulates a 40 years lease, however it was hard to 
get an accurate figure for the value, deemed as “expensive” by the company’s 
executives. Also worth noting, the farmland was adjacent to a brick factory, 
which was bought by the company, and was annexed to the originally bought 
land. At the time of the fieldwork, the newly acquired piece of land was under 
reclamation, expected to join production in the season of 2017/2018.   
 
Figure 6.2. Farm gate Al Dahra Agricultural Development Company Egypt – Al Salheya 
 
Source: Photo by author 
 
Al-Dahra’s Al Salheya farmland started agricultural production in 2008. 
Cultivated crops include; 1,475 Feddan Citrus (Orange Naval 130 feddan & 
Orange Valencia 1175 feddan), while the remaining 1,725 feddan are divided 
amongst cultivating wheat (1,200 feddan) and sweet corn for silage and winter 
weed (525 feddans). Crops from Al Salheya farm have three different 
destinations or markets, mostly exported abroad; fruits are exported to the 
European markets, silage is exported back home to the UAE, wheat is sold 
locally in Egypt, in addition to the rejected fruits (Grade B) which were not 
exported as they do not qualify with European market specifications (either 
                                                             
23 Literal translation for ‘possession’ 
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due to sugar content, or inconsistency in the fruit itself). For this reason, Al 
Salheya farm’s location has a comparative advantage due to its vicinity to the 
existing infrastructure especially the roads and the ports near the 
Mediterranean, the Suez Canal ports, and Cairo. This is one of the main 
characteristics of this farmland compared to other remote sites in the Mega 
projects southwest desert of Egypt as discussed in chapter 5.  
 
For Al Dahra’s technical and operational staff, there are four key variables that 
need to be taken into consideration in order to secure water and ensure the 
efficient use of their irrigation system, including; (i) water supply, (ii) water 
quality, (iii) soil type, and (iv) the application of the system to yield the 
highest level of agricultural productivity and irrigation water use efficiency 
(field notes). In Al Dahra’s farm, water flows by gravity from Al Ismailia Canal 
towards the Tarouty secondary Canal whereby government pumps lift the 
water towards Al-Kassara sub-branch (tertiary) Canal, constructed by Sheikh 
Zayed. Also interestingly enough, the road parallel to this canal is named after 
Sheikh Zayed.  
 
During my interview with the company’s South African executive, he pointed 
at a map lying down on his desk situated in one of the few concrete structures 
on the farm close to the farm’s gate. He started by explaining that Al Ismailia 
Canal is located to the South of the company’s farm, feeding Al Tarouty 
secondary Canal which in turn pumps water to Al Kassara Canal depending on 
government pumps. Al Kassara tertiary Canal contours the farm from the 
northern, eastern and southern borders as shown on map 6.2. Hence, the 
perimeter of the farmland is embraced by the irrigation canal which provides 
water access directly to three out of the four sides (Field Notes).  
 
Map 6.2. Al Dahra Farmland in Al Salheya 
 
Source: (Google Maps 2018) 
Al Dahra’s primary interest in Al Salheya’s farm is water access and 
availability. Al Salheya agricultural operation is a big capital investment 
(Interview #20). Cost elements include; filtrating and pumping water, adding 
fertilizers, and continuously ensuring a maintenance cost. For the company, 
conveying water from where it is extracted to the delivery point on the farm is 
a continuous cost. Using its Gulf based financial capital, the Emirati company 
had installed three additional pumps on the canal contouring the farm, thus 
supplying water to the farm’s 3 main zones. The logic of the 3 pumps is 
straightforward. The industrial scale farm is mainly divided into 3 main zones, 
each pump supplies water to a different part of the land. The abstracted water 
is channeled through an inlet to a reservoir and from the reservoir the 
company uses 8 pumps to distribute water to the rest of the farm via an 
automated high tech system. 
 
Figure 6.3: Water Intake from Al-Kassara Tertiary Canal directly to Al Dahra farm in Al Salheya 
 
   Source: photo by author field Work Al Dahra Farmland in Al Salheya (March 2016) 
 
 
There are three main precision irrigation systems used in Al Dahra’s Salheya 
farm; centre pivot, drip, and sprinkler systems. Each irrigation system has 
pros and cons, depending on lateral movement of water in soil, the soil type, 
the climate, among other factors, which directly and indirectly affect crop 
cultivation in a given location. Centre Pivots are used to cultivate wheat. Al 
Dahra uses 14 Center Pivots –depending on 7 out of the 8 pumps on site to 
channel the water received from the secondary canal to the different zones of 
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the farm. An additional pump is left on standby for emergency cases. On 
average, center pivots consume 250 cubic meter/hour (i.e. 2500 liter of water 
/ hour). The irrigation schedule is 12 hours per day in the winter and 18 to 20 
hours per day in the summer. At full speed, the pivots can make a full 
revolution in approximately 12 hours and apply around 3,000 cubic meters 
(792,500 gallons) of water. At 60 % speed, which is closer to the average, a 
pivot will take 20 hours per revolution and apply about 5,000 cubic meters 
(1.3 million gallons) of water (Interview #18). When cultivating using center 
pivot, at the start when the plant is still small the center pivot rotates at 100% 
speed for a full circle for a duration of 9.5 hours. When the crop grows the 
centre pivot runs at 70% of its speed (it stops/stands still for 30 seconds every 
minute to provide more water for the growing plants). The more crops grow, 
the more they need water. The farming cycle takes place in rotation, 3 months 
wheat, 3 months maize, 3 months wheat, 3 months maize – so there are 4 
cycles of income in centre pivot irrigation. To plant wheat during one cycle of 
production (3 months) yields an average productivity of 3 – 3.5 tons/feddan.  
 
For sprinklers, micro sprinklers cover an area of 3 meters of diameter by 
wetting a larger are of the root zone using an average of 45 litres per hour with 
an estimated 30-35% evaporation rate, based on which there is a need to 
irrigate for longer periods. For drip irrigation, each tree needs 4 drippers 
which cover a smaller area compared to sprinklers, however there is more 
concentration and less evaporation – consumption is approximately 16 litres / 
hour and 1 % evaporation. For citrus, double drip lines are used, which is the 
most effective and economic way of irrigation. Double drip lines deliver a 
certain amount of water to a certain tree at a “precise” location. A Citrus tree 
needs on average 600 litres of water per week during summer and 250 litres 
of water per week during winter. Citrus – 550 trees/hectare – 50 trees / 
square meter – generates income once a year – productivity is 20 tons / 
feddan. 
 
Yet, with the presence of advanced irrigation technologies, farming practices 
can differ between one manager and the other, given the same land-water 
resources. Before the South African farm manager arrived to Al Salheya farm 
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“water was wasted by irrigating for long durations throughout many hours”. 
Irrigation used to take place over 6 hours with an average consumption of 16 
liters/hour, whereas trees only needed 1-2 liters of water /hour.  According to 
him, any farm is not supposed to use 96 liters of water in 6 hours. Given the 
nature of the sandy soil, the water used during the first 4 hours is wasted and 
only the water used during the last 2 hours remain, mainly due to the porous 
nature of the sandy soil. To remediate this situation, he started to use shorter 
cycles of irrigation with more frequency. The irrigation cycle was split for 
shorter periods (2-3 hours), with a period of one hour as a break, before 
starting again. This way, water use is more effective, and water loss is avoided 
given the nature of the soil, taking into consideration that for the fruit trees 
there are 7 centimeters of moisture available for a tree amidst 30 cm roots, 
and 50 cm root zones (Interview #20).  
 
According to (Interview #21), Al Dahra’s practices reflect the adoption of 
“state of the art technologies and scientific principles of agricultural 
production … The Company’s priority is the sustainability of profit, which can 
be achieved by ensuring the sustainable use of –scarce- water resources”. 
According to management views, Al Dahra’s large-scale agricultural farms 
represent a prime example of agricultural productivity, and water use 
efficiency, all of which are key inputs for a “world class agricultural production 
model” (Interview #21). For him al Dahra is adopting a modern, 
technological, scientific approach for agriculture, which should be replicated 
across Egypt.  
 
But even with Al Dahra’s prime farm location and advanced technology, the 
company still complains about the lack of sufficient water resources to 
maintain a consistent water supply for its ongoing industrial agricultural 
operation. The farm manager explained to me that it is quite common that 
water levels in the tertiary canal are too low, thus not allowing the pumps to 
work, and resulting in long periods of water absence sometimes reaching over 
20 days, which consequently negatively affects the crops, and more 
importantly the profitability of the industrial agricultural operation 
(Interview #19). This aspect of the operation was a surprise for the company’s 
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chief executives, initially not anticipated at the high level “state-capital 
alliance” for the land deal. Thus, the question of access to water in the 
company’s farmlands in Al Salheya adds another investment challenge in 
addition to those discussed in chapter 5 concerning New Lands. 
 
Figure 6.4 Pumps Intakes from tertiary canal feeding in the main station Salheya farmland   
 
Source: photo by author field Work Al Dahra Farmland in Al Salheya (March 2016) 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Industrial scale piping system feeding into the farms’ automated irrigation system  
 
Source: photo by author field Work Al Dahra Farmland in Al Salheya (March 2016) 
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While the question of water availability in Al Salheya farmland may been a 
surprise to the company, it comes in line with the idea of the manufacture of 
abundance and the inherent water quality and quantity challenges 
downstream of Nile delta. In a context of inherent physical and political water 
scarcity, these factors combined denote new water (hydro) politics amongst 
different water users around Al Kassara canal in New Salheya as discussed in 
the next section.  
 
6.2.2. Water Politics in Al Kassara Branch Canal (Al Salheya): Corporate 
Profit vs. Flood Irrigation  
 
For the Al Dahra, while the company may have received the advantage of a 
good location, issues of water quantity and quality are ample around Al 
Kassara canal (Interview # 19). As an essential production input, the company 
needs to ensure the availability of water for its continuous agricultural cycle. 
“Water shortages, which are common- represent a serious risk to the farm’s 
productivity and the health of its produce” (Interviews # 19; 20).  
 
According to Al Dahra’s management, the government pump is a main 
problem and a key “factor of uncertainty” facing the company. “Government 
pumps constantly need maintenance and consequently result in inadequate 
volumes of water channelled in the main irrigation canals. As a result there is 
no constant flow of water reaching the farm” (Interviews #18; #20). 
Furthermore, due the fact that the irrigation infrastructure is largely an old 
one dating back to over 40 years ago, there are a number of uncertainties 
related to water flow including; seepage, erosion, canal embankment 
instability, water deficiency resulting from the deterioration of the irrigation 
systems in the region, in turn imposing threats to the arable lands, causing 
water losses and water logging (African Development Bank 2016). This in turn 
limits the canals’ ability to convey flows and to maintain water levels at 
desired levels. Thus adding another element of inherent uncertainty in Al 
Salheya farmland.  
 
For the South African farm manager, there is “too much competition over the 
use of water resources” around Al Kassara tertiary canal. According to him, 
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the “tertiary canal does not always have enough water and sometimes there is 
no enough water to pump from the secondary canal too”. The challenges 
related to water supply are a “blame game, and everyone blames the other”. By 
saying so he implied that the farmers blame the company and the state, the 
company blames the state and the farmers, and the state blames the farmers 
who represent the largest water users (Interview # 20). 
 
As discussed earlier, in Old-New Lands such as Al Salheya, irrigation mainly 
depends on water flow from al Ismailia canal towards secondary (Al Tarouty) 
and tertiary (Al Kassara) irrigation canals. An inherent challenge of access to 
surface water irrigation is the classical issue of head and tail. According to 
different experts, officials, and investors; farmers and water users at the head 
of the irrigation canal tend to over-irrigate their thirsty lands once water is 
available due to the lack of awareness! (Field Notes; Interviews #4; #10; #13;  
#17). When asked about this practice, farmers indicate that flooding their 
lands is the only guarantee their crops will get the needed water, since they 
have no confidence in the timing of the next rotation (monawba) (field notes; 
Interviews #57-61). This practice leads to an over consumption of large 
amounts of water, more than the actual crops’ needs, consequently leading to 
water shortages at the tail of the irrigation canal. As such, water losses in the 
lands at the head of the canals affect irrigation at the tail. (Interviews #1, #4, 
#9, #10; Meeting notes#2; #5). 
 
According to the farm manager, in comparison to other places where he 
worked, there are wasteful agricultural water practices; “the logic is simple, 
small farmers cannot afford the cost of precision irrigation, that’s why they 
primarily rely on flood irrigation techniques, which is an unsustainable 
practice” (Interview #20). He asked me in a serious tone “when using flood 
irrigation techniques, where does the excess water go? It gets wasted in the 
desert,” he answered confidently. From Al Dahra’s point of view, its practices 
and the high level technology it uses help to avoid all these types of challenges 
related to wasting the already scarce water resources.  
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Nevertheless, and despite this logic, it is important to question whether using 
capital intensive technological actually contributes to saving water, or not. As 
discussed in the previous section, industrial agricultural operations tend to 
work around the clock with a continuous need to access water and energy 
resources for food production, and ultimately profit. Hence, despite using 
state-of-the-art technology, corporate investors are not necessarily using less 
water! 
 
For the farmers, the narrative on accessing water resources is quite different. 
For farmers, water is a “gift from god” and a “granted right” on which their 
livelihoods depend. For farmers and smallholders “Water rights are tied to the 
‘land’, and water is also a constitutional right” (Interviews #54; #56; #63). 
Water is supposed to be distributed according to a defined time schedule 
among different land parcels within a certain location whereby conveyance 
depends on the land’s location and its proximity to the main source of water. 
Yet, according to water users depending on el Kassara Canal for irrigation, 
“the water flow in the canal (monawba) is inconsistent”  (Ibid). For 
smallholders the issue of insufficient water quantities to irrigate their lands is 
a major source of frustration due to its direct impact on farm income, and the 
associated impacts on their livelihoods, given their limited capital and 
technological resources.  
 
During fieldwork and interviews with different water users and smallholders 
around Al Kassara canal, the following problems were unanimously 
mentioned as key risks affecting their livelihoods, including; insufficient water 
flow in the irrigation canals, especially for water users located at the tail; 
complaints from different water users (including the large company), about 
the government not respecting the irrigation schedule, whereby water is so 
often not available on a consistent rotational basis, which destroys their crops, 
especially during the summer. 
 
Reasons driving the scarcity narratives by smallholders indicated preferential 
treatment to some locations over others (e.g. preferential allocation and 
granting access to water for locations such as Giza, Cairo and Alexandria as 
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opposed to remote agricultural areas). Others highlighted the expansion of 
irrigation canals to expand agriculture in certain areas, which eventually 
results in providing areas with water at the expense of other areas already 
under water stress such as in Salheya . As a matter of fact, this can be viewed 
as a form of the manufacture of abundance leading to the reproduction of 
scarcity for smallholders already facing water stress to irrigate their lands.  
Additional issues related to water scarcity narratives by smallholders in Al 
Salheya are associated with the polluted irrigation canals by human waste or 
blocked by grass and other vegetation not allowing the water to flow, affecting 
everyone. Farmers blame water pollution and scarcity on the failure of the 
government to undertake the annual maintenance work on irrigation channels 
(Interviews #56; #59). This often results in the farmers having to pay 
themselves for the cleaning and maintenance of the irrigation canals 
“although these should be covered by the annual irrigation tax” (Interview 
#60). These views and narratives were further confirmed by (Interview # 3) 
indicating that “water quality is a hindering issue for small farmers they do 
not have the necessary financial and technological capital to treat low quality 
water. As such, a farmer withdraws water from the irrigation canal, and if it is 
of low quality, he can’t do anything about it”.  
 
Other problems explained by the farmers but less obvious to me as a non-
irrigation expert included those of water quality, as well as the drainage 
problems, which for many translate in lower quality soil, lower land 
productivity and lower agricultural yields. For them thee factors combined 
result into lower income negatively affecting their livelihoods. The key 
message of the unheard and marginalised smallholders is; “we need the 
government to look at us, or for anyone to listen to our problems and needs” 
(Interviews # 55; #57; #63)).  
  
 Accordingly, the corporate involvement through additional pumps did not 
help this inherent situation, which was already challenging for existing 
smallholders who had been long there suffering from absence of irrigation 
water. In other words, water grabs by corporate actors using their technology 
and financial capital have contributed to the reproduction of water scarcity 
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for different water users in an already water stressed context coupled with 
other structural challenges affecting their livelihoods. This has been 
confirmed by (Interviews # 2 & #3) indicating that especially for the lands of 
the small farmers and young graduates such practices cannot take place. 
Indeed, the existing government program for small farmers (mozare3een) and 
young graduates (kheregeen) are heavily regulated and do not allow 
smallholders to do much in terms of accessing water using alternative means 
but to rely mainly on the water channeled through the conventional 
government irrigation infrastructure. These structural challenges necessitate 
pro-poor agricultural policies that take into consideration not only the 
question of water scarcity, but also other elements related to the smallholders 
agricultural economy in Old-New lands as well as land reclamation schemes.  
 
6.2.3. Drainage and Environmental Impacts  
 
The question of drainage reflects an even worse logic than this of water 
abstraction. As I was walking along the tertiary (Al Kassara) canal, I observe 
two small pipes returning water to the canal as shown in figure 6.6. Upon my 
inquiry about these, the manager explains to me that this is the drainage 
water returning back from the farm. Needless to say, this water is full of 
chemicals and other inputs/fertilisers injected by Al Dahra in its irrigation 
water. But perhaps all of this is common practice in a context where there is a 
lack of strong infrastructure, yet what strikes me the most was when I asked 
about the impact of this drainage water on the “quality” of the water flow in 
the tertiary canal and downstream water users. The answer was shocking, “if 
you are downstream, then you are downstream, we cannot help you”. This 
answer really implied several things which I kept thinking about; (i) the 
company only cares about its operations and not about water as a public good, 
(ii) being upstream an irrigation canal is a position of power as opposed to 
being downstream, (iii) the government does not or cannot approach the 
company with a clear absence for the role of the ministry of environment, and 
finally (iv) do the farmers know about this? I guess they do, but then all they 
care about is to have access to water, so that their crops do not die. This is 
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actually true given that often farmers use waste water to water their crops. As 
such water quality does not really matter, in a water scarcity context.  
 
Figure 6.6: Water Drainage back to Al Kassara canal from Al Dahra Farm 
 
Source: photo by author field Work Al Dahra Farmland in Al Salheya (March 2016) 
 
6.2.4. Power Asymmetry & Water grabs: Financial, Technological, and 
Political Capital 
 
Investors perceive themselves as using state-of-the art water management 
technologies and ‘modern’ agricultural practices. However, it could be argued 
that in a context of inherent physical and political water scarcity, technology 
(e.g. pumps) and government connections (e.g. state-capital alliances) 
facilitate water grabs by corporate actors using their financial, political, and 
technological capital. Yet, corporate actors often blame smallholders for 
ignoring the value of water by using flood irrigation techniques, which results 
in water loss, and unsustainable use of an already water stress situation and a 
“scarce” resource. According to irrigation experts and government officials, 
“problems generally arise due to poor understanding of their crops' irrigation 
requirements leading them to pump as much water as they can afford during 
daytime along mesqas, regardless of whether or not water won’t reach other 
tail-end users. Each smallholder mainly cares about satisfying his thirsty land, 
with no collective awareness” (Interviews #4; #10). As such, investors 
consistently stress the need for smallholders to find cheap and affordable 
technologies, which can prevent water losses and “save water for everyone” 
(Interviews #17; #20). But when asked about who should bare the cost of this 
technological shift for smallholders there is no clear answer. Investors are 
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aware that smallholders do not have the means to invest and upgrade their 
irrigation systems, and are also conscious that the government is unable to do 
so at the farm level, or at the district level. 
 
The technological gap between Al Dahra and other water users reflects issues 
of equity in water abstraction and distribution. For instance, the question of 
equity in Al Salheya is reflected from two perspectives; the location of the land 
being not just at the head of the tertiary canal, but having access to water 
through three out of its four boundaries, in addition to the easy access to 
electricity from the main grid despite its inconsistency as discussed earlier. 
The second issue concerning equity is related to the number and size of water 
pumps directly abstracting water from the source, thus creating a shortcut 
which other farmers and small agricultural investors do not have access to. In 
these locations, inherently, smallholders have been increasingly complaining 
about water not reaching their fields. This equally applies to those at the head 
and at the tail of the Mesqa. For those at the head, they complain that the 
water flow does not reach their canals due to irregular irrigation schedule, 
thus negatively affecting their crops. For those at the tail, the problem is 
compounded. In addition to the water delays, their chance of having water 
reaching their fields is even slimmer as the head farmers over-irrigate their 
fields in anticipation of forthcoming scarcity, leaving them with almost no 
water for their cultivations, thus increasing inter-farmer conflict at the local 
level. Fieldwork in Al Salheya clearly confirmed that it is unheard off that any 
agricultural company or investor had the “financial means” and the 
government “blessings” and “connections” to install additional “private” 
pumps directly on the irrigation canal to supply water to its land. In Al 
Nubareya, the widening of the on-farm irrigation canals to increase water 
storage is another way the company is attempting to override the system to 
ensure continuous access of water for its profit oriented operation.  
 
However, “the government can turn its eye on these issues as part of its 
“investment promotion strategy”. According to (Interview# 20) “an investor is 
allowed to undertake such practices, given its political capital and economic 
weight, and the favourable treatment the company receives from the state; 
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“once water does not flow in the company’s irrigation canals, management in 
Cairo calls Abu Dhabi “connections”, who in turn call “officials” in Cairo to 
open the irrigation canals for water to flow in the company’s farmlands” 
(interview #19). This is one of the key forms of power asymmetry amongst 
small farmers and large corporate investors and a strong manifestation for 
water grabbing. That is, pumping water as much as they can, using their 
political capital, as well as their financial and technology endowments 
unaffordable by other water users. It is also a clear contradiction with the 
status of smallholders who have been suffering the lack of water to irrigate 
their fields. This equally applies to those in the middle, let alone the 
downstream fields on the irrigation canal. It is interesting to note that a 
foreign investor can get away with such a practice, under the label of 
“investor”, whereas farmers who have been around for years cannot do any 
similar action without facing serious legal consequences! A clear 
manifestation that state-capital alliances often overlook the largest and most 
vulnerable water users, while providing preferential treatment to technology, 
as well as financial and political capital.   
 
6.3. The Paradox of Surface and Underground Water in Al Dahra 
farmlands in Al Nubareya  
 
6.3.1. Land Reclamation West of Nile Delta: Al Nubareya 
 
The West Nile Delta region is one of the early desert development schemes 
since the 1950s. Al Nubareya canal was established at the end of the 
nineteenth century, named after Nubar Pasha (from Armenian origins) who 
supported the agricultural development of this area. According to MALR 
statistics, in 2012 the West Delta reclamation areas made up of Al Nubareya 
and extensions in Alexandria governorates, had some 1,060,000 feddan of 
irrigated agricultural land, which is about 13% of Egypt‘s cultivated area 
(African Development Bank 2016; Sims 2015, p.83). This area is irrigated by 
underground water aquifer, and by a complex system of large canals and 
secondary and branch canals fed by pumping stations from the Nile’s water. 
Out of the total land area served by the canal, 746,140 feddan are managed 
under surface irrigation and 335,504 feddan under modern irrigation (African 
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Development Bank 2016). Overall, it is estimated that a total of 1,250,000 
inhabitants live in the area irrigated by the Nubareya Canal (Ibid). Today, 
according to World Bank, this area is a flourishing agricultural economy 
estimated between US$300-500 million annually, serving both domestic and 
export markets in the European Union and elsewhere (World Bank 2012).  
 
Al Nubareya canal became the main water source for horizontal expansion 
projects in the West Delta Region during the Fifties. Initially a 61 km canal 
was constructed in 1952 to serve 77,700 ha along its right bank (African 
Development Bank 2016). The canal length and command areas were 
successively increased to about 118 km to serve 0.42 million ha by 1993, 
including an additional 62,160 ha which receive supplementary irrigation 
during the winter. However, water conveyance has decreased over time from 
266 m3/s to 221 m3/s due to progressive material accumulation along the 
canal bed (African Development Bank 2009b). Hence the canal has been 
repeatedly widened to cope with the increasing demand for water of the newly 
added command areas. These new command areas added over time are part of 
the state’s horizontal expansion strategy and frontier making in Old-New 
lands, and a good example of the ‘manufacture of abundance’.  
 
Since the 1980s, the growing agricultural investments and commercial private 
farmlands in Al Nubareya mainly depended on underground water for 
irrigation. According to a World Bank report (2012), due to the scarcity of 
irrigation water, these lands depend to a large extent on more efficient and 
more expensive irrigation systems such as drip or sprinkler. Accordingly, most 
investors operating medium and large farms were able to adopt water saving 
systems. Ironically, this rapid development has led to an excessive depletion 
of the groundwater reserves, with a negative impact on overall water quality 
(World Bank 2012). Illegal and unlicensed underground water withdrawals 
have been a main characteristic of Al Nubareya. But even if the wells were 
licensed, there is no water metering and it is impossible to define the quantity 
of water withdrawn by each farm (Interviews #16; #22). Consequently, a main 
result of these practices has been over withdrawal of groundwater, either 
legally via unmetered wells, or illegally via unlicensed wells used by both 
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farmers and investors. Both practices have had catastrophic implications on 
the quality of groundwater, especially salinity levels (Interview #10).  
 
In terms of surface water from Al Nubareya Canal and its branch Al 
Nasr Canal, recent studies indicate that “the main tributaries of Al Nasr Canal 
are not well cemented by concrete of good quality, thus the water losses in 
open channel distribution system must exceed the designer allowance of 10%” 
(Mohamed 2016, p.8). Other environmental challenges relevant to surface 
water are solid waste in branch canals as well as urban and industrial 
wastewater significantly deteriorating water quality. Accordingly, a key 
environmental challenge in this area is water seepage estimated at an average 
loss of 550 million m3/year according to the African Development Bank’s 
environmental impact assessment in 2014 (African Development Bank 2016). 
The seepage of excess drainage water led to the rising of water level and 
groundwater aquifer (Mohamed 2016).  As such, underground water quality 
and soil salinity have been a major source of concern for many farmers and 
private investors in Al Nubareya. This is mainly due to the negative impacts 
on their lands’ soil quality, water productivity, and the reduced crops’ 
financial return.  
 
6.3.2. Al Dahra Farmland in Al Nubareya 
 
Al Dahra’s farmland in Al Nubareya west of the Nile delta is relatively much 
smaller than Al Salheya, roughly representing 10% of the total land size, with 
an estimated 320 feddans. Worth noting that Al Nubareya farmland is Al 
Dahra’s first agricultural investment in Egypt. The farmland supplies Grade A 
fruit products (citrus, grapes, mango) primarily targeting export markets, 
whereby the rejects are supplied to the local market.  
 
According to (Interview #21), as an agricultural specialist, and based on his 
previous 20 years of experience in one of the top large-scale export farms in 
Egypt, “fruit trees need to be continuously served and maintained, they can 
last up to 20-30 years, depending on the characteristics of each. It all depends 
on modern management and high-level service for the land, in addition to the 
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availability and quality of water resources to ensure high levels of 
productivity”. For a successful agricultural operation, there are two key factors 
that need to be taken into consideration; the first is to select the modern 
irrigation technique, and the second is the management of the irrigation 
system (Interview #21). In this respect, “Al Dahra stays up to date with all 
irrigation and agricultural technologies to remain ahead of other 
competitors”. For the irrigation manager, it is not enough to have the latest 
technology without knowing how to use it, making a comparison with 
someone has the latest model car and cannot drive. From a corporate 
perspective, according to (Interview #21), water security for Al Dahra entails a 
detailed planning process which is entirely based on the experience of local 
staff, “due to the knowledge of the local context, including soil analysis, water 
analysis, determining the right crops to be cultivated based on these factors 
and other ones too”. 
 
Figure 6.7. Gate of Al Dahra Farmland in Al Nubareya (photo by author) 
 
Source: photo by author field Work Al Dahra Farmland in Al Nubareya (March 2016) 
 
In Al-Nubareya, the irrigation of Al Dahra farmland depends on a mix of 
water resources from the Nile via Branch 4 (terriary canal), fed from al Nasr 
Canal (secondary canal), fed from Al Nubareya Canal (primary canal), as well 
as underground water from the Nile aquifer west of Delta. Originally, since the 
start of the company’s operations in 2008, the irrigation of the farmland 
mainly depended on underground water. Surface Nile water irrigation was 
only introduced in 2014, and only started to have a stable flow in 2015 
according to the farm manager. Unlike Al Salheya, in Al Nubareya, the entire 
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agricultural area suffers from low groundwater quality, which was the 
principal source of irrigation water west of delta. Similar to Al Salheya 
farmland, Al Dahra uses modern irrigation techniques and state-of-the-art 
technology in its fruit farm. Water is delivered to the variety of fruit trees 
using a double drip irrigation system, relying on Danish pumping technology 
using “Grundfos” pumps. Al Dahra deploys a control panel system whereby 
production inputs including water, and fertilizers are automatically controlled 
(Interview #21).  
 
 
Figure 6.8: Branch Irrigation Canal (4) feeding Al Dahra Farm in Al Nubareya 
 
Source: photo by author field Work Al Dahra Farmland in Al Nubareya (March 2016) 
 
The introduction of surface Nile water was perceived as an alternative to the 
underground water quality challenges associated with Al Nubareya and 
Western Delta agricultural area. With this additional access to surface water, 
the company was hoping that the Nile’s water quality would overcome the 
inherent issues of land and water salinity associated with the use of 
underground water wells. According to Al Dahra’s farm manager in Nubareya, 
“each feddan irrigated by Nile water is equivalent to 5 feddan irrigated using 
underground water in terms of ease of irrigation, and crop productivity”, for 
him, “a feddan irrigated by the Nile water lives more, costs less, and yields 
more productivity”. In terms of water quality, a main distinction between Nile 
and underground is that the Nile’s water is of higher quality due to the Nitrate 
and Nitrogen components, which are less present in underground water. 
Additional challenges related to underground water quality include salinity 
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and residues from pesticides especially in the shallow aquifer east and west of 
Nile Delta (Interview #4). 
 
Ironically however, by depending on the Nile water, a new challenge has 
emerged during the company’s operations, that is; “the inconsistency of the 
Nile’s water supply from the government canals and ‘Monawba’ (rotation) 
system … which implies a situation of water scarcity that also harms our land 
and our crops as much as low quality saline water does” as expressed by 
company staff. This time, it is the Nile’s water quantity that is a burden to Al 
Dahra’s operations, and not its quality.  
 
The Dilemma between ‘low quality saline underground water’, and the ‘scarce 
good quality Nile water’ is a serious issue for Al Dahra’s operations. It is 
important to recognize that the additional Nile water, which started to flow in 
2014, helped the farm in depending less on the low quality and highly saline 
underground water wells. At present in 2016, “our operations equally depend 
on both sources, half of the land is irrigated by underground water, and the 
other half by Nile water”. “We are only able to do so given our water storage 
strategy to keep the ‘Monawba’ water from the Nile in the on farm canals. 
Without this strategy, and given the lack of reliability and consistency of Al 
Monawba irrigation system would be forced to depend 75% on the 
underground water, and 25% on Nile water, hence making our job harder in 
treating the higher water salinity levels”. “In comparison to other water users 
and farms, we achieve 50% water savings due to our up-to-date irrigation 
systems. However, as my farm gets older and my trees get bigger, the farm 
tends to use more water. For this reason it is important that we can maximize 
the use of our limited existing water given the growing needs of our farm on 
the one hand, and the scarcity of the Nile water, and salinity of underground 
water on the other”. 
 
Yet, despite the high irrigation efficiency of water resources based on the mix 
of use from surface and underground water, Al-Dahra is exploring options to 
adapt to periods of water shortages. One of these options was to expand the 
on-farm irrigation canals so they can serve as a reservoir for larger amount of 
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stored water on farm. In Al Dahra’s farm in Nubareya, the company has 
developed its own adaptation strategy to be able to cope with periods of water 
scarcity due to the lack of reliability and consistency of the Monawba system. 
As proudly explained by the farm manager (Interview #21), Al Dahra has 
developed its own on farm water storage system using  “Canals as Reservoirs”. 
As shown in figure 6.9, the company started by expanding the canal’s storage 
capacity from both sides, so that during periods where water reaches the farm 
they can store more water; “the purpose of these canal reservoirs is to store 
excess water to serve as a reserve to make up for the periods where the Nile 
water does not reach our farm due to the weak and ineffective Monawba 
system”. As explained by the manager, “the canals were already there when we 
leased the land and were ignored, we had to clean them, and we expanded 
their sides so that they can store an even larger amount of water when it 
reaches our land”. Indeed, Al Dahra receives water on average once a week 
(instead of every 3 days), which in turn results in withdrawing as much water 
as possible to irrigate the land, and to store excessive water for the remaining 
six days, until the next monawba arrives. And since Al Dahra is located at the 
head of Branch 4, it is possible to imagine the impact of this over withdrawal 
to the remaining water users at the tail of Branch 4. A clear example for the 
reproduction of scarcity in an inherently water stressed region! 
 
Figure 6.9: Expanding irrigation canal as on farm reservoirs during water shortage periods  
 Source: photo by author field Work Al Dahra Farmland in Al Nubareya (March 2016) 
 
This situation is quite interesting as it reflects the correlation between surface 
and underground water. It also holds a contradiction as typically  
underground water resources were usually used where surface water is not 
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available. Yet, in this case the situation is reversed. By over exhausting the 
underground aquifer west of Nile delta (Interviews #2; #9), water users now 
are competing for additional surface water to irrigate their crops, whether for 
their livelihoods or for profit! 
6.4. Nexus Tensions in Old-New Lands (Salheya and Nubareya) 
 
6.4.1. WEF Tensions for water users and investors in Old-New Lands 
 
As indicated by Ghazouani et al. (2014) differences in water availability, 
inequity in water distribution for different water users, and the impacts of 
inadequate irrigation on yields and farmers’ income have been well 
documented in Egypt and in many other arid and semiarid regions (see (El-
Shinnawi et al. 1980; Skold et al. 1984; El-Agha et al. 2011) . In the past, lifting 
water was mainly carried out by animal-driven water wheels (sakias), 
connected to the canal or mesqa by an intake pipe of specified diameter that 
were licensed by the ‘Irrigation Districts’. The farmers' capacity to abstract 
water from the delivery system was thus restricted by both the number and 
location of the lifting points and the discharge. In particular, the need to share 
the use of the sakia with several other farmers in the same sakia "ring" and the 
limited discharge, combined with the restrictions of the rotation system, 
meant that farmers were considerably constrained in terms of when and for 
how long they could irrigate (Oosterbaan 1999). This traditional mode of 
irrigation changed significantly over the last 25 years as privately owned 
mobile diesel-driven pumps have progressively replaced sakias. At a particular 
lifting point, different farmers may take turns to irrigate using different 
pumps. Farmers with fragmented holdings may use a single pump that is 
moved between their different plots (Satoh & Aboulroos  2017 ). However, a 
significant number of farmers do not own pumps, and rent them from others. 
 
Despite the use of modern pumps, water users and farmers face several –
challenges whether they rely on ground or surface water to irrigate their lands. 
For those depending on Nile surface water, they expect to irrigate every 4 
days, however water does not reach their farms “due to the inconsistent 
rotational schedule (monawba)” (Farmers Interviews Al Salheya and Al 
Nubareya). For those depending on underground water, their pumps are too 
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small and can only extract water at 350 meter of depth (Interview #3). As 
such, as soon as the water levels drop below this level, it is very hard to access 
water (Interviews#1; #36; #46). But even when water is available for 
pumping, and where electricity is absent, diesel becomes the crucial factor for 
accessing water. Diesel has two problematic, its availability, and its price 
(Interviews #62; #63; #65; #67).  
 
Perhaps one of the most interesting observations I came across during my 
fieldwork is when I asked farmers in Al Nubareya whether it is better to 
depend on underground water or surface Nile water. The answer was 
interesting, denoting that “in the wells, water exists throughout the entire 
year, it is just a question of pumping it. As for the irrigation canals, quite 
often water does not reach the different mesqas and merwas, especially 
during the summer season” (Interviews #67; #68). When this situation 
occurs, farmers can resort to any alternative to save their lands and their 
crops, even if this means using drainage or sewage water. As such, in both Al 
Salheya and Al Nubareya, despite the existence of a sophisticated network of 
irrigation canals and distribution system, the lack of consistent water supply 
and the exhaustion of physical irrigation infrastructure adds to the problem of 
water delivery and negatively affects agricultural land productivity (Interview 
# 2).  
 
In terms of water use (in)-efficiency, flood irrigation for 1 feddan consumes an 
average of 8000 cubic meter of water per year. On the other hand, with the 
use of modern (precision) irrigation techniques in the desert lands, one 
feddan is supposed to use an average of 4000-5000 cubic meter of water per 
year (Interviews #2; #4). The major problem occurs when flood irrigation is 
used in desert lands given the nature of the soil, which does not allow water 
retention due to high permeability. The problem is even compounded if flood 
irrigation depends on non-renewable underground water resources. These 
practices also contribute to the loss of fertilizers and soil nutrients; for this 
reason precision irrigation is preferred and used in desert lands (Interview 
#16).  
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Furthermore, according to a recent study addressing issues of water scarcity 
in Egypt and the challenges associated with ‘Spatial and Temporal Water 
Allocation in the Nile Delta’, a key conclusion indicated that “matching 
irrigation supply with crop demand is currently impossible because there is no 
real ability to properly measure and regulate water volumes at the distributary 
canal level (Wolters et al. 2016). Moreover, releases from the High Aswan 
Dam are made according to crop water irrigation requirements from an 
estimated cropping pattern, while the actual cropping pattern is free. As crop-
demand-based precision irrigation supply is not easily attainable in Egypt, 
providing water security in the form of guaranteed or agreed water supply 
may be a possible water allocation principle (Ibid).  
 
Adding to this are cumulative impacts related to drainage and consequently 
their negative implications on surface and ground water. In this respect, 
despite two decades of expansion and canal widening, water users and 
smallholders increasingly complained from negative impacts such as water-
logging and salinization especially along areas adjacent to the widened 
stretches of the Nubareya and Ismailia canals (African Development Bank 
2009b). As the Nile River no longer carries and deposits substantial quantities 
of sediment after the construction of the High Aswan Dam, progressive 
widening of the canal removes layers of less permeable silt without 
subsequent replacement, thus resulting in increased seepage (Ibid). Other 
problems range from deteriorating irrigation infrastructure such as irrigation 
off takes, regulators, canal obstacles such as bridges, etc. (Ibid). 
 
On the other hand, international investors as a ‘water’ user also face different 
land-water-food and water-energy-food nexus challenges. According to Al 
Dahra’s interviewed staff and management, issues of uncertainty related to 
the company’s operations go beyond technical issues of conveying water from 
one location to the other across the farm, as well as the continuous 
operational and maintenance costs and procedures. In addition to these daily 
operations, and despite the massive deployed investments in technological 
and financial capital, critical issues “outside of the company’s control” remain 
a challenge to daily operations including; 1- secondary irrigation canals gates 
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not opening; 2- following an inconsistent schedule, and 3- increased 
occurrence of electricity cuts with no reliable current. For Al Dahra, the 
inconsistency in the irrigation schedule and the fact that gates in the 
secondary canals do not open imply a serious disruption for the company’s 
operations. “Every missed day of irrigation is a loss for the company, as they 
have a negative impact on the company’s production. Given an operation with 
the size of Al Dahra, “it is very hard to make up the lost times of irrigation” 
(Interview #20).   
 
Despite the fact that Al Dahra’s investments were mainly driven by the 
availability of land and water resources in Egypt, the company’s executives in 
Cairo identify the lack of consistent supply of water resources as a main 
obstacle facing the investments not only in Al Salheya but also in Al Nubareya 
farm. This situation clearly implies “financial” losses and an obstruction to the 
massive agricultural “industrial” operation. Accordingly, “the main 
operational risk is the consistency of water availability, reaching 60% level of 
lack of water flow” (Interview #19). In other words, the existing available 
water resources only cover 40% of the company’s water resources needs. 
Hence, despite the large-scale capital and technological intensive investments 
in land and water resources by Al Dahra, access to water is still an issue.  
 
Furthermore, from the company’s operational perspective, the issue of access 
to electricity and the WEF challenges are viewed differently than 
smallholders. For instance, in Al Salheya farmland, there are 2 power stations 
on site; the first station supplies the eight irrigation pumps and the other 
station supplies the center pivot irrigation system. Almost every night the 
electricity cuts for one to two hours, which has a negative impact on the center 
pivot’s 380 Volt power supply. The company loses 2 hours of irrigation from 
each power cut in the center pivot system. On a daily basis, Al Dahra irrigates 
its farm in Al Salheya on an average for 20 hours. Losing two hours daily 
implies that in 5 days the company will lose a total of 10 hours of irrigation, 
which is a significant period of losing irrigation water for the crops.  For the 
farm manager, “every lost time is a waste that we cannot catch up – with this 
existing rate we lose in 1 week 1 pivot’s 100% cycle”. When electricity cuts it 
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affects the pivot system, which stands still, however the water pumps still 
work which can result in over irrigation and over fertilizing certain spots of 
the land which can be detrimental to the crops, resulting in burning roots and 
killing the plant.  As a result, one laborer has to stay up at night in order to 
make sure he can stop the pump when electricity cuts the pivot cycle. A clear 
example of the tensions associated with the water-energy-food nexus. 
 
In addition to the use of advanced technology in their farms, Al Dahra’s 
engineers continuously stress the fact that in order for a system to function 
properly and to ensure continuous water savings the most effective way to 
minimize this cost is for the government to undertake regular maintenance 
and ensure the smart use of available water resources, by; (i) Fixing and 
treating leaks from pipes; (ii) ensuring pumps are maintained regularly, (iii) 
maintain a consistent irrigation schedule.   
 
Given all these challenges, the role of the government according to the 
investors’ views should include the following; (i) support small farmers 
education & awareness (risks, scarcity  & losses), (ii) address the hydro 
political challenges from the demand side by raising awareness about water 
use efficiency (iii) Regulate groundwater use and ensure government control 
over available water resources while coordinating land and water use. A 
suggestion offered by one of the investors was for the government to dig larger 
wells and then distribute the water amongst the different users (Interview 
#17). By ensuring that the government controls water resources in desert 
areas, this can overcome the chaos and lack of control of water use in the wells 
in desert lands. Everything is controlled by government (i.e. natural gas, oil, 
etc..), so why not water? For them, water distribution by the state in the new 
lands is a way to avoid digging random wells and also to avoid water use 
inefficiencies and its impact on the reduced underground water tables (Ibid).  
For farmers, the role of the state should be able to support their livelihoods. 
For investors, the role of the state is to protect water due to its economic 
value, to ensure maximum economic return and profit. These issues reflect 
what water security means for each actor. These water challenges also reflect 
the absent and weak role of the government on the ground, whereby weak 
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regulations and the policy disconnect represent a main factor of uncertainty 
for both the farmers and the investors. 
 
To address these scarcity and security narratives, proportional division of flow 
may have the best chances as the basis for water allocation in periods of 
drought. Instead of dividing water over the area, the water shortage is then 
divided over the land. There is a lack of awareness about the need to develop 
the capacity to deal with droughts in the future.  The issue of (future) water 
scarcity has consequences and implications that can no longer be adequately 
addressed by any one of the Ministries alone (Meeting Notes #2; #4). Many 
other government departments and agencies must be involved and decisions 
will have to be made at the highest political level, requiring the integration of 
policies. There is a need for a “Water Scarcity Action Plan” as well as effective 
science–business–policy interfaces at the national level (Meeting Notes #4). It 
is important that all involved realize that food is  grown by the private sector 
(including large farming organizations and small farmers) and this important 
stakeholder has a prime position in the Egyptian irrigation system (and its 
new extensions) (Wolters et al. 2016, pp.10–11).  
 
6.4.2. Beyond Water: Smallholders Challenges in Old-New Lands 
 
Issues of water quality and water quantity are not the only challenges facing 
water users in Old-New Lands. According to (Interview #3), farmers need to 
have their land register, which is often not the case, as many of them have 
rented their lands from others, or had it split amongst brothers or other 
members of the families. For the land, official tenure is required to be able to 
register ‘land ownership’ and consequently receive government subsidies, or 
to be able to sell wheat crops for instance to the government. According to 
interviewed farmers in Al Salheya and Al Nubareya, there are three main 
elements necessary for them to sustain their agricultural livelihoods; land, 
water, and fertilizers. These are basics without which their day-to-day 
livelihoods cannot go on, and their seasonal income cannot be secured. But 
within each of these elements lies a hidden ghost. Indeed, land and water 
resources are key elements for small farmers to sustain their agricultural 
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livelihoods, however they are not the only ones. Fertilizers were also often 
mentioned as an important one to complement this nexus. Needless to say, 
one of the main negative environmental impacts of Egypt’s High Dam in 
Aswan was the blockage of siltation behind the Dam and its accumulation in 
Lake Nasser. As such, agriculture activities in Egypt needed to replace and 
substitute this loss of natural fertilizer. According to them, the state-
subsidized fertilizers are often resold in the black market at high prices, 
leaving them with no choice but to buy. As a result of this black market 
practice, they end up paying at least five times more than what they would 
normally pay if they would get the fertilizers directly from the source (i.e. 50 
kg of fertilizers are sold to the state at 5 USD equivalent to 44.5 L.E., but 
farmers end up buying it at a price of 225 L.E. approx. 25 USD). 
 
According to smallholders (Interviews #64; #67-69), this is mainly due to 
corruption of the “agricultural cooperatives” employees. The problem is 
further exasperated by the fact that local production of fertilisers is much 
lower than the existing demand, a prime instigator for the rise of the black 
market, often resulting in a gap between supply and demand, and above all 
“affordability”. For the farmers, this is a manifestation that corruption is not 
only present at the high levels of the state, but everywhere. “Several of these 
small farmers and graduates struggled in developing their lands due to 
financial and technical challenges… they ended up renting these lands to 
farmers from the Nile valley and delta who are more experienced with 
agriculture and farming” (Interviews # 13; #1). A key challenge for small 
farmers and young graduates is the long-term nature of the investments and 
the need for strong financial capabilities. “Everything inside the farm is the 
responsibility of the developer, everything outside the farm is the 
responsibility of the state” (Interview #2). For example, the cost of land 
reclamation per feddan averages 25,000 L.E., whereby production only starts 
on year 5, and breakeven is achieved by year 10 (Interviews #13; #9). With 
these challenges facing the majority of water users in Old-New lands, “it is 
very hard to develop sustainable communities in the desert” (Interview #1); a 
manifestation of the inherent political and physical water scarcity in Old-New 
Lands. 
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According to smallholders, inherent challenges in the Old-New Lands are not 
only confined to land and water. Additional challenges related to the absence 
of government services include a weak infrastructure, especially in terms of 
accessing electricity, shortage of schools, and absence of medical services and 
health centers (we7da se7eya) near their lands. For many small farmers and 
young graduates, “Medical services are lacking in our villages, whereas the 
medical unit is just an empty building with a big sign” (Interviews # 55; 57; 
62; 64) which prevents them and their families from accessing basic health 
care services. Other farmers decided that they do not live in the area given this 
lack of basic services, and for them commuting from and to other locations 
near Alexandria (i.e. Ibrahimia) is better for them, than just living in such 
isolated and service lacking areas. A common problem in this respect is “the 
confusion we face in dealing with several government agencies to access basic 
public services; for example, drinking water belongs to one governorate, while 
access to electricity belongs to another one, whereas the Ministry of 
Agriculture Directorate, and the Ministry of Education is divided amongst 
several administrative areas” (Farmers interviews Al Salheya and Al 
Nubareya). Accordingly, “it is very hard to approach one single administrative 
entity, which imposes huge bureaucratic burdens on our daily lives”.  
 
Furthermore, following the 25 January 2011 uprising, many farmers lost their 
crop, as they could not get access to input or even to their fields to water their 
crops. They then couldn’t pay back the loans (Dixon 2013). These concerns 
voiced by the farmers have been also confirmed by domestic NGOs and 
grassroots organizations interacting with local communities in reclamation 
areas. Although the profile of smallholders in the Old-New Lands and New-
New Lands is distinct from the graduates and beneficiaries, the limitations all 
of them encounter in the production process are quite similar to those faced 
by small farmers in the Old Lands (Zalla et al. 2000). Graduates, farmers, 
smallholders and young investors face obstacles such as lack of extension 
support, limited information on technology, lack of access to both local and 
external markets, and weak financing required to overcome these obstacles 
(Interview # 1; meeting notes #5). According to (Interviews # 2, & 3), the role 
of the state should not only be confined to these issues, but the government 
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should also support farmers in accessing the required inputs for sustainable 
agricultural development especially in relation to the distribution of fertilisers 
(al kimawy) similar to system of agricultural cooperatives in the old lands 
whereby a certain quota of agricultural production inputs are provided at a 
subsidized price. For others, marketing their agricultural produce should be 
also the responsibility of the state.     
 
According to (interview # 28a) key policy issues associated with smallholders 
are agricultural policies that favor large-scale companies and put the small 
farmers out of production.  For example, small farmers producing sesame 
cannot compete with large-scale investors producing the same crop, as they 
will put them out of market due to their economies of scale and production 
advantages. Accordingly, the government needs to adopt policies that do not 
harm the local farmers and their livelihoods. In other words, these 
investments should not just benefit the larger companies on the expense of 
small farmers, rather adopt pro-poor developmental strategies taking into 
consideration interests of different actors and players. Pro-poor approaches 
“do not mean we are not promoting free market, rather trying to enforce 
community based development, and without hurting the rural communities” 
(Interview # 28a).  
 
According to (Interview # 22), the only solution for water and agricultural 
productivity and environmental challenges is to address the question of the 
unity of the land.” For instance, interviews # 1, 2, and 3 and meeting notes # 2 
confirm that a major structural challenge in the agriculture sector is farmers’ 
income, which is the result of the high level of fragmentation of agricultural 
land. As a result agriculture production is not based on viable economics, 
rather it serves self-sufficiency purposes on the family level, which implies 
negative opportunity cost. Interview # 22 further confirmed that a main 
challenge facing smallholders is the problem of land fragmentation given that 
“Egypt has now reached the fourth generation of land owners after the 
agricultural reform of the 1950s whereby it is impossible to reach the 
economies of scale. In this respect, developing cooperatives such is the case in 
different countries is a possible solution to this challenge in order to ensure 
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that agricultural production and crop value are of higher economic returm, 
thus yielding positive social and economic return to many farmers typically 
under the poverty line.  Cooperatives can also encourage the different 
agricultural cycles (dawra zera3eya). 
 
Climate Surprises 
 
Another risk facing corporate investments is climate variations. Unexpected 
climate events and temperature shocks negatively impact the quality of the 
farm’s produce, resulting in a decrease in crop yield. These include issues such 
as unexpected rain, which actually took place during April and May 2015, or 
alternatively periods of excess heat and drought during the summer months. 
“Nowadays ‘adaptation’ to unexpected weather conditions, vis-à-vis on farm 
water resources management is a key function for any farm manager”. 
According to (Interview #22), “during periods of drought, we provide the 
cultivated land with an extra dose of water to minimize the negative effects of 
a heat wave. If we do not intervene to manage the crops’ water need in 
response to these weather conditions, we risk losing our crops, and our 
profit”. 
 
6.4.3. The absent Role of the State: Risks & Uncertainty for Farmers and 
Investors  
 
Despite the existence of state-capital alliances, “unanticipated” land-water-
energy challenges are ample for investors, often translating into higher cost of 
production and financial loss. Challenges and tensions associated with 
infrastructure maintenance, irrigation schedules, and access to electricity in 
remote desert schemes, etc. facing both, water users and investors reflect the 
absent role of the state on the ground. In particular, issues of operation and 
maintenance (O&M) of the irrigation network infrastructure in Al Salheya and 
Al Nubareya add further pressure on water access to all actors. In the case of 
Old-New lands, this absent role could be viewed as a result of the 
manufacture of abundance. It can be also interpreted as a result from 
addressing more attention to new mega projects, at the expense of 
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maintaining the O&M costs of existing schemes in Old-New Lands, and 
avoiding addressing the inherent challenges in Old Lands.  
 
The MWRI local officials represented in the irrigation directorate (modireyet 
al ray), “provides no support to the farmers to overcome such problems. 
Instead, farmers are usually the ones to blame” (Interviews #1; #2; #3; #36). 
Government authorities typically play the blame game, either by pointing at 
the limited budget to fix exhausted government infrastructure, or to the 
farmers’ unsustainable practices due to over irrigation of their agricultural 
land. Irrigation engineers suffer and do not sleep based on the numerous 
problematic faced by water users (Interview #10). This situation is further 
complicated in the absence of compliance with operational rules and 
regulations for the operation and management of individual pumping, in 
addition to the illegal rice cultivations. For corporate actors, this is a pure 
waste of resources for a common good that is often perceived as scarce, and in 
fact its conveyance through irrigation channels often delayed to the farmers 
and investors. Overall, from Al Dahra’s perspective the absence of agricultural 
advisory/extension services for small farmers ‘Irshad Zera3y’ (farmer guidance) 
is a main reason for the challenges facing the farmers. The absence of 
“Irrigation Guidance” and the weak role of the government are challenging 
factors, whereby the private sector cannot fill this gap. In this respect, there is 
a need to make a distinction between 2 eras; the post 1952 agricultural reform 
movement led by Nasser era and the contemporary agricultural system.  
During the 1960s Nasser era, the state was very strict with farmers and 
imposed fines on those who went against the centrally imposed agricultural 
cropping system, whereby crops were removed from the land. Previously “the 
irrigation guidance department had more power than the general attorney. 
Currently it is not the case since the state seized hiring any new ones. As such 
the last appointed generation of morshedeen zera3eyeen have all retired, 
leaving no one at present. This results in very weak law enforcement of 
agricultural/water related laws and regulations” (Interview # 4). Another 
major challenge is that in the past, the state mainly controlled all agricultural 
transactions, inputs and outputs. Today, the private sector has a bigger role in 
providing inputs and marketing outputs, thus leading to a significant change 
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in the agricultural system in Egypt. As a result, today the water related 
problems are related to the head and tail ends of the canals. Those at the head 
of the canal have installed high capacity water pumps and withdraw large 
amount of water resources -while leaving the agricultural drainage open- 
leading to shortage downstream at the tail. It is important to realize that 
agricultural practices tend to encourage over irrigation (Interview # 4).  
 
Consequently, the present water situation forces private investors to conduct 
risk assessment for their activities. The objective of these risk analysis 
exercises is to determine the impact of current and forecasted demand on 
water quantity and quality in all of their operations, not only in agriculture but 
also in agro-industry processing across the different farms, and facilities. 
Another important factor for private investors is risks and impacts of 
pesticides use from other farms. Which in turn forces these risk assessment to 
include analysis on water salinity, iron content, pesticides residues in water 
from other farms, amongst other factors (Interview #17). Most of these issues 
represent different hidden social and environmental risks of the land-water 
nexus, hence representing tensions between farmers’ livelihoods and 
investors’ profitable operations. Most of these hydropolitical interactions on 
the local level were unaccounted for at the time of formulating the state-
capital alliance, and reflect the absent role of the state. Securing water comes 
at a high risk, and cost! Furthermore, “there is a need to avoid exhausting the 
soil which leads into desertification due to the large scale agriculture by 
private sector leading to a vicious cycle of exhausting land resources without 
paying attention to the sustainability of the natural resources” (Interview # 
28a).    
 
The government’s approach to adapt the situation of water budget deficit 
resulting in water scarcity reflects the manufacture of abundance for both the 
farmers and the large investors depends on large-scale infrastructure 
interventions. As stated earlier, the state in collaboration with the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) and the African Water Facility (AWF) have 
commissioned a study for the improvement of both Al Nubareya and Al 
Ismailiya Canals. Through this approach, physical and management 
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improvements are expected to result in positive impacts on distribution, 
quantity, quality, and timeliness of water delivery to beneficiaries of these 
canal systems. By implementing these improvements, the state aims to 
achieve efficient and sustainable use of land-water resources. However, once 
more, the state focuses on technical solutions, thus ignoring the limitations of 
this technocratic approach typically overlooking the larger questions of equity, 
which represent the very essence of sustainable livelihoods for the largest 
water users.   
 
6.4.4. Adaptation to Scarcity: Grabs or Security?  
 
Actors respond differently to the absence of water flow. For instance, farmers 
use several methods to adapt to water scarcity including changing cropping 
patterns, crafting collective irrigation rules, reusing agricultural drainage 
water, practicing deficit and night irrigation, and over-irrigating whenever 
water is available (Ghazouani et al. 2014; field notes). While these issues are 
widely documented and reflect a variety of challenges and adaptation 
practices associated with smallholders depending on surface water from the 
Nile, the engagement of large-scale investors adds stress to this challenging 
situation. Interesting to observe here that Al Dahra would not resort to this 
same adaptation solutions, instead it would think about more high tech and 
capital oriented solutions to grab the already politically and physically water 
scarce resource.  
 
In the case of Al Dahra, alternative strategies for water security involved 
installing additional pumps on irrigation canals, and the use of their 
technological, financial, and political capital to ensure a constant supply of 
water flow for their ongoing massive industrial agricultural operation. As a 
way of compensating for the shortage in surface water flow, the company is 
attempting to re-equip 14 existing wells in Al Salheya farmland to use them as 
reservoirs. The concept is based on reinstating the low quality saline 
underground water by re-injecting Nile water from the canals, mixing it with 
saline wells in their lands to improve its quality, and use it to compensate for 
periods of water shortage. In addition, the company is planning to build a 
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reservoir in order to store water to supply farm when water is not available. 
The reservoir is planned over 1 hectare and can supply water for 2 days. 
Building reservoirs on the farm is function of the opportunity cost of the 
agricultural land, meaning that if the company builds larger reservoirs, it 
tends to lose production space, thus presenting an interesting trade-off 
between water storage and profit generated from agricultural productivity. 
Other ideas to adapt to periods of water shortage in Al Salheya farm were to 
attempt to pump water from one canal and hold it behind small dams to make 
it feed other canals when water does not reach the farm. In Al Nubareya 
farmland, the company depends on a mix of underground water and surface 
water. Yet, and as discussed in section 6.3, the company widened its irrigation 
canals on site to use them also as reservoirs in periods of water shortage.   
 
6.5. Conclusion:  The Reproduction of Water Scarcity 
 
In Egypt, land and water are equally important inputs for the state to achieve 
its hydraulic mission. They are also essential elements for the livelihoods of 
small farmers, and a source of financial profit for agricultural entrepreneurs, 
and large-scale investors. Unlike Mega projects in remote desert schemes, Al 
Salheya and Al Nubareya (east and west of Nile delta) have the comparative 
the advantage of location and access to export ports. However Old-New lands 
downstream the Nile River involve a large number of water users. They also 
entail an inherent situation of water stress with resources nexus tensions, 
reflecting intrinsic physical and political water scarcity. 
 
The chapter discussed how corporate actors using financial and political 
capital, as well as advanced technology are engaged in “water grabs” to 
abstract water for the ‘sustainability of their profit’ in an already hydrological 
stressed context. Nexus risks and uncertainties associated with transnational 
investments in Old-New lands influence the investors as well as different 
water users, particularly smallholders. The use of water resources by 
smallholders and investors is often unregulated and reflects the existence of a 
parallel economy. Evidence also shows the interplay between the source of 
water (surface or underground) on the one hand, and water quality and 
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quantity on the other. Each actor however adapts to different nexus tensions 
differently. Driven by profit, livelihoods, or Mega projects different actors (e.g. 
investors, smallholders, state) adopt their own approaches towards securing 
water. These adaptation strategies reflect greater competition over a politically 
and physically scarce resource, and often lead to the reproduction of scarcity.   
 
Based on Al Dahra case study across two different sites east and west of Nile 
Delta, a primary research finding is that scarcity affects everyone, but water 
security is only affordable to corporate actors. In this respect, local water 
politics occurring between smallholders and investors reflect inherent nexus 
tensions, as well as the absent role of the state. Competition over the land-
water nexus for food production result in water grabs in an already stressed 
hydropolitical context, thus adding additional elements of social, 
environmental and economic risks on the local level. By investing in already 
water stressed regions, investors have contributed to the reproduction of 
water scarcity, whereby water grabs by corporate actors shed light on larger 
questions of equity, social justice, and asymmetrical power.  
 
This reproduction of scarcity raises the question of which is more important, a 
company to achieve higher profits, or a small farmer to secure his livelihood 
under constraining poverty challenges. A paradoxical perspective reflecting 
what “securing” water translates into in reality. For one actor it is less profit, 
while for another it is a loss of livelihood and a downward spiral of rural 
poverty. As for the state, while these investments may be endowed with capital 
and technology, they may not be necessarily addressing its ecological-
demographic narrative of crisis, or its hydraulic mission. 
 
While chapters 5 and 6 have examined the water politics of Al Dahra’s 
investments within Egypt on local and national levels, the following chapter 
examines how non-state actors’ investments in other Nile basin countries such 
as Sudan may also influence hydro politics on the transboundary level.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Egyptian Water Security and Transnational Land-
Water Investments in the Nile Basin: The Case of Sudan  
 
 
Introduction  
 
It is hard to discuss Egyptian water security without addressing Nile 
hydropolitics, in particular as it relates to transnational investments in 
upstream riparian states such as Sudan. In chapters 4, 5, and 6 the role of 
non-state actors and transnational state-capital alliances was examined as an 
emerging element of Egyptian water security on the local and national levels 
within Egypt. This chapter further explores the role of non-state actors and 
transnational state-capital alliances in upstream countries as an emerging 
element of Egyptian water security at the transboundary level, with a 
particular focus on Sudan. 
 
Sudan has been long recognized as the southern strategic depth for Egypt with 
borders extending across 1273 Km (Abdel Wahab 2011). Accordingly, the 
security and stability of Sudan represent part of Egyptian national security 
(Interview #8). The Nile basin is another major unifying factor between Egypt 
and Sudan. This is especially true given the changing hydropolitical landscape 
over the last decade, notably as it relates to Sudan’s shifting position vis-à-vis 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) (Nicol & Cascão 2016; Cascão 
& Nicol 2016). Hence, the importance of Egyptian policy towards Sudan is 
clear to maintain its stability on one hand, and promote economic integration 
between both sides on the other (Solieman et al. 2013; Interviews #8; #11).  
 
Fundamentally, it is important to understand that Egypt and Sudan are both 
downstream riparian countries in the Nile basin, but also share a prominent 
status in the League of Arab States (LAS).  The Gulf-Nile connection is 
therefore founded on the discourse of  ‘joint Arab economic integration in 
trade and food security’ along with water scarce Gulf (GCC) countries. Sudan 
is also seeking to revive its vision to be the ‘breadbasket of the Arab World’ as 
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highlighted by Sadek Al Mahdy in his keynote speech at the Gulf-Nile 
Conference in Cairo during May 2015 (Meeting notes #8; translated from 
Arabic speech). A vision that was emphasized during President Bashir’s 
speech at the opening ceremony of Egypt’s Economic Development 
Conference in Sharm El Sheikh on March 13th 2015, where he invited Arab 
financing to invest in Sudan’s available land and water resources stating that 
“Sudan has the land and water, Egypt has the human resources and expertise, 
while gulf countries can provide financing” (AlBashir 2015). According to a 
recent unpublished study by a Dutch consulting firm, Sudan is by far the most 
prominent target destination for agro-investments by both Egyptian and GCC 
actors in sub-Saharan Africa (Interview# 35). Probable reasons include the 
geographic proximity, cultural similarity, the well-established business and 
investment relations, and the huge agricultural potential of the country 
(Hillhorst 2015b).  
 
Given this background, the primary purpose of this chapter is to unpack 
transnational state-capital alliances and the ‘land-water-food’ nexus in Sudan 
from three different perspectives; (i) Egyptian ‘state’ actors; (ii) Egyptian non-
state actors, and (iii) international (GCC) state and ‘non-state’ actors. Given 
the larger context of Egyptian-Sudanese hydropolitics, the chapter argues that 
transnational investments and land-water nexus in Sudan and other Nile 
basin countries represent a venue that brings different risks, opportunities, 
and uncertainties to Egyptian water security in light of the river basin’s 
changing hydropolitical landscape. The analysis also examines the Gulf-Nile 
connection and highlights how the nexus is framed as a political-economic 
commodity in light of the wider regional politics and water scarcity narrative, 
in the Arab Region (GCC and MENA). In this respect, hydropolitics at the 
basin level are not only limited to state actors or state-centric debates, but are 
also influenced by non-state actors (from within and outside the basin) 
seeking LSLA and access to water rights or water grabs.  
 
Transnational investments in Sudan by the Egyptian State can be situated 
within the larger discourse of modernization and frontier making (see chapter 
3), and an element of the hydraulic mission of the entrepreneurial state (see 
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chapter 4). The ‘land-water-food’ nexus in this respect is an opportunity to 
establish bilateral agreements and state-to-state investments especially in the 
agriculture sector, as an element of Egyptian water/food security. This -
unachieved- opportunity can be viewed as an additional element to the 
existing virtual water trade movement between both countries. This is 
especially true given Egypt’s large food imports (40% of its total food needs), 
and the potential Sudan can bring to close this food gap (Interview #4). 
However, evidence indicates that cooperation and collaboration to develop the 
land-water-food nexus in Sudan by the Egyptian state has been so far an 
unachieved potential as suggested by different historical and contemporary 
(hydro)-political bottlenecks.  
  
Transnational investments by non-state actors in Sudan gained momentum 
over the last decade due to the food and fuel crisis of 2007/08 and 2010/11. 
For the purpose of this chapter, these are broadly defined in two distinct 
categories; the first is the category of Egyptian non-state actors investments in 
Sudan and South Sudan with a particular focus on the example of Citadel 
Capital in both countries. The second is the category of land-water 
investments in Sudan by international non-state actors, especially from GCC, 
demonstrating that the Gulf-Nile Connection is not only present in Egypt, but 
also extends to Sudan as well as other Nile basin countries such as Ethiopia. 
In this respect, the importance of the land-water-food nexus is emphasized 
through regional cooperation and integration, as well as the development of 
Sudan’s untapped resources. Accordingly, Egypt and other Arab countries 
often frame the investments in Sudan in a way that manifests its potential as 
the breadbasket of the Arab world, whereby regional politics are becoming 
more relevant to transnational investments given the growing water and food 
security narratives. Therefore it is evident to link water resources to regional 
politics (Interview #52), shaped by food sovereignty concerns and a joint Arab 
Food Security strategy (Meeting Notes #7).  
 
The question however remains, whether these investments and nexus linkages 
represent a form of regional integration within the larger framework of 
Egyptian-Sudanese relations and Arab food security, or do they manifest a 
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new form of water grabs on the transboundary level of the Nile basin, or both? 
These questions will be addressed in this chapter to shed light on the 
implications of transnational state-capital alliances taking place on the 
transboundary level in Sudan and other Nile basin countries, notably from an 
Egyptian water security perspective. 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the 
importance and potential of the land-water nexus in Sudan’s post oil era, and 
the role of transnational investments to contribute to the ‘breadbasket of the 
Arab world’ vision. The second section highlights key milestones in Egyptian-
Sudanese hydropolitics notably as it relates to joint investments and attempts 
for bilateral economic integration. This section explores Egyptian state land-
water investments in Sudan, and highlights the unachieved potential of the 
resources nexus through incomplete agricultural investments and cooperation 
schemes over the last half a century. The third section identifies Egyptian and 
international non-state actors’ investments in Sudan. The first part presents 
insights from an Egyptian private equity fund investing in both North and 
South Sudan. The second part discusses the growing engagement of 
international non-state actors in Sudan notably from GCC countries. Section 
four concludes the chapter by highlighting the opportunities, risks and 
uncertainties associated with transnational investments in Sudan vis-à-vis 
Nile hydropolitics and Egyptian water security on the transboundary level. 
 
7.1. Transnational Investments and Land-Water Resources  
        Potential in Sudan 
  
A significant part of the Nile basin’s ecosystem and its watershed’s 
natural resources within Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan were under the 
control of the Ottoman Empire and its succeeding Khedives and Kings since 
Mohamed Ali’s invasion of Sudan in 1821. With the increased British influence 
in Egypt and Sudan in 1882 and 1897 respectively, coupled with colonial 
strategic interests in both countries -especially cotton cultivations and trade- 
(Waterbury 1979), the Nile river flow was governed by the 1929 agreement24,25. 
                                                             
24 Other treaties took place prior to the 1929 agreement such as the 1902 treaty between Ethiopia and Britain on 
behalf of Egypt marking the “principle of non-interference with the flow of Blue Nile” confirmed by the tripartite 
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Sudan eventually gained its independence in 1956 and signed the 1959 Nile 
Treaty26 between Colonel Abboud and Nasser, whereby Egypt and Sudan were 
granted full rights for the utilization of the Nile waters with annual shares of 
55.5 and 18.5 billion cubic meters respectively.  
 
From an Egyptian water security perspective, Sudan is an interesting case 
study for several reasons. First, the Sudan is metaphorically and physically in 
the middle of the hydro-political complex relations in the Eastern (Blue) Nile 
river basin. Second, Sudan gains significant importance amongst the other 
Nile basin countries due to its size and the area of the river basin within its 
geographical territory. All parts of Sudan27 including both Sudan and South 
Sudan represent a total area of 2,551,341 Km2, whereby Sudan’s landmass is 
1,911,341 Km2 compared to 640,000 Km2 in South Sudan28 (Nile Basin 
Initiative, 2012). In terms of water resources, it is important to note that 
2,062,558 Km2 equivalent to 80.84 percent of both countries (all parts of 
Sudan) are within the Nile basin, whereby more than 64 percent of the basin’s 
total area (3,176, 543 Km2) lies within both countries (Nile Basin Initiative 
2012).   Agriculture production is the cornerstone of the economy with a 
wealth of fertile land representing 47.4% of the total area in 2012 (World Bank 
2015), and employs around 60-80% of the work force and contributed nearly 
34.5% of the GDP in 2013 (ADB 2015). 
 
The Sudan is also hydro-politically bound to the 10 other Nile basin countries 
and is also politically committed and plays an active role in the Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI) -with a recent project of hydropower for joint electricity 
generation with Ethiopia and Egypt. In addition, as one of the very few Arab 
economies where horizontal agricultural expansion is possible due to 
availability of land and water resources, Sudan is typically labeled as “the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
agreement of 1906 amongst the colonial powers Britain, France and Italy leading to an exchange of notes in 1925 
whereby Italy recognized the “prior hydraulic rights” of Egypt and Sudan and agreed not to construct any works likely 
to modify the flow of the Ethiopian tributaries of the Nile  (Shapland 1997a, p.70). 
25 Sudan was planning to build two dams which led to the development of the 1929 treaty; Sennar Dam completed in 
July 1925 primarily for cotton irrigation, and Jabal Awliya Dam which was being planned prior to the 1929 
agreement, however was completed in 1936 for hydropower and irrigation (Awulachew, et al. 2012) 
26 The Roseires Dam in 1950 triggered Egypt’s protests, leading to the 1959 agreement with Sudan. 
27 For nomenclature, all parts of Sudan refers to Sudan prior to the split of the country, Sudan refers to the northern 
part of Sudan, and South Sudan is the newly independent country. 
28 Sudan lost almost a third of its land size from 2.5 million square km to 1.86 million square km 
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breadbasket of the Arab World”; a vision that witnessed unsuccessful past 
experiences in agricultural development and contemporary attempts of 
revival. In this sense, Sudan can be viewed as wearing two hats; a key country 
in Africa’s Nile river basin, and a cornerstone of the Arab food security 
strategy emphasized through its participation and role in the League of Arab 
States (LAS).  
 
Historically, unleashing Sudan’s full agricultural potential has been a 
challenge. Sudan has roughly 650,000 km2 of land with high agricultural 
potential, but 75 per cent of it is farmed at only 10 to 50 per cent of its 
capacity, and one quarter of the land that has high suitability is farmed at only 
10 per cent of its capacity (Ranganathan et al. 2011). Most agricultural activity 
has been concentrated in three areas: Khartoum, the central provinces, and 
the northern region, attracting 86 per cent of FDI partly due to available 
infrastructure, while other regions east and west of the country have been 
neglected (Geopoliticalmonitor 2013). According to the FAO, the country’s 
agricultural policy was changed in 1997 in an effort to attain greater food self-
sufficiency by reducing the area of cotton production due to irrigation water 
shortage, replaced instead by wheat and sorghum, which require less water 
(Mahgoub 2014 p.13). 
 
Yet, successive governments were not able to mobilize financial resources to 
make use of the country’s comparative advantages, consequently leading to a 
clear contradiction as Sudan relies on imports for its food security. This is 
often attributed to a few factors; (a) mismanagement of the agricultural 
economy only enabling the use of a small fraction of its agricultural land, (b) 
lack of financing as government spending as investments in agriculture and 
other sectors of the economy were limited and neglected once oil started 
flowing in 1999 (Siddig 2012), and (c) Lack of expertise in farming especially 
in terms of skills and use of modern agricultural technology. As such, 
historically, the Sudan “breadbasket vision” was not achieved. 
 
Despite the past disappointments in Sudan’s “breadbasket” vision initially 
perceived by Numeiry in the 70s (Verhoeven 2015b), the dream of Sudan’s 
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agricultural revival is still luring. Sudan has lost a large share of its oil revenue 
-nearly close to 50% of its budget revenue and 75% of its international 
payments due to South Sudan’s secession in 2011 (ADB  2012). As a key 
country in the Nile Basin, Sudan is seeking to revive this vision to make up for 
its lost oil revenue. Despite the availability of land areas solely dependent on 
the abundance of rain for agriculture, the government aims to attract local and 
foreign capital, through new infrastructure investments to facilitate easy 
access to irrigation from the Nile. Prioritizing agriculture for self-sufficiency, 
the state embarked on an ambitious plan to improve a massive infrastructure 
and dam development program for hydropower and irrigation using Chinese 
expertise and credit, as well as Arab financing. Khartoum has staked its 
political future in the post-oil era on the most far reaching (hydro) 
infrastructure program in Sudanese history, with Kuwaiti, Emirati and Qatari 
funding for its dams totaling almost US$10 billion (Verhoeven 2011, pp.695–
699; Verhoeven 2013, p.12). Dams are being built throughout the country 
diverting a large share of water resources towards new irrigation projects. 
According to the geopolitical monitor, early in 2013 Gulf nations contracted a 
Chinese firm to expand the Roseires Dam, substantially increasing Sudan’s 
ability to irrigate farmland. This is perhaps similar to earlier investments 
during the 2000s when the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) lent 
Sudan a total of US$225 million to support the Merowe and Roseires dam 
projects (EIU 2015). 
 
Sudan is also seeking to promote an ambitious agricultural investment plan as 
announced by the Ministry of Investment in 2013 supplying large-scale 
agricultural lands and water resources. As such, the agriculture sector is 
receiving more attention to attract the petro-dollars from water-scarce GCC 
countries (Woertz 2011), as well as other investors such as China, Brasil, and 
Egypt through large-scale land-water investments, and trade opportunities. In 
this sense, Sudan is positioning itself as a primary agricultural investment 
destination due to its abundant land and water resources, often viewed as a 
cornerstone for a joint Arab Food Security Strategy (Hanna 2016).  
Furthermore, with the construction of the GERD initiated in April 2011, 
Sudan is aiming to benefit from both hydropower as well as the regulated flow 
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of the Nile to expand its agricultural schemes downstream (Interview #14; 
#35; #37; #44).  The dam located some 40 km from the border between 
Sudan and Ethiopia is largest hydro-electric plant in Africa with a height of 
145 m, storage capacity of 74 billion cubic meters, and a power generation 
capacity of 6,000 MW depending on 16 turbines (Salman 2016). According to 
my interviews with both Sudanese as Ethiopian senior policy makers and 
technical experts, the GERD aims to benefit all Blue Nile countries, and is not 
going to harm Egypt’s water security interests (Interviews # 14; #15; #72). A 
view that is widely contested in Egypt, whereby the dam’s capacity and filling 
period represent major concerns for the Egyptian state and society at large 
(Interviews #5; #7; #8; #11). Others view the construction and operation of 
the GERD as an opportunity to demonstrate wider political economic benefits 
from the Nile basin resources including pooling of power resources, co-
development of hydropower, and co-management of the basin’s resources 
including land for irrigation (Cascão & Nicol 2016). 
 
Sudan’s shifting position about the GERD reflects its potential benefits for its 
economy. The dam’s planned commission date is 2018, whereby a power 
interconnector between Ethiopia and Sudan has been completed recently. 
Furthermore, given the Blue Nile’s highly seasonal flow, most irrigation 
schemes in Sudan cultivate only one crop per year (the exceptions are the 
White Nile pumping schemes and a number of smaller schemes on the Main 
Nile). In this respect, the GERD will regulate the Nile flow and will facilitate 
crop intensification and multiple cropping seasons per year, while providing 
cheap electricity for the pump schemes (Hillhorst 2015b). Hence, it could alter 
the economic viability – and thus the dynamics – for agro-investments in 
Sudan (Ibid; Interview #72). 
 
These recent developments reflect the changing hydropolitical landscape in 
the Nile basin. They could possibly lead to a greater engagement of both state 
and non-state actors from within and outside the basin to benefit from 
Sudan’s land-water-food nexus through transnational investments. However, 
while these developments may entail economic benefits notably in the energy 
and agriculture sectors, they may also have potential impacts on Sudan’s 
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utilization of its Nile water share (Nicol & Cascão 2016). While the GERD is 
perceived as a venue to unlock future economic cooperation and trade (Ibid), 
it could be also anticipated that large-scale irrigation schemes in Sudan 
depending on the Nile water may affect the flow downstream, especially if this 
use exceeds its water quota under the Nile treaty (Interviews #46; #70).  
Hence these developments may represent both an opportunity and a risk from 
an Egyptian water security perspective as discussed in the following sections. 
 
7.2. Transnational Investments in Sudan by the Egyptian State:  
       The Land-Water-Food Nexus as an Unachieved Opportunity   
 
Egyptian-Sudanese bilateral relations have been shaped by a Nile 
Solidarity/Unity discourse, with unachieved plans for joint investments and 
economic integration since Nasser’s era. In 1969, following a bloodless coup 
d’état in Khartoum, Jaafar Numeiri came to power, and the three socialist 
republics in the region -Egypt, Sudan, and Libya- signed the `Tripoli Charter' 
for greater political, military, and economic co-operation (Warburg 1985). 
Following Nasser’s death in 1970, president Sadat intervened militarily to 
rescue Numeiri's regime in July 1971 and again in July 1976 with both leaders 
signing ‘charters of integration’ in 1970, 1974, and 1982, which kept the 
concept of a united Nile valley on the agenda (Ibid). Anwar Sadat saw the 
Sudan as an important ally for Egypt, which appeared to be dangerously 
encircled by pro-Soviet regimes in Libya, Chad, Somalia, and Ethiopia (Ibid). 
 
In return for helping Numeiri to remain in power, Egypt obtained a number of 
concessions from the Sudan, notably permission to construct the Jonglei 
Canal in 1976. The first phase of the project was designed to divert part of the 
flow from the Bor to the mouth of the Sobat, another tributary of the White 
Nile, in order to decrease the loss of water that occurs, especially from 
evaporation, when the river passes through the Sudd swamps in southern 
Sudan (Collins 1990). The proposed second phase, which included dams at 
Lakes Victoria and Albert, and drainage schemes for the Machar Marshes and 
Bahr el-Ghazal, as well as the longer Jonglei Canal, could be described as 
Egypt's master water plan, to supplement the annual flow by 4.7 billion cubic 
meters of water, of which Lake Nasser's share was to reach 3.8 billion (Ibid). 
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Eventually, all these plans have not materialized due to political instability 
and successive periods of conflict amongst different ethnic groups in the 
North and South of Sudan. 
 
Subsequently, bilateral relations witnessed several attempts to strengthen 
Egyptian-Sudanese relations. For example, the ‘Economic Integration Charter’ 
was signed in November 1982. It established three institutions to handle a 
mechanism of economic, social, political and military integration between 
both countries including; (i) ‘The Supreme Council for Integration’; (ii) The 
parliament of the Nile Valley; (iii) The Egypt-Sudan Integration Fund (ESIF). 
ESIF’s mandate was to support financially viable projects whether fully or 
partially owned by the private sector, with the objectives of stimulating, 
broadening, and deepening entrepreneurial activities in the private sectors 
between both countries. A “project approach” was adopted for joint economic 
activities, instead of the more popular method of tariff reductions followed by 
coordination economic and trade policies (Hodges 1979). In this respect, the 
Sudanese Egyptian Agricultural Integration Company (SEAIC) established 
more than 40 years ago represents the unachieved potential of land-water-
food nexus between both countries. SEAIC is the outcome of the integration 
agreement stipulating the establishment of an agricultural company in Ed-
Damazin in the Blue Nile state. Worth noting however the total agricultural 
land owned by the SEAIC diminished from 250,000 to 92,000 feddan due to 
the armed conflict in the Blue Nile where the Sudanese army has been fighting 
the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/North (SPLM-N) since 2011 
(Sudan Tribune 2015). However, in August 2015, a new deal was announced 
to cultivate 92,000 feddan using modern irrigation, and expanding livestock 
and fish production, by clearing 70,000 feddan of acacia trees in the region 
(Mada Masr 2015). Efforts to advance this investment were still ongoing up to 
April 2017 when Agriculture minister Abdel Moneim el-Banna arrived in 
Khartoum to participate in the SEAIC general assembly, and also to discuss 
the operational plan of the project.  
 
Other integration attempts included the “Four Freedoms Agreement” 
signed on September 4th 2004 between both governments. The agreement 
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allows citizens of Egypt and Sudan to move freely across the borders, with 
rights to reside, work and own property in either country without a permit. An 
agreement that in appearance reflects the cooperation and integration 
discourse, however in reality has not been fully realized due to unclear reasons 
(Interview #12). On the one hand, Sudan has been contesting Egypt’s non-
abidance by the agreement especially in relation to freedom of movement of 
goods and citizens (Tawfik 2016). On the other hand, according to the 
ambassador of Egypt in Khartoum, officials in both countries have been 
discussing approaches to overcome obstacles facing trade and movement of 
citizens through the Qastal-Ashkeet border crossing. Negotiations also 
included a number of barriers hampering the flow of commercial exchanges 
between both countries, including the certificates of origins and transport. 
Other issues included exempting Egyptian exporting companies from the 
Value Added Tax (VAT), in addition to air transport challenges, particularly 
regarding entry of the Egyptian aviation into the Sudanese air space, and the 
activation of the freedom of ownership for Egyptians in Sudan (Farmlandgrab 
2011c).  
 
In terms of food security and virtual water trade, according to the Egyptian 
Ambassador in Khartoum, by 2011, Egypt was the third largest investor in 
Sudan with an investment portfolio of 5.4 billion dollars, whereas bilateral 
trade stood at 622 million U.S. dollars (Egypt Independent 2015). By 2015, 
despite US sanctions, Egyptian investments in Sudan reached $11 billion, 
ranking fourth among foreign investors (Egypt Independent 2015). In this 
respect, Egypt imports cattle annually from Sudan with a value of US$200 
million, with future targets to double this amount (Ibid). The Entrepreneurial 
state (see Chapter 4) is also developing transportation infrastructure to 
enhance trade relations not only with Sudan, but the African continent at 
large. For example, the Argeen transportation project aims to link Alexandria 
to Cape Town, to increase trade and investment in Africa, due to the absence 
of water obstacles along the road (Interview #31). 
 
In addition to trade in agriculture, transnational investments in Sudan by the 
Egyptian state witnessed several modalities throughout the last decade. Grain 
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database indicates that a government-to-government deal was signed in 2010 
giving the Government of Egypt access to 400,000 ha of land within the Al 
Gezira project in Sudan for it to offer to private companies. The deal 
stipulated that “companies striking agreements with Egypt for portions of the 
land would also have to sign deals with the Government of Sudan, similar to 
an earlier arrangement between Jordan and Sudan” (Grain 2012)! following 
the January 25th Revolution in 2011, Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf 
visited Sudan and signed a total of nine agreements to boost bilateral ties. 
During the visit, the prime minister and Sudanese vice president Ali Osman 
Mohamed Taha announced an agreement by the joint ministerial committee 
“to develop food security through different agricultural projects in Sudan”. In 
this respect, “Sudan and Egypt would focus on establishing companies in vital 
fields, particularly ‘wheat, oil, sugar and meat’ to achieve self- sufficiency of 
strategic crops” (Farmlandgrab 2011a).  In this respect, joint ‘strategic 
projects’ confirmed by Sudanese officials included a land deal of 41,000 
feddan signed in March 2011 for the White Nile state cattle project targeting 
food security needs of both countries by investing in all stages of production of 
processed meats and dairy products (Grain 2012). In December 2014, the 
government of Sudan announced the allocation of 100,000 acres (40,000 ha) 
divided into small slots of 10 acres (4 ha) each to small-scale Egyptian farmers 
as announced by the Sudanese Minister of Investment in Khartoum 
confirming that “Sudan gives maximum priority to Egyptian investors in the 
country” (Farmlandgrab 2014d). But similar to other plans, little progress was 
achieved on ground whereby the status of these projects remains obscure 
despite their strategic importance. 
 
 From a hydropolitical standpoint, the ‘Egypt-Sudan Nile Water Joint 
Technical Committee’ is “an instrumental mechanism to ensure 
transboundary water cooperation” (Hodges 1979; Interview # 6). The 
committee was established as part of the 1959 Nile agreement, and comprises 
four members from each country. As per the agreement, the functions of the 
PJTC were to (Hodges 1979, p.79): 
 
(a) develop projects to increase the yield of the Nile, (b) supervise the 
execution of such projects as they are approved by the two 
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governments, (c) draw up working arrangements for schemes to be 
constructed either in the Sudan or in other upstream countries, (d) 
supervise the operation of the mutually constructed works and the 
related agreements and (e) advise the two governments, when and if 
required, an arrangement for an equitable reduction in water use in 
the event that a series of low flow years in the Nile basin reduces the 
flow below the average.  
 
On November 9th 2017, the committee concluded its meeting in Cairo by key 
recommendations including; develop and upgrade the measurements stations 
along the Nile river, provide updated equipment to measurement units, and 
develop joint technical studies about the water situation in Egypt and Sudan 
(Al Watan 2017). While the PJTC is a legal and historical vehicle for 
cooperation between both countries, its role is unclear when it comes to the 
recent developments in the basin, either as it relates to GERD or even 
transnational investments.  
 
Furthermore, amidst all these historical cooperation attempts, bilateral 
relations also witnessed different periods of tensions. In 1995 the 
assassination attempt of President Mubarak led to a freeze in the relations 
between Egypt and Sudan amidst accusations of Sudan’s involvement. 
Relations were eventually resumed in 2002. Furthermore, the controversial 
border issue of the Halayeb triangle has been a contentious one creating 
tensions to present, whereby Sudan complained to the UN Security Council 
against Egypt for holding elections in the disputed triangle (Tawfik 2016). 
 
Overall, Egyptian-Sudanese bilateral relations witnessed different periods of 
co-existence of conflict and cooperation (Mirumachi & Allan 2007) over 
political, economic issues, as well as Nile basin hydropolitics. The vision of 
promoting agricultural projects and cultivation of water intensive crops 
(including sugar, rice, and wheat) through transnational investments outside 
of Egypt has been potentially a key element of Egyptian water security in 
order to preserve water resources on the Egyptian side (Interviews #4; #12; 
#26). However, according to a senior Sudanese official “in comparison to the 
announced intentions, economic integration plans between Egypt and Sudan 
on the ground are negligible and not proportionate to the bilateral 
cooperation discourse” (Interview #14). As such, beyond virtual water trade, 
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transnational investments in Sudan by the Egyptian state represent a missed 
opportunity and manifest the unachieved potential of the land-water-food 
nexus between both countries. Yet, another key unanswered question is 
whether state land-water investments in other riparian countries would be 
considered as ‘joint Nile cooperation efforts to develop agriculture’, or would 
they represent a disguised form of water grabs? A potential question for future 
research! Furthermore, Sudan’s latest stance and shifting role as it relates to 
the tripartite negotiations around the GERD mark an interesting development 
in Egyptian-Sudanese hydropolitics. It also raises a key question concerning 
Sudan’s strategy to fulfill its own development interests vis-à-vis its 
commitment towards the existing obligations under the 1959 agreement 
(Nicol & Cascão 2016).  
 
The following sections discuss non-state actors’ investments in Sudan by both 
Egyptian and international investors, as an emerging trend that entails 
different risks from an Egyptian water security perspective, notably in light of 
the changing hydropolitical landscape in the Nile basin.  
 
7.3. Transnational Investments by Egyptian and International Non-State 
Actors in Sudan 
 
The Landmatrix database identified 37 large-scale agricultural projects in 
Sudan, including investments by GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
the UAE and Qatar, in addition to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Brazil, 
Iran and India, and Sudan itself. Land size varies greatly between one deal 
and another ranging from 10,000 to 100,000ha with a few exceptions 
exceeding these. For example in Sennar and Northern State – (Harqa and 
Nour el Dine) land uses can extend over 99 years lease (Interview #26). Not 
all documented deals have been finalized as indicated in the database by their 
‘status of negotiation’; some deals are concluded with the contracts signed, 
others are just intended with an expression of interest, and some deals failed 
during the negotiation stage. But even with all the confirmed signed deals, the 
level of implementation on the ground is significantly low indicating a 
significant gap, thus ‘underlying the very problem it had set out to resolve: the 
unreliability of media reports’ (Woertz 2013a).  
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In another database developed by a consultant working on large-scale 
agricultural investments in Sudan, the intended size of GCC land investments 
is 295,359ha, out of which only 16,200ha were in production in 2014 
(Hillhorst, 2015). Other databases documenting LSLAs include GRAIN, an 
international non-profit organization supporting small farmers and social 
movements, also enlisting 19 land deals in Sudan involving different countries 
(GRAIN, 2012). Overall, in light of the delayed materialization of agricultural 
investments, quantifying the actual use of ‘water and land resources’ and their 
environmental implications remains a challenge given the obscurity of the 
deals and the lack of quantitative data regarding the actual agricultural 
production, water withdrawals and their associated aspects (type of crops, 
water source, productivity, technology, employment effects, and exports of 
agricultural outputs). Nonetheless, the following section presents a few 
examples of large-scale agricultural projects portraying the diversity of 
investment modalities from the demand side. 
 
7.3.1. Egyptian non-state actors in Sudan 
 
There are two main types of Egyptian non-state actors and private sector 
investors in Sudan; small and medium agricultural companies, and 
institutional investors (e.g. private equity funds). For the private sector, the 
underlying business logic towards the land-water-food nexus and agricultural 
investments in Sudan is profit (Interview #23; #28b). Exceptionally, some 
investing companies have the vision of reducing dependence on water 
intensive crops in Egypt, and therefore find Sudan a convenient environment 
for their investments, yet this is not always the case (Interview #26). Other 
investments however can engage in agricultural operations abroad for 
example to produce sugar in Sudan – for local consumption by Sudanese – 
which is more profitable than export (Interview #26). Another modality can 
be to allocate part of the production for local use and the remaining to be 
exported to Egypt (Interview #26). As such, non-state investments by 
Egyptian investors in Sudan can end up taking different modalities whereby 
the end user of the agricultural products can be local or export markets.  
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Private sector investors are increasingly getting engaged in investments in 
meat and livestock sector from Ethiopia and Sudan. (Interview #26) explains 
that in Sudan most land use for agricultural investments is around the Blue 
Nile, unlike in Ethiopia where agriculture is not necessarily dependent on Nile 
water, but on resources from other basins. Sudan has 33 million heads of 
livestock, while Egypt only has 3 million (Interview #26; #31). In this respect, 
“investment and cooperation with Sudan in the area of livestock and meat is 
crucial for the Egyptian market and the national food security agenda at 
large”. Investors aim to target the market gap in Egypt to achieve food security 
and compensate for water intensive process of livestock investments in 
response to high level of meat consumption in Egyptian market (Interview 
#26; #31). Egyptian investors in Sudan grow alfaalfa and invest in fridges 
(cold rooms), as well as border investments in logistics. Other investments 
include the creation of value chain for fisheries in canals and waterways 
linking the investor’s land to the Nile (Interview #26). Other investors view 
Egypt as a gateway for Ethiopian meat, given that exporting to Europe is much 
shorter through Egypt, as the road from Addis to Alexandria, is around 48 
hours over land via Sudan which is half the time compared to Djibouti ports. 
This is primarily due to the fact that much of Africa’s trade takes place 
through land instead of sea using the Sudanese side borders as it makes 
transportation costs cheaper. It also implies time saving for Ethiopia and 
opening new markets as well as the creation of a regional hub for trade.  As a 
result, Ethiopian and Sudanese meat is cheaper in the Egyptian market 
compared to meat imported from other destinations (Interview #26).  
 
Aside from state-led initiatives, and small/medium private sector engagement 
in Sudan’s agricultural investments, evidence suggests that financial investors 
from Egypt began investing in LSLA and agricultural projects abroad since 
2008. An example of financial investors is Beltone and Mahaseel Fund. In 
March 2009, Beltone Private Equity29 and Kenana Sugar Company of Sudan 
formed a joint venture, and announced an agreement to launch a $1-billion 
agricultural investment fund; ‘Mahaseel Agricultural Investment Fund’ to 
                                                             
29 Beltone private equity, a subsidiary of Beltone Partners, had over 2.1 billion Egyptian pounds in assets under 
management at the end of February 2010, mostly in real estate and retail.  
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address food security in the Arab region, with direct exposure to the 
agriculture and agribusiness sectors through green-field projects and private 
equity opportunities in Sudan and Egypt. According to Hazem Barakat, Chief 
Executive Officer of Beltone Private Equity, “Beltone would provide 
investment management, corporate finance and strategy capabilities for the 
fund, which will focus on investments in agriculture; the production and 
processing of crops and livestock in Sudan, as well as opportunities in food 
processing and agriculture related businesses in Egypt” (Farmlandgrab 
2011a). Very little public information is available about either the status of 
Mahaseel Fund or the status of the partnership.  
 
Citadel Capital (now Qalaa Holding) is another leading private equity firm in 
the Middle East and North Africa focusing on building regional platform 
investments in selected industries through acquisitions, turnarounds, and 
Greenfield executed via Opportunity Specific Funds (Qalaa Holdings 2017). In 
2007, Citadel Capital launched the Wafra Fund as a platform to invest in the 
Sudanese agriculture sector via a portfolio of companies. Wafra engages in 
large-scale cultivation of cash crops including sugar, sorghum, maize, 
sunflower, rice and various grain legumes for sale in the local market. Wafra’s 
investments for agricultural production in both Sudan and South Sudan 
include the rights to more than 500,000 feddan of land.  Investments fall 
under portfolio companies Sabina (324,000 feddan in Sudan) and Concord 
Agriculture30 (250,000 feddan in South Sudan) according to the company’s 
website.  
 
Another subsidiary of the private equity firm is Al Nahda project for rice 
production in Ed Dueim (150km south of Khartoum), Sudan’s first large-scale 
commercial rice farm planned on 25,210ha (60,000 feddans), and rice will be 
processed on a site-based mill. The project’s objective is to grow rice primarily 
for domestic consumption in Sudan, a net importer of rice, with the excess 
production to be exported to Africa and the Middle East. Land is flooded for 
up to eight months per year by water held back by the Jebel Al-Awliaa Dam, 
                                                             
30 Concord Irrigated Crops in Unity, previously known as the Sudanese Egyptian Agricultural Crops Company 
(SEAC) (250,000 feddans/105,000ha in Southern Sudan) 
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where earthworks for the farm include the construction of a major levee bank 
to exclude the water regulated back onto the property (Farmlandgrab, 2010). 
Worth noting that in November 2011, the US government Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation provided Citadel with a US$150 million loan package 
to help expand its subsidiaries, US$115 million of which was earmarked for 
crop production in South Sudan (EJATLAS 2014). 
 
According to an interview with an executive of the Egyptian private equity 
firm which considers itself as “a pioneer in the field of agricultural 
investments in Africa and the Middle East”… “future investments in the sector 
can be described as the ‘cattle herd mentality’. Investors will follow each other 
in masses, whereas entities which started investments in agriculture will be 
considered as leaders and will attract other ‘herds’ to follow resulting in 
massive investment flows” (Interview #23). In this respect, “investment 
money usually flows when a sector increasingly attracts more investments”. 
This clearly implies increased competition over land and water resources by 
investors and non-state actors; a possible manifestation of water security 
mercantilism.  
 
However, from an investor’s view, “achieving successful investments in Sudan 
is doable but needs high level of experience in agricultural 
investments”.  From the investors’ perspective, “private companies and 
financial investors such as private equity funds are interested to acquire land 
in Sudan because rent is cheap” (Interview #24). The process of land 
acquisition in North Sudan entails an annual amount for renting the land, in 
addition to an initial premium amount paid at the time of signing the contract. 
According to (Interview #24), “land contracts include ‘rights to use the water’, 
but these are not specified quantitatively”. The highest cost for investors is the 
irrigation cost since lands in Sudan were cultivated using traditional 
agricultural methods since the 1950s. Accordingly, given that the 
infrastructure and irrigation canals are exhausted, the highest cost of 
investment for private companies then becomes the Irrigation Canals.  
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In addition, private sector investors in Sudan face a myriad challenges. 
Investments imply labor requirements; need to issue compensations for the 
land acquisition based on partnerships with the state; and face red tape 
especially as it relates to export clearance (Interview #26). Furthermore, the 
investment process in Sudan entails addressing both federal requirements at 
the level of the central government, as well as state requirements since each 
state has different laws when it comes to land deals. These challenges often 
result in the weak materialization of investments on the ground. The following 
section explores in further detail some of these challenges for Egyptian non-
state actors by portraying some aspects of private equity (Citadel Capital) 
investments in both Sudan and South Sudan.  
 
Citadel Capital in Sudan  
 
Sabina is Citadel Capital’s Platform Company for investments in Sudan’s 
agriculture sector. Sabina holds Citadel Capital’s investment near Kosti, 3.5 
hours South of Khartoum, where it has obtained a 99-year leasehold on an 
area of 254,770 feddan. The highly productive land with strong development 
potential has 38 kilometers of White Nile frontage, with full irrigation rights. 
In 2012, Sabina farm completed the rehabilitation of more than 200 km of 
irrigation canals that will supply water to its own land as well as 13,000 
feddan for local farmers. It has also completed demarcation of its 324,000 
feddan of farmland that has established clearly defined lines on both 
topographical maps and on the ground to insure that all stakeholders are 
aligned (Qalaa Holdings 2017). Crops are intended for sale in Sudan, with the 
excess exported to Egypt or the international market. According to the 
company’s executives, Citadel Capital in Sudan has access to 2 million mega 
litres of water, which eliminates its execution risk in terms of access to water 
resources (Interview #23). However other challenges such as access to 
electricity, weak infrastructure and logistics represent operational challenges 
on the ground (Interview #24). The land deal also included land of local 
farmers, resulting in an increased cost for the investor. Work only took place 
over 10,000 feddan during the start-up phase, but no progress was achieved 
since “Wafra struggled because there is a level of minimum competency that 
was not available throughout the projects start-up phase.  In Sudan and South 
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Sudan, Citadel Capital hired Australian experts - some were incompetent, 
others were very competent - overall they all end up leaving” (Interview 
#24). The choice of Australian expats is based on the fact of their expertise 
because they had a major problem related to water resources and as such 
Australia developed advanced competencies in agricultural technology and 
machinery. Nevertheless, it is important to note “even the most successful 
experts only have experience in managing 40,000-50,000 feddan, which can 
be considered small scale compared to 200,000 hectares” (Interview #24). By 
saying so, he implied that the size of land acquisitions itself is a challenges to 
manage, even by the most experienced expertise. 
 
In this respect, challenges in developing large-scale agricultural projects in 
Sudan include several factors. First, while the cost of investment for land 
acquisition and rentals may seem low compared to other countries, the actual 
cost is very high due to corruption and financial cost associated with the 
amounts that need to be paid for an operation to take off (Interview # 23). 
This is especially relevant to local governance at the provincial level given the 
power and authority of the State governor(s) (7akem Al wilayah) and the 
State’s Ministry of Agriculture (wazeer zera3et Al welaya). Another factor is 
the issue of the available expertise on the ground to manage these 
investments.  In this respect, it is important to have capable representatives 
and qualified managers on the ground, whereby “it is almost impossible to run 
a size of such an operation remotely”. Third, in terms of human resources 
technical capacity, it is mandatory to master two key areas; the basics of 
agricultural including management, staff, knowledge of technology, and 
knowledge of the market for agricultural products (Interviews #23; #26).  
 
As such, not all large-scale Egyptian investments by non-state actors succeed. 
Overall, some small or medium scale Egyptian investments may perform 
better than other large-scale Egyptian or Gulf investors due to the question of 
Egyptian expertise in agriculture, as well as the absence of the language 
barrier. In this respect, institutional and large-scale private sector investors 
from different Gulf countries face increasing challenges in the development of 
their investments in Sudan “because none of them were present on the ground 
 
 
237 
and running their business on a daily basis. They relied on hiring expats and 
foreigners to manage their projects - these eventually failed due to lack of 
knowledge of local context, as well as challenges related to dealing with 
Sudanese labor involved in the agriculture sector” (Interview #24). 
 
But aside from all these challenges, the key issue for private investors in 
Sudan’s agricultural sector the fact that “there is a very high ‘execution risk’ in 
implementing large-scale agriculture operations on the ground” (Interview # 
24). This means that in terms of project operation, “there is a need for capital 
and cash flow to keep the operation going”. For private investors, “the 
execution timeline goes backwards, whereby all production inputs such as 
pesticides, fertilizers and other inputs need to be available”. Specifically, in the 
case of Sudan, importing these inputs has been difficult due to embargo, 
which consequently resulted in delaying the timeframe for implementation, 
thus imposing a key execution risk to these operations. These issues remain a 
key question and an unresolved challenge in the context of Sudan. 
Furthermore, in light of the embargo imposed on Sudan, any agricultural 
company that wants to import machinery has to do it via Saudi Arabia, which 
results in additional costs associated with time delays, as well as higher 
financial costs for investors. Some investors have resorted to Chinese 
machinery given its relatively cheaper cost, nevertheless some of this 
equipment has broken down.  
 
Once more, little public information or official data from the fund is available 
about the operations in Sudan. However, the company is carrying on its 
mandate in Sudan to grow staple crops for domestic consumption first, and 
then sell value-added products regionally and to minimize the need for 
expensive imports” (Qalaa Holdings 2017). Interesting to note, that in 
addition to its agricultural operations in Sudan, Al Qalaa acquired one of 
Egypt’s dairy farmlands “Dina Farms” in 2007 with a total size of 9,500 
feddan mainly depending on ground water resources “using the world’s top 
irrigation system” according to the company; another manifestation of the 
diversity of LSLA by non-state actors in both Egypt and Sudan.  
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Citadel Capital in South Sudan 
Large-scale investments by Egyptian non-state actors are also present in 
South Sudan, however with more dependence on rain fed agriculture. 
According to (Interview #25) “Initially, Citadel Capital was not interested in 
agriculture in South Sudan, rather in transportation. However, through the 
course of its investments in South Sudan, it came to the realization that the 
cost of transportation was very high from Juba to Bentiu, whereby importing 
agricultural products into South Sudan was very expensive”. Accordingly, the 
prices of agricultural products were very high whereby prices increased the 
further you move from the sea/ports of imports. For instance, the WFP had to 
transport maize by helicopter to Juba. Given these factors, Citadel Capital 
started to think about agricultural investments in South Sudan. The 
Hypothesis of the investment was; “Let’s cultivate these products in South 
Sudan in order to avoid the high transportation costs”.  
 
For Citadel Capital the main strategy in South Sudan was based on serving the 
local markets. There is a demand for certain products in some domestic 
markets leading private equity firms to see the opportunity to modernize the 
sector. In the case of agriculture it was mainly about mechanization and IT 
applications in the sector especially as it relates to rain patterns and laser 
leveling for the land (Interview #25). Investments were in Bentiu – in the 
North of South Sudan targeting corn as a staple crop amongst others. The 
price of corn in Juba was a main driver for Citadel Capital decision to invest in 
agriculture to serve the local market. At the time of the investment, the global 
commodity price of 1 ton of corn (staple crop) in the Chicago Board of Trade 
was 200$/ton (up from 130$/ton) reflects an interesting increase in price 
over the timespan of 10 years. In South Sudan, corn was usually imported 
from Ukraine and took a long root to reach Juba, whereby its price changed 
from one destination to another. As such, by the time it reached the Mumbasa 
Port in Kenya its price reached 240$/ton, and from there to Kampala in 
Uganda, the price reached 340$/ton.  From Kampala to Juba the price of 1 ton 
of corn reached 420$, and this was the shortest route for the imported 
agricultural crops to reach Bentiu in South Sudan with not alternatives. In 
South Sudan, “corn is a main source of caloric intake and is therefore a 
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necessity crop, and our company saw the opportunity to engage in its 
cultivation” (Interview #23).  
 
The preparation phase for the land to be ready to be cultivated took place 
between 2009-2011 (almost 3 years), and then production took place for 2 
seasons in 2012 and 2013. By the time Citadel developed the investment, “the 
price of 1 ton of maize at farm gate was 500-600 $ with no marketing efforts. 
Traders used to come at farm gate to buy the crops. The idea was simply to 
produce corn at a low cost and sell it locally as opposed to importing it” 
(Interview#25).  
 
In terms of the academic debate about land grabs, “from our perspective, 
there was no land grab issues in South Sudan, perhaps it is more relevant in 
the North. Contractually, in North Sudan each feddan used by investors was 
supposed to provide another feddan for farmers in return”. Based on 
interviews with different investors, the land grab discourse portrays that “the 
western mindset and a very screwed perspective about land-water 
investments. Most of our deals have not harmed local communities”. 
However, given the many operational challenges they face on the ground, 
“private equity firms and financial investors are primarily concerned with 
profits, whereby social and environmental implications may not necessarily be 
an important priority on the ground” (Interviews #25; #28b)! This is an 
unfortunate perception given the growing social and environmental risks, 
which are often as serious as operational risks as stressed by several 
development finance institutions (DFIs) such as IFC and EBRD amongst 
others.  
 
In fact, contextual challenges and risks for transnational investments in South 
Sudan are also ample. Political conflict is a major obstacle facing the 
development of agricultural investments. Other investment challenges 
included “human resources and labor training… the workforce in these 
projects in the south is usually from Zimbabwe and is a major obstacle, 
especially given the absence of skilled labor, not trained to use advanced 
machinery. Locals were not used to being employed and receiving a salary at 
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the end of the month.  Our basic challenge was to get the labor to come to the 
site – Citadel told them at the beginning that all they need to do is to come 
regularly to work – then citadel was planning to train them”. As simple as it 
sounds, “we discovered that we needed to philosophically explain what it 
meant to have a job. Bentiu is very far away from civilization and we had no 
choice but hire labor from the nearby villages next to the farm” (Interview 
#25). Furthermore, investors in South Sudan continuously complain about 
the lack of infrastructure for their investments since farmlands are typically in 
remote areas. For Citadel, eventually, production stopped because of the war, 
and the militias took over the company’s camp. Almost a repeat of history 
similar to what happened in Jonglei canal project!  
 
7.3.2. GCC and International Non-state Actors’ Investments in Sudan 
 
Between 2000-2008, international agricultural investments in Sudan were 
mainly from Gulf countries as shown in table 7.2. The Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) indicates that Sudan’s National Investment Board issued a report 
in February 2015 claiming that UAE investments in Sudan amount to US$6.7 
billion, out of which Emirati investments in agricultural schemes were US$5.7 
billion in total, with 19 projects (ten in Khartoum state, and nine in the central 
states of Gedaref, Nile, Northern and White Nile) funded between 2001 and 
2013 (EIU 2015). Saudi Arabian investments are also targeting Sudan. In 
January 2014, Ibrahim Al-Khidir, governor of the Northern region, 
announced the entry of four Saudi companies (Al-Safi, Al-Marai, Tabuk 
Agriculture Co and Al-Jouf Co) in the field of agriculture covering an area of 
approximately 4000 acres in Sudan’s northern region (Arab News 2014). 
According to the governor, the Northern region attracted a total of 32 
investment projects from Gulf countries, covering an approximate area of 14 
million acres depending on surface and ground (Nubian aquifer) water 
resources, as well available infrastructure, including Dongola Airport, a road 
network, and a power transformer station with Arab financing (Ibid).  Other 
operating Saudi investors include Al-Rajhi’s Al Kafa2a project established 
near Barabar city in the River Nile State of the Northern region (see chapter 
5). In the same State, the Qatari Hassad Food project in Abu Hamad is a 
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US$205 million agricultural investment, supported by a 310km power line, 
which includes four transformer stations, Berber, Al Ghbash, Abu Hamad and 
Hassad, inaugurated on 23 June 2013 by Sudan’s president and a Qatari 
delegation (Gulf Times 2013). However this latter project has not been 
operational due to electricity access challenges (Hillhorst 2015b). 
 
Table 7.2. International investments in Sudan by country of origin 2000-2008 (% of total FDI) 
 
Source: (Elamin & Tanyeri-Abur 2011) 
 
Financial investors and private equity firms are also involved in land and 
water investments in Sudan. A good example under this category is GLB 
Invest SAL, a Lebanese offshore company operating in the trade of 
agricultural raw materials. Initiated in 2011, GLB Invest acquired 87,200 
hectares and is developing a center-pivot irrigated alfalfa farm in North Sudan 
(Farmlandgrab 2014c; GLB Invest 2014). The first phase has already been 
completed whereby the project is planned over five phases ending in 2018, 
with planned production capacity to reach 40,000MT in 2014, to be sold 
primarily to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In December 2013, Bemo 
Securitisation (BSEC) and Bemo Saudi Fransi Finance (BSFF) acted as joint 
sell-side advisers to GLB Invest SAL and facilitated an acquisition of a 
minority stake by M1 Harvest in a deal worth US$16.5 million. Badra, the 
chairman of GLB Invest SAL, had declared in May 2013 during an investment 
conference in Khartoum that his investments in this project will reach $800 
million by 2019 (Business News 2014). 
 
Other modalities of investments also exist. For example, according to the Arab 
Brazilian Chamber of Commerce, during the Brazil–Africa integration 
seminar conducted on 29 August 2014 in Ceará–Fortaleza, two projects 
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involving Brazilians and Arabs were presented involving investment by the 
Algerian company Cevital in Brazil, while the other entailed the Brazilian 
Agro-Industrial Company in Sudan (Farmlandgrab 2014b). The chairman of 
the company Paulo Hegg presented ongoing agricultural projects in Sudan, 
including growing grains and cotton, whereby ‘the company’s planted area 
increased from 7,300 hectares in 2011 to 11,000 hectares in 2014 with 
projected revenues to reach US$22 million’ (ANBA 2014). 
 
There are several factors facilitating GCC investments in Sudan. In terms of 
regional politics, Saudi investments in Sudan are a quid pro quo, a reward 
mechanism for Khartoum’s military-Islamist Al-Ingaz (Salvation) regime for 
its participation in the war in Yemen. In November 2015 both countries 
signed four agreements that committed the kingdom to fund three big dam 
projects, as well as the cultivation and irrigation of more than one million 
acres (Verhoeven 2016). These agreements were further expanded in February 
2016 when Ibrahim Al-Assaf the Saudi finance Minister travelled to Sudan 
and committed US$5 billion in dam project finance to Sudan’s Dam 
Implementation Unit, in addition to concessions for a thermal power plat, as 
well as rural development initiatives (Ibid). This is a clear example for the 
intersection between regional Arab politics, and the ‘land-water-food’ / 
‘water-energy-food’ nexus in the Nile basin. Other factors facilitating GCC 
investments in Sudan include the regional proximity with eastern Africa 
representing a logistic advantage because of lower shipping costs whereby 
savings could reach US$ 30 per ton for export to the UAE, and higher for 
export from Sudan to Saudi Arabia (Hillhorst 2015b). However, challenges for 
investment development in Sudan and most sub-Saharan Africa (in contrast 
with Egypt) include poor infrastructure and logistic constraints, often 
resulting in high transport costs from farm-gate to seaport in the exporting 
country which could be overcome by establishing (Hillhorst 2015b). These 
logistical challenges can be overcome through transport corridors from the 
Atbara region in Sudan to Saudi Arabia to export of alfalfa (Ibid). These 
factors combined can further facilitate transnational land-water investments 
in Sudan and other Nile basin countries, notably under the joint Arab food 
security strategy. However, they may be perceived as a risk for Egypt’s water 
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security and Nile hydropolitics and may represent a growing aspect of 
competition over land-water resources for food production (Interviews # 70; 
#6; #29; #44). 
 
7.4. Conclusion  
 
Nile Hydropolitics & Transnational Investments in Sudan: Water Grabs or 
Economic Integration? 
 
Egyptian-Sudanese hydropolitical relations have witnessed several events of 
cooperation and tension over the last half a century. Despite different political 
cycles throughout the postcolonial era, both countries have historically formed 
an alliance to maintain the hydro-political status quo. However, Sudan’s 
changing position in relation to Ethiopia’s GERD marks a significant shift in 
Nile hydropolitics, as it will benefit from the largest hydropower structure in 
Africa, both in terms of electricity, as well as regulating the Nile flow, thus 
allowing for more agricultural investments downstream (Nicol & Cascão 2016; 
Hillhorst 2015b). These events could represent a good example of the “co-
existence of conflict and cooperation” in trans-boundary hydropolitics 
(Mirumachi & Allan 2007; Earle et al. 2010), albeit from a state-centric 
standpoint.  
 
Given the changing hydropolitical landscape in the Nile basin, the chapter 
argued that transnational investments and land-water nexus in Sudan and 
other Nile basin countries represent a venue that brings different risks, 
opportunities, and uncertainties to Egyptian water security. The chapter 
examined state-capital alliances and land-water-food nexus in Sudan from 
three different perspectives; (i) Egyptian ‘state’ actors; (ii) Egyptian non-state 
actors, and (iii) international (GCC) state and ‘non-state’ actors. Worth noting, 
in Sudan investments depend on underground and Nile water supplemented 
by rainwater in some locations, while in South Sudan, they mostly depend on 
rainwater. 
 
However, several contemporary attempts are taking place by the Egyptian 
state to facilitate trade and transportation with Sudan and Africa at large. 
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Trading in meat and livestock is the most common economic activity by the 
Egyptian private sector in Sudan, which entails a significant amount of virtual 
water. Beyond this water-food-trade sub-nexus, evidence indicates that 
transnational investments by the Egyptian state in Sudan as well as other Nile 
basin countries, have been long proposed, however little progress has been 
achieved on the ground (Tawfik 2016). As such, despite the long-standing 
policy discourse on economic integration and joint food security strategy 
under the Nile basin or the joint Arab food security strategy, state-to-state 
agreements to develop the land-water-food nexus have not materialized and 
represent an unachieved potential from an Egyptian water security 
standpoint.  
 
In terms of the Egyptian and international non-state actors’ investments in 
the Nile basin, evidence indicates that these have increased in number over 
the last decade, however the reflect a significant implementation gap. 
Transnational state-capital alliances in Sudan by non-state actors’ especially 
from GCC countries reflect the Gulf-Nile connection, driven by both strategic 
objectives, as well as profit. In this respect, it is important to separate between 
private equity firms, sovereign wealth funds, and international private sector 
companies supported by their home government. Furthermore, transnational 
investments in North and South Sudan by Egyptian non-state actors may not 
necessarily contribute to Egyptian water security despite their potential. 
Egyptian non-state actors’ land-water investments in Sudan and other Nile 
basin countries mostly serve the domestic markets. Financial investors and 
private sector may sell their produce locally (as in the case of Citadel Capital in 
South Sudan), or may export it to Arab region, or alternatively to other 
destinations. A key finding in this respect is that Egyptian investments by 
private sector in Sudan are usually profit and market oriented, whereby 
agriculture produce does not necessarily reach Egypt, hence does not 
contribute to its food security. In fact, “Egyptian and international 
investments in Sudan can be harmful to Egyptian water security and indeed to 
the Nile basin at large notably where high water consuming crops are 
cultivated and exported outside of the Nile basin” (Interview #6). This implies 
that the nexus may potentially represent a risk negatively affecting Egypt’s 
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water security vis-à-vis the Nile basin’s already contested upstream water 
resources.  
 
The (positive or negative) implications of transnational investments in 
Sudan on Egyptian water security and Nile basin hydropolitics are not yet 
defined. However, according to (Interview #70), “Sudan is already using its 
Nile water share and therefore any new large-scale irrigation investments 
depending on the Nile automatically imply additional water requirements”. 
This has been also confirmed by senior water resources officials in Egypt 
stressing the importance of understanding the implications of transnational 
investments (Egyptian and Arab) on Nile hydropolitics. What are the 
precautions and preconditions necessary to avoid negative impact of water 
quality and quantity issues especially in light of growing Arab water security 
concerns and the role of League of Arab states in Africa?” (Interviews #6; #8). 
These concerns are primarily due to the fact that non-state actors’ investments 
are financially driven by profit and market dynamics, and can represent a 
form of water grabs on the transboundary level, whereby the destination of 
final agricultural produce and the water embedded within may not necessarily 
be directed towards Nile countries. State-capital alliances may be framed as 
economic integration under the Arab food security strategy or bilateral 
economic agreements, yet they may well represent a form of disguised water 
grabs. 
 
Hence, from an Egyptian water security perspective, transnational 
investments in Sudan and other Nile basin countries may represent different 
opportunities, risks, and uncertainties associated with land-water-food nexus 
for both state and non-state actors. In this respect, the land-water-food nexus 
in Sudan as framed by different state and non-state actors may entail water 
grabs, which could represent a new variable in Nile hydropolitics. This could 
be viewed as another form of water security mercantilism, whereby 
technology, financial, and regional politics are involved in Nile water 
grabbing; for profit and larger strategic objectives. 
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Chapter 8  
 
Synthesis & Conclusion 
 
A Multi-level Analysis of Egyptian Water Security 
 & Transnational State-Capital Alliances 
 
8.1. A broadened view of Egyptian Water Security & Transnational 
Investments in the Nile Basin 
 
Conventionally, the question of Egyptian water security focused on 
transboundary hydropolitical analysis within the larger context of the Nile 
river basin. Analytical endeavors typically concentrated on state actors and 
their (hydro)-political interactions on bilateral, regional, and international 
levels. This dissertation explored a different aspect of Egyptian water security 
beyond this ‘state-centric epistemology’, typically focusing on a singular scale 
of hydropolitical analysis. The presented research explored the water (hydro) 
politics of ‘transnational state-capital alliances’ and the role of non-state 
actors in the -silent- appropriation of land-water resources, through 
investments in farmlands abroad, within Egypt, as well as other Nile basin 
countries, notably in Sudan. 
 
This research scope was explored in light of the wider contexts of the food and 
fuel crisis of 2007 and 2011, as well as the political context in Egypt post 2011 
uprising and its regional implications. Globally, following the food-fuel crisis 
in 2007, prices dropped by the end of 2008, but they never resumed their pre-
2008 levels, and began to rise in 2009 and spike by the end of 2010 (Dixon 
2013). These factors put tremendous fiscal and political pressures on 
countries such as Egypt who depends on wheat imports to feed a growing 
population. Furthermore, Egypt’s economic challenges escalated after four 
years of instability in the aftermath of the January 25 2011 revolution, as well 
as its military operations against terrorist groups in Sinai, and its diplomatic 
and military engagement in regional conflicts (Tawfik 2016). Furthermore, 
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largely since the 2007- 2008 food-fuel-financial crises, the corporate agri-
food system has been expanding regionally, as finance capitalists began 
acquiring (and attempting to acquire) agricultural land and food processing 
companies in neighboring countries(Dixon 2013). At the regional level, this 
led to an alignment with GCC countries, notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE to 
support Egypt politically and economically, and to actually contribute to its 
national Mega projects such as the 1.5 million feddan, amongst other 
investments. While Egypt witnessed all these political-economic changes 
during post-2011 uprising, these events contrasted with the relative stability 
and economic rise of Ethiopia, thus creating new power imbalances in the Nile 
basin, notably with the launch of the GERD in April 2011 (Tawfik 2016). 
 
To be able to examine the hydropolitics associated with transnational 
investments, the analytical lenses of  ‘land-water-food’ nexus and water grabs 
were deployed within a multilevel water security framework.  This analytical 
approach is based on recognizing the presence of different actors (polycentric) 
that interact across multiple scales (multi-level) (Bakker & Morinville 2013). 
While each scale of analysis represents a unique perspective, a multi-level 
water security approach towards transnational investments allows to broaden 
out hydropolitical analysis beyond the territorial trap of methodological 
nationalism (Agnew 1994). Hence, adopting a multisite case study 
methodology, the presented analysis sheds light on common patterns and 
contradictions of transnational state-capital alliances and land-water 
investments across different hydropolitical scales, to understand the 
interrelation between local dynamics, domestic politics, and international 
relations (Menga 2016). To examine the hydropolitics of transnational 
investments within Egypt on local and national levels, the research presented 
the case study of the Emirati Al Dahra Agricultural Company. To examine 
transnational investments and Nile hydropolitics, the analysis focused on the 
case of Sudan with a particular emphasis on transnational investments by the 
Egyptian state on the one hand, as well as investments by non-state actors 
including both Egyptian and international (GCC) investors. 
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Therefore, it is argued that the water (hydro) politics of transnational state-
capital alliances and land-water investments are manifested through;                 
(i) multi-scalar linkages with hydropolitical implications across the local, 
national, and transboundary levels potentially influencing one another;           
(ii) ‘land-water-food’ nexus linkages and water grabs which expand and 
broaden out the classical perception of state-centric water (security) from a 
singular element of the political economy towards polycentric water security 
governance reflecting the changing role of state and non-state actors towards 
land-water resources; (iii) implications on social justice notably in relation to 
the largest water users (e.g. farmers), often overlooked by state-capital 
alliances framings of the land-water-food nexus as a ‘political-economic 
commodity’.  
 
This chapter synthesizes the research findings by presenting them in three 
distinct categories. Following this introduction, Section 8.2 highlights how 
transnational state-capital alliances in both home (GCC) and host (Nile basin) 
manifest the Nile-Gulf connection driven by a particular framing of the ‘land-
water-food’ nexus as a political-economic commodity; a venue for capital 
accumulation, modernization, and non-traditional security. In this respect, 
land-water investments take several shapes and forms within Egypt, but also 
in Sudan and other Nile basin countries. Section 8.3 discusses how the land-
water-food nexus in Egypt is founded on the manufacture of abundance often 
reflecting tensions associated with multiple nexi, for both investors and 
smallholders. These tensions reflect the absent role of the state which 
negatively impacts different water users. Section 8.4 presents a multi-level 
analysis of transnational investments. It shows how state-capital alliances 
within and outside of Egypt represent various forms of water grabs across 
multiple landscapes. It argues that water politics of transnational investments 
different scales represent an emerging element in Egypt’s water security 
debates, and manifest a growing role for non-state actors in Nile 
hydropolitics. Section 8.5 concludes the chapter by highlighting how 
transnational state-capital alliances and the growing role of non-state actors 
in land-water investments denotes the shift from the hydraulic mission to 
water security mercantilism. In this respect, state-capital alliances have served 
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primarily the financial mandate of investors, either by accessing the land-
water nexus for production of strategic crops to be sold in the local market, or 
by exporting strategic crops to their home countries and international market. 
In all cases, non-state actors achieve financial profit by accessing land-water 
resources in host (Nile basin) countries, thus intensifying competition to 
secure water amongst different water users, notably the farmers at the local 
level, and the riparian countries at the transboundary level. These elements 
combined represent new variables in the Egyptian water security equation 
beyond state-centric hydropolitics. 
 
8.2. The Gulf-Nile Connection: State-Capital Alliances and the Land-
Water Nexus as a Political-Economic Commodity  
 
8.2.1. Political Economy of Trans - (national) State-Capital Alliances: 
Changing role of state and non-state actors 
 
The sharp increase in LSLA and consequently the appropriation of water 
resources through investments in farmlands abroad is often attributed to the 
food and energy crisis of 2007/08 and 2010/11. However, transnational 
investments have been sustained long past the market turbulence. In fact, 
these global events led water scarce countries from the GCC and MENA 
regions to realize “the risk of not securing enough food imports at any price 
even if their pockets are lined with petrodollars leaving an immense 
psychological impact” (Woertz 2011) . Indeed, scarce water resources in the 
Arab World and limited opportunities for the expansion of arable land are 
often perceived as key obstacles for domestic food production. As the invisible 
‘virtual water’ trade system failed them, the threat of export restrictions led 
importing countries with severe physical water scarcity indices, to become 
concerned about their food security, and “to consider ways to by-pass global 
food markets by engaging directly in food production” (Li, 2014). 
Furthermore, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE phasing out wheat and alfalfa 
production, dairy and poultry producers in the GCC are continuously looking 
for alternative supply sources for feedstock (Hillhorst 2015b). 
 
As a result, different investors from these regions have been seeking 
opportunities for large-scale investments in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, 
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amongst other countries within the Nile basin and elsewhere globally. 
Interestingly enough, Egyptian state and non-state actors themselves are also 
seeking investment opportunities in other African and Nile basin countries. 
Investments often take place on a bilateral basis or under the umbrella of 
regional platforms (COMESA; League of Arab States). 
 
Land-water acquisitions by non-state actors imply new investment modalities 
in search of water and food security, founded on state-capital alliances. 
Alliances encompass different types of non-state actors aiming to grow their 
farmlands abroad, including financial investors and international private 
sector companies supported by their home governments, notably from GCC. 
State-Capital alliances and transnational investments also reflect a changing 
role of the state towards land-water resources, and consequently water and 
food security as observed on two different fronts; (i) the first in home 
countries (typically water scarce) between state and non-state actors/national 
investors capable of investing in farmlands abroad to address the state’s larger 
strategic objectives of water/food security (supply of strategic crops). (ii) The 
second front consists of ‘state-capital alliances’ taking place in host countries, 
between the state and international investors/non-state actors aiming to 
appropriate land-water resources through large-scale investments. Both 
venues however are not mutually exclusive. For instance, while GCC 
investments in Egypt typically represent both types (national and 
transnational alliances), Egyptian investments in Sudan can vary between 
either state-to-state, or, independent private sector (small, medium or large), 
as well as institutional and financial investors (e.g. private equity).  
 
As discussed in chapter 5, there are different institutional arrangements to 
coordinate between home governments, international investors, and host 
governments. Examples of ‘national state-capital alliances’ include the 
arrangements between Gulf government agencies or programs (ADFCA, 
QNFSP, KAISAIA) on the one hand, and their domestic private sector capable 
of investing in farmlands abroad on the other. In this respect, GCC agro-
investors aim at enhancing national food security and vertical integration of 
the supply chain. Non-state actors and investors also pursue the greater 
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objectives of profit maximization, and long-term asset management to provide 
income for an after-oil age (Interview # 35). KAISAIA aims at providing funds, 
credit and logistics to Saudi Investors to invest in farmlands abroad. Its 
strategy is founded on establishing a strategic reserve for basic food 
commodities, to meet the Saudi food needs and avoid a future food crisis. In 
the case of UAE, investments rely more on the private sector and state-owned 
funds, whereby LSLA by private investors are more informal compared to 
other GCC investors (Woertz 2013a). The state-owned Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Development (ADFD) or the commercially motivated Dubai World subsidiary 
for investment in natural resources adopts an equity-oriented approach (Ibid). 
Abu Dhabi Food Control Authority contracts qualified local firms engaged in 
agricultural investments abroad notably in the market of fodder production to 
strengthen domestic Emirati agricultural and livestock sectors (ADFCA 2016). 
For example companies such as Jenaan Investments and Al Dahra 
Agricultural Company undertook investments in Egypt and Sudan, as well as 
other countries globally “to supply ADFCA a variety of fodder items that have 
been scarce in the market”. 
 
In host countries, transnational investments represent a venue for state 
modernization to achieve socio-political and economic objectives. In Nile 
basin countries, LWI serve the state’s objectives to maximize its revenues 
from foreign currency by renting land and granting rights to use water 
resources by international investors. Under this arrangement, from the state’s 
perspective, FDI is typically a sign of modernity, job opportunities, and 
economic growth. In the case of Egypt, transnational investments are also 
conceived to play a more significant (political) role via the hydraulic mission 
of the state and its horizontal expansion plans. In Sudan, infrastructure and 
agricultural investments represent an opportunity to unleash the country’s 
underutilized potential of land-water resources, and to revive the vision of ‘the 
breadbasket of the Arab world’. It is also a source of foreign currency after 
Sudan’s loss of oil revenue after separation with South Sudan. 
 
As such, the land-water-food nexus represents a venue for “national” socio-
political projects, corporate profit, and non-traditional security. Hence, state-
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capital alliances frame the land-water-food nexus as a political-economic 
commodity. Many of these investments in the Nile basin are founded on a 
joint Arab food security strategy, and take place in Arab countries such as 
Egypt and Sudan, who also happen to be Nile basin countries. Both countries 
are perceived as contributors to the larger vision of water and food security 
amidst an alarming regional water scarcity narrative. Within this regional 
framework, transnational investments support host countries achieve 
agricultural sector modernization. In Egypt, investors position themselves as 
contributors to the state’s investment strategy and Mega projects. In Sudan, 
investors claim to support the larger vision of the breadbasket of the Arab 
World. However, this nexus framing often overlooks the already stressed Nile 
basin hydropolitics, and imposes a new element to the Egyptian water security 
equation. State-capital alliances also manifest the role of political and 
financial capital associated with transnational investments in grabbing water 
resources for their own profit as well as larger strategic objectives. In other 
words, transnational state-capital alliances serve larger political-economic 
objectives, thus shaping a new modality of water security mercantilism. 
 
8.2.2. Diverse Modalities of Land-Water Investments  
 
As shown in Annex 3, investments involve a multitude of actors, and take 
several shapes and forms across different geographic locations within the Nile 
basin countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan), depending on a variety of land-
water resources, and production strategies. In particular, in relation to 
Egyptian water security debates, the analysis focused on two broad categories 
of transnational investments; (i) within Egypt; (ii) in other Nile basin 
countries notably in Sudan.  
 
Transnational Investments in Egypt  
 
Despite being the most downstream country in the Nile basin, empirical 
evidence indicates that several transnational investments have materialized in 
Egypt. Investors target Egypt as an attractive destination for large-scale 
agricultural projects due to its infrastructure, business climate, labor, and 
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proximity to European and Gulf markets. Yet, large-scale projects only 
materialized on a small portion of the leased lands due to a number of factors 
and nexus tensions as discussed in section 8.3.  Al Dahra case study further 
showed that LWI within one country (Egypt) can vary in land size, water 
sources, and type of production, as well as other factors such as –but not 
limited to- access to electricity, transportation, logistics, and strategic 
location.  
 
Land deals taking place on the national level between the “entrepreneurial 
state” and the investors within Egypt are not only LSLA. As shown in Al Dahra 
case study, the company’s four different farmlands within Egypt targeted 
both; LSLA in remote desert areas of Mega Projects in ‘New Lands’ notably in 
Toshka and East Oweinat, as well as much smaller farmlands in ‘Old-New 
Lands’ in Al Salheya and Al Nubareya located east and west of Nile delta 
respectively. Al Dahra’s diverse farmlands modalities shed light on the 
variance in the nexus production elements across different sites as discussed 
in chapters 5 and 6. This diversity in location and size of farmlands allowed 
the company to access the comparative advantage across two generational 
models of land reclamations. Despite their relatively small size, investments in 
Old-New lands benefit from several advantages such as location, proximity of 
export ports and ease of logistics. This implies that financial profit through the 
appropriation of land-water resources is not only limited to LSLA, but can also 
take place in small/medium scale farms. 
 
Each of these sites depends on different water resources, and target certain 
types of crops. For example, in Al Dahra’s two acquired farmlands in Old-New 
Lands, water is sourced mainly from the Nile (i.e. Al Salheya) depending on 
Nile water from Al Ismailia Canal, or as in Al Nubareya depends on a mix of 
water sources, originally from underground water, supplemented by water 
from the Nile, which only started to flow to Al Dahra’s farms in 2014, 
conveyed through Al Nasr Canal, a main branch of Al Nubareya Canal. In this 
respect, Al Dahra developed a niche in Al Nubareya, despite the small land 
size (320 feddan), the farm production is mostly high value crops (citrus) 
exported to the European market. Al Salheya farmlands contain a mix of crops 
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such as alfa-alfa, wheat, and citrus. In Farmlands of western desert Mega 
projects such as Toshka, irrigation depends on water from Lake Nasser, 
expected to be complemented by underground water resources from the Great 
Nubian Sand Aquifer, while in East Oweinat, farming mainly depends on 
energy intensive water abstraction from the same aquifer. In this respect, 
desert farmlands in Toshka and Sharq Al Oweinat adopt economies of scale 
approach by establishing large size crop plantations, whereby the company 
has engaged with more strategic crops such as wheat and alfa alfa, whereby 
the former is sold in the local market and the latter is exported to the UAE.   
 
Crops have different market destinations. As shown from the case study, 
transnational LWI direct their production to 3 different markets; (a) the 
European market typically demanding high value crops (fruits and vegetables) 
which often translate into foreign currency profit for the investor; (b) the 
home country based on previous deals conducted with state agencies, in the 
case study that was Al Dahra’s agreement with ADFCA to supply alfa-alfa and 
animal feed as discussed in chapter 5; (c) local market, whereby the 
transnational investor supplies the state with wheat as a way to contribute to 
its food security objectives, given that Egypt is the largest importer of wheat.  
 
However, each generational category of land reclamation schemes (Old-New 
Lands vs. New Lands) also entails some resources nexus tensions. For 
instance, in New Lands, Al Dahra faced different legal difficulties especially 
following the January 2011 Revolution in Egypt.  These were mostly related to 
politics of land allocation in New lands during the Mubarak era, however 
caused significant delays and financial cost on the ground. Other nexus 
tensions are related to remoteness of desert sites, access to electricity, and 
high cost of logistics and transportation.  In Old-New lands, despite the 
various advantages, investments are situated in a downstream geographical 
context east and west of Nile Delta (Al Salheya and Al Nubareya) with 
inherent challenges for different water users. As such, Al Dahra faced the 
classical challenge of water availability, estimated to be only 40% of the 
company’s actual irrigation needs. This situation clearly reflects the water 
politics associated land-water nexus tensions on the local level, and often 
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leads to water grabs by the political, financial, and technological capital 
endowments of the investors. Additional investments in Egypt include other 
investors from Saudi Arabia and the UAE with LSLA in Toshka, East Oweinat, 
as well as the recently launched ‘1.5 million feddan project’.  
 
Transnational Investments in Sudan and the Nile Basin 
 
Sudan remains the riparian country with most potential for land-water 
resources in the Nile basin. Investments in Sudan do not only depend on Nile 
water, but also on underground water resources, often supplemented by 
rainwater. For example, Egyptian investments in Sudan by both state and 
non-state actors depend mostly on Nile water. While in South Sudan, LWI by 
Egyptian non-state actors depend on rainwater such as the case of Citadel 
Capital. In this respect, the land-water nexus in Sudan represents an 
opportunity for different state and non-state actors to invest in agriculture 
either for profit or for larger strategic objectives such as food security. The 
Sudanese state has also benefited from Chinese and Gulf investments to 
develop its under utilized land-water resources, notably by financing 
infrastructure, dams, reservoirs, canals, irrigation and agriculture 
technologies. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
(GERD) in Ethiopia and its large storage capacity may change future water 
allocation policies in Sudan, favoring agricultural intensification in existing 
irrigation schemes in the country (Hillhorst 2015b). In 2013, the Sudanese 
National Investment Authority and the Presidency Office issued the Directory 
of Proposed Investment Projects, including 323 projects in different economic 
sectors with a total investment cost of US$30 billion. Out of these 323 
projects, 117 projects are in the agriculture sector, totaling 8 million acres 
distributed among 12 states (National Investment Authority 2013).  
However, little investments have materialized in Sudan. Evidence indicates 
that the operational acreage from the recent GCC investments is small 
compared to the existing irrigation schemes (16,200 versus 1,701,000 ha). 
However, the intended GCC - MENA projects (about 300,000/500,000 ha 
respectively) cover a sizeable area and would lead to a substantial expansion 
of the irrigated area in Sudan.  
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8.3. Manufacture of Abundance: Nexus Opportunities, and Tensions in 
Egypt 
 
8.3.1. Land-water-food nexus as the manufacture of abundance  
 
For the Egyptian state, water security is often synonym to horizontal 
expansion, frontier making, and modernization. As discussed in chapters 2 
and 3, under the rule of Mohamed Ali and Nasser – known as the founders of 
modern Egypt, the ‘developmental state’ strongly intervened in the economy 
to achieve deep social and economic transformations (Farah 2009). This role 
was manifested in advancing the hydraulic mission (defined as mastering 
nature and controlling the flow of water) through storage, hydropower, and 
irrigation infrastructure. In addition, the state aimed to develop the ‘water 
and agriculture’ economy through large-scale land reclamation schemes for 
horizontal expansion and expanding Egypt’s Nile watershed.  
 
It could be argued that the state’s hydraulic mission has evolved to the level 
where it is trying to do too much with too little, thus leading to the 
“manufacture of abundance”.  In other words, “the current use of water 
resources for irrigation is higher than what is actually needed” (Interview # 1). 
Egypt’s total agricultural land is 8 million feddan. Originally the Nile’s 
watershed within Egypt serves 5.6 million feddan known as the ‘Old Lands’. 
Since 1952, and more progressively following the construction of the Aswan 
High Dam, the state’s 5-year socio-economic plans (Khetta Kahmseya) 
embarked on a massive horizontal expansion plan, which added 2.4 million 
feddan of what is known as ‘Old-New Lands’ and ‘New Lands’. Hence, in post-
colonial Egypt, the dream of greening the desert and horizontal expansion 
through state-sponsored land reclamation projects has been an essential 
element in fulfilling the hydraulic mission on the national level. There is a 
contradiction however between “reclaimed lands” and actual “productive” 
land. Evidence indicates that figures do not match whereby an 
implementation gap exists (Sims 2015). Furthermore, despite the state’s 
investments in massive land reclamation schemes, Egypt’s  ‘ecological-
demographic narrative of crisis’ still prevails with its twin challenges; 
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demographic redistribution, and increased food production for the 
unachieved objective of self-sufficiency. 
 
The role of the ‘developmental state’ towards its hydraulic mission and land 
reclamation changed across time. With the liberalization of the economy 
during the late 70s and 80s, followed by a period of structural adjustment 
programs during the 1990s, the role of the developmental state (as understood 
under Ali and Nasser) gradually faded. It transformed into a predatory role 
(Evans 1989; 1995) with increased private sector participation in the 
economy, and no exception the ‘water and agriculture’ sectors. During this 
period of economic liberalization, post-colonial land reforms were partly 
reversed by Law 96 issued in 1992, through which the agrarian land was 
liberalized often at the expense of smallholders’ land rights mostly in Old 
Lands. During this period of agrarian reform policy called “privatization of 
state land”, the Ministry of agriculture started selling its land, thus promoting 
greater private sector participation in the agriculture sector.   
 
As discussed in chapter 4, national data shows that over the last 30 years 
private sector investments in agriculture witnessed significance growth, 
representing over 90% of total new investments with a continuously 
diminishing share for the state. This growing private sector contribution to the 
agricultural economy mostly took place through export of high value crops. In 
this respect, over the last few decades, the agro-food industry has been 
conceived as a “frontier” for capital accumulation as argued by Dixon (2013). 
Hence, the predatory state focused more on the commercialization of 
agriculture for financial gains and economic growth, while overlooking the 
problems of small farmers entrenched in physical and political scarcity.  
Furthermore, the participation of domestic private sector in farming high 
value crops for export to European market created a parallel water economy 
mainly depending on underground water resources especially in Old-New 
Lands; the first is the economy of farmers and small landholders from youth 
and graduates mostly depending on surface Nile water deteriorating in terms 
of quality, quantity, and distribution. The second is the economy of private 
sector investors endowed with technology and capital, which typically vary in 
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size, location, and markets, mostly depending on underground water 
resources, due to its better quality matching European exports requirements. 
Ironically, with the liberalization of the water and agriculture sector, and the 
relative withdrawal of the state, the immature private sector has significantly 
exhausted underground water resources (higher water salinity and digging 
deeper wells hence higher cost of energy), from which they were the first to 
suffer. Furthermore, while private sector engagement created a parallel water 
economy for the export market, it did not address Egypt’s ecological-
demographic narrative of crisis (Sims 2015), nor the unreachable goal of self-
sufficiency. As a result, the country’s physical and political (water) scarcity 
narratives have deepened further. 
 
Ironically however, while the share of private sector investments in 
agriculture increased, it was still considered as insufficient for the growth of 
the Egyptian agricultural economy. Consequently, by the end of the twentieth 
century (circa 1996-present), the state shifted its horizontal expansion 
strategy in pursuit of modernization dreams and 21st century hydraulic 
mission, by establishing national Mega Projects in remote desert lands (e.g. 
South Valley- Toshka & Oweinat; Al Salam project). Additional drivers for this 
evolving approach towards land reclamation included the cumulative 
challenges associated with Old Lands where small farmers dominate, as well 
as the mixed results achieved in the Old-New lands associated with historical 
baggage and inherent water user challenges. Mega projects also aimed at the 
expansion of the agricultural economy to achieve the paradoxical objectives of 
self-sufficiency and the growth of agricultural exports. 
 
To address these inherent challenges, the changing role of the 
“entrepreneurial state” (Mazzucato 2011a; 2013b) aimed at promoting the 
engagement of new players in its National Mega Projects. This entrepreneurial 
role is founded on de-risking land reclamation and horizontal expansion 
through infrastructure investments in remote desert areas (e.g. largest pump 
in the world, access to electricity, irrigation infrastructure, roads, ports, 
etc.…). This new approach towards the state’s hydraulic mission aimed to 
attract domestic and international investors endowed with capital and 
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technology, capable of developing large-scale agricultural production schemes 
in remote desert areas, to advance its horizontal expansion plans and frontier 
making processes. On the other hand, for the investors, securing water is an 
essential production input and an important element to achieve both profit, 
and in some cases fulfill larger strategic objectives such as food security. 
Conceptually the thesis situates large-scale corporate and financial 
investments in land and water resources as a key factor of the hydraulic 
mission of the ‘Entrepreneurial State’, thus representing an emerging element 
of water security on the national level.  
 
As such, transnational state-capital alliances reflect the changing role of the 
state towards its hydraulic mission. While post 1952 the state was the main 
sponsor, developer, and operator of large-scale desert development schemes, 
today, land reclamation and water use are not confined to state actors, small 
farmers or domestic investors. Rather, new international investors have been 
also appropriating land-water resources by investing in Egypt’s Mega desert 
reclamation schemes. In this respect, these alliances entail a myriad of 
interactions between capital, technology, global commodity market, as well as 
regional political and economic interests.  
 
Mega schemes and transnational investments attracted many criticisms 
domestically as well as internationally; politically in terms of water shares, 
socially in terms of benefit to the larger population, and environmentally in 
terms of resources exhaustion, commercialization of natural resources, and 
dependence on non-renewable water resources, thus facilitating virtual water 
grabs. In this respect, Warner (2013) indicates that foreign development 
experts accepted the questionable assumptions legitimizing developmental 
mega schemes (Mitchell 1995; 2002). Experts from the World Bank and 
Arthur Anderson made economic cost-benefit analyses apparently believing 
the promise of full reclamation made by Gulf investors. As such, 
infrastructural megaprojects sought to make up for an almost complete 
disconnect between state and society (Dorman 2007). 
 
 
 
260 
Little success was achieved during the first decade (1996-2006) of Mega 
projects implementation, marked with the presence of a few controversial 
transnational investments by Gulf (Saudi) investors such as KADCO owned by 
Saudi Prince Walid Ibn Talal. However, despite the challenges associated with 
early transnational investments in Toshka, additional Gulf investments 
targeted land-water resources and Mega projects in Egypt during the last 
decade. Many of these were driven by the food and fuel crisis of 2007/08 and 
2010/11, mostly from Gulf companies such as Al Rajhi from Saudi Arabia, as 
well as Jenaan, and Al Dahra from the UAE.  
 
Furthermore, under the ‘Egypt 2030 Sustainable Development Vision’, 
the state’s strategy implemented by the Ministry of Investment promotes FDI 
in the agriculture sector as a promising area of growth. The state’s objective is 
to further pursue horizontal expansion to expand Egypt’s agro-ecological 
zones and urban centers from the current 8 million feddan to 12 million 
feddan (AL Ahram 2015). To achieve this plan, the entrepreneurial state 
launched the ‘1.5 million-feddan project’ in 2015, which offers additional 
opportunities for international investments  (as part of a larger national 
project to reclaim 4 million feddan). The research labels this latest episode of 
Mega projects as ‘hydraulic mission 3.0’.  
 
However, amidst an inherent context of water stress, and given the 
state’s water budget, the objectives of frontier making and horizontal 
expansion are mostly founded on the ‘manufacture of abundance’. Hence 
state-capital alliances reproduce the inherent context of physical and political 
scarcity, which not only negatively influence the largest water users, but also 
investors’ profit, and ironically the state’s hydraulic mission itself.  For the 
state, the land-water nexus is often synonyms to paradoxical policy objectives 
such as –but not limited to- horizontal expansion, demographic 
redistribution, agricultural sector modernization, economic development in 
terms of employment and GDP shares, FDI, self-sufficiency, and growing 
agricultural exports. Land reclamation and the establishment of large-scale 
farms in both Mega projects and Old-New Lands depend on both Nile water, 
as well as underground water resources from underground aquifers. However, 
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in an already water stressed context, large-scale projects require water 
quantities which often surpass the existing water budget. Given the inherent 
politics of water allocation and distribution (Barnes, 2013), these additional 
amounts will be either extracted from non-renewable aquifers in the desert, 
hence contradicting the very essence of sustainable use of resources, with a 
high probability to affect future generations. Or alternatively, if large-scale 
investments rely on already stressed surface water (e.g. Nile river), they will 
most likely come at the expense of other users. In both cases state-capital 
alliances are founded on the abundance of a politically and physically scarce 
resource. As such, this raises the question of opportunity cost of water use in 
desert areas and Mega projects, thus bringing back the opinions of Roushdi 
Said who advocated the use of water in the desert for industrial use given its 
economic return compared to agricultural activities.  
 
Furthermore, there is an important link between food security and the 
different uses of water resources – for example wheat and rice are highly 
consumable crops in Egypt, which use a lot of water resources for their 
cultivation. There is a need to make a political decision of whether to cultivate 
these crops despite their high consumption of water resources, or whether the 
water should be directed to other low water consuming/high value crops and 
in this case rely on importing rice and wheat. It may be cheaper to import rice 
and wheat and use the water resources in other high value cultivations – 
however this may have negative implications on Egypt’s food security as rice 
and wheat are staple crops necessary in the Egyptian diet.  
 
In conclusion, it could be argued that the “manufacture of abundance” is 
equivalent to “trying to do too much with too little”, often leading to the 
reproduction of scarcity in areas of inherent stress. In this respect, Egypt’s 
water budget imposes certain limitations and constraints on the use of its 
renewable water resources from the Nile, which often contradicts with the 
state’s horizontal expansion plans. Furthermore, Mega projects entail a 
contradiction with the state’s hydraulic mission. On the one hand the 
entrepreneurial state is advancing frontier making through transnational 
investments in remote desert locations, while on the other losing the most 
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fertile agricultural land in the Nile valley and Delta. This implies that the more 
attention is needed to farmers and smallholders in order to conserve existing 
fertile land, as opposed to imposing more stress on existing renewable water 
resources or by exhausting non-renewable underground water resources.     
 
8.3.2. Resource Politics, Risks, and Uncertainty: Nexus tensions for water 
users and investors  
 
As discussed earlier, state-capital alliances often frame the ‘land-water-food’ 
nexus as a ‘political-economic commodity’. They represent a venue for capital 
accumulation and profit, as well as larger socio-political and (non-traditional) 
security objectives for both state and non-state actors (Gulf/Arab states and 
Nile countries). Little questioning however takes place about the social, 
environmental, and hydro-political risks as well as resources nexus tensions 
associated with these investments. Furthermore, this framing of the nexus 
tends to overlook the largest water users and their inherent challenges. 
 
Between the People and Water, the entrepreneurial state wants to attract the 
investor by mobilizing capital, technology and large-scale investments as a key 
aspect of modernization, while neglecting smallholders. A possible 
interpretation is that smallholders do not generate the same source of foreign 
currency as the investors. An unfortunate perception, since most of Egypt’s 
local food supply comes from local farmers who are “feeding Egypt’s 
population by their local production, compared to other commercial farming 
either exporting or producing to high value commercial chains (i.e. Carrefour, 
Niche markets, etc…) unaffordable by most population” (Interview # 4). 
Furthermore, state-capital alliances do not necessarily reflect a linear or fair 
process, given that they are often unregulated whereby private investors are 
not subject to the same restrictions imposed on smallholder and beneficiaries 
of state land programs. 
 
According to both, the state and investors, smallholders often lack financial 
and technical skills to fully develop their reclamation projects. From their 
perspective, there is no water value in Egypt, which is opposite to California 
for example, where the state takes shares from investors depending on 
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amount of water used, even in the case of rainwater. The vicious circle 
between traditional flood irrigation, cost of modern precision techniques, 
unauthorized withdrawals and pumping, cost of fuel, and access to markets 
amongst other factors are longstanding challenges facing the largest segment 
of water users. For different experts and investors, a more active role by the 
state is required. Experienced investors claim that they can play a role in 
providing technical advice to small investors, often under the umbrella of 
corporate social responsibility as in the case of Sekem for instance. However, 
this type of initiatives diverts attention from the key core questions of 
distribution, equity and social justice.   
 
In this respect, transnational investments are not just about the state and the 
investors. Nexus framings by state-capital alliances often overlook the largest 
water users; the farmers. As the largest users, the land-water-food nexus is the 
foundation of their livelihood, not only in Egypt, but also in Sudan as well as 
other Nile basin countries. There are ample of inherent and existing 
challenges associated with land-water resources for smallholders notably in 
Old-New lands. As original beneficiaries of the state’s land distribution 
programs, smallholders are heavily regulated, lack support and suffer from 
weak infrastructure (Interview #1); this is also confirmed by smallholders who 
often describe their start-ups in desert lands as very tough given the limited 
resources and the government regulations and restrictions. Water quality and 
quantity are also a major problem in both new and old lands (Interview # 3). 
Water losses often result from leakage in irrigation canals distribution 
network inefficiencies, while chemical fertilizers often influence water quality 
and hence the reuse of drainage, in some cases mixed with sewage. In 
addition, issues of electricity in terms of access and cost are considered a big 
burden for smallholders. Despite being the largest water users, the neglect of 
smallholders by the state reproduces the inherent conditions of physical water 
scarcity and stallholders’ challenges, which negatively affects their livelihoods.  
 
For the investors, even with the diversity of land-water resources, their 
investments faced several challenges related to water, energy, and other 
issues. In the New Lands of Toshka and Sharq Al Oweinat, Al Dahra faced 
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several challenges related to land, water, and electricity as discussed in 
chapter 5. On the other hand, and as shown in the case study, in Old-New 
lands, nexus tensions for the investors are manifested in irregular water flow 
as a face of ‘scarcity’ resulting from the continuous added pressure on the Nile 
River, especially where irrigation depends on surface water. While Al Salheya 
and Al Nubareya farmlands lands may have a comparative advantage in terms 
of infrastructure (e.g. irrigation canals, roads, ports, access to electricity), two 
key factors challenge a profitable agricultural operation; the first is the 
insufficient amount of water resources, which only covered 40% of the 
company’s water needs to undertake its ambitious investments. However, the 
power of political connections in UAE plays a role to irrigate the investors’ 
farmlands in Egypt “when high level connections are made to ask for the water 
flow to reach the company’s farmlands” (Interview #20). The second 
challenge is the lack of proper maintenance of existing infrastructure, which 
in turn negatively affects the company’s operations on the ground and 
translates into high cost. As discussed in chapter 6, this was clearly manifested 
in the water-energy-food nexus challenges faced in Al Salheya operation, 
whereby the inconsistent electricity supply resulted in lost irrigation time, and 
consequently lower productivity, which ultimately translates into financial 
loss.   
 
Investors are not farmers. While financial investors and non-state actors can 
mobilize the funds to undertake a massive agricultural operation in farmlands 
abroad, they do not necessarily implement successful agricultural operations 
due to their lack of technical expertise and experience (Interviews # 24 & 19).  
This has been confirmed by both; international investors in Egypt as well as 
Egyptian financial investors abroad, especially in Sudan. Many investors 
identified the lack of technical knowledge, suitable to the local conditions of 
the acquired lands as a main obstacle towards developing large-scale 
agricultural investments. Consequently, once issues of cash flow and lack of 
finance occur at the surface, most of these investments significantly slow 
down, and may shut down. This is primarily due to a business strategy which 
depends on initial investment to develop 10% of the land size, whereby the 
revenue generated from this first phase of project development will be reused 
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to develop additional plots of acquired lands. As investments face risks and 
tensions on the ground, project implementation is often delayed in many of 
these farmlands due to several technical, political, cultural, and bureaucratic 
factors. This can be a possible explanation to the slow materialization of LSLA 
and farmlands vis-à-vis the announced figures of land deals.  
 
In this respect, the manufacture of abundance affects the rich investors and 
the struggling smallholders. Given the multitude of actors, and despite the 
diversity of investment modalities depending on the land-water nexus, 
competing interests create tensions between different resources and actors. 
They also reflect the absent role of the state on the ground. As such, different 
political economy factors, as well as sovereign, operational and socio-
environmental risks affect and are affected by these investments such as; 
water availability and the inconsistent water flow for different water users, in 
addition to issues of water quality and quantity, access to electricity, weak 
operation and maintenance (O&M) of irrigation infrastructure, transportation 
and vicinity to ports. Additional factors of pressure include the uncertainties 
associated with climate variability and shocks. State-capital alliances also 
draw attention to questions of water grabs, equity and social justice for 
smallholders. These tensions represent a new variable in Egypt’s water 
security equation not only for the smallholders, and investors, but also for the 
state itself. 
 
Sovereign, Environmental, and Social Risks for Investors 
 
Unlike other countries globally, several transnational investments 
materialized in Egypt. However, once the large-scale irrigated farms were 
operational, the government of Egypt imposed an export tax of 300 Egyptian 
pounds (~43 US$) per ton. Consequently, this tax rendered the foreign 
companies’ operations non-feasible from an economic standpoint, and forced 
the project operators to grow wheat for local consumption rather than fodder 
for export. While producing for the local market is profitable, it changed the 
original objective of the investments. It also reflects a different side of water 
security mercantilism. 
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While this export tax represents a form of sovereign risk, investing companies 
continued their engagement, as they were also producing high value crops for 
export to European markets, from which they can generate profits as shown in 
al Dahra case study. The continuation of Emirati investments in Egypt reflect 
larger political questions of alignment with Egypt’s regime to support the 
government’s efforts in feeding its growing population to support stability in 
the country following the events of 2013 which led to ousting of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Investments in agriculture were not however the only form of 
Emirati support to Egypt, which was and still are manifested in several 
projects across different sectors.  
 
Other risk elements of LSLA and investing in farmlands abroad include the 
environmental and social aspects of the investments.  Investors are becoming 
increasingly conscious that if companies do not respect the environment, local 
communities, and social dimensions of the investments, the company could 
face several challenges. To address these social and environmental challenges 
associated with large-scale investments, FAO adopted the Responsible 
Investment Principles (Interviews #28b; #29). These principles signed on 
October 15th 2014 aim to match responsible investment practices on the 
ground with principles of sustainable agriculture. However, FAO realizes that 
these principles only exist at the policy level, yet they need to be implemented 
by the investors. In this respect, there is still a lack of detailed operational 
guidelines, which are needed to provide clear guidance to the investors 
regarding sustainable investment practices. These factors combined represent 
contextual risks, which will be increasingly important elements for any future 
investment decision in farmlands abroad.  
 
8.4.Water Grabs & the Hydropolitics of Land Investments: A 
multilevel Analysis of Egyptian Water Security 
 
Few studies drew the linkage between [the] nexus/grabs literature and 
hydropolitical debates in transboundary river basin contexts. The 
appropriation of land-water resources through international investments 
often denotes a form of resources extraction, referred to as “water grabs”. 
Water grabs is a continuous act, unlike land grabs. Whether abstracting from 
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surface or underground water, withdrawals by international investors are a 
necessary production input for large-scale agricultural operations. 
Furthermore, water grabs do not necessarily imply land grabs. Often land 
deals especially in desert lands such as in Egypt are not labeled as land grabs, 
since they do not necessarily entail any negative impacts on local population, 
since there is no economic activity on most desert lands (with exceptional 
cases related to pastoralism). Yet, these land deals often represent water grabs 
as transnational investors seek to acquire water resources as a key input of 
production.  
 
Water grabs manifest themselves in different ways across multiple 
hydropolitical scales. On the local level, the irregular flow of water affects all 
actors. However the use of technology and capital by investors often leads to 
an unfair competition over water extraction, and may lead to water grabs and 
the reproduction of water scarcity for financially and technically marginalized 
farmers. As such, there is a clear disconnect between securing water for 
livelihoods, and securing water for maximum profit. The role of capital, 
technology, and political power reflect the existence of parallel water 
economies and the neglect of largest water users. Transnational investments 
also raise the question of virtual water grabs on the national level as well as 
transboundary water grabs with potential implication on Nile hydropolitics 
and Egyptian water security. 
 
Al Dahra case study shows how water security translates to different actors, 
notably farmers’ livelihoods, and investors’ profit. In light of the inherent 
challenges in Old Lands and Old-New Lands, Mega projects depend on the 
manufacture of abundance by relying on additional surface water resources, 
or non-renewable ground water resources. This in turn may result in 
increased competition over water resources on several fronts; first nationally, 
where water allocations for Old lands and Old-New Lands (typically 
downstream) may be affected by withdrawals upstream for Mega projects. 
Second, in locations with existing water stress within Old-New lands where 
the flow of irrigation water is already inconsistent as decided by the 
hydrocracy at the central level.  
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8.4.1. Local scale hydropolitics: The Re-Production of scarcity  
 
Water politics in Old-New Lands are manifested in different forms across 
various sites representing several paradoxes for both the livelihoods of small 
farmers as well as different elements of risks for the investors. As discussed in 
chapter 6, national water security policies and discourses are contested at the 
local level, whereby farmers see these investments as unfair competition. With 
the irregular water flow in Old-New Lands, the main government irrigation 
network is not supplying irrigation water (monawba) to different users. From 
the company’s point of view, “the irrigation system is not working well, there 
is a lack of understanding on how to operate the government pumps, resulting 
in physical water scarcity to be a key problem for all water users” (Interview 
#19). Yet, the investors have installed additional pumps to grab water from 
irrigation canals serving their farmlands. As such, water security for private 
investors may come at the expense of small farmers, who are “the most 
important given their contribution to food production locally” (Interview # 3), 
and most importantly sustaining their livelihoods. In this respect, water user 
associations have proven to be a dysfunctional platform due to power 
asymmetries between large investors, medium sized farms, and small farmers.  
 
Ironically however, foreign and private investments fail to secure the needed 
water resources for their massive agricultural operations. Yet, investors have 
the technology and experience to overcome periods of ‘physical’ water scarcity 
where water does not flow in the irrigation canals. Larger companies do have 
financial and technological means to adopt alternative approaches to adapt to 
periods of water shortage.  As shown in the case study, in Al Nubareya (West 
Delta), the company relies 50% on ground water and 50% Nile water. 
According to the farm manager,  “each feddan irrigated by Nile water is 
equivalent to 5 feddan irrigated using ground water in terms of ease of 
irrigation, and crop productivity…..a feddan irrigated by the Nile water lives 
more, costs less, and yields more productivity”. To adapt to periods of water 
shortage, the company has widened its on farm irrigation canals to enable the 
storage of additional water when the government network does not convey 
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irrigation water. On the other hand, in Al Salyeha where the company’s 
farmland mainly depends on surface water, adaptation to irregular water flow 
is still a challenge, however the company is planning to recharge unutilized 
saline underground wells by Nile water. By doing so, the company is planning 
to use these wells as reservoirs to compensate for periods of water shortage 
due to inconsistent government schedule (monawbat). 
 
Large-scale investments endowed with technology and capital do raise 
questions of inequity on the local level, with a high potential of creating 
conflict between small farmers and large corporate actors, often manifested in 
different forms including; water use/water quantity, water quality due to 
drainage and downstream environmental impacts, political and financial 
capital, role of technology, and power asymmetry especially in the setting of 
water users. 
 
A key finding is; while both the state and the investors have framed water 
security to serve their own interests, these investments may have contributed 
to the reproduction of water scarcity for the small farmers, thus imposing a 
new hydro-political element on the local level. As such, in investment 
locations where physical water stress exists, large-scale investments endowed 
with political, capital, and technological power, result in water grabs on the 
local level, affecting the largest and most vulnerable water users; the farmers, 
thus negatively influencing their livelihoods. This is especially the case 
downstream the Nile basin (east and west of delta), whereby transnational 
state-capital alliances reproduce political and physical (water) scarcity 
narratives. As such, there is a clear disconnect between securing water for 
livelihoods, and securing water for maximum profit. The role of capital, 
technology, and political power reflect the existence of parallel water political 
economies and the neglect of largest water users.  
 
As such, while nexus framings and investment processes are rooted in larger 
narratives of security and profit, the tendency is towards the 
commercialization of natural (land-water) resources by both the state and the 
investors. These investments entail Social & Hydropolitical Risks often 
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resulting in water grabs. Thus, they often result in reproducing political and 
physical (water) scarcity narratives. 
 
The Water-Climate Nexus 
 
Empirical evidence also shows that climate change pressures and implications 
on water resources availability (quality and quantity) add to the hydropolitical 
tensions on the local scale as shown in the case study. These dynamics also 
reflect the clear disconnect between political economy dimensions of state-
capital alliances on the one hand, and the resource challenges impeding the 
development of land-water investments on the ground. The climate 
implications on land-water investments include; different levels of water 
consumption between winter and summer seasons. For example, a Citrus tree 
needs on average 600 liters of water per week during summer and 250 liters 
of water per week during winter. During summer Irrigation schedule needs to 
adapt to the rise in temperature. More irrigation intervals for fewer hours to 
avoid high levels of evaporation. During winter, unexpected rain is a problem, 
especially in surprise events of flood or cold weather, typically unusual but 
increasingly happening. Hence, climate risks add to the hydropolitical 
tensions on the local level.  
 
8.4.2. The National Hydraulic Mission: Virtual Water Grabs    
 
 
As indicated earlier, water grabs are not only limited to questions of equity 
and social justice. Despite transnational land-water investments and FDI 
being perceived as a positive contributor to the state’s hydraulic mission and 
frontier making process it can have negative implications on Egypt’s ‘national’ 
water security, in two ways; (i) Transnational Land-water investments do not, 
and will not address Egypt’s ecological-demographic narrative of crisis. Even 
with the engagement of international investors and transnational land-water 
investments, these projects did not resolve the state’s concern about 
demographic re-distribution. (ii) Transnational Land-water investments entail 
a contradiction with the state’s food security and self-sufficiency objectives.  
This is especially true in the case where transnational investments export 
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crops with high water footprint, thus representing a key contradiction with 
Egypt’s security and scarcity narratives.  
 
While international investments are framed as a source of economic growth 
through FDI, they may not necessarily contribute positively to the persistent 
ecological-demographic narrative of crisis. Large-scale investments are 
perceived to contribute to the hydraulic mission of the entrepreneurial state 
and its Mega projects through FDI and agriculture sector modernization. Yet, 
while these investments may develop state-of-the-art farmlands in line with 
the state’s Mega projects and horizontal expansion plans, they have not 
resolved the question of population density and demographic redistribution 
within the Nile valley, or the larger question of self-sufficiency and closing the 
food import gap. This is mostly due to the sheer fact that transnational land-
water investments are capital and technology intensive, with little labour 
requirements, notably for the agricultural production aspects. Many of these 
projects are capital and technology intensive, mostly depending on 
mechanization for agricultural land development. Accordingly, the 
employment impact of these transnational land-water investments is minimal, 
as on average 50 feddan can employ two workers. Furthermore, since most 
investments export raw agricultural products, few labor-intensive value chains 
have developed, beyond packaging, transportation, and logistics. 
Consequently, large-scale investments in New Lands end up being isolated 
farmlands in the desert, with little impact on the larger landscape of Mega 
projects, such as the case in Toshka for instance.  
 
In fact many of these investments may represent a risk to Egyptian water 
security. Transnational investments may also denote a form of virtual water 
grab on the national level, especially in the case where foreign investors 
cultivate high water consuming crops for export. In the New-New Lands, with 
significantly larger farmlands than old-new lands, virtual water grabs may 
also occur through the export of both high value crops to Europe, and alfa-alfa 
and other cash crops to GCC. This is especially true given that international 
investments often receive investment facilitations and tax breaks, which are 
often not applicable to domestic investors. Additional water security risks 
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entail the reliance on non-renewable underground water resources in remote 
desert areas, or investing in farmlands in locations where there is already 
water stress especially in Old-New Lands downstream of the Nile delta.  
 
However, in some cases the state was able to mitigate this risk by imposing an 
export tax on alfa alfa. This in turn has rendered the business operations into 
loss, thus forcing transnational investors into producing wheat for the local 
market. While these measures may have prevented the question of virtual 
water grabs, they represent a modality of water security mercantilism, since 
the state has to buy the agricultural produce grown with its own water from 
the international investors who ultimately make profit from Egypt’s water. 
 
8.4.3. Transnational Investments and Nile hydropolitics: The Nexus in 
Sudan as an Opportunity and a Risk for Egyptian water security  
 
The case of Sudan shows that transnational state-capital alliances on the 
transboundary level of Nile basin represent an emerging element of Nile 
hydropolitics, notably from an Egyptian water security perspective. While 
investments in Egypt are founded on the manufacture of abundance and 
infrastructure investments in Mega projects, the situation in Sudan is quite 
contrary. Sudan’s hydraulic mission is dependent on the surplus of unutilized 
land-water resources, not only from the Nile but also other surface, 
underground and rainwater. Gulf and Chinese financing support Dam 
improvements and erection, as well as irrigation infrastructure for large-scale 
projects. For Sudan, transnational investments represent an opportunity to 
generate foreign currency through maximum use of land-water resources to 
compensate for the lost oil revenue following separation with South Sudan. As 
indicated by President Bashir during his 2015 speech in Cairo, Sudan is trying 
to revive its vision as the breadbasket of the Arab World, depending on its 
land-water resources, along with gulf capital, and Egyptian agricultural 
expertise.   
 
Empirical evidence indicates that transnational investments in Sudan have 
significantly increased over the last decade. Egyptian as well as Arab GCC 
investments in Sudan entail several elements of regional politics including; 
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historical Egyptian-Sudanese hydropolitical relations, a water scarcity/food 
sovereignty narrative in the Arab region, a Saudi-Sudanese reward 
mechanism from participation in the war in Yemen. Overall, transnational 
investments in Sudan by both Egyptian and regional investors are often 
framed under the umbrella of Joint Arab Water and Food Security Strategy 
(Sudan-GCC-Arab nations), or Nile cooperation (especially Egypt and Sudan). 
 
From a water security perspective, Egyptian state investments in Sudan could 
be viewed as an extension of the hydraulic mission of the entrepreneurial state 
and frontier-making process to the transboundary level. Egyptian-Sudanese 
bilateral investments are established as joint economic projects for the mutual 
benefits from the basin’s land-water resources, often framed as an economic 
integration discourse. Furthermore, the state attempted to promote private 
sector engagement in Sudan through a number of transportation projects and 
trade corridors to facilitate investments with the southern neighbour. The 
Cairo-Cape Town Road is also a regional project aiming at increasing intra-
African trade. However, Egyptian State investments in Sudan have not yet 
materialized. Despite a long-standing discourse on Egyptian-Sudanese 
integration, experts and officials from both countries agree that joint projects 
and agricultural investments have not reached their desired goals. With a 
handful of attempts to establish joint projects in Sudan, many of these remain 
unachieved whereby the action on the ground is still negligible.  
 
On the other hand, the growing non-state actors’ LSLA in Sudan depending on 
Nile water can represent a risk in terms of water quotas. While transnational 
investments may depend on a variety of land and water resources, evidence 
indicates that surface water from the Nile plays a significant role in corporate 
farms. As indicated by (Interview #70) it is acceptable and necessary to 
anticipate larger impacts of transnational investments in Sudan on Nile 
transboundary hydropolitics, “since Sudan is already almost using its entire 
quota from the existing Nile agreement of 1959, and therefore any additional 
investments depending on surface water from the Nile will increase its water 
withdrawals and use” (Interview #70). In this respect, the research anticipates 
that the increase in the number and size of these investments, especially those 
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depending on Nile water for irrigation, may also have negative implications on 
Egyptian water security. 
 
This is especially more likely to happen with the completion of Ethiopia’s 
GERD as it will regulate the Nile flow in Sudan and allow for more irrigation 
of fertile lands throughout the year. For existing large public gravity schemes 
in Sudan GERD will: (i) make it possible to grow 2 or even 3 crops per year, 
(ii) dramatically reduce maintenance (dredging) costs because of the much 
lower sediment content of the irrigation water, and (iii) facilitate livestock 
rearing because fodder is now available all year round (Hillhorst 2015b). 
Hence, the GERD may result in higher profitability of farming operations in 
the existing gravity schemes and may influence future water allocation 
decisions in favor of the existing public schemes (with hundreds of thousands 
of farmers and their dependents) at the expense of the large-scale private 
operations further downstream on the Nile owned by foreign investors (Ibid; 
Interview #35; Interview #37). 
 
Consequently, this will make additional large-scale investments possible in 
new locations depending on the regulated flow of Nile water. Upstream-
downstream water allocations within Sudan and the amount of water reaching 
lake Nasser could be affected significantly. The hydropolitical implications of 
transnational land-water-investments in Sudan on Egyptian water security are 
still unclear but can be expected to increase tensions and competition for the 
economic and political use of land-water-resources across the Nile basin.  This 
is especially true given that the existing state-centric transboundary 
mechanisms such as the Nile basin initiative have not yet incorporated any 
guidelines to the participation of non-state actors in transnational 
investments in Nile riparian countries (Interviews #38; #40). An area of 
policy development, which deserves further attention, especially in relation to 
social and environmental risks.  
 
The question however remains whether transnational Investments in Sudan 
are Water Grabs or basin wide integration? Furthermore, it is unclear whether 
Egyptian state-to-state agricultural Investments in Sudan would be labeled as 
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water grabs, or whether they would fall under the umbrella of bilateral 
cooperation or larger regional arrangements such as the Nile Basin Initiative 
and upstream-downstream joint projects. The answer could probably be both. 
Transnational investments are indeed forms of economic/regional 
cooperation, especially to achieve Sudan’s vision of the “Breadbasket of the 
Arab World”. However they often result in water grabs for farmers, the state, 
as well as other downstream countries of the Nile basin.   
 
To summarize, despite being framed as a form of economic integration, 
Egyptian and Arab investments in Sudan have not reached their potential. In 
this respect, state-to-state investments are subject to larger geopolitical 
questions amongst Egypt and Sudan on the one hand, while on the other 
private investors (from Egypt and elsewhere) face a myriad of ‘executional’ 
challenges. In terms of Nile hydropolitics, Egyptian state and non-state land-
water investments in Sudan may entail different risks, opportunities, and 
uncertainties from an Egyptian water security perspective, and can be viewed 
as a variable, which can influence the hydraulic mission of the entrepreneurial 
state both positively and negatively. These investments however can represent 
a form of commodification of natural resources at the level of the river basin, 
leading to a form of water security mercantilism.  
 
8.5. From the hydraulic mission to water security mercantilism 
 
Based on the different categories of findings, the thesis of this dissertation 
argued that the engagement of non-state actors through transnational state-
capital alliances and land-water investments in farmlands abroad denotes a 
transition from the hydraulic mission towards water security mercantilism. 
That is, state-capital alliances frame the land-water-food nexus as a political-
economic commodity, primarily serving financial and strategic objectives for 
both state and non-state actors, while overlooking the largest water users.  
These practices reflect the very essence of “mercantilism’ known to serve 
primarily the generation of wealth and capital accumulation for the state and 
its allies.  
 
 
 
276 
Ironically however, while for the state investments represent opportunities for 
sector modernization based on the introduction of industrial agricultural 
production modes, these alliances have only served the interests of private 
investors. In Egypt, while the changing role of the ‘entrepreneurial’ state 
aimed at benefiting from the technological and capital endowments of 
international investors, transnational investments have not fulfilled its 
hydraulic mission nor resolve its ecological-demographic narrative of crisis. In 
Nile basin countries, particularly in Sudan, despite the weak materialization of 
investments, state-capital alliances also draw attention to the intersection of 
regional and resource politics towards the unachieved vision of ‘the 
breadbasket of the Arab World’. In both cases, these political economy 
dynamics founded on state-capital alliances left the hydraulic mission of the 
state unachieved. Transnational state-capital alliances have served primarily 
the financial and strategic mandates of investors, either by accessing land-
water resources for production of strategic crops to be sold in the local market 
(wheat sold to the state by the investors for profit!), or by exporting strategic 
crops to their home countries and international market which represents a 
form of water grabs, also for profit. In this respect, state-capital alliances re-
shape our understanding of water security, primarily to serve financial goals, 
instead of larger public goals, through a particular understanding of land-
water-food interdependencies depending on private interests. 
 
Hence state-capital alliances facilitate non-state actors’ mandate to achieve 
financial profit by accessing land-water resources in host (Nile basin) 
countries, potentially leading to intensifying competition to secure water 
amongst different water users, notably the farmers at the local level, and the 
riparian countries at the transboundary level. These patterns shed light on 
potential commercialization of land-water-food nexus and growing 
competition over land-water as strategic resources amidst inherent physical 
and political scarcity narratives and contestations within Egypt, the Nile 
basin, and the Middle East and North Africa region.  
 
Consequently, through water security mercantilism, private actors override 
the existing hydraulic mission of the state, and existing water governance 
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mechanisms (Conca 2006). These processes represent an emerging element in 
hydropolitical debates, beyond singular-scale state-centric views, towards a 
multi-level polycentric view of water security. Given land-water nexus politics 
associated with transnational investments, the understanding of Egyptian 
water security can be claimed to witness profound changes with implications 
on the state’s hydraulic mission, farmers livelihoods, as well as agricultural 
and virtual water trade within and outside the Nile basin.  
These elements combined represent new variables in the Egyptian water 
security equation and the larger context of the Nile basin, beyond state-centric 
hydropolitics. These state-capital interactions between different actors across 
multiple scales are critical for understanding change and continuity – and 
inevitable inconsistencies and contradictions – in the political constructions 
of water (Mosse & Sivan 2003). 
 
Implications on Nile Hydropolitics 
The acquisition of land-water resources by non-state actors for profit or larger 
strategic objective could have several implications on Egyptian water security 
and Nile hydropolitics. First, adopting capital and technological intensive 
business strategies, non-state actors gain a leveraging power in water politics 
which can influence both, state actors and existing water users locally, 
nationally, and on a transboundary level. Second, this engagement of non-
state actors in Nile hydropolitics takes place outside of the Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI), which leaves its role questioned in terms of inclusiveness of 
all stakeholders from within or outside the basin. The presence of investors 
and corporate actors in the NBI may be an important element in the 
sustainable use of the basin’s natural capital and resources. Third, the 
implications of the GERD filling and operation in light of the growing appetite 
for land-water investments should be further examined, specially where 
Sudan will become an attractive destination for transnational LWI. This 
aspect needs to be examined based on existing water quotas. Finally, the role 
of external actors such as China or other BRIC countries need to be explored 
further as the global race for land and water resources intensifies. These 
factors combined can further deepen the water mercantilism approach in the 
Nile basin. 
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Annex 1 
List of Fieldwork Interviews  
Interview 
Reference # Interviewee /Data Source Date/Location 
Interview # 1  Water and Agriculture NGO I /Academic 
Researcher 
November 17th, 2015 – Cairo  
Interview # 2 Water and Agriculture NGO I/Senior 
Water and Irrigation Specialist 
December 10th 2015 – Cairo  
Interview # 3 Water and Agriculture NGO II/ Activist November 11th 2015 - Cairo 
Interview # 4 Egypt Senior Policy Maker 1 October 13th & October 22nd 
2015 – Cairo  
Interview # 5 Egypt Senior Policy Maker 2 November 2015 
Interview # 6 Egypt Senior Policy Maker 3 March 15th, 2015 – Cairo  
Interview # 7 Egypt Senior Policy Maker 4 November 2016 
Interview # 8 Senior Advisor / think tank (quasi 
official)  
February 8th & June 4th 2015 
– Cairo  
Interview # 9 Egypt Government –Technical Officer 
Agriculture Research Centre (ARC) 
June 20th 2015 – Ministry of 
Agriculture - Cairo 
Interview # 10 Egypt Government Senior official MWRI 
Planning Sector  
September 28th, 2016 – 
Cairo - MWRI 
Interview # 11 Government Interview Foreign Affairs 1 February, 26th, 2016 – Cairo 
- MFA 
Interview # 12 Government Interview Foreign Affairs 2 September 14th, 2015 – 
Cairo  
Interview # 13 Egyptian-German Water Management 
Reform Program (WMRP) 
January 4th, 2016 – Cairo – 
Ministry of Agriculture  
Interview # 14 Sudan Senior Policy Maker August 30th, 2016 
Stockholm- Sweden 
Interview # 15 Ethiopia Senior Policy Maker September 1st, 2016, 
Stockholm- Sweden 
Interview # 16 Egypt Private Investor Agri 1 
Largest Solar-water pumping 
November 1st 2015 – Cairo  
Interview # 17 Egypt Private Investor Agri 2 November 22nd, 2015 – 
Cairo/field 
Interview # 18 Gulf Private Investor 3 in Egypt – senior 
Egyptian manager 
February 24th 2016 
Interview # 19 Gulf Private Investor 4 in Egypt - expat March 2nd, 2016 – Cairo 
Interview # 20 Gulf Private Investor 5 in Egypt - expat March 8th, 2016 – Al 
Salheya 
Interview # 21 Gulf Private Investor 6 in Egypt - senior 
Egyptian manager 
March 13th, 2016 – Al 
Nubareya 
Interview # 22 Egypt domestic Private Investor 7 March 17th, 2016 – Al 
Nubareya 
Interview # 23 Egypt-Africa Private Equity Fund 1 November 5th 2015 – Cairo  
Interview # 24 Egypt-Africa X CEO Private Equity Fund 
- Sudan Investment 2 
June 10th 2015 – Cairo 
Interview # 25 Egypt-Africa Private Equity Fund – 
Investment Officer – South Sudan 1 
April 2015 - Cairo  
Interview # 26 Egyptian private sector agricultural 
investor in Sudan (small/medium) 
January 10th 2015 – Cairo  
Interview # 27 Sudanese large-scale Private Sector 
Investor in Sudan 
December 13th 2016 – 
Khartoum  
Interview # 28a Senior FAO Specialist February 4th, 2015 – FAO 
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office Cairo 
Interview # 28b Senior FAO Specialist October 25, 2015 –  FAO 
office Cairo 
Interview # 29 FAO Investment Officer – Near East and 
North Africa 
October 25, 2015 –  FAO 
office Cairo  
Interview # 30 FAO Water Scarcity Initiative – Near 
East and North Africa 
April 6th, 2016 - – FAO office 
Cairo 
Interview # 31 COMESA February 8th, 2015 – Cairo  
Interview # 32 Principal Irrigation Officer – Regional 
Development Bank 
March 5th, 2015 – Cairo – 
African Environmental 
Ministerial Conference  
Interview # 33 Land Matrix December 11th, 2014; March 
23rd, 2015 – email and 
skype 
Interview # 34 Specialised Egyptian Consulting Firm 
Feasibility Studies Mega Projects and 
Infrastructure  
December 8th, 2015 – Cairo  
Interview # 35 Dutch Consulting Firm January 20th, 2015 – 
Skype/email 
Interview # 36 USAID Egypt Water and Agriculture 
Specialist 
June 2nd 2016 
Cairo  
Interview # 37 Sudan and Water Specialist Academic - 
Arab Gulf University               (Gam3et Al 
Khaleej Al Arabi) 
March 4th 2015 – League of 
Arab States – Cairo  
Interview # 38 NBI Secretariat 1 Skype 2015 
Interview # 39 NBI ENTRO September 2016 Stockholm 
Interview # 40 NBI Secretariat 2 – Executive Director December 2016 Khartoum 
Interview # 41 Sudanese Civil Society / Activist August, 30th 2016 
Stockholm- Sweden 
Interview # 42 Egypt Journalist 1 – Reporter Water and 
Nile issues 
September 2nd, 2016 
Stockholm- Sweden 
Interview # 43 Egypt Journalist 2 – Reporter Water and 
Nile issues 
September 2nd 2016, 
Stockholm- Sweden 
Interview # 44 Int'l Water Law Expert September 1st 2016, 
Stockholm- Sweden 
Interview # 45 Uganda civil Society September 2nd 2016, 
Stockholm- Sweden 
Interview # 46 ODI/Egypt & Water Specialist December 3rd, 2014 - Skype 
Interview # 47 PhD Researcher Sudan August 4th, 2015 – Skype 
Interview # 48 Financial and Natural Resources 
Research Fellow – MENA region 
February 26th 2015 - skype 
Interview # 49 Academic/Sudan Specialist March 11th, 2015 - Skype 
Interview # 50 PhD Researcher Mega Projects  August 2nd 2015 & November 
26th 2015 - Skype 
Interview # 51 Academic / Research Expert Egypt US 
based 
June 1st 2016 - Skype 
Interview # 52 Professor / Research Expert Egypt US 
based 
September 1st 2015 - Skype 
Interview # 53 SIWI September 30th, 2014 – 
Skype/email 
Interview # 54 Al Salheya water user/ Site Interview March, 2016 - Kassara 
Interview # 55 Al Salheya water user/ Site Interview March, 2016 – Kassara 
Interview # 56 Al Salheya water user/ Site Interview March, 2016 - Kassara 
Interview # 57 Al Salheya water user/ Site Interview March, 2016 - Kassara 
Interview # 58 Al Salheya water user/ Site Interview March, 2016 Kassara 
Interview # 59 Al Salheya water user/ Site Interview March, 2016 Kassara 
Interview # 60 Al Salheya water user/ Site Interview March, 2016 Kassara 
Interview # 61 Al Salheya water user/ Site Interview March, 2016 Kassara 
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Interview # 62 Al Salheya Site Interview March, 2016 Kassara 
Interview # 63 Al Salheya Site Interview March, 2016 Kassara 
Interview # 64 Al Nubareya Site Interview March, 2016– Al Nubareya 
Interview # 65 Al Nubareya Site Interview March, 2016– Al Nubareya 
Interview # 66 Al Nubareya Site Interview March, 2016– Al Nubareya 
Interview # 67 Al Nubareya Site Interview March, 2016– Al Nubareya  
Interview # 68 Al Nubareya Site Interview March, 2016 – Al Nubareya 
Interview # 69 Al Nubareya Site Interview March, 2016 – Al Nubareya 
Interview # 70 Interview Australian Academic and 
Water Expert  
Kigali October 2017 
Interview #71 Interview IFPRI November 11th, 2014 - Skype 
Interview #72 Senior World Bank Expert / Academic 
Sudan 
Khartoum December 12th 
2016  
Field Notes and Official Meetings  
Meeting Notes # 1 Sustainable Consumption and 
Production Action Plan Water Sector I  
 
 
June 21st, 2015 - Meeting in 
Ministry of Environment  
(note: Meetings 1 to  6) 
Senior Policy Makers 
WorkGroup Meeting under 
Switchmed-UNEP SDG) 
Meeting Notes # 2 Sustainable Consumption and 
Production Action Plan Agriculture 
Sector I 
Meeting in Ministry of 
Environment – July 5th 2015 
Meeting Notes # 3 Sustainable Consumption and 
Production Action Plan Energy Sector I 
Meeting in Ministry of 
Environment – June 21st 
2015 
Meeting Notes # 4 Sustainable Consumption and 
Production Action Plan Water Sector II 
Meeting in Ministry of 
Environment – June 24th 
2015 
Meeting Notes # 5 Sustainable Consumption and 
Production Action Plan Agriculture 
Sector II 
Meeting in Ministry of 
Environment – August 24th 
2015 
Meeting Notes # 6 Consumption and Production Action 
Plan Energy Sector II 
Meeting in Ministry of 
Environment  - August 19th 
2015 
Meeting Notes # 7 GIZ-League of Arab States Nexus 
Roundtable – Arab Region 
March 4th 2015 – League of 
Arab States – Cairo  
Meeting Notes # 8 Nile COMESA Meeting Meeting in Cairo May 28th 
2016 
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Annex 2 
 
Infrastructure Investments by the Entrepreneurial State 
 Toshka East 
Oweinat 
North Sinai 
Area 
 
540,000 feddan 
 
500,000 
feddan 
620,000 feddan 
 
Water supply ▪ Mubarak pump station : 24 pumps  
▪ El-Sheikh Zaied Canal : main 
Canal of length 52 Km ,divided into 
four branches 40 Km. each . 
▪ Irrigation water free from waste 
with degree of salinity 200 particles 
per million . 
▪  7 wells /each well irrigates 30-50 
feddan with degree of salinity 
between 600-800 particles per 
million 
Wells, by 
using 
pivotal 
irrigation 
systems . 
 
▪ El-Salam Canal 
crossing to Sinai 
through four tunnels 
underneath the Suez 
Canal ,with length 
extending 87 Km 
inside the peninsula. 
▪ El-Sheikh Gaber 
Canal,175 Km. 
length inside Sinai.  
Electricity Power grid available 
+ 20 MW solar power station (only 
inaugurated in November 2017)/ prior 
to that, investors complained from 
reliability of access to electricity 
Not 
specified 
Grid  
Roads Roads connect Toshka to Aswan (200 
km) and Abu Simble Airport (50 Km) 
and 700 Km from Safaga Maritime 
Port. 
Airport 
East 
Owainat 
6,000 Km. roads and 
railway project with 
unclear status 
Cost of 
infrastructure 
The Government paid L.E 5,780 million 
on infrastructure as follows: 
Pumps station L.E 1,480 million; El-
Sheikh Zaied Canal L.E 4,000 million; 
high voltage transforming station and 
connection grid L.E 300 million. 
Not 
specified 
Not specified 
Cost of land 
and services 
▪ Price of feddan: L.E 50  
▪ Price of water : 16 cents /m3 
▪ Infrastructure / feddan : L.E. 12-15 
thousand.  
▪ Operational costs: L.E 350 
▪ Electricity :3.4 cents / K.W .H 
  
(Source: Unpublished GAFI data) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3. Compiled Table GCC Investments in Nile Basin 
 
Location 
Investor / 
Home 
Country 
Water Source Production Size 
(ha) 
Potential 
Size 
[ha] 
Crop Comments 
Egypt / 
Sharq Al Oweinat 
Jenaan  
UAE 
Underground water / 
great Nubian Sand 
Aquifer 
Exact production size 
not know but is large; 
20,000  
 
Wheat  
 
Water is pumped from the Nubian 
Sandstone Aquifer; wheat production 
for local markets  
Egypt/ 
Toshka 
Al Rajhi  
KSA 
Nile Water / Lake 
Nasser  
6,300 42,000 Wheat 
Alfa alfa 
 
Egypt/  
Al Salheya 
Al Dahra UAE Nile Water/Ismailia 
Canal 
3,200 4500 Wheat 
Alfa alfa 
Citrus 
 
Egypt/ Al 
Nubareya 
Al Dahra UAE Nile Water/Nasr Canal + 
underground water  
300 300 Citrus   
Egypt/ Toshka Al Dahra UAE Nile Water / Lake 
Nasser 
20,000 1oo,ooo Wheat 
Alfa alfa 
 
Egypt/ Sharq Al 
Oweinat 
Al Dahra UAE Underground water / 
great Nubian Sand 
Aquifer 
15,000 50,000 Wheat 
Alfa alfa 
 
Sudan /Berber Al Rajhi Int. 
Investment 
/KSA 
Underground water  3,800  
 
20,492  
 
Fodder/Fo
od Crops 
Operated by Masstock UK  
Sudan /Zayed al 
Khair; Wad 
Raway 
 
 
Al Anhar / UAE  Blue Nile Water 5,200 16,800   
Project is visible on Google Earth 
Sudan/ 
Al Heemrat  
Al Dahra UAE  - 34,802  project implementation has been 
postponed until further notice 
 
 
304 
(interview with Al Dahra executive) 
Sudan / Al 
Dabbah  
Jenaan / UAE water is sourced from 
the Nubian Sandstone 
Aquifer; 
2,000 31,100  Projects operated by Suidwes 
Agriculture (RSA); 
Sudan / Wadi 
Hamed 
Hassad Food 
Corporation / 
Qatar 
NA NA 101,172  Project funded through funds 
allocated by GoQ for Sudan; 
electricity shortages are 
delaying project 
implementation  
 
Sudan/Wadi 
Hamid 
GLB 
Invest/Lebanon 
 ~2,000 87,200 fodder Project visible on Google Earth; recent 
website: www.glbinvest.com 
Sudan/Kosti Citadel Capital / 
Qalaa 
Holding/Egypt 
Nile water 7,000 131,000 fodder Sabina 
Source: Author compilations based on (Hillhorst 2015b; Hillhorst 2015a; Landmatrix 2015)
 
